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ABSTRACT
Organizational Management of New Knowledge:
A Case Study of A State Bureaucracy
by
N. J. Fenwick
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies
and Planning on November 12, 1975 in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy
This case study of the medical division of a state welfare department
examines the organizational management of new knowledge and the concept of
a learning organization. Knowledge is broadly defined to include not only
new information, but also the set of events triggered by the entry of that
information into the organization, while new is defined by the inclusion
of that which is perceived by organizational members to be outside their
routine performance.
Current descriptive models of organizational change by which new
knowledge is introduced are examined. These include two prime models:
the "crisis" and "guerilla" models, both of which, while partially effec-
tive, tend to be widely disruptive of the organization and create lasting
frustrations and antagonisms. The resultant changes tend to wither away,
thus necessitating a reactivation of either of the models. New models
developed in response to this situation are examined and a basic underlying
thrust towards the concept of organizational learning is uncovered.
The author here defines organizational learning to be the development
of patterns of response to new knowledge in a manner which is not perceived
as wasteful of energy, time or other resources, but which has both signifi-
cant and lasting effects. This definition is elaborated in the study to
include six possible levels of learning. These levels also serve as cri-
teria by which putative learning organizations can be evaluated. The
levels include:
1) learning new tasks and an associated development
of new policies
2) learning to routinize those tasks and policies
over time
3) learning general principles which can be used
to improve task performance or which are trans-
ferred to other task areas
4) developing general patterns of action or
"programs" of behavior which permit the
generation of new tasks or principles
5) developing overall approaches for the learn-
ing of those principles and patterns
6) learning (or changing) the organization's
paradigm.
The studied organization, a 40-member central office division of a
large welfare bureaucracy, administered a program of medical care for
the poor. That division was examined via a detailed exploration of
fifteen situations of new knowledge and was evaluated using the above
criteria. Within the space of two years the organization developed such
that it successfully met these criteria for a learning organization.
Neither the crisis or guerilla models nor the more normative models
were found to be useful in accounting for this success. Rather, a model
based on both teaching and management and on the evocation of an organiza-
tional paradigm were found to be the main sources of the division's effec-
tiveness. Competent management of routine activity was found to have
created a basic credibility with the division's environment such that the
division was given breathing room to explore new task areas. These new
areas were entered with a sense of organizational confidence created by the
same management style and the organization's strong paradigm - a "responsible
buyer" (of health care services for the poor). Explicit principles and tacit
patterns of action were then developed through the use of a teaching style
which prospered because of a unique agency head and competent staff members.
These sources of effectiveness were found to be different from the con-
ventional change models in a) their basic pragmatism, b) an emphasis on ends
at the expense of means, c) an explicit focus on the organizational paradigm,
d) a tolerance of a diversity of styles, and e) a balance between an emphasis
on the teaching of new principles and an emphasis on responsibility and
accountability aspects associated with routine performance. Nonetheless,
the division's learning model was found to have certain costs associated
with it, principally an avoidance of internal advocacy of dissenting positions.
The division's model was also examined from the point of view of its
durability and possible transfer to other organizational situations. The
division's success in creating a learning organization combined with the
problematic conclusions regarding its durability and transferability lead
the author to conclude that the achievement of the fifth and sixth criteria
(including transformation of the organizational style or even its paradigm)
as necessary conditions of organizational learning is an excessively stringent
criterion. A more flexible and less rigorous definition of a learning organiza-
tion is thus posited, one in which organizations need achieve the six successive
levels of learning only in accordance with general environmental demands.
Thesis Supervisor: Donald A. Schon
Title: Ford Professor of Urban Studies
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1. Introduction
This study is concerned with the manner in which organizations
manage, mismanage or fail to manage new knoweldge either generated
from within or injected from the organization's environment. The
rationale for choosing such a topic is the current helplessness felt
by both academicians and practitioners in finding solutions to the
problem of making organizations, particularly government bureaucracies,
responsive to new knowledge in a manner which will have significant
and lasting effects.
In the study, I have chosen to approach these themes in a delib-
erately broad manner. Thus, in "new knowledge" I would include all
that which is perceived by the organization members as new - that is,
outside their routine behavior patterns. This new knowledge might
range from a complete new technology (e.g., a caseload versus a
functional technology for social workers) to a specific new procedure
for job performance; from new attitudes about employees' jobs to new
strategies for goal attainment or even new goals and organization's
definition of their mission (their paradigm). "Responsive" indicates
that the organization had in fact developed a pattern for responding
to those sorts of new knowledge in a manner which is not perceived
as wasteful of energy, money, time or other resources. Significant
areas of responsiveness might include broad transformation of the
organization's mission or paradigm, but could also include, for example,
development of new approaches to learning or even adoption of important
working principles. Lasting effects (i.e., some degree of durability)
would require that there be some consequences of those patterns beyond
the initial success in responding to new knowledge.
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Thus the prime question asked in this study is: can organizations,
in situations where their environment expects or mandates a response,
develop effective methods of managing new knowledge. And, if so, can
they do so without excessive disruption of the performance of their
routine activities;and can such a learning style be maintained over
appropriate periods of time.
Current descriptive organizational theory suggests that organiza-
tional responses to uew knowledge occur in one of two ways. The first,
as described by Crozier and Downs, for example, suggests that typical
management of new knowledge derives out of a crisis situation in order
to implement an idea or program publicly deemed to be"in good currency"
and is accomplished by a massive and sudden injection of resources into
the organization.
Downs, in his earthy and descriptive work, suggests as "laws"
that all organizations (and individuals in them) tend to become more
conservative as they become older, unless they experience periods
of very rapid growth or internal turnover. He also suggests that no
one can ever fully control a large organization and that even this
partial control becomes weaker and internal coordination poorer as
the organization gets larger, even leading - in some cases - to direct
counteractions by some organization officials. Such officials tend
to distort information upward, are biased in favor of programs they
personally favor, and act upon orders only to the degree that it will
further their own interests. Downs elaborates considerably, but the
vision he presents can only be seen as pessimistic to advocates of
organizational change, no matter how realistic it may sound to those
millions who have toiled in government bureaucracies.
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Crozier has also developed an interesting theory of how these
"vicious circles of bureaucracy" develop. He describes how bureaucrats
tend to "escape from the reality" (of uncertainty) to preserve their
-own autonomy. The only tools the brganization has to counteract this
escape - development of rules, centralization of decisions, and strata
isolation - tend to form a vicious circle, since their failure leads
to pressure to extend them rather than abandon them. Ability to change
them recedes upward and even top management becomes impotent except
in situations of crisis or when tacit assumption is made by a majority
of the organization's members that "the rules" will be suspended while
the organization adjusts.
These and other authors describe how a massive and sudden injection
of resources into the organization is required to change these situations.
Yet this approach to change is seen to be disruptive of routine activities
and wasteful of both energy and resources, since most organizations fight
to remain the same - they are "dynamically conservative" (Schon).
A second approach to change less commonly observed but well des-
cribed by Schon, Rogers, Burns, Stoffer and even Merton and others is
based upon activity by organizational "guerillas" and "insurgents"
(who may also be called "deviants", "zealots", or "misfits"). They
are usually mid-level persons in the organization but occasionally bureau
heads. They aggressively fight for change and support for their ideas,
all the while disrupting the organization and, after burning themselves
out, leave the agency. The organization then continues, often struc-
turally unchanged and often backsliding into its former pattern of
rigidity. While the disruption has not been as great as in the first
approach, the reform or change is often short-lived and a legacy of
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antagonism towards future guerillas or,more importantly,change itself,
has usually been created.
Normative responses to these two descriptive theories of organiza-
tional change have been many. The "technologists" and management
scientists (J.D. Thompson, J.R. Galbraith, Beers, etc.) have suggested
the importance of developing formal structures based on the specific
technologies needed, and of utilizing planning, project management,
PBBS and other sophisticated tools for the smooth integration of both
new and routine information. Thompson and Galbraith, for example,
have suggested (in two separate works) that all organizations deal
with new information in what might be viewed as a tendency towards
certainty or a re-establishment of stability. They first establish
rules, then a hierarchy (Thompson calls this pooled interdependence
and links it to a specific kind of technology, as he does with his
other types of interdependence), then establish a planning system
(to manage Thompson's "sequential interdependence"). The two authors
go further to show how some organizations may passively deal with new
information by "buffering" or creating slack and by changing or isolating
the core technology so the med for interaction is lessened. Or they
may actively deal with new knowledge by changing the "vertical system",
that is adding assistants, computers or early warning systems and even
spies who can assure the adequate flow of knowledge up and down the
structure and who can take corrective action to forecast, level or
ration resources. They may also actively deal with new information by
improving lateral relations (to deal with Thompson's"reciprocal inter-
dependence")with committees, liaison staff or project managers.
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The human relations and organizational development school (Likert,
McGregor, Bennis, Argyris, etc.) has stressed the importance of personal
growth and competence in organizational management of, or adaptation to
change. This school advocates flat organizational hierarchies, decen-
tralied control, few rules, combined with open, trusting, and honest
organizational members who develop a shared understanding of organiza-
tional purposes. They participate in group problem solving and
decision-making and rely heavily on coordination and liaison activities
to both probe the environment and to follow up on task completion. More
sophisticated members of this school (e.g. Argyris, Schon and Vickers)
have begun to draw from other fields and have advanced notions of
"learning organizations" in which the organization, through a variety
of as yet mainly unexplored means, but including the human resources
techniques and the principles of individual learning, will learn to
change itself without the disruptive effects inherent in the "guerilla
and insurgent" theories.
The environmentalists (Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Wilson, Vickers,
etc.) have suggested the importance of developing sound relationships
between the organization and its environment. For example, Lawrence
and Lorsch have shown that the performance of businesses in responding
to the uncertainty of their environments is strongly related to the
various manners in which they differentiate their task structures and
to their success in integrating these tasks through a variety of struc-
tural and personnel devices. Others concentrating on government have
stressed that bureaucracies must knowingly derive power from their
environment and exercise it in response to that environment.
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More recent work by a variety of authors (Perrow, 1967, Lawrence
and Lorsch, 1969, etc.) have stressed a contingency appraach in which
structures, technologies and organizational development styles for
organizational change vary depending both on the complexity and cer-
tainty of the environment andspecific mixes of internal factors such
as organizational history and personnel.
Central to all these alternative normative theories, however,
is the implication that organizations designed in such ways can become
"learning organizations". That is, not only can they accomplish
their tasks effectively, but they can improVe their task performance
over time, develop specific patterns and approaches for improving
this performance and, more importantly, even change the nature of
their tasks in response to externally or internally generated infor-
mation or knowledge. Such organizations would act without the disruptive
and inefficient effects said to be inherent (Downs, Bennis) in the
crisis or guerilla models.
As one author asks- "Is it possible for organizations to be con-
tinually adapting to both environmental changes and changes among
their individual contributors? By what processes can this be accom-
plished?" (Lawrence). Another (Schon) states that "we must become able
to not only transform our institutions in response to changing siutations
and requirements; we must invent and develop institutions which are
learning systems, that is to say, systems capable of bringing about their
own continuing transformation." This normative call for a "learning
organization" is a powerful one and is why I have chosen that. framework
of analysis as a basic departure point. It is also why I have chosen
to call the raw material of such an organization new knowledge, since
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it seems only approrpiate that a learning organization be one which
processes or manages knowledge. The broad definition of new knowledge
suggested on page 6 thus includes not only the initial awareness, con-
tributed from outside or from within, that new elements could be
added to the organization's repertoire of behaviors but also the
succeeding patterns and methods of responding to that initial event.
A learning organization would thus be one which effectively manages
(according to my earlier suggestion) not only that initial awareness
but the succeeding behaviors it triggers. Since my definition of new
knowledge is a broad one, one which might but might not include a new
paradigm, then the importance of a change of organizational paradigm
implied in "continuing transformation" is one which should remain
open to investigation.
Not only should we be open on such particular points but the
whole learning organization framework of analysis, while useful as a
departure point, must be further tested in practice and its basic
concepts more thoroughly examined. Actual experience with such "learning
organizations" has generally been limited, usually to organizations very
specifically designed with learning in mind, such as some research and
development bodies. And upon closer examination of other putative
learning organizations, one of the two conventional models (the crisis
or guerilla pattern) is more often found to be at work (e.g., Burns and
Stalker, Nelkin). Nonetheless, idealists argue that such learning
organizations must be designed and extensively, if not universally,
implanted; otherwise, our complex organization-based society will
perish via "dry rot" (Gardner).
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Others also assert the need for such organizations but stress that
they may only be necessary at certain times in an organization's life
cycle or in certain environmental situations. That is, when an organiza-
tion's environment is continuously stable and where routine tasks are
called for (e.g., a Department of Motor Vehicles), the organization
may not need to be a learning organization; there are no, and would
likely not be, any societal requirements for it to acquire new tasks
or to significantly change the way it performed its existing tasks.
Other organizations, particularly research and planning organizations,
may need to be learning organizations throughout their lives. Another
large group of organizations - probably including most government
bureaucracies offering direct services to the public - need only have
the capacity to learn when the environment requires it to change the
mix of its routine/non-routine tasks. In general, however, these
questions about the necessary scope of learning organizations fuse
with the earlier questions about what learning organizations might,
or should look like and how they might be designed and managed.
2. Focusing the Study
This study is a case study of one particular bureacracy, one chosen
as a medium size, stable and entrenched government agency not obviously
subject to either the crisis or guerilla patterns of change described on
page 7. The reason for selecting a specific organization is that I
believe the vocabulary for discussing organizational learning is so
rudimentary that a more exploratory approach is called for in which
practical and conceptual frameworks different from these two predominant
models can be developed.
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Specifically I will try to develop a method of understanding
the relationship between different kinds of new knowledge and the
organization's management of its various systems of behavior.
The analysis begins (Chapter II) by examining the organization's
task structures, its personnel/career systems, its technological
system and its political system (a very useful classification
suggested by both Price and Burns and Stalker), but concludes by
focusing on how the agency managed these systems with tools which
cut across each of them. While I have many personal notions about
such management and have been influenced by a wide range of authors,
it is not my purpose here to test in an experimental fashion any one
particular hypothesis about the manner in which organizations manage
new knowledge but rather to understand how one organization does so,
and, from that, to generate definitions of what learning might be
in that case, evaluate whether and how that organization achieved it,
and describe any limits of that learning, or of the manner in which
it was achieved.
The organization chosen was the medical division of a state welfare
department. While a part of a larger organization, the division was seen,
by its members, by the welfare department's members, and by the otuside
environment as being a distinct and separate organization. The division
was responsible for administering the federally supported Medicaid pro-
gram which financed health service delivery for welfare clients. The
division (and the program) was begun in 1968 and grafted onto a 1500
member welfare bureaucracy acknowledged to be one of the most unmanageable
and resistant to change in the state by both the legislature and cabinet
level officials. By 1973 the division had a staff of 22 persons and
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adminstered a program which purchased over $300 million worth of
medical care. It relied on other divisions of the department to carry
out many of its functions (particularly on the local level) and was
constrained by many other state and federal agencies in its policy
development. In 1973, after the assistant commissionership of the
division (its head position and a political appointment) had been
vacant for eight months, a new head was appointed. Over two years
he doubled the staff, created new programs, increased the agency's
monitoring capacity and watched the service budget double. The
division's external credibility with members of its environment
improved considerably and the new head stated that "we're building
a learning organization here", one that presumably would manage
new knowledge effectively and perhaps even efficiently.
I have asserted that the vocabulary for discussing organizational
learning is so rudimentary that survey type analysis, quantitative
analysis or comparative analysis are inappropriate for the research
question I have posed. What is needed in such areas of uncertainty
is, as Rhenman states, the development of a "language for describing
unique cases" (as, for example, Freud and Keynes so compellingly
developed) rather than comprehensive generalizations in a shifting
world "beyond the stable state" (Schon). Therefore my initial res-
ponsibility here is to be rich in the telling of this story about
one (putative) learning organization, thus permitting the reader to
determine how that language and the concepts developed may be useful
in his own situation.
But this initial responsibility of vocabulary development is not
the only task suggested by the study. The simple effects of demonstrating
that a possible alternative to the crisis and guerilla models, or to more
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normative theories existsare also significant. Similarly, a con-
sideration of the possible limits of that model, not only inherent
lfbmits but also limits which might only become apparent over time
or through application to other situations, will be helpful to the
reader.
3. Initial Conceptual Development
After observing the organization for several months, it became
clear that the many calls for learning organizations (pg. 11), were
overly general and that more specific criteria which would define
a learning organization must be sketched out. Bateson's work on
the levels of learning seemed useful not only in its use of levels,
but also because of the suggested systemtaic relationship between
levels. I thus attempted to define several rough, successive levels
of learning by which the organization could be evaluated. Those
levels included:
1) learning to perform the organization's routine tasks
2) learning new tasks and an associated development of
new policies
3) learning to routinize those tasks and policies over
time
4) learning general principles which could be used either
to improve task performance or which could be trans-
ferred to other new task areas
5) developing general patterns or "programs" of behavior
for approaching new task areas
6) developing overall methods for the learning of those
principles and patterns, and finally
7) learning (or changing) the organization's paradigm.
-16-
The attainment of each of these levels by the organization would
thus indicate the degree to which that organization had become a
learning organization. Reaching only, say, the initial levels, would
indicate simply that the organization was learning to a lesser degree.
The criteria for evaluating a putative learning organization are thus
encompassed in the working definition. The significance of this
working definition of a learning organization lies in the use of levels.
Thus earlier, more global definitions of a learning organization (as,
for example, that it must be able to change its paradigm) are replaced
here by a definition which is somewhat more flexible. I will later
suggest that the degree to which any organization need meet these
criteria is determined basically by environmental forces.
These are the main criteria which will be utilized throughout
chapters III through V in describing and evaluating the types of
learning which take place within a specific organization. Not all
these levels will have the same importance in the development
of the study. For example, the first level of learning (learning to
perform the organization's routine tasks) is adequately covered by
other management literature and will not be stressed here. Thus, the
level of learning new tasks and policies will constitute the first
level for dealing with new knowledge in this study. Also, the impor-
tance of an overall approach to learning (levels 6 and possibly 7)
and details of the development of such an approach were not clearly
understood at the commencement of the study. Nor was the significance
of the criterion of the changeability of the organization's paradigm.
-17-
These upper level criteria and their significance in the definition
of a learning organization are thus more fully assessed at the
conclusion of the study. The discussion in Chapters VI and VII
of their utility in describing this one situation, and more importantly,
their application to other organizations, must also be assessed by
the reader of the study. But I believe that these upper level cri-
teria are reasonable ones to be applied to organizations managing new
knoweldge even though they may be met only infrequently.
It would, of course, have been relatively simple to construct a
much more elaborate and theoretical conceptual schema here before
commencing the study. But my definition of levels of learning
and their attendant criteria for evaluation have been influenced by:
1) the belief that learning is a process and that
evaluations of putative learning organizations
must be geared to uncovering processes (e.g., the
teaching and management approaches) rather than to
an adherence to more rigid criteria;
2) the need for clear and simple concepts which can be
recognized by, and whose embodied realities are access-
ible to, members of the organization and its environ-
ment; and
3) the somewhat normative views of the researcher.
The working definition of learning will thus be tested in the main
chapters of the text - does it adequately define learning, what are
the consequences of those levels of learning and how useful is the
definition and the language accompanying it for uncovering processes
of.learning which are understandable by, and accessible to, both
practicing managers and researchers.
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4. Methodology
While the organization chosen was not as stable and entrenched as
I had originally envisaged and became more politically visible over
the course of two years, it was based within two conservative and
unmanageable systems (welfare and health care delivery). I had also
not desired to study a "strong leader" agency, but the high competency
of the agency staff convinced me that other features than those stressed
by the management folklore about strong leaders would be present. And
finally, I had no real practical choice as the chosen organization was
the only one whihc would permit my methodology, that of participant
observer, to function. For a year and a half, I was employed as a
full-time member of the organization, responsible for a particular
medical program.
This employment period meant that an arbitrary cutoff date had
to be imposed even though in some of the cases, it became evident
that an assessment of the division's learning (or not) would probably
change over time. Thus the time period covered in the text is limited
to that between the summer of 1973 and March of 1975.
During that time I examined some fifteen cases of new knowledge
management within the division. A "case" was defined as the set of
actions and decisions triggered by the initial knowledge that a new
response was called for. These cases were triggered by new knowledge
ranging from how to punish violators of the agency's regulations, to
how to develop new medical policies,to how to deal with other state
agencies and bureaucrats around specific programs. All these cases
were new to the agency although not all were new in any societal sense.
That is, many of the situations had previously been confronted by other
health agencies or other states. But each case called for a response
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not previously called for and was thus deemed by the researcher and
confirmed by staff members to be outside the organization's routine
activity. These 15 cases, along with an equal number of new situa-
tions not examined here in detail, probably accounted for approximately
20% of the agency's time, the rest being consumed in routine functions.
(See Chapter II.)
The selection of appropriate cases to examine was the first method-
ological problem faced. A random selection was first made but this
proved unfruitful since they turned out to be of such a widely varied
nature that no consistency could be determined in their development,
despite the fact that staff members and I felt there were significant
recurrent patterns. A search for patterns was signficant since the
conceptual framework detailed above included both the generation and
use of principles in varied but not too varied situations (level 3)
and the development of relatively consistent programs of behavior
(level 4). Thus the criginally randomly selected seven cases were
enlarged to 15 in three quite definite streams of activity - involving
five cases of new medical services development, five cases of provider-
monitoring activity and five cases of the division's internal adminis-
tration. The three streams of activity were thus selected in order
to provide three sets of cases of a similar nature for which tests
for the achievement- of levels 3 and 4 could be applied. Within each
stream, the cases were selected randomly except for their arrangement
in a time sequence. A time sequence was necessary since any criteria
which would be developed to determine if levels 3 and 4 had been
achieved would necessarily include the transfer of principles over time
and the development in time of a pattern for approaching new areas.
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This method of choosing cases presented the inherent possibility that
I was choosing cases in order to confirm developing hypotheses. How-
ever, the study results indicated that my original (after the develop-
ment of the first seven cases) observations about the content and style
of the organization's learning were not so much confirmed or denied,
but rather more fully differentiated and that a wider variety of ex-
planatory factors needed to be added. For example, that the study
organization willfully ignored certain new areas was early on confirmed,
but only later explained by examining it's chief administrator's
particular view on cost effectiveness and only later elaborated by the
observation that areas the agency head truly felt committed to, the
organization would not ignore. Finally, after two years from the
initial date of employment, a full body of 15 cases was available to
which the rough criteria of learning could be applied.
During that period I had wide access to the agency and kept a
daily diary of events. I was also able to observe many meetings in
which I was not legitimately involved through my professional res-
ponsibilities. Also, most documents and records concerned were avail-
able to me. But the most important method of data collection was in
personal interviews with staff members. Over 100 interviews (of an
hour or more in length) were conducted to determine the facts of each
particular case of new knowledge, how that new knowledge had entered
the agency's consciousness, what members' perceptions about it were
and how the responses to it were generated. In addition, over 25
persons outside the division were interviewed.
This reliance on interviews as the main method of data collection
necessitated that the data be confirmed as much as possible by several
means. The 25 persons outside the division were used to confirm much
-21-
of the data, as was considerable use of records and documents and my
personal observations. With both division members and the outsiders,
a consistent case history was built up by successive interviewing and
re-interviewing until no new or conflicting relevant data appeared to
be forthcoming. Each case required from a minimum of four to a maximum
of twelve interviews, in addition, of course, to considerable reliance
on my own observations and records and documents. While the need to
acquire consistent interview data which would indicate the division's
acquisition (or not) of the first four levels of learning was great,
less rigorous data for determining how (levels 6 and 7 on page 16)
the division may have met these levels was accepted, since at the
outset of the study I had fewer preconceived nations about such levels
and was willing to accept a wide pool of ideas from anyone who had
insight into the organization.
The basic method of data collection presented several real problems.
There was the obvious problem of being swamped by the data I had accu-
mulated ("knowing too much") and of not "seeing" other data since I
was a member of the organization. I attempted to minimize these by
regular testing of the plausability of my conclusions with my academic
colleagues and, to a limited extent, with the division's members and
the 25 outside respondents. Complete feedback from the participants
(i.e., showing them drafts of material) was not possible since some
of the material was either confidential or pot antially disruptive and
injurious to the working relations of the agency. It was necessary
to overcome this by somewhat generalized feedback, usually oral and
usually non-specific and non -accusatory with staff members. In addition,
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when the generation of the learning framework on page 16 was solidified
after the first seven cases, specific data was gathered in order to
determine if criteria for reaching those learning levels had been met;
thus much irrelevant data could be eliminated. A second problem was
that data gathering by taping was not possible since I regretfully
assessed that this would hinder most staff members' ability to respond
openly. For both these reasons the identity of the agency has been
concealed and the names of all participants disguised. Finally, in
order to gain much needed perspective, it was necessary to take a
leave from the division as the final conclusions were generated.
Despite all these problems, the participant observer method,
particularly in this organization, led to some very rich data, certainly
usually unobtainable by other means. The whole organization operated
out of one single block of offices and was easily observable by any
one person who could gain access to it. The staff members developed a
considerable relationship of trust with the researcher and were very
candid and open about their behavior. Similarly, the agency head, while
also trusting the researcher, believed that people know their own
"theories of action" and thus was quite open in talking about his own
and other's theories. This made the study considerably richer since
he was a key figure. Finally the high educational level of most members
made them relatively articulate and sophisticated in those subjects of
interest to the researcher.
The participant-observer method clearly presents limits. However,
one of the main perspectives I wished to adopt is that of a member of
the organization - in particular, one who had some responsibility for
managing new knowledge. Such a manager always 1) has restricted views
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of reality and 2) has available only a few levers for changing the
organization. With respect to the former, it follows that any
extension of individual awareness of how new knowledge is managed
is worthy of effort. What I sought to do was to extend those
boundaries for myself and for prospective readers. This is simply
a different kind of objectivity from that experienced by a researcher
operating from outside the agency(although bias could be corrected through
use of fairly specific and objective tests for some of the levels
of learning - see below). Thus I believe that after a year and a half
I had constructed as complete an understanding of the organization as
anyone in it, including even the agency head. With respect to the
latter (2), I stressed those variables which can be managed, i.e.,
accessible levers, not necessarily those casual variables explaining
the division's success (or lack of it). In order to understand how
any particular manager perceives what are accessible levers and what
are not, an insider's view was necessary. Thus, in using the par-
ticipant-observer method I was attempting to be useful not only for
perspective readers, but also for practicing managers, including the
staff of the agency - although I was not called upon, nor did I act
in a consulting role.
The data collected by these imperfect methods just described
was utilized as evidence of the division's achievement of each of
the several levels of learning. The assessment of that evidence
was made through the use of a set of criteria developed early in
the study to determine if each of the levels of learning had (or had not)
been achieved. Thus, for the first level of learning which I shall
examine (considering level 2 of page 16 as my first"working"level), one
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would ask whether the events surrounding a case of new knowledge
indicated that a new policy had actually been developed and that
process concurred in by members of the organization and its environ-
ment. For the second level one would ask whether this development
had been in some way imbedded in the organization's formal processes,
i.e. had new staff been assigned to continously deal with the problem,
was the outcome of the event codified in the organization's manuals
or directives and were principles developed which could be, and were,
used in roughly similar situations. At the third level one would
also ask if principles of sufficient generality had been developed
and used in situations of great divergency from the original events.
At the fourth level one would.examine whether there was a consistent
pattern of behavior used to develop these principles and for deciding
how and when they should be applied to similar or more divergent situa-
tions. Finally, one could also ask how widespread and shared any
of the above levels of learning were within the organization - for
example, did all the relevant members of the organization explicitly
"hold" and believe those programs and principles?
The complete assessment of whether the study organization met
the criteria of learning and how it did so will be made in succeeding
chapters. It should be clear, however, that this relatively specific
focus and method, both designed to be manageable with the researcher's
scarce resources, meant that some possible themes had to be discarded
while others took on a more prominent light as the study progressed.
Thus, I was interested not in the totality of such a putative learning
organization but more specifically in how information and perceptions
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perceived as new by the organization itself, were managed. Similarly,
I was more interested in the relatively explicit and conscious manage-
ment of new knowledge, that is, those elements which are subject to
some control by the organization. I thus did not focus extensively
on that societal or cultural learning which is less subject to the
will and perceptions of individual managers - for example, the educa-
tional skills of the pool of potential staff members, the political
process in which federal priorities were set, or the technology for
assessing the effectiveness of health policies. Such parameters of
social and cultural learning are discussed in detail by others (Rogers,
Merton, Ogburn).
Nor did I focus on the manner in which routine or standardized
information is processed, even though the distinction between routine
activity and new knowledge activity is not a sharp one. and many
interesting behavioral patterns at the edges of these overlapping
definitions may have been ignored. I have had to limit the study
to exclude not only routine information, but also an examination of
the relationship between routine activity and new knowledge, although
I feel this is an interesting relationship particularly since many of
the techniques of, and approaches to, new knowledge development which
were observed also appear to be quite applicable to routine activity
management.
Nor did I stress the importance of the environment in directing
the organization's attention to new knowledge, but rather I focused
on the responses to the uncertainty created by those knowledge inputs,
by the organization's members, a concept stressed by Perrow, Schon,
Rodgers and others. An additional theme of interest, which could only
be partially focused on, was the effect of any organizational learning
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I observed on the organization's members. Indeed the larger theme of
the concordance of personal learning and organizational learning also
needed to be addressed but was unfortuantely not stressed in this study.
The cases described in the text also presented considerable material
which might be evaluated from a perspective other than that of learning.
Regrettably, a focus on such themes as policy-making, state bureaucracy
and health care administration had to be neglected. However, the
interested reader will have no trouble finding raw nuggets of these
themes. He need only "polish" them and examine them from his own
perspective to assess their worth.
5. A Preview of the Study's Conclusions
An attempt was made to assess the success of the medical division
in creating a learning organization. There is evidence that its success
was significant, not only using the researcher's criteria but also
using the division's own criteria and those contributed by relevant
members of its environment.
The division succeeded not only in processing particular cases
of new knowledge but also in routinizing this success over time and
over a series of similar cases. It also learned a set of principles
for use in a wide variety of situations and it appeared to have learned
how to develop these principles through the generation of a generally
tacit program of action which guided its behavior when confronted by
new knowledge.
An attempt was made to assess how it was this significant success
in learning was achieved. The evidence suggests that netiher the
crisis or guerilla models of change adequately describes or accounts
for that success. That evidence also suggests the importance not of
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the rational/ scientific, human relations, or political models or
styles discussed previously but rather of a model much ignored in
the social science literature and inadequately discussed in the
business literature although it has some similarity with the environ-
mental/contingency models.
That model is the model of management and leadership with some
significant new developments added by the division. The division's
approach or style consisted of three important factors. The first
was an emphasis on what the agency head called "good management".
This management style was principally important in developing both
internal confidence among agency staff and external credibility with
the division's environment. The result of the application of this
management style to routine activity was then utilized to give the
division "breathing room" and resources to adequately tackle new
knoweldge. The second factor was the strong emphasis by the agency's
head on a teaching style. The success of that style accounted for
the manner in which the division's set of principles and a program
for developing them was learned. Finally, the continual evocation of
a simple but powerful organizational paradigm - the "responsible buyer"
(of health services for the poor) - not only reinforced the division's
credibility, but provided a touchstone against which the large number
of health care delivery principles could be tested.
The success of the organization appeared to have been made without
the disruption of routine activities inherent in the crisis and guerilla
models described on page 7. Some disruption occurred but it appeared
not to have affected employee performance or morale. A basic pragmatic
focus on high pay-off strategies contrasted with the focus on "solutions"
to complex problems inherent in the crisis model. That pragmatism also
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focused on strategies which could be implemented in contrast to the
antagonistic sense of "correctness" found in the guerilla models.
These observations combined with the unique style of the division
just discussed, permit an assertion that a third identifiable and
successful model of organizational change, one called "learning" can
be described.
Several observations about the sources of effectiveness of the
organization are significant in that they differ from both the crisis
and guerilla models and much conventional bureaucratic practice. For
example, the role of the teaching element is significant since it is
so rarely discussed or observed as a part of bureaucratic change.
In addition, the usual stress on the development of explicit patterns
of action (means) at the expense of a usually tacit organizational
paradigm (ends) was here reversed. That explicit stress on the para-
digm here successfully contained much of the uncertainty and consequent
"wavering" tendencies found in many organizations and provided a
built-in test for learning by the division's members. There also
was the reversal of the usual style/content balance in that considerable
freedom of style was permitted as long as the organization's "content" -
its paradigm and its principles developed through teaching - were observed.
Finally, there was the equal prominence and delicate relationship between
routine performance, accountability and learning which avoided the perils
of many so-called learning organizations which place learning and change
at the top of their lists of priorities and downplay accountability,
often unnecessarily shortening their effective political life. That
success had, however, some costs associated with it and several of these
are also identified.
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While the organization had clearly learned a successful style,
one might ask whether more stringent criteria, such as the capacity
of the organization to maintain this style over time or even its
ability to transfer it to a wider set of circumstances, should be
applied -that is, did it possess the qualities of durability and
universality sought by some authors (Argyris, Schon, Gardner, etc.).
While the speculations I will make concerning its continued success
are based on observed characteristics of the organization, the con-
clusions are essentially problematic. That is, the passage of time
will create internal political rivalries (the absence of which is
currently notable) as resources get differentially distributed;
increased size will lessen the potency of the "teaching" model as
staff become more isolated from the leader; and the certain departure
of the agency head will destroy the cohesive qualities and sense of
confidence of the organization. Similarly, the very conditions which
permitted the organization to succeed (small size, expansion, primative
technology, professional staff, a policy orientation, and general
environmental support) constitute, in combination with the positive
aspects of the model developed by the organization itself, such a
unique package of circumstances that the general transferrability of
the model to a wide range of other situations should be appraoched with
caution.
The obvious success of the organization combined with its speculated
difficulty in meeting such stringent criteria for learning, suggest that
completely "self-renewing" organizations are extraordinarily difficult
to create. It also suggests that the search for such pure and universal
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models by some idealists is a vain search, since the environment does
not require that all organizations in all circumstances be perpetual
learning organizations. If organizations are viewed not as individuals
(in that they do not seek learning for its own sake) but rather as
tools in the service of goals - whether generated by the environmant,
by organizational members or by a combination of the two, then the
normative search for models of organizational change might thus be
more profitably directed towards:
1) more politically-oriented studies of how organizational
goals are generated and disseminated by usually small
clusters of individuals inside the organization or from
a specific sector of its envornment; or
2) mid-level case study explorations of organizations
(such as this study) which examine actual learning
alternatives to the "crisis" or "guerilla" models,
but still alternatives within a goal achievement
framework.
-29 b-
. Chapter II
The Medical Division
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1. History of Medicaid
The Medicaid program was begun in 1967 by the federal government.
It provided for financial sharing of the costs to the various states
of assuring that welfare recipients received adequate medical care.
It, along with its counterpart, Medicare for the elderly, was con-
ceived of as an insurance program, that is, government would not pro-
vide services directly, but rather pay the private sector for services
rendered.
The federal government's role was two-fold. Firstly it defined a
minimum package of services which all states had to include in their
program and also an optional set of services to be provided at the
states' discretion. For both these groups of services, the federal
government would provide financial participation ranging from approxi-
mately 50% in the richer states to 80% in the poorer ones. In order
to receive this federal financial participation (ffp), the state had
to abide by usually complex sets of regulations defining precisely
what services were eligible and how they should be delivered.
The states, for their part, would further define the "amount,
duration, and scope" of the mandatory and lptional services, determine
the eligibility of clients, (usually those single parents and aged or
disabled persons below a certain income and thus eligible for welfare
cash assistance payments) and pay licensed medical providers for the
delivery of services. Many states had previously had very minimal
programs of medical assistance for welfare recipients but nowhere
near the broad scope of the new Medicaid program.
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More importantly, the federal regulations required that the reci-
pients have complete freedom of access to the whole private medical
sector. The medical profession at first fought the new program, but
it soon became clear that the freedom of access provision, combined
with the surety of payment by government, was creating a huge new
demand for medical services. Some likened it to giving a (medical)
credit card to the poor. This new demand was met by an increase in
supply, but one which lagged behind the demand. Consequently, prices
rose and many providers were able to either begin to break even for
the first time or to make very large incomes.
The size of the welfare rolls was also greatly increasing at
this time,creating commensurate problems in the state welfare agencies.
Most of the state agencies were totally unprepared for both these
developments, the increase in clientele and the addition of a new medi-
cal program. State governments for the most part had never been viewed
as particularly responsive to problems of this nature due to such well
documented forces as poorly qualified staff, divided organizational
responsibility and provincial outlooks. Thus the federal government
prodded the states to reach minimal levels of performance in such
vital Medicaid areas as assuring that providers enrolled in the
program, that recipients receixad their "credit card" and that pro-
viders were paid, generally at their usual and customary fees.
This necessary focus on such basic management processes assured
that the high goals of the program were not immediately met and that
many unforseen consequences were ignored. In addition to the surge
in demand and prices already mentioned, many providers set up what
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came to be known as "Medicaid mills"- clinics which processed welfare
clients at considerable speed and with some doubt as to the quality
of services. Monitoring by the states of such practices was generally
lax and much unfavorable publicity resulted. Many providers also
declined to participate in the program because of the considerable
paperwork involved in filing a bill with the state or in waiting
for an often delayed or disallowed payment. Others simply declined
to serve welfare clients since they presented cultural problems many
providers were not accustomed to dealing with. And for some recipients,
the credit card meant little because there were few or inadequate
places to utilize it, that is, the program often did not assure
access to care although in many states transportation services were
paid for.
Despite these problems, the overall assessment of the program was
relatively favorable. Many recipients who had not previously received
care were now receiving it although at vastly inflated costs to
the governments involved and with no real assurance that its quality
was high. For others, access to care was uneven and equality in
delivery was not assured since the medical profession was and continued
to be organized to deliver care to middle class patients and not the
poor, the elderly and minority groups. Many observers felt that the
"expose" of the inadequacies of the health care delivery (and financing)
system brought about by both Medicaid and Medicare was one of the
contributing factors to the increased discussion about a national health
insurance system.
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2. The State's Response
The state welfare agencies were caught in the middle of this
complex mix of new programs, federal pressure, strong medical lobbies,
increasingly vocal welfare recipients, inefficient state agencies
and ill-informed state legislature. The state chosen for study, while
able to confront some of these forces in a more responsive way than
some other states, had its own unique problems to deal with. It had
paid for, like some of the other states prior to 1967, a limited program
of medical services for welfare recipients. In 1969, the state legis-
lature enacted a bill which provided for all the federally mandated
services of the program and virtually all of the optional ones (e.g
adult dentistry, podiatry, physical therapy, etc.). This package
was one of the most comprehensive of all the states and, combined with
the relatively generous cash payments already granted to recipients,
was the reason to assert that the state could be proud of its efforts
for the poor.
The state welfare department, the Department of Public Welfare
(DPW) was, however, not up to the complex task of administering either
the cash grants or medical assistance program. In the late '60's,
the state had "taken over" the administration of welfare from the pre-
viously independent cities and towns. Each town had had its own benefit
levels, had contributed varying amounts from local resources, and had
administered the program according to its own views. The state DPW
attempted over the next several years to standardize policy and payment
levels and to institute controls over these previously independent
local offices. In most cases the whole local staff was simply transferred
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to the state payroll and the same facilities utilized. In addition to
the obviously immense problem of standardization and control imposed
by this shift, the new Medicaid program was thrust upon them.
Virtually all of the 1500 employees of the department had grown
up in it, or were trained in the "welfare" aspects of the department.
Most were social workers and had little experience with medical care.
The new program received little attention from the old bureaucracy who
remained focused on their essential tasks of assuring cash grants to
recipients and arranging for, or providing,social services. However,
a central office Medical Division was created whose mandate it was
to create policy for the Medicaid program and to assure that it was
administered properly by the local offices. (For a chart of the DPW
see Figure 1). As is clear from the chart, the division had no
direct control over the local or regional offices and had to rely on the
godd graces of the other divisions to ensure that its policies were
carried out.
3. The Medical Division
By 1973, the Medicaid program was costing nearly 300 million
dollars or close to 20% of the state budget. The cash grants and
social services programs provided for another 20% of the budget, yet
these latter two divisions received the lion's share of the depart-
ment's - personnel budget. The twenty members of the medical
division viewed themselves as terribly understaffed and only "coping"
with the routine tasks they had to perform. These tasks included
interpretation of federal guidelines and further refinement (or change
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Figure 1. The State Welfare Department
where there was leeway) as to what and how medical services should
be provided, monitoring of the quality and extent of services provided,
developing and encouraging innovations in the overall health care
delivery system and problem solving at the local level. As will
be described in later case material, the central office was only
able to deal with these problems in the most rudimentary manner and
according to both inside and outside observers, spent most of their
time "fighting fires".
The division's management up to 1973 had been varied. The chief
operating officer of the small division was an assistant commissioner,
an appointed position serving at the -'pleasure of the governor". The
first occupant of the position after 1968 had apparently antagonized
the medical profession and soon exited. Two later assistant
commissioners failed to acquire the necessary administrative support
for the program they felt they needed and they too left, discouraged
after terms of less than two years.
Several explanations were offered for this
welfare commissioners all came from the social
fields and were seen as simply not giving high
cal program. Secondly, the legislature, while
liberal medical benefits for recipients in the
to give adequate staff support since they could
by claiming they were cutting down the size of
situation. Firstly, the
service or welfare
priority to the medi-
voting relatively
enabling act, declined
gain political points
the "wasteful" welfare
bureaucracy. This was particularly important in a state where a
large part of the bureaucracy was viewed, perhaps not paradoxically,
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as both patronage ridden and also inefficient. Finally there is
some evidence that the then poor management of the medical program,
e.g. its failure to produce adequate budget requests, angered
the legislature such that they refused to vote monies to correct
the situation. Finally the legislature's displeasure with a brash
young human services secretary (see Figure 1) led it to deny many
of the secretary's and commissioner's requests.
In the fall of 1972, the assistant commissioner of the division
had resigned and a search was instituted for a replacement. The secretary
knew that"a manager would be needed" since the changed national climate
clearly called for that. By then some of the problems created by
the Medicaid program had begun to be discussed on a national level by
various health experts and this coincided with the Nixon administra-
tion's social and fiscal conservatism. The result was an omnibus
health bill passed in 1972 with several amendments to the Medicaid law.
It provided for some new service benefits but generally stressed in-
creased management and control activities states would have to take in
order to halt some of the abuses then being exposed. As the secretary
expressed it, "we wanted a person who had good management sense, good
policy sense, could recruit talent, had fiscal and financial sense,
and some political skills. NoT.7iwhere could you get a guy like that-for
$24,000?" But he decided not to settle for "half the guy" and so
the position lay vacant for eight months.
Finally an adequate replacement was found. He seemed to possess
most of the needed talents and, not insignificantly, would accept the
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appointment at that low salary level since he had sources of independent
income. He arrived in April of 1973 with an existing staff of about
20 persons including clerical and secretarial personnel. Over the
course of the next two years the division budget and staff were to
double, new programs were to be instituted, monitoring activity
increased and a newly acquired credibility gained. The story of
how these were accomplished will be detailed in Chapters III, IV and
V. Here I shall more fully describe the division's routine tasks,
the expectations held out for it by outsiders and by the new head,
and the initial transformation of the agency.
4. Organizational Tasks
I have chosen to discuss the division's routine tasks first since
these will help to "situate" the division for the reader. This is
not to imply that the division had no sense of goals or mission or
was not influenced by environmental forces, but the former did not
become clear until well into the new appointee's stewardship while
the latter have already been briefly described and will be explored
in more depth in Section 6.
Several interviews with staff members confirmed that the division's
tasks were four-fold. The first was developing and administering
medical policy. That is, within the limits of federal regulations,
the division had to decide what kinds of services would be paid for,
under what circumstances they could be delivered, and had to recommend
a suitable rate to the Rate Setting Commission (RSC), a separate state
agency appointed to set rates (and avoid collusion with providers).
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For example, in the durable goods area, the division would determine
that certain types of wheelchairs were appropriate while others
were not, that they only be delivered to clients upon prior approval
by the division of a request by a physician, that they be purchased
at approved vendors and that a price of X dollars (to be approved
by the RSC) was appropriate. Similar types of decisions were made
for nursing homes, hospitals, clinics, "entists, individual physicians
and all other licensed providers such as nurses, home health aides,
rehabilitation specialists and mental health providers. Each of
these policy decisions were formalized in a written policy manual
which was the basic working document of the division's field offices
and those providers with large Medicaid clienteles. The complete
set of policy instructions constituted over 200 pages of the depart-
ment's policy manual and were continually being revised.
The administration of these policies primarily involved insuring
that the new policies were inserted in the department's manual and
understood by field personnel and providers. Recall that this latter
function was not directly under the division's control and the day-to-
day contact with clients and providers was through these local welfare
offices (lwo's). For example, a client would be told (or already knew)
by his social worker that he was eligible for say, rehabilitation treat-
ments after a stroke. The recipient would go to a rehab clinic,
present his Medicaid card and be treated. The clinic would send a
bill to the local office, who would make the necessary approvals
(sending it to central or regional offices if it was a complex case),
and then forward it to the finance unit of the department (see Figure I)
for payment.
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The second major task of the division was to monitor the program
to uncover provider and client abuse and to generate overall manage-
ment information. For example, through. examination of "exceptional"
bills (see task 4), through field inspections or through perusal of
the financial reporting from the finance unit, it could determine
both on an individual basis and on a system basis whether, say,
clients were being placed in an inappropriate level of nursing
home care, or whether there appeared tco be an excessive usage of a
new form of dental treatment given what the division knew about local
patterns of usage.
The third major task was to promote new medical resources (or the
restructuring of resources) in areas inadequately or improperly
served. This task was not as explicit as the others despite the
language in the enabling act specifying that the division, "in coopera-
tion with the Department of Public Health", "stimulate", "plan for"
and "assist" in the development of new medical resources and the
delivery of services. Given the small staff of the division, the
achievement of this task was limited to what small amounts of technical
assistance it could provide through staff consultation, or to pointing
out to the medical community that certain geographical areas were
undeserved or that certain situations were detrimental not only
for Medicaid clients but for the health-consuming public at large.
For example, the very existence of the Medicaid program as a source
of financing might encourage providers to offer new services (e.g.
nursing homes, rehab agencies) or the advocacy of the use of generic
drugs (as opposed to brand name drugs) for welfare clients might help
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to point out patterns in the pharmaceutical industry viewed by many
as far too costly.
Finally, some of the division's tasks revolved around handling
exceptions and "foul-ups" generated by policy implementation, billing
irregularities, or cases of emergency medical or financial need.
The first category consisted of services which required a prior approval
by the central office. These services and others which were of suffi-
ciently unique nature that no price could be set in advance were
sent to the central office for review by a staff of medical consul-
tants. These "PA" and "IC" (individual consideration) items, while
constituting a small proportion of the budget, generated a considerable
amount of paperwork. Billing irregularities would also often be the
focus of central office action as providers phoned to find out
why their bill had been disallowed or their payment slow in reaching
them. Local offices of course handled much of this activity but much
also filtered directly to the central office. Finally, in situations
where a client needed a particularly unique service or some "red
tape" had to be cut to gain his access to services, the central
office would often become involved. For example, finding a suitable
nursing home for a "problem" patient who had been refused at several
homes or arranging for an out-of-state provider to give very special-
ized treatment to a client, e.g. heart treatment at the famous
Houston clinics.
I shall not make an attempt here to assess how well these tasks
were accomplished or their range of accomplishment. The staff
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complement almost assured that only the most pressing or urgent areas
within these tasks were covered. During the latter part of 1973,
an extremely rough estimate of the percentage of staff time and
energy devoted to the few major tasks would be as follows:
a. developing and administering policy - 45%
b. monitoring - 15%
c. developing new resources and programs - 20%
d. handling exceptions - 20%
For the most part, each of these task areas was carried out by
a unit within the division responsible for a specific medical program
area, i.e. clinics, nursing homes, hospitals, etc. That is, the
division was organized principally on a program, not functional, basis.
This organization was completed by the new assistant commissioner
shortly after he arrived. The manner in which each program unit
carried out these tasks varied somewhat from unit to unit depending
on the nature of the program and the staff assigned to it. Figure
2 indicates the major program areas in late 1973, and the staff
assigned to them. The development of this particular form of the
organization will be described separately in section 8 since its early
stages had considerable influence on the later success in managing
new, non-routine knowledge. To conclude this section the relative
proportions of the 400 million budget for that year are listed below.
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NOTES: 1. All the heads of program areas shown functioned as "assistant directors".
2. The director of medical care, N.K., over the course of 1973 and 1974, assumed
the functions of an assistant director.
3. Y.H. and R.K., by late 1974, had begun to function as "associate directors".
FIGURE 2. THE MEDICAL DIVISION IN LATE 1973
I
Provider type Percentage of Budget
(approximate)
Hospitals........................... 22%
Chronic Hospitals................... 14%
Nursing Homes ...................... 40%
Clinics............................. 3%
Mental Health..................(Inc. in Hospitals & Physicians)
Physicians......................... 7%
Dentistry.......................... 5%
Pharmacy and durable goods......... 6%
Licensed practicioners............. 2%
5. Routine Activity
Each of the program areas carried out a wide variety of routine
subtasks. I use routine here in the sense that (1) there was near
unanimity from the staff on the need for action, (2) the required action
was known by the staff, and "expected" or anticipated by providers or
other agencies and (3) in virtually all cases, the subtasks had been
carried out, however superficially or sporadically, by staff members
for several years previously. Over the course of two years, the number
of routine subtasks increased considerably as new knowledge was inte-
grated into the division and became routine, and existing routines were
subdivided or enlarged with the addition of new staff.
In the long term care unit (nursing homes and chronic hospitals)
regular certification and inspection of all homes in the state was
carried out under a contracting arrangement with the Department of
Public Health. Agreements were signed and reviewed with each of the
homes as required by federal law. Additionally, medical review teams
(DPH teams under contract) were established to periodically check on
care provided by the patients own doctors. The unit also developed its
own "little list" of poor providers and with the limited staff available,
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closely watched, cajoled and, in a few cases, closed down inadequate
homes. It, like the other units, handled a wide range of "local"
problems such as transfers of patients from one facility to another
or unclogging providers bills in the payment system. The unit had
little control over the supply or cost of nursing home beds (these
being regulated by DPH and RSC respectively) but did continually
testify at major hearings to determine new construction or rate changes.
The hospital unit consisted of one person half-time plus about
half the time of the nursing home director. The hospital director
was principally involved in assisting the Rate Setting Commission in
determining new hospital rates and in routinely notifying local offices
of these changes. Occasionally, the mix of services paid for in the
hospitals per diem changed and those had also to be reflected in the
policy manual. The only significant hospital monitoring activity was
a contracted-out program which reviewed each patient's length of stay.
The nursing home director managed this contract. The hospital director,
in his remaining half-time, concerned himself with the division's
internal administration (space, manuals, supplies, etc.). Equally
important, he assured that all the division's documents were procedurally
correct and had been formally approved by other divisions of DPW or other
state agencies since many other state agencies administered laws de-
fining how medical care could be delivered and the "state plan",
actually a contract with the federal government, specified what could
or could not be legally reimbursed by HEW.
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In the ambulatory care area, routine activity consisted of
periodically reviewing the entire fee schedule for physicians and
assuring that the schedule was adequately communicated to the local
office, physicians and the department's computer-operated payment systems.
Monitoring activity was unsystematic and inspection of facilities
sporadic, but had slowly begun to develop into a more routine activity
(see Chapters III and IV). The dental and pharmaceutical units had very
well elaborated policy positions and here their activity was concentrated
on monitoring, that is, reviewing individual bills and granting prior
approvals or permitting deviation from the fee schedules. The develop-
ment of new resources was most apparent in the ambulatory areas (again
see several examples in Chapter III). A wide variety of providers
(chiropracters, psychologists, physical therapists, abortion clinics,
health maintenance organizations, ambulance companies, podiatrists, etc.)
continually approached the division to be certified as eligible providers,
or if already certified, to seek a new rate.
The mental health unit was a newly-created unit but by early 1974
had already settled into a routine of setting conditions of participa-
tion (which had the force of informal regulations) for the many varieties
of mental health clinics, encouraging them in their attempts to re-
structure the mental health field and in attempting to handle their
billing problems.
Two or three other units cut across each of the above "program"
units. The sanction unit, receiving tips from a wide variety of sources
(billing patterns, other providers, audits, etc.) sent out warning
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letters to providers to change the pattern of resource utilization
(although rarely in strict "quality of care" areas - see Chapter IV).
Field relations were coordinated by a central office staff member who
worked to assure that the division's seven regional representatives
and the local welfare offices were aware of, and responsive to,
policy changes. Finally, one central office staffer organized a
group of forty part-time medical consultants who reviewed bills,
approved claims, and acted as general advisors to the division. As
will be described below, other possible cross-program functions, such
as research and planning, budgeting, or lobbying were either not
carried out due to the small numbers of staff or were executed by indi-
vidual program personnel or the assistant commissioner.
This summary of the division's routine activity is of course in
no way complete. It makes no attempt to discuss how well the division
carried out these tasks or the levels of consistency, energy, or
integrity it brought to the tasks. It is intended only to give a
flavor of the more common daily activities of the division by late 1973
before the new assistant commissioner had an opportunity to completely
make his mark on the agency. He had, by that time however, managed
to organize the division into the basic program areas described above
and to add a few new staff. From April to late 1973 the division ad-
justed to his new organization, carried out its routine tasks, and
reviewed the need for changes. It is impossible to understate the
sheer bulk of this routine activity. The division was universally
viewed as being very understaffed and, it is clear, could have spent
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nearly all its time performing these routine tasks or responding to
crises created by new federal regulations or severe provider or client
pressures.
But by late 1973 it had begun to develop a distinctive approach not
only to these routine tasks, but also in dealing with situations of
new knowledge-which is the subject of Chapters III through V. It
should be pointed out that the dividing line between routine tasks
and new knowledge is not a sharp one. New tasks often become routine,
certain staff dealt "routinely" with new program areas and tasks, and
new staff created new roles. But in general, what has been described
here was the type of activity which the division carried out before
Knight's arrival and during his early days. It is also activity which
would have had to be carried out in some form no matter who occupied
the staff and appointed positions. Indeed, all the above activity
continued well on into 1975, during the full period of the study.
6. Environmental Forces
This then was the organization in late: 1973. It faced certain
general environmental pressures and carried out certain routine tasks.
A new head had been appointed and, with that appointment, certain more
specific expectations were created. Let us now examine in more detail
what these pressures and expectations were and what the new appointee
brought to this situation.
The federal climate has already been briefly described. A new
law had been passed requiring increased monitoring and encouraging
improved management of the state's program. This law produced a
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voluminous amount of regulations requiring not only improved management
but in some cases newly organized services, e.g., child screening
programs or family planning services. Federal regional officials
(who oversaw several states' efforts) realized that the division was
understaffed and thus only selectively applied pressure on it to live
up to the regulations. But other priority areas were strongly emphasized
by Washington (e.g. nursing home safety Inspection) and the regional
office had no choice but to pass along the pressure. The division
could only respond to the most urgent of these pressures. Indeed the
division was out of compliance with many federal regulations and, while
regional officials ignored many of these, they also saw that the
lack of a clear management focus and the concurrent focus on solving
local problems or responding to crises was prohibiting the development
of an overall program philosophy, divisional credibility and an inte-
grated, efficient policy - one which would "bring-some light to the
delivery system", assure respect from medical providers and stem the
flow of dollars to those providers who were, legally or otherwise,
"milking the system". As one official put it, "This is a highly-politized
environment, with vast amounts of money flowing through it.. .you've
never had a real philosophy or strategy to deal with this."
The state legislature viewed the situation, according to one state
official, as "a giant moneyhole". They had voted in one of the most
comprehensive benefit packages in the country several years earlier and
now were amazed to discover how expensive that program had become,
although rising prices in general and in the health field in particular
and rising welfare caseloads had also contributed to the increasing
-50-
budgets. The legislature as a whole did not appear to be concerned
with the quality of care delivered or the more innovative aspects of
restructuring proposed. But several of the provider groups had
particularly strong lobbies and their major wishes (i.e. Medicaid
rates) were usually acceeded to by the Governor or the legislature.
One of the providers' clearly less unreasonable requests was for a
centralized bill paying operating to reduce the backlog of claims due.
This was voted in in 1971 and by 1975 had calmed many of the providers'
concerns.
Non-payment of bills due to the state treasury running out of
cash each year also involved the legislature. The division and the
DPW were never able to accurately predict the total year's spending
since caseloads and medical utilization were quite variable and
since many rate changes occurred during a fiscal year. The depart-
ment's estimate was usually low (or cut by the legislature to spite a
governor and human services secretary of the opposite party) and at
the end of the fiscal year all funds usually stopped while a time -
consuming deficiency appropriation was made. Providers were always
eventually paid, but the legislature resented the administration not
being able to submit "accurate" budget requests. In the patronage-
ridden state, legislatures viewed more management staff for the division
as "throwing good money after bad" and generally washed their hands
of the program despite the fact that it represented nearly 20% of the
state budget. As the HSA secretary remarked - most of the legislature
was "totally ignorant of Medicaid". Others saw it as a "fiscal sore
spot" or a "pain in the ass". The efforts of the HSA secretary and
the DPW commissioner to convince the legislature of the need for more,
support were, however, not perceived as being adequate. As the HSA
secretary remarked, "we tried to convince them but I guess we didn't
try hard enough".
HSA, however., had additional priorities. Many of the state's health
services for indigent groups (particularly in mental health, for
example) were supported completely by state money. If the patients
could be "squeezed" into Medicaid categories or if the services could
be considered Medicaid services then the costs would be partially
reimbursible with federal money. Many of the division staff felt HSA
concentrated too much on this strategy to the detriment of revising
program policies or changing the overall delivery system. The HSA
undersecretary said, "Medicaid doesn't have 'programs' in the tradi-
tional sense". Here, he meant that since the division did not deliver
services or did not generally affect the delivery of services, but
only financed existing services, it did not have real programs (except
in a few areas, e.g. nursing homes).
Thus the secretary was viewed as seeing the division as a "quick,
sharp insurance program". He saw that many of the controls needed in
the insurance industry were needed here also but first had to "get
DPW straightened out" before he could tackle Medicaid. This involved
the computerized bill payment system and the computer recipient files
on which a Medicaid management system would have to be based. He
felt that "using Medicaid to influence the system was a long way to
go", but that it could be done. But his first priority was to improve
management (in DPW and Medicaid), the second to improve Medicaid services
and the third to influence the health system.
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The provider community generally recognized the importance of
the program in financing their system (e.g., the hospitals no longer
had bad debts or charity cases) and the relative generosity of the
benefit package - indeed, the benefits were more generous than most
private insurance schemes, covering a wider range of services and having
fewer or no upper limits on utilization. But they viewed the program
as unwieldly and unresponsive. Paper work was extensive, bills were
paid late and, for many providers, the clientele was difficult to
deal with, often from minority groups and with a large proportion of
"psycho-social" illnesses. The fees were seen as low but not un-
reasonable and the profession, long steeped in a climate of lack of
public accountability (bordering on a reactionary arrogance according
to some) simply wished the division would "keep its nose out of our
business." They viewed the program as just another insurance carrier
like Blue Cross, only less efficient. Indeed many suggestions were
made to the legislature to turn over all or part of the program to a
private carrier as had been done in some other states. The other
carriers also viewed the program is inefficient and made overtures
to take it over but to no avail.
The public at large had little comprehension of the program. Welfare
recipients were unorganized and when they did begin to organize in
the late 60's and early 70's, did so around the welfare, i.e. cash
assistance side, of the DPW's program, not the medical side. The
commissioner reflected this pressure as he too concentrated on re-
forming the other divisions of the department. While sympathetic to
the medical program, he was a social worker by training
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and the division seemed to suffer from lack of attention as he con-
tinued to gain national prominence as a welfare administrator.
The above summary has reflected the various environmental pressures
on the division by 1973. Each of these pressures were real and had
to be responded. to in some way. It should be clear that the most
generalized picture of the division was that it was not focused, out
of control, unresponsive and, while clearly responding to some of the
real needs of clients, not living up to its potential nor seriously
affecting the health care system other than to pump over $300 million
inflationary dollars into it.
7. A New Appointee
The newly appointed assistant commissioner, Don Knight, of course
brought his own set of priorities to the division. He was well
aware that he would be entering a highly charged political arena, but
he chose to focus or define his role somewhat apolitically. His prior
background had been in the management of a large, heavily market-
influenced company in the sporting goods industry and he saw himself
primarily as a manger. He had helped his prior company expand enor-
mously over 20 years and then, in middle age, made an abrupt career
shift. A physician friend and he founded a neighborhood health center
in one of the city's ghetto areas and built it up into a well managed
and responsive provider of care. The center took advantage of both
federal and local grants and Medicaid financing and built a reputation
in the city and the state.
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Knight, during these four years, learned about the delivery of
health care and became well known in the health community. His atti-
tude that "health care delivery is not the same as the practice of
medicine" obviously did not sit well with all the medical community
who would have liked to see "one of their own" in the assistant
commissioner's position, but given the strict requirements laid out
by the secretary for the position (see Page 38) he was an admirable,
and perhaps the only choice.
Knight combined these two prior experiences, management and health
care, into his formulation of what the division needed. He said he
felt he "had to get this house in order, give the agency a direction
and then develop a commitment to some goals and strategies". He felt
he had first to concentrate on the implementation of the new omnibus
federal law, and then he could worry about the actual delivery system.
He saw that the staff "was not intelligently generating priorities" and
so began to organize the division on a "purchase of service" basis
(see Figure 2).
After he had "got the house in order", then he felt he could begin
to worry about "what we are really buying, accountability, quality,
and improving information flow". This role of "buying medical care"
was one which was not clearly formulated at the beginning of Knight's
tenure, but his role as a purchaser inindustry had influenced this
basic posture. When asked what the division goals should be, he
replied "we have a responsibility to buy quality care and to be sure
that we do that in the most effective way". That meant that
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the "care should be good, useful, actually be delivered, be at a
fair price and someone should be responsible for delivering it." At
other times- he said that these goals were "not routine or platonic
goals - they're very reasonable." He felt that the problem was
"not to spend more money on care but to control it". He wanted to
provide a "viable standard of living for the elderly (mainly in
nursing homes) and held kids grow up healthy".
These goals were of course, reasonable. The prevailing health
delivery literature stressed quality care, cost effective pricing, and
improved access for all patients. Those concerned with welfare clients
often added a fourth goal, equality of treatment and a "voice" for
the patient. Knight translated these goals easily. Quality care could
not be defined absolutely but could be defined relatively. He felt
that welfare clients should receive the same quality care as middle
class patients (thus combining both the quality and equality issues
although he did elaborate on what quality might mean - need, fair
price, etc.). This was to be achieved (at one end of the scale) by
refusing to purchase care from poor providers or poor categories of
providers. Cost effective goals would be achieved by stressing ambula-
tory care since it had the highest potential financial payoff (particu-
larly with children) and since it also would help to keep recipients
out of institutions. Access was a desirable goal but less attention
needed to be paid to it since in general the state had a very well
elaborated network of providers, although many refused to deal with
welfare recipients. Both the access question and the equality of treat-
ment could be approached, he felt, by gaining the respect and confi-
dence of providers.
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These goals of Knight's were invoked relatively early in his
tenure. The staff had, of course, no difficulty in understanding these
goals nor did the division's most immediate environment of the HSA
secretariat, federal officials and the major providers. What was
interesting however was the manner in which "the house was put in
order", attention focussed on these goals and new areas tackled quite
differently than they had been before.
8. The First Few Months
During the summer and fall of 1973, Knight began to "put his house
in order" and "develop commitment to goals". Many of the strategies
used during this period were conscious ones, others were conscious but
strongly dependent on permissive conditions within the organization
and its environment, while others simply evolved out of a complex
interaction of many forces. The use of these strategies did not of
course stop after the fall of 1973; they continued in a stabilized
pattern. This pattern permitted the division to carry out its routine
tasks in a more efficient, responsive and credible way. This general
success then,permitted (a point I shall elaborate on in Chapters III
through V) the division to turn part of its attention to the manage-
ment of newer, less routine areas.
J.L. Price (1968) has suggested that four main systems of an organi-
zation are generally amenable to analysis and usually to management.
These are the "production" or economic system (usually reflected in the
formal structure), the personnel/career/sanction system, the political
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or decision making structure, and the technological system. Burns and
Stalker (1966) have suggested a similar system without stressing the
importance of the technology system as separately important, linking
it with the production system (the two may or may not be coincident).
I shall use Price's four classifications to describe the initial
development of the division since the manner in which Knight dealt
with each of these systems were determinants of the division's later
success in both routine and new tasks.
a. The production system
Firstly, the "production" system. Prior to Knight's arrival,
the small core group of six or seven staffers dealt with routine tasks
on a fairly unstructured basis. Two staffers did specialize in nursing
homes and pharmacies but the remainder "covered the waterfront", dealing
with a wide variety of problems in all of the service areas as they
arose. An example of the titles used is indicative - "research economist",
director of "program services , "director of medical care", "director
of the innovation unit" - they were non-specific and probably well
suited to the climate in which the division found or had placed itself.
The staff saw themselves as each sharing in all the major decisions and
being knowledgeable about "the whole system". Recall also that the
division had previously been without a full time head for eight months
and while this structure may be seen as a response to the uncertainty
of such a situation, it was also perceived by outsiders as being un-
focussed and difficult to extract consistent answers from.
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Knight reorganized the division on a purchase of service basis
as shown in Figure 2 and initially described on page 45. Each unit
was to be responsible for a particular medical service while only a
few (field relations and sanctions) cut across all these program areas.
More importantly, the division of the tasks into a wide number of
programs was accomplished by having each program person report
directly to Knight. The acting head of the division had a title and
salary level greater than the remaining staff but he soon became, in
effect, not the director of medical care, but simply one of a number of
assistant directors who all reported to Knight. Similarly, some staff
who had civil service ranks and titles below that of assistant director
(which paid about $14-15,000) were given acting assistant director
titles. Even with this large span of control, some of the staff who
remained at the level below assistant director continued , if not re-
porting to Knight, to at least share the reporting task with "their"
assistant director. Much later, in 1974, two of the assistant directors
were "promoted" to an associate directorship (although this title did
not exist in the civil service lexicon). They did not come between
Knight and all the remaining assistant directors, but instead took
charge of only one assistant director. The other assistant directors
continued to report to Knight.
What this meant of course, was that Knight was able to keep a close
watch on all activities and to develop an approach to the division's
tasks which each of the staff and he could share. This initial wide
span of control is not uncommon when a new manager is appointed;
-59-
what is unusual here is the length of time it endured and the effect
it was to have in developing a shared approach both to routine tasks
(discussed below) and new knowledge (Chapters III, IV, V).
Equally important was the development of an informal structure.
At each of the regular staff meetings during that time (also during
informal meetings), each of the staff were encouraged to step outside
their program role and criticize other staff's programs or raise issues
which cut across several programs. For example, questions of political
implications, or of ultimate effect on the daily lives of clients, or of
general "system" consequences were continually being raised by specific
individuals even though no one was specifically charged with those
roles. This informal organization (which I shall label the "informal
matrix" since it had many of the attributes of a matrix organization)
was effective not only in raising issues and sharing perspectives but
also in assuring that their resolution was satisfactory to Knight,
who, when irreconcilable differences arise, could be assured that he
could resolve the differences. When the meetings were informal, and when
Knight was not present, this matrix style helped to raise issues and
differences, but many of the staff felt that their resolution was not
as rapid.
This informal matrix did not endure as long as the formal system.
By early 1974, Knight stopped the increasingly large staff meetings saying
that he felt people now knew what they had to do and should no longer be
sharing responsibility with so many others. A few cynics suggested that
Knight had become unable to "control" the increasing level of argument
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at the staff meetings. In any case, only a few (not the cynics) regretted
the passing of the large meetings. Some degree of the informal matrix
did endure however, in casual or scheduled meetings among the staff.
b. The Personnel System
The personnel/career/sanction system was also utilized effec-
tively by Knight during this period. The staff basically consisted
of three groups of people in the fall of 1973. First were several long
time members of the division - career employees who had grown up in the
social work and medical service professions. All were over forty, but
most nonetheless had advanced degrees, usually in social work. A
second group consisted of six newcomers to the division who had been part
of a separate,federally funded, innovation unit. They were young, generally
untrained in medical areas but had each had a year or two of experience
in some health care administration position. Several of this group also
had advanced degrees. A third group consisted of several newcomers
to the division for whom Knight was able to acquire positions. Three of
these were young generalists with advanced degrees and a few years
experience (although only had a health care degree) while the others
were young persons he had found "languishing" in secretarial positions
in the central office or in social work positions in the division's
field structure.
Each of these groups had a particular response to the new manager
and to the new structure. The long term staff who, while " thinking
anecdotally and not in a policy sense" (Knight) did not appear shaken
up by the changes. Some expressed private fears and hesitancies about
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their competence, but each dug into their new tasks with relish. As
one put it, "we've been frustrated for so long, now Don will be able
to take the groundwork we've laid down and really do something".
Knight was now giving a focus and some tools for the older staff.
For example, one of the long-term staff turned with great delight to
"cleaning up" wayward nursing homes, something he had felt the division
had never had the "clout" to do (see Chapter IV). Knight generally
permitted the long-term staff to carry on in their old roles although
they were circumscribed somewhat by limiting them to one, not several,
program areas. He also used them as "bridges" to the rest of the welfare
department bureaucracy.
The other two groups fused into one as Knight disbanded the innova-
tion unit and assigned specific tasks to each of the members. But this
assignment was not made rapidly. Many were permitted to "float around"
and "find something interesting you'd like to do, then come and talk
to me about it." Others (at least six of the twelve or fifteen in this
group) were permitted to play the "fly on the wall game" as Knight
described it. Here they would occupy a desk in Knight's office for
a few weeks with no specific tasks, all the while watching the full
range of telephone calls, meetings and outside visitors. Usually, by
the end of a few weeks the "fly" would have been given a few specific
short term tasks since he was the most obvious person available and was
"free". For example the researcher was given the task of coordinating
the new omnibus federal legislation. This general "freedom to select
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a task" was a conscious strategy of Knight's. He knew that the civil
service salaries were low and that not only could lie not recruit very
experienced persons, but that even those he could recruit (or had
available to him) could not be "forced" to take assignments they
did not like. Indeed he felt "you have to get peoples' egos involved
in their jobs".
The division as it was constituted offered very little room for
advancement as the assistant director level was the last step on the
career ladder in the division - the next position being a political
appointment - Knight's. Even within the total health field, the
future of the Medicaid program did not appear bright as at that time
it seemed likely that it would soon be obliterated by a national health
insurance program. Thus the formal organizational sanction system
seemed to play a minor part in the restructuring of the division.
Where Knight did have to confront it, he did so boldly or simply
ignored it. For example, he assigned "acting" titles to many staff,
brought in professional staff at clerical salaries with the promise
of eventual boosts, bent the hiring regulations specified by the civil
service commission for job qualifications and even used volunteers to
whom he assigned full task responsibility.
This free floating selection of tasks and the overlapping task
responsibility described earlier indicates a flexible development which
could only have been partly due to Knight's actions. The personal
qualities of the staff should also be considered. These appeared to
be four principal reasons for this high level of role flexibility,
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with several members of the staff combining two or more reasons.
Firstly, some staff had been explicitly trained as generalists in
law, management or planning. Secondly, others (particularly the
long-term staff) had had lengthy experience running all aspects of
the program when the staff had been much smaller and they thus
felt at ease with each of the many pieces of the division's program
even though they no longer held as great responsibility. Still others
had a considerable degree of personal self-confidence backed up by
a well thought out philosophy of health care delivery which enabled
them to slide into many areas with ease. Still others had a great
curiosity and desire to learn about the medical system and took
considerable pleasure in understanding it and being able to manipulate
it.
It should be apparent that there is a considerable possibility
that a "dependency" situation-had been created due to the combination
of the structure developed by Knight, the young and generally in-
experienced staff, and the turbulent outside environment. Indeed one
comment by an observer was that Knight had "bought off" the staff and
assured their philosophical allegiance by offering them (a) respon-
sible positions involving (b) new (to them) fields of endeavor. While
I shall later (Chapter III) discuss this issue more fully, here I
will only briefly describe the linkage between each of the assistant
directors and Knight and forego any consideration of whether a dependency
was created or what its long term effect might be.
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Each of the long term staff appeared extremely solicitious of
the new head of the agency during its early stages and sought to prove
their eagerness and competence to him. Of the younger staff, two
were unabashedly linked to Knight, one through past associations and
commitments in the neighborhood health center movement and another
through his desire to "please" Knight and prove his evolving managerial
competence. Three new assistant directors indicated to the researcher
that they felt insecure about the definition of their tasks and,
when confronted with an overwhelmingly large potential area of action,
said they looked closely to Knight for priority setting. One other
assistant director felt that many of his "managerial outlooks" were
counter to Knight's (e.g., around the need for planning) and yet
he clearly realized "who pulls the strings", so he was forced (by his
own choice apparently) to check with Knight to define their area
of agreement. Finally, two other staff managed to operate quite in-
dependently. Both possessed their own sense of personal outrage
at the inefficiencies in their program areas. Both were also further
separated from Knight by, in one case, the complex professional
nature of his program area (pharmacy) and the other by his retained
loyalties to the Human Services Agency from whence he had been "parachuted".
The allegiance to Knight, whether it be called dependency or "buying
off", did create some interesting sidelights. For example, there
appeared to be,at least during the early stages of Knight's tenure,
very little of what might broadly be called "human relations" problems.
While there was the obvious and frequent communication between staff,
-65-
it was nearly always task centered ("what is the right policy") rather
than interpersonally centered ("how we do relate together around job
issues"). Several of the staff commented on this situation but felt
that any such problems were discussed with Knight on a one-to-one
basis and not between staff. Given a task structure which appeared
well suited to the environment(a mismatch of which seems to be a
frequent cause of human relations problems), there may not have been
an obvious focus for such behavior. The researcher also observed
that many of the staff were somewhat shy personalities who had
difficulty dealing with open conflict involving philosophy or style.
Conflict did center around substantive issues of policy however,
but even then it was infrequent. These are sweeping statements
and probably unprovable, but of the few staff members who were eased
out by Knight or who left the division on their own, most were ob-
served to have relatively "conflicting"styles, thus lending some
credence to the notion of the difficulty of the division in tolerating
conflict.
c. The Technological System
The technology that the division had available to it in those
days was (and remained) a primative one. Basically it consisted
of three parts - the practice of medicine, the delivery of care and
the practice of government. While the practice of medicine was
viewed as relatively sophisticated, the delivery of care- was not. And,
of course, the practice of government is the overall subject of this
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research. Knight very early on realized that to attempt to both learn
and intervene in the practice of medicine would be bound to bring
reprisals on his organization from the medical profession. Rather
he stressed the delivery of health care as the relevant technology
of the division. This was strategically important since it avoided
direct clashes with the professions and because this technology could
be rapidly and easily learned by non-medical personnel. In fact, he
stressed that professionals should not manage each of the division's
program areas (only the pharmacy unit was headed by a professional).
The political climate, while ripening every day for a direct
approach to the control of medical practice, still required that
the technology the division utilized be one of delivery, not practice.
In addition Knight felt that most practitioners in the state were
competent and well intentioned providers and there was less need
compared, say, to other states, to up the general level of practice.
He could thus utilize the delivery and governmental technologies.
Using these available technologies, the division began to harness
them in the service of its goals. Recall that its general goals were
seen as assuring that quality care was given, at economic but reasonable
rates, in an equitable and accessible manner. The division began to
approach the first by weeding out (sanctioning or suspending) obviously
poor quality providers or categories of providers; the second by
promoting reasonable rates for most providers and offering attractive
rates for those services deemed to have high medical financial or
social pay-offs, i.e., neighborhood health centers, pediatric care,
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deinstitutionalization etc; the third by a quite rigorous process of
assuming the client's or patient's interest about all others where
possible and the fourth by paying bills more rapidly and by developing
competence such that more providers would feel compelled to serve
Medicaid clients.
In summary, then, the division did not, in its first months feel
particularly constrained by the available technology. Indeed, it
chose one that matched both the external political climate and the
particular organizational style being created.
d. The political system
Price's final classification, recall, was the political system.
To the degree that decisions are made in accordance with the formal
production structureor hierarchy, then the political system overlaps
the production system. This, of course, is not always the case in
bureaucracies as decisions may be made quite independently by members
who identify with vested interests or who maintain independent control
of resources. Such independence may cut down on the organization's
ability to be responsive to new knowledge.
Two factors in the division generally prevented the development
of any of these potentially disruptive political activities over the
control of resources. Firstly, the annual budget was an open ended
one and the staff could not directly control the amount of money flowing
through it (e.g. monies could not be "shifted" from, say, hospitals to
nursing homes except over a long period of time and with the aid of
complex political and administrative strategies). The other potential
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disposible resource was the personnel budget. This, Knight, operating
within strong Civil Service constraints, directly controlled himself,
assigning staff assistance to only a very few division members. Recall that
each program unit basically consisted of only one or two persons
each of whom reported directly to Knight. Thus potential political
activity could be kept at a minimum especially since each of the staff
was new to the division and well able to find their own buffered niche
in an expanding organization.
As might be expected, the only potentially scarce resource the
staff could compete for within the division was leadership. Although
such competition was not evident in the early stages of Knight's tenure
there was some indication that throughout 1974, there developed some
competition for the attention, time, or confidence of Knight. Several
members expressed these feelings but these will be described more
fully in Chapter VI.
9. Certainty
During this time the researcher observed that a climate of con-
siderable certainty was being generated among the staff. Upon further
observation and some responsive interviews however, it became clear
that this certainty was not, at that stage, centered around what
was "correct" policy in the health field, e.g. how should the division
pay for non-emergency ambulance rides, should a nursing home be allowed
one, two, or six months to correct its deficiencies. Rather this cer-
tainty was at another level of "how to do one's job."
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This climate of certainty is important for two reasons. Firstly,
it united the division so that it might later focus more clearly on
the choice of substantive goals - a much more complex area given
the turbulent outside environment and disagreement about how best
to deliver care. Secondly, it permitted routine activity to be
carried out with a degree of confidence such that not only the staff
but also the division's providers recognized that the division's basic
functions were being well carried out. This then permitted the
division the psychological "space" to tackle new areas with some
degree of confidence and success.
This initial climate of certainty seemed to be created by three
factors evident in late 1973. There was first of all the informal
task structure described earlier. It helped to create certainty by
assuring that the staff covered all the ground and that they were not
"missing" anything. This structure occasionally even helped determine
what was "right policy", but its major function was the raising of a
wide range of issues. A second factor was the role flexibility developed
through the specific personalities of the staff, the newness of persons
to roles and the conscious switching of staff by Knight until they
found "the right slot". At first glance this second factor might
be expected to create uncertainty since new people (no matter how broad
their outlook or training) in new positions is an inherently unstable
situation. But viewed more in a complex fashion, the importance of
this role flexibility seemed to be to create natural interdependencies
(and thus certainty) between staff members, their styles, and job demands,
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as each unconsciously sought out areas of mutual certainty. The
strategy of letting staff "float" but then "grounding" themselves
appeared to be a valuable one in the circumstances.
A third factor, the constant leadership by Knight and his conscious
attempts to teach a style of management to his staff during this early
period was also helpful to creating this climate of certainty. He
continually stressed "ways to go about your jobs" in his evoking
management maxims such as "do things within the Department the easiest
way... try to create the fewest waves", "think in investment terms -
where we can get the most return for our limited dollars and time,"
"take your time thinking out a problem - we want to be 'right' but
once we know, move rapidly". "Be sure to cultivate 'reliable' sources
of information". "Get things in writing - the paper trail is very
long". These features will be explored more fully in later chapters -
here I only wish to illustrate how Knight's strong emphasis on manage-
ment helped to create an aura of initial certainty about job performance
within the division.
Nonetheless, by the end of several months of Knight's tenure,
some "testing" of the certainty began to be observed, testing at least
to the degree to which certainty had been directly instilled by Knight's
actions (as opposed to the informal task structure and the role flexi-
bility). Knight began a very slow "weaning" of staff. He still kept
a large and visible hand in all discussions during this time, but
felt that "I give people a lot of rope". He began to extend that
rope considerably but many staff commented that it was, while long,
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nonetheless taut, and could be withdrawn easily. For those who began to
act more independently, he maintained an open door and encouraged
staff to come to him with problems even though his response was "well,
you know the answer to that don't you?" Freedom to carry out tasks
in individual ways was increased. With other staff he not only
kept a close watch on task implementation but still maintained a
casual but close check on hours, attendance, commitment to work, etc.
In general though,the staff and Knight began to feel much more certain
about their approach to policy questions despite the turbulent environment.
This certainty was all the more surprising given the generally
low level of general or even specific feedback from the division's
environment. During this period (and even later),feedback from the
environment came mainly from providers of service despite the rhetoric
which said that the division's environment was composed of both pro-
viders and recipients ("our clients"). Since the providers mainly
complained about excessive paperwork and late payment of bills there
was very little basis upon which to judge the ultimate effect of the
division's actions. Staff members complained of having only surrogate mea-
sures of effectiveness, i.e. total dollars spent, not even dollars
per person per treatment category in many cases. Even if the later
figures were available, the relationship between it and the health of
welfare recipients was tenuous.
The response to this situation seems to have been that men-
tioned earlier - the adherence to a comparative standard of care equal
to that a middle class family would receive. That provided much more
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certainty since most of the staff "knew" what middle class care was,
being middle class by origin or status (education or income). Another
factor, also a relative one, permitted the division to carry on with
the assurance that "we must be doing something right". This was
the fact that the program in the state was one of the most liberal
in the country in terms of benefits offered and fee schedules permitted.
Another early response to the feedback problem was the enlargement of
the definition of quality care to encompass first efficiency of delivery,
then adequate distribution across the state and districts, and
finally, consumer representation. Overriding these factors, however,
was a strong sense of moral rightness - it was often simply assumed
that there were "right" ways to deliver care and that if the division
could chose such a way and manage to get it implemented then this was
considered a very positive action. All these factors then, both
those consciously manipulated-by Knight and those that emerged out
of a lack of feedback, created an air of certainty which enabled the
staff and Knight to "get their house in order" and to respond to and
develop new initiatives.
10. The Launching Pad
By the turn of 1973, the division had begun to change. The in-
formal task structure had become much less informal, there was much
less talking among staff about shared problems and there were more
clear lines of authority. That appeared to be at Knight's instiga-
tion as he had begun to state that he didn't want "people stepping into
other people's jobs". If there were any problems about who should
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take responsibility or how it should be divided, he asked that they
come to see hom. He then generally assigned the task to one specific
person or took it upon himself. The staff still talked informally
but rarely generated action from such conferences and began to refer
questions from outside to the appropriate staff rather than attempting
to answer them themselves. The groups thus took on less collective
responsibility. Individuals appeared to be making decisions more
independently although this must be understood in the light of the
shared philosophies being created and the similar personalities of
the staff.
While this increased differentiation appeared fairly obvious
to most, the concurrent absence of any formal integrating devices
was especially apparent. Knight appeared to have an aversion to
such coordination or liaison devices although some did develop out
of necessity (e.g. sanction activity) Knight felt that "good people
will do the necessary liaison work" and that "managers need decision
power" whereas when committee or liaison staff take on a strong
role they "are afraid to delegate responsibility". The division's
integrating devices thus remained informal and at this stage were most
clearly evident in the shared approach to management developed through
Knight's teaching, and a competent and willing group of "students".
Over the next several months the division's activity was to
turn from the more routine activity to the development of an organiza-.
tional paradigm or mission - the "responsible buyer" of medical care
and to the development of a set of principles to make this paradigm
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come alive and take form. The way in which these were developed was
through the same teaching and management approached used in putting
the routine actions in order - but the focus was different. Many
new services, philosophies and techniques were attempted. These
new services, philosophies and techniques I have called new knowledge
since they represented a new situation to which the division would
respond. In some cases, the new situation or knowledge was stimulated
by some force outside the agency; in other cases it was generated
by the division, in either case the division made a decision about
how to manage that new knowledge and (usually) then set out to imple-
ment that decision. Some 15 representative situations of such or
new knowledge wll be the subject of the next three chapters, each
chapter grouping five cases in a particular "stream" of activity.
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Chapter III
The New Medical Services Stream
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One of the self-defined tasks of the Medical Division was to promote
the development of new medical services and design policies for their delivery
to Medicaid clients. Along with development of policy for existing
services, the monitoring of these programs and the handling of exceptions
to the division's rules and regulations, these were considered the main
tasks of the central office. In some cases, the agency actually grew
to believe that their purchasing power could be a major factor in
changing the way health care was delivered within the larger "private"
health care system. The assessment of that thrust is made in Chapters
VI and VII and here I shall discuss only those new services developed
for Medicaid clientele.
Over the course of two years, many factors were evident which led
the division to devote resources to new services development. Often
there would be a strong push from the federal bureaucracy which con-
trolled 50% of its funding. Other state agencies occasionally wanted
to involve the division in joint program development since they saw
Medicaid as a source of revenue. Some programs were selected for poten-
tial leverage in a particular area ("we can have a big effect here"),
while others were the pet projects of some of the staff members. Still
others were programs which involved very obvious cost savings and quality
improvements which usually could be achieved at minimal expenditure of
effort. And finally some were selected in order to set an example of
credible management which could then be utilized in the service of other
goals.
The descriptions which follow highlight only five of the dozen or
more new services the division developed over the course of two years.
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Other significant new services which were developed included the coverage
of renal disease, a family planning program, a revised transportation
policy, a home health care program, the development of a system for the
improved permanent and temporary placement of nursing home patients,
a psychiatric day care program, the enlargement of psychology services,
and the addition of certain mentally retarded patients in intermediate
care facilities to the division's clientele. Yet the five discussed
here adequately serve to indicate the particular "program for action"
developed by the division, the teaching of health care principles, the
important roles of credibility achieved through management and the
development of a conscious paradigm as key elements in the division's
learning model through which new knowledge was managed.
The cases are arranged in a rough chronological order although
there is considerable overlap. The ordering is based therefore, on
the period of time during which the agency made its major concentrated
effort in the policy development for that service.
1. EPSDT
EPSDT, standing for Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and
Treatment, was a federally mandated program begun in late 1972. It fell
among those several services which a state had to offer if it was to parti-
cipate in the Medicaid program at all.
Many states had had difficulty in assuring that welfare children were
being adequately cared for and so a new delivery mode was specified by the
federal mandate - mass screening of large groups of children in order to
detect well-known diseases. The use of public clinics was encouraged and
considerable outreach was mandated. It was a program directed at those
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states with few providers of care and with otherwise low benefit packages
or fee schedules. No new federal money was offered beyond the normal
50% (although financial penalties for non-compliance were included) nad
staff assistance was not specifically provided.
The questions addressed by the new program were ones which the
Medicaid apparatus, both federal and state, had to address each time
a new service was proposed. Firstly a determination of the need for the
service had to be made, a target population had to be singled out and a
mode of delivery and potential provider types suggested. Then a reasonable
cost for the service had to be determined and negotiations with providers
entered into. Finally an effort to propagate the new services'availability
had to be made. In each of these issue areas in the EPSDT program the state
was at one time or other to be at variance with the federal authorities
although the political pressure eminating from Washington waivered con-
siderably over time. Eventually, this pressure was reduced as the
federal agencies admitted the confusing and complex problems involved in
the program. This story first describes how this external environment
confronted a key member within the agency who responded passively to
these varying inputs. This passivity in following federal directives
was strongly determined by this staffer's personal style since he had
little personal commitment to, or "feel" for the medical components of
the program. Initially the story describes the weak external and inter-
nal management by this key person, who continually mirrored the strong
but inconsistent focus of his environment.
A newcomer to the organization then became convinced of the non-
viability of the program based on his past experience and the ministra-
tions of a friend. His need for public commitment on the program and
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his lack of fear (through a healthy naivite) of the federal apparatus
stabilized the grounds for action and confronted the waivering federal
inputs. Finally, as an alternative solution was developed, the state
began to develop allies while continuing to use the federal rhetoric.
Its strategy was straightforward but sophisticated, and this sophistica-
tion, coupled with an aggressive stance, eventually "absorbed" the waiver-
ing focuses from the environment. Slowly the division's strategy began
to dominate, until its environment began to demand proof that this con-
ceptual strategy was actually having an impact and was being routinized.
The federal agency, the Social and Rehabilitation Service (SRS),
directed the program through its regional offices which had been notified
by Washington that EPSDT was a priority program. Pressure was to be
applied to each of the states. There was some feeling (later confirmed
by the regional office) that it was applying pressure only because it
had received directives from Washington. It was not determining policy.
The SRS regional office maintained a tight watch on the division since
it (the division) had had a poor follow-up record on other mandatory
programs of this nature due to its excessively small central office staff
and the difficulty of controlling its 100 local offices.
The program was initially assigned within the medical division in
1972 to the Innovation Unit; a group of five persons including three with
advanced degrees in economics, management, and sociology and two research
assistants. At that time these were the only staff available to respond to
a new initiative although the unit's original mandate had not been to deal
with this sort of "required" program. The director of the Innovation Unit,
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(R.D.), began to explore what other states were doing as he was personally
concerned that the program be implemented and that he not be caught in
a poor follow-up position by HEW. He was not deeply involved in the
program's content per se but said he felt a professional challenge to
make something the federal agency required work well. He was concerned
that unless he could show SRS that Medicaid providers were not only
screening children but were also following up by assuring adequate diagnos-
tic, referral, and treatment facilities, that SRS would hold him responsible.
In addition, his mentor and supervisor at the time was the DPW commissioner,
who would be forced to take political "heat" if the program was not
accomplished.
SRS officials waxed hot and cold over the program however, appearing
uncertain about how to encourage or monitor it since, as one DPW staffer
said,few health professionals were involved in its design. This uncer-
tainty was much later admitted by SRS in private discussions. Not only
was there a question of the political "will" behind the program, but
there was uncertainty about whether the screening should be done en masse
or by private physicians,about how much emphasis would be placed on re-
ferrals and treatment, and about how adequate outreach was to be achieved.
The regional office of SRS at the time, however, made a "deal", stipu-
lating that if the state would promise to act in good faith on trying
to implement the program as perceived by Washington and would accept tech-
nical assistance, the immediate pressure would be relaxed. Finally one
person was sent from SRS to oversee the state's efforts and provide this
assistance. The person "stuck to the coat-tails" of R.D. while they
jointly attempted to develop a plan. At first she was seen as a hindrance
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and R.D. felt he was being "shadowed". They even shared an office. It took
him some time to feel comfortable with the situation and to recognize
and accept the assistance offered.
But finally she began to offer what was seen by R.D. as valuable
assistance and began to report back favorably to SRS. She had had
experience with other states and was able to provide R.D. with cost data,
contacts with others in the state government and to help design a reporting
form to be used by providers of service. She was finally convinced by
R.D. that the effort would be more difficult than anticipated due to what
he described as the "cerplex mix of actors, resources and goals" and the
need to superimpose the programs on an existing structure (i.e., the state
could not set up its own delivery system).
The Innovation Unit staff were assigned to three separate areas,
operations, resources and evaluation, with an overall project leader
reporting to R.D. who continued to maintain all contacts with the outer
environment. R.D. felt that he was the only one who had the "overall
picture" and that he should be the "valve" for all contacts. He did
however take staff with him to meetings and informed them via formal memos
of the state of the world "outside". He spent considerable time on other
responsibilities and looked to the project leader to manage the project
since he was felt to have "a good program sense". The project leader
had good credentials, was older than R.D. and had previously been in sole
charge of the program. However, he was eventually seen by R.D. as not
being a capable administrator and this, in addition to the loose definition
and understanding of the program, led to a shared feeling by the staff that
they were "floating and accomplishing little". This led R.D. finally to
deal directly with the staff and to attempt to rectify the confusion.
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His attempt was viewed by the staff as being inadequate even though
he felt he was dealing with the confusion felt by them. None of them
came directly to him to admit their confusion however. R.D. felt that
perhaps he wasn't projecting enough but felt the "problem" was under
control or at least minor compared to other problems facing his staff
and the whole medical division. The division was without an assistant
commissioner during this time and was physically dispersed in two separate
locations. The staff eventually grew more confused since the federal
guidelines kept changing, the grant supporting the Innovation Unit was
due to run out and they felt they had been hired to do other types of
work.
Despite this, R.D., under continuing heavy pressure, managed to
put together a"package" which included a fee schedule, a separate billing
form with model provider contracts. He had come to view the program
as one which must be statistically segregated in order for SRS and the
regional office to be able to monitor their progress. The only way this
was possible was to isolate all the EPSDT activity via these separate fee
schedules and billing forms. EPSDT was, by necessity then, a separate
program, with separate procedures, fees and billing forms.
R.D. retained little personal interest in the philosophy of EPSDT.
While he at times thought of approaching Washington concerning the con-
fusing nature of the program, he continued to relate only to the regional
office, explaining that he had made a commitment to them to follow their
lead, and did not feel he could go "over their head" to Washington. So
he buckled under and did the job over the next several months.
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During the spring of 1973, R.D. addressed a meeting of the local
chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics which grouped virtually
all of the state's pediatricians (but did not include general practi-
tioners, who also cared for a large proportion of Medicaid children).
One of the chapters leading members, S.Y., listening to the address,
felt that R.D. did not have a good sense of the program and furthermore
did not have the medical knowledge to realize that the federal agency was
also confused. S.Y. "got upset", felt that "things didn't smell right"
even though he "had no analysis of the situation and no alternative plan."
He only knew that medically, a massive screening program without. follow
up, referral and treatment was useless. He had tried a screening program
in his neighborhood health center with disastrous results. However his
colleagues decided to support the program since "it had good intentions"
and most had not had experience with Medicaid and wanted to show their
willingness to participate. They agreed to "play along" according to
R.D.
The subcommittee of the professional society had no further meetings
of substance on othe issue so the pediatrician, S.Y., returned to his health
center and talked it over:with his director, Don Knight, who would in a few
months time become the new assistant commissioner. They both decided that
there was no clear understanding of EPSDT but made no further moves to change
its direction. S.Y. felt that Knight "didn't really get a grasp" of the
situation until he was appointed to his new post.
A few months later, Knight was appointed to the division. His roots
in the neighborhood health center movement gave him strong concern with
providing ongoing regular pediatric care. He immediately looked at the
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EPSDT program and "saw it was a non-program", that is, that it was
really only a component of ongoing regular pediatric care. Shortly after
his appointment, S.Y. "dragged" him to another meeting of the local
chapter of the academy. Knight was well known and had the respect of
the chapter. In talking with some of the key members of the group he
declared that "we must integrate EPSDT with the regular Medicaid program."
S.Y. felt that Knight had said this without any real sense of how to do
this ("almost without any plan"), but would commit himself to it. This
public commitment and statement of philosophy, then, coincided closely
with his realization that it was a "non-program".
We see here for the first time several features which are to reappear
in succeeding cases. Knight relied heavily on both his prior experience
and on the advice of a trusted colleague. And he assumed a strong con-
ceptual position (and a role for the division) without excessively dwelling
on all of the effects of this decision, for example, how others would
view it, or how difficult it might, or might not be to implement that posi-
tion. Knight - "I assumed the problem, rather than spend a lot of time
identifying it. We wanted to get something done and then evaluate it."
Nonetheless, he knew that some of the SRS officials would be upset, but
that would mean little since there were few detailed regulations to evalu-
ate the division's performance at that time and no financial penalties were
envisioned then. We also see the first glimpses of the importance placed
on the principle of comprehensive care - that to segregate the screening
aspects of the program would be against good medical practice.
At first Knight decided to take a low profile within the division and
suggested to R.D. that he begin to rely on his friend from the health center,
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S.Y., whom he had retained as the division's consultant. In addition, he
assigned some of the EPSDT staff to quite unrelated areas, fired the
project leader, and generally devoted limited attention to the situation
for the first few months. He was in effect acting on his own declara-
tion that it was a non-program. In addition, he felt that some of the
staff who were doing research might better be utilized in policy manage-
ment positions. But S.Y. was seen by R.D. as not understanding the
"program" requirements of the federal agency and in an inappropriate
position to act as a managerial advisor since he, R.D., was the "manager".
S.Y. continued to gain confidence in the "non-program" idea and to advance
it to R.D.
Slowly, however, S.Y. began to realize that R.D. lacked drive, energy
and interest in the area of pediatric care. He felt that R.D. could not
explain EPSDT well to groups and was only transmitting what the federal
agency wanted - he was "doing a job". But R.D. still maintained that
EPSDT must be conceived of as a "program" at least for federal reporting
purposes. That is, there had to be some way of reporting how many
children were processed, whether through the EPSDT "program" concept
(as viewed by SRS) or through the regular system of pediatric care which
the division paid for.
One of the two remaining staff members (N.L.) who had previously
been little involved with the project had already begun to rebel against
the concept of a mass screening program. She felt that she had always
had her own doctor when young and "why shouldn't welfare clients ahve the
same" - there seemed to be no need for mass screening. She began to be
struck by Knight's and S.Y.'s commitment. The remaining staff person ad-
mitted his low productivity in the area and was immediately given a new
assignment by Knight.
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Contact with the outside began to increase. Previously, a task force
(mainly other bureaucrats from outside the division) had consulted spora-
dically with R.D. for overall policy advice, but he never met with this
group as a whole and indeed tried to keep them.at arm's length since he
felt that "they would only confuse things". He wanted to keep them "in
reserve" for later "promotional" type activities. This whole effort
at touching base with the environment was seen by Knight as inadequate
since the task force (including R.D.) had had little direct experience
in actually delivering services. In addition Knight found such committees
to be generally ineffective devices.
The professional society began to alter its conception of the program.
S.Y., who now headed an EPSDT committee within the Academy, began to adopt
a more active posture as he worked with Academy members to develop an
acceptable protocol for reimbursable pediatric visits. He felt that since
EPSDT was really only a part of ongoing quality care, the major task was
simply to get "the private sector" to accept Medicaid clients (and provide
statistical data on patients seen). Most had done so with reluctance in
the past since fees were seen as low. Now, however, Knight decided the
division would permit a liberal $15.00 fee. This had always been permitted,
but a lengthy report had been required for each visit.
Knight and S.Y. proposed that the pediatricians could use the $15.00
fee regularly if they signed an agreement to (a) follow a protocol of
activity, and (b) provide adequate statistics each month (as opposed
to individual reports). This positive proposal caught on. It seemed to
reaffirm the pediatricians' commitment and more importantly, translated
it into reality. The principle begun to be developed here would be used
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in many later similar situations. That is, for those services the division
wished to encourage, it should offer a very "sweet" fee. In addition, a
large group of pediatricians in one region of the state had a backlog of
bills cleared up by Knight and this added credibility assured the
cooperation of that group. Here again this attempt to understand pro-
viders' problems (in order to assure their cooperation) was a principle
which Knight and the staff were later to utilize.
The federal agency, SRS, appointed S.Y. as its own consultant for
the region (involving several states). He tried to downplay the fact
of this potential conflict of interest, but it never surfaced since
SRS rarely consulted him. However, the fact of his appointment indicated
some concurrence with the division's "non-program" idea. It is likely that
they asked the Academy of Pediatrics to recommend a professional advisor
and the chapter, seeing that it was their own S.Y. who was the most involved,
recommended him. At the same time, S.Y. (in his chapter role) was also
asked to chair a national meeting of the Academy on EPSDT.
There he got "a bird's eye view of the disaster" occurring in the other
states and began to propose the same solution as he was advancing locally.
The other chapters seemed to grab eagerly onto the idea. He was even
asked to write a national plan and a manual for the Academy. He began this
with the assistance of Knight as a co-author. This growing (national) pro-
fessional credibility and acceptance then served as a background for
Knight's contacts with the federal agency and he began to realize that
other agencies (SRS in this case) could be "swung around" if the division
had the backing of the professional bodies. Knight interacted frequently
with the regional office of SRS and slowly began to convince them of the
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medical value of their idea, while simultaneously stressing that the rigid
federal reporting requirements would only drain energy from the true task.
Much later, during a trip to Washington, the regional director of SRS and
Knight even concurred in presenting a united view to the Washington office
of SRS.
Thus, while it appeared that the regional branch was being slowly
won over to the non-program idea, Knight did not manage at this stage
to obtain assurance in writing that they agreed with his concept. In
fact, R.D. believed the term "non-program" was never voiced in SRS's pre-
sence. In essence, then, Knight was adopting the SRS rhetoric, a con-
siderable change from his initial goal of doing nothing about the "program"
and of assigning as few people as possible to it. He had come to learn
that at least initially one must talk the monitor's language. He was still
unconvinced however of the need to "go through the motions for the feds"
and began to suggest the new strategy to R.D.
R.D. then began to adapt his strategy to the new one which involved
outreach to get children into the aegis of regular providers who would
sign contracts, follow a protocol, and agree to supply statistics. He
felt that he had had this in his own mind as a strategy all along but
had devoted effort to trying to comply with SRS's guidelines which had
emphasized screening and separate clinics as the mode of delivery and the
provider types preferred. Now he had only to "retool" his thinking to
the old strategy, i.e., to adopt an offensive strategy as opposed to a
defensive one.
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R.D. had, however, not won the confidence of Knight and the latter
continued to diffuse the responsibility for EPSDT relying on others such
as S.Y., one of R.D.'s staff (N.L.), and another new director in the
division, R.K. Knight said that he began to realize that while medical
skills were not needed, his staff must at least have some interest in
health delivery. R.D. seemed to lack the necessary commitment and
did not respond to Knight's teaching style. Knight felt much happier now
that R.D.'s involvement was lessened and he began to work closely with
N.L. stressing with her not only the importance of having a philosophy to
guide themselves but one that assured comprehensive pediatric care and
not the fragmented program proposed by the SRS.
R.K., a former associate of Knight, was also asked to help R.D. with
the program. R.K., like his boss, had valuable pediatric experience
and was able to oversee the project for a few months. He too, however,
had originally conceived of EPSDT as a separate program and had recommended
the setting up of a distinct billing system for it. But Knight convinced
him that in terms of philosophy, statistics, and billing, EPSDT was a
non-program and that emphasis on separating it out could only lead to ex-
cessive concentration on the format, not the content of the program. Thus,
"non-program" came to take on a new meaning -- that is, EPSDT, while having
substantial medical content, should not be segregated as an administrative
program, like,for example, nursing homes or dentistry.
R.K. helped to contact providers and neighborhood health centers
using the sweetener of the higher fee for solo practitioners (which had
always been in existence but unknown to most of the providers) and the
threat of withdrawal of support from the neighborhood health centers.
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He also participated in the contacts with Washington and the professional
society. But he did not wish to stay involved for long and began to pull
away.
At that point, it was decided by Knight that too much time had been
spent in identifying the problem. Rather, he would "assume the problem",
take a risk, "do something" and then evaluate it. He concluded the project
did not need a manager at all and made the sole remaining staff member
(N.L.) fully responsible although she still reported to R.D. on other
matters. A disagreement developed between R.D. and Knight over assigning
a staff person to "manage" a program. But Knight prevailed and, a few
months later when R.D. assumed new tasks, N.L. began to work more closely
with Knight who had then begun to beef up his own involvement by writing
the national EPSDT manual (for the Academy). Most of her efforts were
devoted to persuading providers to sign contracts and to complete the
now minimal reporting forms.
Knight's interest picked up with his writing of the manual, which
was designed to explain EPSDT to a national audience of pediatricians.
One of the by-products of this manual was that the state's EPSDT phil-
osophy began to be nationally "legitimized" by the American Society of
Pediatrics. Knight felt this legitimacy could be used as a tool in
future defensive actions with SRS which might be necessary to head off
any question of non-compliance with federal regulations. But the
regional office appeared convinced of the division's approach and no
financial penalties were envisaged although they and Knight had to con-
tinue to keep convincing Washington of the validity of the state's stra-
tegy. Thus, over the next few months, at least two "audits"
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of the program's effectiveness were conducted by federal officials from
Washington. Each time Knight managed to convince them that the philosophy
of his approach was correct and that the pressure should be lessened
so that they could "get on with the job".
However in late 1974, a citizen's group made plans to file a suit
against the division for non-implementation of the program. The advocacy
group, after meeting with Knight and the staff, accepted the philoso-
phical direction of the division but commented that not enough clients
knew of the program. The regional office of SRS felt pressure from
Washington to produce hard evidence of success and began to try to
pressure Knight to show more evidence of progress. But the advocacy
group's problem could only be solved by improved performance by the
field staff at the local levelover which the division had no direct
control (see field case in Chapter V). Similarly, an improved effort
at enlisting more EPSDT providers, a central office function, would necessi-
tate considerably greater staff than were available. Knight did not
appear disturbed by either of these challenges since he felt his philoso-
phy was correct and indeed welcomed the challenge since it might force
the state's new administration to provide more staff in the face of
federal penalties.
When some additional staff did become available through a federal
job training program, he assigned several of them to the division's
regional offices to begin to provide the necessary outreach. However
other staff members, and the department's lAwyer, D.L., and N.L. re-
mained worried and often asked themselves "have we really done anything".
I call this the "nagging ego problem", one which is seen to appear often
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among the staff (not Knight) as they assessed their activity after a
burst of enthusiasm and energy. In the short run such a syndrome did
not appear to present a problem but in the long run was potentially
destructive in that staff might feel their constraints were so severe
that certain minimal aspects of job satisfaction (i.e., positive feed-
back from the environment) were not being met. Yet they continued to
work in the direction laid down by Knight, trying to minimally satisfy
the "bureaucratic" federal requirements with the few staff available.
The generating force behind all this activity, the concept of a
non-program is difficult to trace to its source. Knight had had ex-
tensive experience in a high quality pediatric system and little exper-
ience in dealing with federal regulations concerning the kind of care
offered. He was thus ready to brand the program as a sham, one un-
acceptable to the state, and one that he, as a responsible official,
could not in good faith support. Furthermore, he sensed that R.D.
lacked a "gut" program sense and would cater to "what the feds thought
was right" and not develop a strong offensive. If R.D. had felt
strongly about the program content, Knight's realization might have
been delayed considerably. But Knight was able to ease R.D. out of
the EPSDT responsibility and in effect, take it over himself. N.L. and
R.K. shared his approach and only needed to be convinced that SRS
could be confronted on an issue of policy. Knight's strategy of con-
vincing SRS consisted of gaining credibility with allies (the pro-
fessional society) based it on the integrity and soundness of his
approach while continuing to use the federal rhetoric. As his strength
grew and he was able to convince the regional office, he became more bold.
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It is clear that the learning not only of this strategy but of the possi-
bility that it could be effective was the most important contribution
this case made to the organization's overall mission.
The mission or paradigm, as described in Chapter II, was to act as
a "responsible buyer". While this paradigm was not called upon this
early in the divisinn's new life, some of its features were evident
in that they clearly guided the development of some of the division's
working principles. For example, buying quality products translated
into not purchasing a separate system of treatment for welfare children
and responsibility translated into holding specific providers account-
able both to the department (via provider agreements) and for the re-
ferral of children to needed specialists.
The manner in which the division developed its strategy is inter-
esting in that much of what we see here will also be seen in later cases.
I shall introduce the term "program for action" here to briefly describe,
in a generic sense, the behavior rules which Knight (and the division)
used to generate their final decisions. Since the use of the term- "pro-
gram".within . the division had a more specific meaning, i.e. anything
carried out by one of the staff, e.g. a "nursing home program", or "a
sanction program", there may be confusion with the term "program for
action" here. I will generally specify the use of the term or, alter-
natively, refer to the "pattern of action" or "program for learning".
Firstly there was the early attempt to deal with the complexity
of the new program by linking it to another program - in this case,
ongoing pediatric care. There was the strong role assumption by the
division that it was responsible and should take a stand on the issue.
-94-
A specific goal was formulated early on - in this case "do nothing".
Then there was the direct assignment of responsibility, in the case
taking it away from a large unwieldy group and vesting it primarily
in Knight himself. There was the clear attempt to "bend" the regulations
of SRS to suit the division's outlook and then a strong reliance on
past experience and close friends (i.e. S.Y.) to formulate that outlook,
coupled with a widening move to convince or "touch base with" the
provider community. Also evidenced was the entrepreneurial spirit in
which a "problem", i.e. having to respond to the federal mandate, was
turned into an opportunity to develop, for the first time, a protocol
of good pediatric care.
In addition to the "program for action" developed, several specific
principles about how to deliver medical care or how to mobilize others
to assure that it was delivered were developed during the case. These
principles were the first entries into an expanding pool of principles
which the division would draw on in later cases.
I have already mentioned the emphasis on "comprehensive" care as
an important pediatric principle, the use of high fees to encourage
providers, that working with children had a high pay-off, and that
providers' philosophies should be listened to. Knight also began
to stress the importance of having a philosophy, i.e. knowing what
you want - not only for himself but also in his staff (see the lack of
it in R.D.). Other minor principles were also generated in the
case which were to have greater significance in later cases. For
example, the feeling that welfare clients should not be discriminated
against (as would occur in a mass screening program), that local offices
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could not be relied on to provide outreach, or that one must be very
careful with reporting systems since they could be easily manipulated
and could lead to misunderstanding. These principles, however, were
not initially widely shared since only Knight, R.K. and N.L. worked on
the program. Knight was later to invoke these principles (and others)
when dealing with program staff in other cases.
Knight's approach here in developing these principles was not as
clearly a teaching style as in later cases. Here Knight clearly viewed
the program as his program and he was, to a considerable degree,
teaching himself about how to implement the set of working principles
described above. It is not clear whether much learning of these principles
or strategies occurred through the staff. R.D. remained unconvinced that
it was an appropriate strategy to directly confront the federal apparatus.
His prior experience had taught him this and he still felt, the division was
open to possible financial penalties for non-complaince. He did admit
to learning that tighter control should be kept on his own staff, since
he felt he had not provided adequate "direction". The EPSDT staff itself
had been summarily decimated by Knight and learned little about operating
strategy with SRS since they had had little contact with them.
N.L., however, continued to work on EPSDT and gained considerable
confidence and knowledge of pediatric care delivery with Knight's backing.
She also benefitted from his teaching style as he carefully laid out the
facts of each situation and explained his decisions to her, let her
observe him in meetings, and was generally non-critical of her when she
made "mistakes", since he was equally concerned with the process of her
learning. He also showed an ability to anticipate N.L.'s talents, that is,
she was viewed as being very interpersonally adroit and could help "win
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over" various SRS officials and HEW auditors with her skills. These and
other aspects of Knight's teaching style will be more fully described
later in this and other chapters. Here the reader is alerted only to
the success of that style with N.L. and its failure with R.D.
We also begin to see some of the features of Knight's management
style. There was his reluctance to rely on a committee structure (as
R.D. had), or on research or "innovation" units, his keeping a close
check on staff in whom he had not developed confidence, his belief in
the importance of non-medical staff managing programs and his willing-
ness to let those staff "find their own slots" while following a direc-
tion worked out between them and himself.
Both these management and teaching approaches were directed at the
fulfillment of the division's paradigm - the responsible buyer. In
summary then, this case has described how a concept originally conceived of
as a program came to be viewed as a "non-program" since it did not fit
within that evolving paradigm. It is a story of how Knight "learned"
and how he convinced (taught) others inside and outside the agency.
Equally important, it is a story of how the agency was forced to demon-
strate that not only had its concept been learned but that its practical
effects were being felt.
2. Free-Standing Mental Health Centers
This case concerns the establishment of a purchasing policy by the
division for free standing mental health clinics. These clinics had
existed in the state since the mid-sixties and by 1973 some 50 of them
were providing services. They had received considerable federal grant
funding but their primary source of income was from the Department of
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Mental Health (DMH) which paid the clinic's staff salaries. Local contri-
butions (up to 25%) covered some overhead and other expenses. The clinics,
many of which were small and staffed by part-time professionals, provided
"free" services to their clients, including Medicaid recipients.
In 1969, a group from a state mental health association and the
DMH approached the Welfare Department to propose that the division
include the free-standing clinics (FSMHC's) in their reimbursement plan.
At that time the extra cost to the DPW was estimated at $2,000,000 per
year and was rejected by DPW budget officials as being too costly. With
the advent of a new commissioner in 1970, the group tried again and the
commissioner convened a task force of his research director, the director
of medical care (who reported to the Assistant Commissioner of the
Medical Division) and other DPW, DMH and DPH staff. The issue lagged for
over two years with three principle roadblocks being cited; the question
of whether the clinics needed to be licensed by DPH; what criteria
DPH would use as certifying agents for DPW (a second role for DPH) and
the overall lack of leadership within the task force.
Finally the emergence of the new umbrella human services agency (HSA)
managed to resolve the licensing question, and DPW began to write condi-
tions of participation for the clinics to be used as DPH criteria. These
conditions were generally viewed as being "obsolete" since they were in-
tended mainly for child retardation bureaus but were accepted by the task
force as being plausible in the short run. The question of leadership was
not resolved until mid-1973 when Knight was appointed.
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Two young DPW staff members had been working part time on the
conditions of participation but both had left the department (one before
Knight's arrival, one shortly after) and this had slowed down the process
according to the director of one of the clinics and a key member of the
task force, Y.E. Upon Knight's appointment, he was informed of the task
force's meetings and the length of time it had taken to produce such
little agreement and began to attend the meetings with a new staff
member, L.A. He was somewhat cynical about the whole mental health
area, feeling that in most cases it was a "rip off" or an "exercise in
mutual gratification" between the professional and client.
But the HSA was stressing that as much federal money as possible be
attracted into the state and the opportunity to convert the clinic's
100% state funding to 50% state funding (at least for the Medicaid
portion of the clinics) was appealing. Knight also felt wary of the
clinics free standing nature (not connected to other medical care) but
felt that, "the clinics were there, we had to deal with them". He
responded openly to HSA's push but adopted his own immediate specific
goal that he would not worry too much about program content but rather
concentrate on the financial aspects of the problem. The clinics, for
their part, saw possible Medicaid involvement as a source of additional
dollars.
Knight was disturbed by the amount of time the task force process
was taking and suggested that one of the clinics be selected as an
experiment through which an acceptable dollar rate per visit could be
determined. He had familiarity with one clinic and suggested it be
chosen. The clinic members of the task force at first perceived him
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as "abrupt" and even "uninformed" on mental health.* For example, they
convinced him ("shouted him down" according to one task force member)
to add a more representative clinic to the experiment. While he was
later to shy away from large task forces such as this since he felt
them to be ineffective, he felt he was saddled with this group and could
only prod it along, not disband it.
While these costs were being developed, the task force turned to
another!.ssue, the double payment issue. That is, state Medicaid money
would be~ paying for the services of DMH doctors already salaried by the
state. Considerable debate was conducted on this issue with Knight and
HSA taking a hard line, i.e., the clinics would only be allowed to
keep 12 1/2% of the rate (still to be determined) as an incentive to pay
for the costs of billing for Medicaid patients. Otherwise there would
be no incentive to bill Medicaid since each dollar coming in would be,
in effect, "subtracted" from the DMH salaries and returned to the
state treasury.
The issue appeared to be settled satisfactorily after many hours
of negotiation so the clinics agreed to the formula and the Undersecretary
at HSA said that as long as the DMH and DPW were in accord then he too
"would go along". But the calculations for these billing costs and the
rate determination revealed that the clinics had no real idea of their
cost per visit and similarly had no idea whether the 12 1/2% rebate would
be good or bad. ("It looked good so we went along." - Y.E.). Knight
began to be upset at putting money into such poorly managed clinics but
felt that it was the only way possible that he could influence the
delivery of services. The clinics did not initially perceive him as
having a desire to change their service patterns, but their poor management,
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combined with Knight's own basic mistrust of the mental health profession,
led him to add a restructuring of service patterns to his agenda.
Knight, while as usual having a specific goal (increase federal dollars)
was not as quick to assert the division's perogatives as he was later to
become. It was only when he saw one of his principles (good management)
being abused and another possibly violated (poor clinic treatment of
Medicaid clients) that he began to be more assertive. He moved rapidly
on the question and with authority, and while this often annoyed the clinic
members of the task force, it gained him considerable credibility since
"we couldn't believe we -ere getting anywhere - it had taken seven years
of talking".
Here we see a beginning of the iteration of the principles which
were to be used in other cases both within and outside the mental
health area. For example, the principle that Medicaid clients should
not be "discriminated against" through excessive provision of care
by residents or nurses was stressed in the EPSDT, 442 and HM0 cases.
Similarly the principle that the division should devote its energy
to well managed providers surfaced later in the HMO and Day Care cases.
And finally the feeling by Knight that the staff must talk to providers,
be open and try to understand their problems was stressed in the EPSDT,
HO and Day Care cases.
The remaining issue to be settled before services could be provided
was the actual rate to be paid and what were to be considered as allowable
costs (i.e. services) within that rate. One way to have approached this
would have been to begin work on revising the conditions of participation
(which had the force of regulations). But each of the parties seemed
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to feel that the rate question was more important and, since it was to be
a rate developed from scratch, any agreements on cost components could
then be later developed into conditions of participation. The director
of mental health, L.A., knew however that the old ones previously prepared
would have to be revised at some time so as to make the understandings
reached more binding.
The clinics wished to include the cost of many types of mental health
professionals in addition to the psychiatrist, for example, social workers
or even occupational therapists. In addition they felt that group therapy
was an important service to be reimbursed. It was here that Knight's
initial biases against the mental health field focused on the clinics.
As one of his staff was later to remark, "Knight had a medical model
of mental health - that you have 3 to 4 patients going at one time,
that there are no "no-shows", and that you are treating a "disease",
whereas the mental health profession worked in terms of 1 hour blocks
of time, frequent "no-shows" and an attack on circumstances surrounding
the"pathology". Despite Knight's background in a neighborhood health
center, his view of mental health services was based on "the private
practice model" according to his consultant in the area.
But Knight persisted and the compromise reached was that professionals
such as psychologists and social workers with masters degrees could pro-
vide service but that they would have to be billed in the clinic's
name and then under the direct supervision of the director of the clinic
who must be a physician. He had begun to see how social workers and
other "mid-level professionals" could be useful in certain settings (like
his former health center) but he feared that in unstructured situations
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like the DMH clinics, the services could easily "get pushed from a
reasonable level of professionalism to simply outreach." The rate
also covered the services of residents and interns with.which Knight
disagreed since he felt it was "second class care". The rate actually
agreed upon was a high one, $30/visit, allowing all these para-professional
and trainee services to be hired but designed so that the clinics could
be prodded to tighten up their medical accountability (the internal
control was to be that all services must be under the direct super-
vision of the physician) and their financial management.
By this time Knight had a full-time staff person, L.A., working on
mental health (where no one had been previously) and she was able to
negotiate the rate through the Rate Setting Commission (RSC). She had
a social work background and no specific mental health background, but
learned quickly during the negotiations with the clinics as she and
Knight developed a shared understanding of the key principles involved.
Knight began to place more responsibility in her hands ("she thinks
very logically") and this negotiation of the rate was her first solo
effort in the area. The high rate was questioned by the Rate Setting
Commission but L.A. relied on the support of the chairman of RSC, with
whom the division had good relations, to push the rate through. The
clinics again requested that occupational therapists and rehabilitation
workers be included in the comprehensive rate determination but, upon
the division's advice, the RSC denied this. They did however set a
separate rate for para-professional visits against the division's
wishes but the division simply refused to purchase this particular
service even though a rate had been set. But these aides were only at
a bachelors level and Knight felt strongly about such "dilution" of quality.
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Knight's initially strong position on the mental health area was
thus negotiated to a successful initial compromise. He felt he had stressed
the role of accountable, well trained providers and then began to rely
on his staff to carry out the program - ("He doesn't like to get his
hands that dirty" - L.A.). But here the staff was to influence him
and the program in a significant manner. L.A. had just had a young
man (L.E.) added to her staff who had had some experience in community
development work aid in a state public health hospital. When the problem
was now specifically in their hands, they began to explore with detail
how the accountability could be secured (i.e. monitored) and how they
might get Knight to accept some of their "newer" views of mental health
such as the role of non-physicians. While they did not ignore the guide-
lines established by the task force in any way, they continually dis-
cussed with Knight these and other topics such as "problem-oriented
records", which had been suggested by the division's two consultants,
his brother-in-law and a psychiatrist (D.M.) at Knight's former health
center. Knight had great faith in the two consultants and began to
leave the medical decisions to D.M., while the staff, sensing this
strong personal relationship, worked through him to get their views
across to Knight.
This relationship was apparent even to the clinics and to one offi-
cial in DMH who said they were clearly aware that the consultant was by
then the key person in the division. He shared the goals of Knight
however and their relationship was mutually reinforcing. Knight was
intrigued by the idea of problem oriented records in which, for each case,
the clinics would submit a plan outlining what the patient's problem was
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in functional terms, not psychiatric terms. That is, what could the
patient not do that was causing his maladjustment in society. The
record would also include a plan for treatment and progress notes as
to how well the patient was meeting the goal. They discussed the
idea of requiring these from each of the clinics along with considerable
debate about the role of non-psychiatrists in mental health.
Both L.A. and her staff member, L.E., and D.M. felt that they had
managed, over the course of the succeeding year to change Knight's view
on the possible treatment forms offered by non-MDs. The clinics, of
course, felt encouraged by the change and entered into discussions about
the problem-oriented records with a more open attitude. Knight saw
these records as a way to further increase medical accountability. He
agreed with the HSA undersecretary, L.N., who, in expressing his hesitancy
about the effect of problem-oriented records, said that "you don't improve
management by imposing conditions", but felt that he had no other lever
to do so other than the division's buying power.
Evidently both the clinics and DMH felt the effect of that lever
since they agreed to the problem-oriented record system. Both the key
member of the task force (Y.E.), and a DMH official said they did feel
Medicaid power was significant and that they had "clout", and they respected
Knight's attempt to understand the philosophies of the clinics. While
this may appear strange at first glance, the clinics, long in a state
of poor and "under management" were responsive to the first person making
demands of them. They were a very decentralized physician-dominated
organization and their responsiveness can only be explained by sheer
"shock". They simply were not used to the idea of accountability but
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when this vacuum was filled by Medicaid, they did respond. Knight also
used this principle of "stepping into a vacuum" to advantage in the
EPSDT case and in HMO and Day Care where other staff successfully filled
similar vacuums.
Meanwhile, L.E. began the certification process. Each of the 50
clinics had to submit documents describing their operation and be in-
spected by the department. This inspection was informal as the depart-
ment had arranged with DPH to conduct formal certification visits. During
this process L.E. built up relations with each of the clinics and pre-
pared them for the advent of the problem-oriented records. His style
was deemed "difficult" to work with by Y.E., who also felt that "he does
not know who to go to to to get things done" but the relationship was
still one of general acceptability. L.E. felt that DMH personnel were
"impossible to work with" but continued to work with the clinical (medical)
,directors of each clinic, bypassing the executive directors. This appar-
ently weakened the community input into the discussion since the
board of the clinics reported to the executive director and not the
medical director.
Given L.E.'s difficulty with DMR staff and his view of the import-
ance of community development, this is at first glance inexplicable. But
initially L.E.'s learning was internal - that is he was enjoying strong
support from Knight and also felt he had benefitted by his relationship
with D.M. who made him realize that his former community development work
was quite parallel to and indeed was "community mental health". He
.also felt that he had learned from Knight that his former "ideologically
pure" view of publicly run centers was a red herring in that the public/
-106-
private question was really one of "do the clinic staff have the right
values, the commitment and the managerial and medical ability." More
importantly, he felt that "we can get something for our resources."
Thus the division was a buyer, one with clout. L.E.'s aggressive and
heavy handed approach to the clinics may have been an over-reaction to
this newly declared power and probably accounted for his "difficulty" in
working with the clinics.
After the certification process was completed, attention shifted
to the problem-oriented records. Knight felt that these would be a great
step forward and urged their progress. L.E. and D.M. worked with
several of the clinics and developed an understanding of the requirements.
They also instituted a regulation that all visits after 10 per year must
have the prior approval of the division in addition to submission of
the regular treatment plans. Knight felt that what the division was
doing was "getting itself into a position where we can set criteria
for what services the clinics provide." The clinics for their part
did not completely understand the position they were being maneuvered
into and felt it would be easy to "fake the record", i.e., provide what
DPW wanted to hear.
L.A. feared this also, but other staff officials at DMH and Y.E.
and D.M. agreed that the simple fact of preparing such a record would
change the attitude and performance of the clinicians. The act of making
one's tasks explicit would be a great step forward in the mental health
area, long characterized by a closed-system, dependency relationship
between patient and clinician. The rejection rate of records submitted
for D.M. to review was low. The only problem appeared to be that DMH
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clinicians were also operating with their own parallel record system
and that the existence of the two was confusing.
The experiment with the rate formula however was soon to create
another problem. After a period of several months it became clear
that not all the clinics were actively billing for Medicaid clients.
Some of them were suburban clinics who were relatively well managed but
who had few welfare clients. Others, it turned out, felt that the
administrative work required to complete the complex billing requirements
was not worth the $3.25/visit the clinics were allowed to keep before
rebating the fee to the state treasury. This new billing requirement had also
come on the heels of additional federal record-keeping requirements on the
clinics which had been "a fiasco" and had left them "battered".
Despite the fact that all had agreed initially that the fee was
adequate, this seemed to confirm Knight's convictions - that the
clinics were poorly managed and had little idea of what it cost them to
do anything. But the clinics could not prove they were losing money
at this fee, they just "felt it". A staff member from the state budget
agency (Administration and Finance) toured the facilities and discovered
to his amazement how small (and consequently undermanaged) many of the
facilities were. He returned to argue with the secretary and under-
secretary that the rebate should be 50% not 87 1/2%. Knight actively
opposed this, and the association of clinics, later admitting that they
should have tried to convince Knight himself, lobbied directly with the
cabinet secretary. But they "put their eggs in the wrong basket" accord-
ing to Y.E. and the decision was made not to change the formula.
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The A&F staffer then became a member of an advocacy group working
with the clinics and continued to push Knight for a better deal on the
rebate. But Knight felt that DMH should have forced the clinics to
bill Medicaid for the state to get the federal financial participation
(which was a greater net gain to the state than any "loss" the clinics
might suffer by billing Medicaid). Knight also felt there was no
reason why most of them could not handle the paperwork for less than
the 12 1/2% and saw this as a chance to force better management on them.
DMH agreed but their control over the centers was so loose that they
did not appear to envisage any action in the short-run, although the
DMH commissioner had a budget-review team inspecting all the centers
as part of an overall program.
Discussion with the clinics continued on other grounds such as the
possibility of not billing for trainee professionals and the possibility
of having more part-time employees. But Knight took a hard line on
these questions, particularly since he felt that trainees were a second
class form of service. This was in line with his overall principle that
if it 'is impossible to evaluate care absolutely, one can at least be
certain that it is as good as what middle-class people get, i.e. the
fully trained professionals. L.E. also revised the conditions of parti-
cipation somewhat to conform to the agreements worked out (although a
major revision would be necessary soon - said both he and L.A. - to
reflect the actual practice demanded of the clinics) and worked the
guidelines through the DPW bureaucracy so that they appeared in all the
field offices' policy manuals. D.M. felt that still more work needed to
be done with the clinics on such matters as peer review, but felt that
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that could be slowly "folded into" the requirements. Attention was then
turned to mental health services in comprehensive neighborhood health
centers (NHC's).
Here the team moved ahead much more- rapidly. R.T.., the NHC director,
began to participate and he stated that "the process was easy. We used
the guidelines and the rates developed in the free standing clinics."
The NHC's appeared to be slightly better managed and the idea of compre-
hensive care appealed to Knight much more, particularly since he
received, in a moment of candor from Y.E., the admission that the free
standing clinics often did discriminate against Medicaid clients. But
L.E. and D.M. felt that their continuing conversations with Knight had
educated him to accept the role of non-psychiatrists in mental health.
Indeed the discussion with the NHC's, for example, centered not on
whether psychologists would be permitted to bill for services, but
what their qualifications need be to do so. Finally, after the
conditions of participation for NHC's were inserted in the policy manual,
L.E. moved on to develop similar conditions for hospital out-patient
departments and family service agencies. He was buoyed by Knight's
statements that "after sanctions, getting mental health (and its abuses)
straightened out is our next priority."
Given that Knight deliberately chose to place resources in the
mental health area without any strong pressure from outside, it is apparent
that this decision was based on his overall philosophy. He perceived
the mental health area to be one where services were of extremely varied
.quality and the opportunity to get "ripped off" was high. Not only could
he improve quality but there was a chance to exercise the responsibility
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he wanted to achieve - the mental health field was decentralized, lacking
in direction and poorly managed, thus Medicaid "might have some real
clout here". It was clear that the clinics and DMH recognized the clout.
The success of the new program can, of course, not be completely
evaluated. A new service was provided and with relatively little delay.
The providers gained a respect for the program and seemed willing to
work with the division on further refinements and to accept their lead
in focusing on tightening up their procedures given a lack of leadership
from DMH. The Medicaid staff easily transferred their learning to new areas
of mental health and the division's perceived role as a responsible buyer
was enhanced. The mental health field is one relatively insulated from
other areas off medicine and effects in other cases in the division cannot
be easily assessed although many of the principles developed in this
case were used in other situations.
These principles have already been described in the case - for
example, the principle of working in areas where federal financial parti-
cipation could be increased or where a vacuum of responsibility existed.
Similarly the principle of exerting effort only with well managed
providers, unless such efforts might reasonably effect service patterns
was developed here and applied elsewhere. And the principle of assuring
medical accountability (in this case a psychiatrist) was stressed.
The -teaching by Knight so evident in other areas appeared to be more
mutual here. The staff learned most of these principles and about their
increased buyer power while Knight himself broadened his view of the
possibilities of the mental health field. Knight, as usual, carefully
explained why he felt the clinics were poorly managed and why he wished
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to stress medical accountability ,yet was open to the teaching of his
staff and consultant. He let the two staff members develop the program
in their own styles (which were quite different from each other) and the
three of them very clearly recognized that they had established a set
of principles which could be used in other settings (i.e. they knew what
they had learned).
All the features of the "program for action" described in the first
case were evident here and a few more features were added. The
division was first of all comparatively open to its environment in
accepting that there was a problem to be dealt with. It assumed a moderately
strong role position and adopted a fairly specific goal which could ini-
tially be focused on,i.e. develop an adequate reimbursement rate. As
usual, Knight tried to conserve resources by first assuming that mental
health services were analogous to regular medical services (i.e. the medi-
cal model later downgraded by his consultant and L.E.). The usual
reliance on close friends for advice and the common teaching base with
the larger provider element was also clearly in evidence here.
We also see here a feature not shown in the EPSDT case. That is,
after the initial goal was established, a relatively slow but persistent
search for a satisfactory (as opposed to "perfect") solution was instigated.
Indeed the satisfactoty solution was viewed as one which could be used
elsewhere,thus turning a problem into an opportunity. This complex of
behaviors became a quite common feature of the division's program and
was clearly one of its strengths. That is, despite the very strong sense
of mission and the assertion of the rightness of the division's peroga-
tives and its principles, the combining of these into a workable
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solution was usually carried out with considerable prudence and lack
of arrogance - all of which helped to assure credibility with providers.
Knight's conscious management approach was most evident here in
his insistence on sound management from the clinics and also in his
feeling that the clinics must understand the division's position - that
it was aiming for a program of high integrity. Knight's usual desire
to have clear lines of authority was not so evident here as the team
of D.M., L.A. and L.E. shared the responsibility with little supervision
from Knight at all. It seems that this may be explained by the high degree
of trust and confidence he placed in each of these three. But as usual,
he did stress the important role that non-professionals should play in
managing health care and the value of experimentation. Thus, not
only did the clinics and DMH recognize the "clout" the division possessed,
but they clearly respected the manner in which the division exercised it,
both in the division's implicit program for action (e.g. using well
qualified consultants), and in the way Knight consciously managed that
program in the service of a goal-acting as a responsible buyer.
3. The 442 Program
This case involved the development of a new service by a group of
outside state agencies who felt that Medicaid might make a financial impact
on, or have program inputs to, their new service. Their estimate of the
size of these inputs varied widely as did their interest in involving the
division. The Medicaid staff made tentative forays into the program -
trying to link it to an existing service, then dropping involvement when
advised to by the assistant commissioner. He, keeping his overall strategy
to himself, later swept in to defend his agency's perogatives and to
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"assemble" a trusted group of allies to develop policy. Throughout this
time,however, he continued to try to instill a sense 3f purpose in his
staff, one of whom devoted little attention to and one of whom became
quite involved in, the actual details of the program. Eventually a
harmonious agreement as to the division's role in the program was reached
while the other agencies continued to implement it and further refinements
were made by one of the division's staff.
The "442 program" was a law (Chapter 442) passed in mid-1972 by the
state legislature. It was intended to mandate that local school districts
assure that the full range of regular educational programs be available for
all children with physical, medical, emotional and developmental problems.
The needs of all school-age children were to be determined through a
"core evaluation" by a multi-specialty team who would also develop an
educational program based as much as possible within the school system.
The implementation of the law was to be primarily designed by the Office
of Special Education (OSE) within the Executive Office of Education (EOE)
.although the Office of Children (OC), a Governor's coordinating body, was
assigned to coordinate interagency activity shortly after the 442 bill was
passed. The OC had not concerned itself with Medicaid and stated that if
it had thought about Medicaid's role, it assumed it would be just like
another bill payor, like Blue Cross. Thus no role was initially man-
dated for the Medicaid program or for any other third party payor.
Knowledge of the program first penetrated the Medical Division in
late spring of 1973. N.L., who.had been working on EPSDT, heard the
program mentioned in a meeting with the Office of Children. She called
the Special Education Office but was informed that no regulations had
-114-
been developed and that they could not yet define the program and were
also not certain if Medicaid would have a role in it. She suggested
that if some patients being "treated" were Medicaid recipients (as
was likely, probably more than 15% of the total), then she would need
to at least know the numbers of Medicaid clients involved so that
they might be included in EPSDT statistics. At this point the OSE did
indicate that they were worried about program duplication with Medicaid
and double billing (one source of state funds paying another). The
discussion ended there, however, with some later indication that OSE
took a rather parochial view of the program and was not very interested
in involving other agencies. N.L. then simply prepared a summary of
the legislation which was transmitted by her senior (R.D.) to Knight who
had just recently been appointed.
According to N.L., Knight read the material and "decided that Medi-
caid had no input", although he did not give his reasons for this decision
to her. Knight himself could only vaguely recall having been presented
with N.L.'s summary and felt that Medicaid would indeed have a role but
that it would have been premature to jump into it at that time or to
designate a person to work on it. In fact, Knight said he was quite
interested in the 442 concept, but did not move immediately since he
knew that eventually those in charge of the program would have to come
to Medicaid, asking for its money. He did not discuss it with his staff
since he "felt he knew more about pediatric care" than any of them and
there was thus no need at that time to enlarge the scope of a problem
which was not yet an issue. The question was again brought to Knight's
attention in the early fall by one of the division's regional offices,
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but he waited until early December to further precipitate some action.
There is nothing to suggest that he concerned himself with the problem
during this time.
This first series of events illustrates several features common
to many of the cases in the stream. The division (N.L.) was quite open
about initially learning about the program (another staff member also
later went through the same process) but after this initial phase, a
clear role definition was made - that the division should not get in-
volved just yet since it was premature. Normally in such situations,
Knight would actively try to influence program direction but here the
initial complex mix of other agencies likely pointed him away from early
involvement. He was generally loath to become involved in large committees
such as the inter-agency task force here. In addition, since his recent
arrival, he had concentrated on what he perceived to be more serious
problems and issues. Another member of the staff indicated that he
was probably relieved at that time to hear that other agencies were
taking the lead. Knight also exhibited a feature evident in the EPSDT
case, the clear definition of internal responsibility. Initially, he
assigned it to himself and much later to his mental health director.,
The mental health director, L.A., had been contacted in August by a
representative of the.Office of Children who knew her personally and who
had been working on writing regulations. for the program. While he had
previously seen no role for Medicaid he now asked if the division should
be involved and invited L.A. to attend a few meetings concerning the
drafting of the regulations. She went "as an individual", but said she
was soon viewed as "representing Medicaid".
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Finally, she suggested to the OOC that they contact Knight directly
since she had been frustrated by "not seeing Don" on the problem. She
had not been able to convince Knight that their involvement in the
program was becoming an issue. Knight had been individually seeing a lot
of the.persons involved in the program development, but she felt that
he did not really understand it. T.L. from the Office of Children
contacted Knight to arrange a meeting and simultaneously the Executive
Officer of Education contacted her to ask what would Medicaid's involve-
ment be. The EOE had become concerned about Medicaid involvement since
they had had a ruling from the governor's office that the schools, i.e.,
the Education Division, must pay for all treatment necessary for a
child's education (which could include medical treatment), and that all
possible sources of third party payment be solicited to lower costs.
This proposal was later dropped, but the idea of billing Medicaid for the
core evaluations remained. She suggested a combined meeting of the OOC
and the EOE with Medicaid although Knight later recalled that he called
the meeting together.
In any event the meeting was held, significantly without the Office
of Special Education - the office that would likely have to implement the
program. At the meeting Knight "told them that sooner or later you'll
have to come to us for money". L.A. felt that Knight had given a "This
is the Medicaid program and aren't we marvelous" type of presentation at
the meeting without really realizing the impact of 442 and the potential
involvement of the division. The OCC representative (T.L.) resented the
fact that Knight was also suggesting that the EPSDT program be used as
a substitute for, and "valve" for, referrals to the school system. T.L.
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felt the two were being confused and resisted Medicaid's attempt to
dictate program content. L.A. also later sensed that Knight did not
want to become involved in any large committee meetings to discuss
the development of the service.
Knight's right hand man, R.K., had also attended this meeting and
felt that the others did not understand the program or did not see
that they were headed towards a separate system of care based in the
schools, a separation which would only be bad, in his view. Within
that context however, he stressed that the neighborhood health centers
be used to conduct evaluations, thus paralleling Knight's attempt to
"squeeze" the 442 program into another format. But he remained
quiet since Knight had voiced the opinion that Medicaid should not get
involved and that it was beyond his (R.K.'s) and the division's control
anyway.
Thus three key principles were highlighted here which were stressed
throughout this case and used occasionally in other situations. Firstly,
there was the attempt to link one program to another or to meld one
into another; there was the belief that as much as possible, the
existing school medical system should be avoided for it provided only
sporadic, low level care (Knight wanted the best available for Medicaid
clients) and finally that if the potential new service being examined
was not too big, then the division should wait for the other actors
to approach Medicaid. While the reasons for such principles were explained
to L.A., they were advanced as being more or less self-evident.
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At this time the program was seen by the other agencies as being
centered on a "core evaluation" whose major inputs were to be psychological,
social and educational. The medical component was still seen as being a
minor component although the OOC and the EOE were anxious to get other
agencies such as Medicaid to commit as much resources as possible for the
evaluations. The local school districts were in favor of the program
but feared that any state reimbursement for a program they would have
to provide would come only after the completion of the fiscal year thus
presenting them with cash flow problems. Similarly they wished to keep
overall costs down and, backed by the Department of Education, did not
clearly see the medical component as important. (Knight -- "the education
people wanted to keep the M.D.'s out of the program.")
At this point, OSE staff began to feel they might not be able to use
Medicaid money for the program and began to discuss the possibility with
Knight. He had indicated that a "layer cake" approach should be used;
i.e., that third party insurance should be used for the program
with private insurance, Medicaid and then local school district money
being used in that order of priority. He saw no problem in using Medicaid
money and the only problem was how to identify the Medicaid population at
risk without violating confidentiality regulations.
L.A. and N.L. began to work with personnel from the Human Services
Agency (HSA) during which time the question of whether the 50% federal
share of Medicaid money could be committed to a program which had a
very loosely defined medical component and which so overlapped the
other educational and psychological components. HSA had a strategy
of using Medicaid dollars whenever possible (even to the point of keeping
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children in institutions if the federal share was greater, complained
the Education Dept. official). Thus, a lawyer from HSA assigned to
the Office of Children began to deal directly with the question of
federal participation in the use of Medicaid dollars for 442. Knight
and the HSA secretary had meanwhile decided on a strategy of simply
submitting the 442 bills through the federal apparatus and seeing
what happened.
But the HSA lawyer began to act as though Medicaid money was com-
pletely committed and would also be accepted by the federal government.
Knight had heard of thir attempt to commit "our money", was angered
and, after clearing the matter with the Secretary, requested a meeting
with the federal regional office to clarify the use of Medicaid dollars.
Clearance was received with the proviso that Medicaid money not be used
for services provided in the school or not selected freely by the
recipient. Knight thus achieved his goal of keeping the program out
6f the school physician's hands. The federal regional office informally
concurred since it trusted Knight and his handling of the program and
felt that 442 concept would likely be included in a national health
insurance program which then appeared imminent.
The regulations appeared in January and, much to the consternation
of L.A., the division had not been involved in their drafting despite the
continuing talk about a possible use of Medicaid dollars. The other
agencies had not seen fit to deeply involve Medicaid either. The Office
of Children staff member, in particular, saw the division as a "quick,
sharp, insurance program", a view he said he inherited from working with
the HSA secretary. In addition he saw the division being filled up with
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"social service" types and he didn't want to be responsible for "un-
ravelling" any turmoil the Division might create.
L.A. felt that Knight had not wanted to get involved in the drafting
of the regulations since, in general, "he thinks that regulations don't
have much effect", although he says he jumped in "head over heels" only
to later pull back and leave the task to L.A. Knight often used this
approach of involving himself early on to set the direction for the agency
but in this case, it seemed that L.A. perceived this as only establishing
"turf". He ignored the rule making process, feeling that regulations
could usually be bent to serve the agency's purposes. And then he
assigned full responsibility to his staff who, while not losing their
confidence, did feel that more of Knight's involvement was needed. Knight,
however, was in general willing to "let the staff make mistakes as long
as we get where we want to go" and he had a strong faith in L.A.'s capacity.
It was not until later when his enthusiasm was rekindled that his accessi-
bility to L.A. on the issue increased and she began to trust his judge-
ment about the importance of the whole program.
About mid-February a call from a member of the capital city's
school committee had triggered off the idea in Knight's mind of using
one of the neighborhood health centers as a place where the concept
of a "core evaluation" could be tested. He began to develop enthusiasm
for the content of the 442 program, stating that a child's malfunctions
at school could be due to a variety of reasons, including medical ones,
and that their "solution" might equally validly be part medical. He con-
centrated on the evaluation part of the program, a concentration which
appeared to bother L.A. since she felt he was ignorning later diagnostic
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and treatment components. The OOC also was ignoring these aspects
although they later stated that they had not stressed medical treatment
since the schools could never afford to get into such heavy-cost programs.
Knight's use of one health center (the one he had founded in his
earlier career) indicated a kind of "tunnel vision" to N.L. and to L.A.,
who felt that the center was atypical. Similarly, the OCC staff did
not believe that many Medicaid recipients lacked a family physician
for the core team thus necessitating a health center to perform that
role. It was justified by Knight as being an experiment with a well-
managed group he could trust (thus keeping it out of incompetent school
doctor's hands). He felt he needed to "institutionalize" the most
complex part first, after which he would concentrate on the treatment
aspects. But again, these plans were not conveyed to N.L. or L.A. Nor
was any explicit priority ever assigned to the program, although L.A.
felt that Knight felt it was a good idea "because it was for kids and
had a high pay-off."
During this time, Knight had contact with a member (E.B.) of the
Department of Education who was later to move into the position of the
head of OSE and to initiate a more aggressive OSE role. E.B. stated that
Medicaid never seemed to have a clear philosophical direction but that
since they shared his humane concerns, he assumed their strategies would
agree. Knight concurred on this although they never really discussed any
detailed strategy. Medicaid provided "crisis relief" for E.B. in a
time when he was under great pressure to implement the program, and he
felt that Medicaid "must have made it a high priority" since the division
was always "creatively involved" in their meetings.
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But no one in the division had ever really calculated how large a
piece of the total picture they would be nor had anyone in the other
agencies. Around July, a series of "back of an envelope" calculations
were agreed upon by the various agencies which suggested that the
division had about 13% of all eligible children state-wide, 20% in urban
centers and 50% in the capital city. However, a realization that Medicaid
money might be used to pay for the special needs of institutionalized
children in the 442 program was always an unspoken factor. The amount
of Medicaid money potentially involved here was much larger than the
"ambulatory money" but the two components always seemed to be separated
in discussions. However the realization that the division would have
financial "clout" in this adjacent area likely influenced the agencies'
sense of priorities, that is, of granting Medicaid a large voice.
A few months later, following a period of little activity within
the division (L.A. continued to meet "with other agencies, which took
up too much of my time"), an impromptu lunch -was held during which
several Medicaid staff and Knight discussed the program. R.K. discussed
the need to involve the whole family in the core evaluation and the
need to have a team doing the evaluation. It was agreed that Medicaid
could pay for three-quarters of the team members involved in such core
evaluations. Yet two-problems remained. L.A. and R.K. continued to feel
the link between evaluation and later treatment by the schools was being
ignored. L.A. felt this since she saw little medical component in the
treatment plan. Knight seized on the idea of establishing the linkages
but did not appear to follow it up at that meeting although later a
friend of Knight's did begin to develop a form for school districts to
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use to assure adequate medical follow-up. R.K. also seized upon this
potential problem. Neither realized at that time that a liaison for
each school district had been appointed to assure follow up. L.A. also
felt that the definition of what was a core evaluation was thrust aside.
When she tried to ask Knight for consultant resources to define a core
evaluation, he said, in essence "come to me and I'll tell you". (L.A.)
Thus Knight was seen as initially ignoring or giving a once-over
to some of the elements of the problem (their share of the "market", the
regulations, the treatment aspects) which he later returned to upon
urging by the staff. TLis increased involvement coupled with the health
center experiment led him to frequently proclaim to the staff that he
"hadn't realized what a big thing 442 was" and how pleased he was that
the division was now making "real progress" on the issue.
R.K., however, continued to have doubts about the program since he
had assumed that all children in the school system, not only referred
ones, were to be evaluated and thus felt that the program had serious
faults (i.e., lack of coordination and a stress on testing, not evaluation
and treatment). He was about to write a letter to the HSA secretary when
L.A. alerted him to the incorrectness of the first assumption. He was
annoyed since no one had told him that only referred persons would be
evaluated despite the fact that he had participated in several meetings on
the program. Despite his unfamiliarity with the program, he appeared
to have learned from the EPSDT program and a second pediatric program
("TAP") that mass screening was inefficient and adequate follow-up must
be assured and thus "pushed his ideas for the program although he was
not a major participant. But his involvement here led him to contact
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the staff he had been involved with on the "TAP" program to stress that
the guidelines developed for the 442 core evaluation were the kind of
guidelines needed for TAP. The TAP personnel eventually began to use
442 guidelines for their evaluation of children destined for group care
residential programs.
The experiment at Knight's old health center produced cost data for
the core evaluation which indicated a rate of over $300. Thus Knight,
through using this trusted ally, was able to develop a rate which he
felt was fair. Other providers who were, in the development of other
new services, usually brought into the process quite early, were kept
on the outside for some time. L.A. was then able to negotiate through
the RSC this favorable rate which would encourage providers to offer the
complete evaluation. She then signed a contract with the center and
continued to develop contracts with other health centers for the core
evaluations. The professional associations were then contacted and
informed of the need to develop further teams of evaluators.
L.A.'s insistence that the treatment aspects were equally important
eventually bore fruit as Knight and she began to discuss with the
Education Department just how the costs of such treatment could be shared.
Medicaid regional staff were also assigned to coordinate the division's
442 activity in their areas. The actual progress, however, of the total
Education-administered 442 program remained somewhat slow and chaotic as
the hundreds of local school districts sorted out the deluge of new
responsibilities and money in the fall of 1974. Nonetheless the division
had succeeded in responding to the new initiative by outsiders. It had
developed a policy and had begun to apply it, being restrained only by the
fact that they did not administer the total program.
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The overall pattern of action displayed by the division in this
case is similar to that of the other new services' development cases
in this stream save for the longer period of waiting before any initial
action was taken and the relative guardedness with which Knight explored
the new knowledge with his staff. The hesitation can probably be best
explained by the newness of Knight to the division and the lack of any
outside pressure on him to develop a 442 program. L.A. did assert,
however, that "it was our fault too, not only Don's hesitancy and lack
of knowledge. N.L. and I could have bitten the bullet sooner".
These features (hesitancy and guardedness) somewhat dulled the rich
exposition and discovery of general operating principles through Knight's
teaching. The idea of linking 442 to another program (EPSDT) proved to be
an impractical vehicle. The principle of letting the other agencies come
to Medicaid if their program was small was reversed when the other agencies
began to "commit" Medicaid's resources. Only one other principle was.
developed here, that of giving as little responsibility as possible to
school medical programs. Nonetheless some principles developed in
earlier cases were invoked here, for example, that a "sweet" fee be
used to encourage providers, that federal financial participation should
be increased, or that programs for children had a high pay off. As usual
though, Knight did place considerable confidence in his staff, both
anticipating their qualities and generally being non-critical of the way
L.A. carried out her tasks. He even backed down eventually and acceeded
to L.A.'s insistence that treatment aspects of the program be considered.
But these qualities, along with his willingness to experiment were the
only visible aspects of his generally well elaborated teaching strategy.
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The internal management of the case seemed to bear little on its
outcome although several of the usual features of Knight's management
approach were in evidence, e.g. the clear delegation of- authority, the
unwillingness to get involved with large "task forces" and his eventual
open door policy with L.A. (and with all the other staff). Knight
had not had the chance to convince many of the 442 actors outside the
division that he was running a sound program since most of them were other
bureaucrats and not providers. Thus he had to stake his claim for program
integrity fairly directly and harshly with the RSA secretary. Later,
however, some of the education officials, including the key person
responsible, developed an appreciation of both Knight's and L.A.'s philo-
sophies and L.A.'s thoroughness and management competence in following
through. Thns, more than anything, the role that L.A. played enabled
the division to produce a "product" accepted by all - a workable operating
policy.
The carrier of the responsible buyer paradigm in this case was
also primarily L.A. Knight did address himself to the responsibility
aspect of that paradigm by staking out the division's turf, but it was
L.A. who then "recovered" that turf to make certain it was not being
"trespassed" upon. And it was she who stressed the purchase of quality
services more than Knight and even enlarged the definition of quality.
These events took place shortly after the free standing mental health
clinic case and it must be surmised that she learned considerably from that
exercise. Indeed a separate story tracing L.A.'s development would be
informative since she alone of all the staff members had to develop
several new services over the course of two years. But if the concept of
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organizational learning is to be examined thoroughly, the performance of the
division in other new service areas must be considered.
4. The HMO Program
Health maintenance organizations (HMO's) were a radical idea for the
delivery of health care which had nonetheless been put into practice in
a few isolated situations since the 30's. The idea received considerably
increased attention in the medical community at the beginning of the 70's
and an additional giant boost from the federal government in 1974. Despite
the support of the more liberal sectors of the medical community, it
received staunch opposition from others.
This case involves an early political decision by Knight's predecessor
that the HMO idea be tried on a limited basis. Upon Knight's arrival he
threatened to cancel the one HMO project the department had entered
into, but hesitated since the HSA undersecretary was very much in favor
of the idea. He delayed the renewal of the contract while attempting
to acquire more resources from the department and HSA to manage the
program. Finally, he found someone on his staff to whom he could delegate
responsibility for developing the HM0 program - which he did, "cleaning
it up" to the satisfaction of both Knight and the HSA official.
The latter also wished to use Medicaid money as a key lever in
initiating several additional HMO's. This strategy was finally found
wanting since Medicaid's money was not sufficiently concentrated as it
was in other areas such as the nursing home industry where over 80% of the
industry was Medicaid supported. However, in attempting this strategy,
the staff member grew quite knowledgeable in the field and became influ-
ential in offering both strategic and technical advice to both developing
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H1O's and other state officials. Knight was pleased with his performance
and, though the program was small in dollar terms, he cited the division's
"HMO program" to HSA and the public as examples of program innovation.
Thus Knight and his staff did eventually develop a strategy to
deal with the HMO area to their satisfaction - although the strategy
was not as aggressive as two or three other states' nor were the bound-
aries established by the strategy as far reaching as the HSA under-
secretary would have desired. But Knight felt that he had done the right
thing - indeed all that the division could do. The program then had some
"integrity" and yet did not impinge on other program areas where Knight
wished to concentrate. Only the assignment of considerable staff time for
such a small area might be questioned.
A contract had been signed in 1971 between the Department and the
one EMO then existing in the state. The HMO had pushed the idea since it
believed it could deliver quality care at a low cost to a low income
group. It hoped to do this through the use of a prepaid mechanism in which
the buyer (DPW) paid a monthly charge for all costs - irregardless of
actual services delivered. The HMO would operate on a fixed budget, thus
providing an incentive to keep costs within that limit - something regular
physicians and hospitals did not face since they knew that third party
carriers, not the client, would pay all costs. It was the strict appli-
cation of financial accountability to medicine. As for the quality
aspect, it was hoped that the HMO, through both its closed panel and its
group practice features could assure better care. The financial incentive
would also force the HMO to stress preventative care, i.e., they would be
paid for keeping people well, not sick.
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This particular HMO, backed and staffed by the liberal elements of
a medical school, also wished to demonstrate its commitment to medicine
for the poor. Thus Medicaid clients in the HMO would be indistinguishable
from middle class clients. They also agreed to set up an outreach station
in a ghetto area near their main facility to assure welfare clients'
access, one of the division's main concerns in addition to quality and
cost. The division, ravaged by the increasing costs of the Medicaid
program, and also desirous of promoting innovative care, first signed
a contract with the HMO in 1971. The commissioner of the department
while willing to experiment, also stated that strong pressures had
been brought on the department to sign the contract. Enrollment in the
HMO was to be voluntary and within two years some 2,800 persons had
enrolled in the one ghetto area near the HMO facility.
Out of the very small medical staff of under 15, some two people were
assigned (part time) to work on managing the contract. The whole HMO
concept was a 180 degree turnabout from the conventional fee for service
sector thus necessitating adaptations to the division's billing system
and reporting requirements and also involving the division directly in
the marketing of the HMO to welfare clients. However, both the two
staff members had a somewhat analytical, even academic, style and were
keenly interested in attempting to prove whether the HMO idea did deliver
better care at less cost to welfare clients. Thus little attention was
paid to the management of the loose ends of the contract, nor was a
routine system for bill processing or reporting built up. The idea proceeded
backed by the faith of the two staff members and the willingness of the
HMO (since the department was initially one of its larger client groups -
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some 15-20%). The two staff members' operating goal was to at least
assure that as many clients as wished could enroll and that the HMO was
paid in some coherent fashion.
The idea of HMO's spread slowly through the rest of the country and
by 1973 there were over 100 in existence with one large California opera-
tion having several branches and over 2 million members. The moderate
success in California had led the Reagan government to adopt a vigorous
policy of enrolling Medicaid clients in HMO's. Many sprang up just for
this purpose; but by late 1973, allegations of misuse of funds, pressurized
marketing techniques and non-delivery of services had racked the Califor-
nia program. The state bureaucracy was just beginning to sort out the
chaos it had plunged itself into and other Medicaid agencies were naturally
leery of getting too deeply involved in HMO's.
Thus, Knight arrived to a background of continuing ideological support
for the idea, but with little hard evidence of its success. The one
largest experiment (California) had probably failed, although much had
been learned. The division's contract with the HMO was up for renewal
in the summer of 1973 shortly after his arrival. The program was then
being handled by the assistant director for ambulatory care, R.D., with
whom Knight was to have so much difficulty in the EPSDT and sanction
cases. That recent change in personnel had not helped the management
of the HMO program, since R.D. took considerable time in familiarizing
himself with it. He said that he "did a few academic things, a few one-
time surveys of the HMO's activities and began to think how they might
control the program."
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Knight arrived four months later and familiarized himself with the
contract negotiations. He believed that the fee-for-service sector,
for all its faults (incentives to overtreat) at least did not contain
the HMO capitation incentive to undertreat. He was also disturbed by
the fact that the HMO might be getting paid for persons it did not
treat even though they were enrolled (although in this sense the HMO,
while basically a delivery mechanism, had insurance aspects, i.e., the
provider assumed a risk and was paid for that risk). But none of these
fears could be confirmed or denied since adequate data on actual use within
the HMO was lacking and since enrollees were free to use other parts of
the city's medical system. This first attempt by Knight to "situate" the
new service by comparing it to other services was easily made since HMO's
were a complete reversal of the fee for service sector. And the principle
of avoiding incentives to undertreat was carried from Knight's earlier
experience that providers must be paid an adequate, but not more than
adequate,fee.
Knight at first wished to cancel the contract, but then, after
making this initial strong assumption of the division's perogatives,
sensed pressure from HSA (and the commissioner of DPH) and decided on a
few specific "holding" strategies. He would "tighten up" the contract
such that a greater burden wculd be put on the HMO to see people even
though no monitoring capacity was available and he would take the first
step to set up a system to restrict enrollees to the HMO so evaluative data
would be more meaningful.
A city agency's initiative involving a proposed HMO based on a
second teaching hospital and neighborhood centers (NHC's) was also
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one of the-'items Knight was forced to confront. He was as cool to this
idea as he was to the one operational HMO. In addition, he felt that
if these less efficiently run NHC's could participate in the HMO move-
ment, why not do it with well-run centers, such as his former center.
He gave little support to this proposal which gave some credence to the
thought expressed by R.D. that Knight felt HMO's were a form of competi-
tion to the NHC's or that those poorly-run NHC's were simply trying to
save themselves by latching onto this new gimmick. Later it was to
develop that Knight's resistance to the idea was mainly on the grounds
of prepayment, but it also seems clear that he doubted the extravagant
claims being made for the operational EMO sInce he felt that he had
built up one of the best ambulatory care settings in the city. However,
the proposed HMO (HMO-2) died a slow natural death through lack of ini-
tiative from its own sponsor and the division did not have to contend
with it.
Attention turned back to the operational HMO. Knight, upon reviewing
the slight cost data available, inferred that while the HMO might
have been at least beneficial for the department (i.e., the capitations
paid roughly equalled the services provided), that did not mean that
the HMO was run efficiently. Indeed it had a high per visit cost compared
to some of the NHC's (although not all) but also offered the most compre-
hensive benefits of any of them. He did not push these economic comparisons
since he knew the NHC's (his old grounds) would also not stand up to close
scrutiny. He also began to feel, through talking with the HMO staff,
that they were indeed competent and concerned managers and stressed this
with his staff. Thus the second of his principles was demonstrated here,
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that as much as possible the agency should try to work with well-managed
providers. As we were to see so many other cases, the HMO staff's goals
were similar to his and he trusted their competence. Thus he and R.D.
concentrated on improving the contract's provisions rather than can-
celling it.
R.D., at Knight's urging, began to set in motion the necessary
control measures. But the Project Management Office (PMO), which was
charged with the computer operation of the Department, was under extreme
pressure, and without the necessary large pushes from Knight or R.D.,
they simply carried on with more urgent tasks. R.D. was not skilled in
pushing for, or demanding, changes from PMO, nor had Knight found the
"correct" relationship with PMO, which, during the preceeding year in
the absence of an assistant commissioner, had been "running the division".
In addition, R.D. had had his staff decimated by Knight (see EPSDT case)
and was not relating well to him.
The two were under heavy pressure from the Human Services Agency.
The undersecretary, L.N., had a young staff member who very much favored
the HMO idea and who proposed that as many as possible be set up in the
state. L.N. and the DPH commissioner also favored the idea. A team of
consultants had prepared tentative HMO policy guidelines and reporting
requirements for the undersecretary and, through the staffer's urging,
were proposing that an "HMO generator unit" be established with continued
staffing from the consultants. Knight, the undersecretary and DPH even-
tually reached a compromise goal -- they would try to develop four to
six HMO's within the year. The state could offer no seed money, only
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technical assistance through a device like the generator unit which
would be financed at between $100-300,000. The next theme of discussion
was therefore how to finance this unit and where to locate it. Since
the HSA agency (and Knight) had hopes that the medical division could
be used as an instrument to restructure the health system, they felt
there was some logic in putting the unit in Medicaid; but others felt
the HSA or DPH were appropriate places. The whole issue lagged when
the young HSA staff member left his position in October.
In December, R.D. and the then assistant director for provider relations
and sanctions, R.T., switched positions since Knight had concluded that
R.D. was not overly interested in health care per se. R.T. was now
to take over the negotiating with the HMO. By this time the old
contract had been temporarily extended for three months. But Knight
was not rushed since he knew the HMO wanted to work out an arrangement
and he would not be upset if the contract had to be cancelled --
although the ghetto area served had few ambulatory clinics, it was surr-
ounded by hospitals and their out-patient clinics.
At the end of the month, a new staff member (K.E.) had finished up
a previous task and asked for new responsibilities. He had spent the
previous few months working out of Knight's office (the "fly on the wall")
and had earned his trust and displayed competence in his earlier task.
Knight's style was to let people try problems which appealed to them,
so K.E. suggested five areas (in order of priority) he would like to tackle.
Since the contract negotiations were dragging on and since R.T. would
have his hands full learning the other aspects of his new job, Knight
suggested the two work together on K.E.'s third choice -- HMO's.
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The two (R.T. and K.E.) first of all began to develop an enrollment
procedure which would assure that both the HMO and DPW knew who was on
the rolls and who not, from which they could determine precisely how
large the client group was. No adequate system had been developed;
indeed it was discovered much later that people who had left Medicaid
were still being billed for by the HMO. At Knight's prodding, PMO began
to work on producing a restriction on the clients' Medicaid card
limiting them to services at that HMO- thus giving the cost contain-
ment goal of the HM0 some teeth. The two staff began to familiarize
themselves with elements of the HMO through the "entry route" of these
administrative tasks.
A month or two later, the HMO began to feel the pinch of operating
at the previous year's contract prices, and tried to reopen the negotia-
tions. By this time K.E. had also dealt with another HMO (see below)
and had gained confidence in the area. He took the principles written
down by Knight and the HMO vice-president during an earlier negotiating
session and reopened the negotiations himself. K.E. also felt that he
had, while working out of Knight's office, absorbed some other key
principles such as the non-discrimination against welfare clients, the
possible misuse of services and most importantly, the importance of
having an overall approach to a problem.
The HMO felt it should be judged at the (low) standard of other pro-
viders - but Knight and particularly K.E., countered that no, they
professed high goals for themselves, therefore they should be held to
them. The negotiations centered around issues such as reimbursement of
funds if services were not delivered, the proportion of nurse visits to
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physician visits, the cont'inued working of the enrollment system,etc. Other
additions to the contract such as grievance procedures, subcontracts
and data reporting were readily agreed to by both sides.
During this period while K.E. was negotiating the contract, he sought
and attained help from several sources in addition to Knight who encouraged
him to discuss the negotiations with him. The HMO itself was willing to
help "educate" him, but more importantly, a proposed HMO (HMO-3) was
then knocking on the division's door to sign a contract. Their newness
and inexperience enabled K.E. to test out his ideas and wring concessions
from HMO-3. He was then able to use these ideaswith the operational HMO
(HMO-1). Similarly, several conversations with a representative of
Blue Cross who had also been negotiating with HMO-3 enabled him to build
up a repetoire of strategies. He also occasionally turned to the chairman
of the Rate Setting Commission for political advice on how to deal with
HMO-1, since the chairman had previously been the governor's health
advisor and knew the HMO-1 managers. While Knight usually turned to
a group of trusted friends in discussing any new service, here no such
group existed and K.E. was left to develop one.
The overall HSA group which had been discussing the state's role was
slowly evolving into a "task force". Knight began attending its meetings
less frequently when he saw that the level of activity was going to be
low, i.e., that the HMO generator unit could probably not be financed
and that it was unlikely the medical division would be "bagged" into
signing contracts with HMO's it did not want to deal with (this had been
one of his largest worries). And there appeared to be no outside forces
which would lead to a flood of HMO's for quite some time --
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the federal HMO bill with attached grant money had just been passed
but its effects would not be felt for at least a year or two. Having
gained control of the HMO-3 negotiations through K.E.'s activity,
Knight could now rest assured that no severe additional problems would
present themselves.
In the meantime K.E. had prepared a critique of the HMO generator
concept and other materials as proposed by the HSA consultants. Both
Knight and the undersecretary accepted this critique. Thus almost by
default the key HMO role in the state began to fall to Medicaid as the
"HMO generator." Knight and K.E. prepared an elaborate scheme justifying
this role even though K.E. felt that its logical location was in HSA.
But he, too, did not wish to be "bagged". He also felt that in addition
there was inadequate competence (and staff) in the other agencies (DPH,
RSC, and HSA) at the time, so felt comfortable assuming that role. The
HSA tacitly accepted the proposal and Knight felt convinced that assuming
authority in a vacuum situation was a sound operating principle (which
was also stressed in the sanction stream and here in the free standing
clinics and day care cases).
K.E. took the material (guidelines and reporting requirements) pre-
pared by the consultants and began to adopt them to DPW usage, and also
tested them with a committee of providers he formed for the purpose. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield were also contacted, but their interest in quality
of care (and thus an elaborate set of guidelines and non-financial report-
ing requirements) was not high. So he worked with the committee and HMO-1
on the guidelines and reporting requirements. The committee felt that
Medicaid might not be able to impose such strict requirements. K.E.
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realized his "clout" was not high in all HMO territories and was even
decreasing with HMO-1 (as Medicaid's proportional enrollment decreased),
but he still felt that some HMO's would be anxious to satisfy Medicaid's
needs as they commenced operations. The HSA still thought Medicaid's
financial power was strong and permitted it to play the "generator"
role.
Finally in April a contract was signed with 1M0-1 some six months
after the other had expired, The only significant concession the
division made was in the reimbursement formula, but the conditions
under which it might apply were somewhat problematic, therefore, the
concession was a "philosophical" one only. Included in the new capita-
tion rate was a person paid by the HMO but who would report to DPW.
She would act as an overall monitor of the HMO's activity, and also
help to straighten out the billing and enrollment problems. The person
hired had extensive experience in the computer and social service fields
and was ideal for the job. The salary offered was low, but her need
for a career shift and the appealing atmosphere of the division con-
vinced her. Thus Knight was able to bring on staff without changing his
overall budget.
She took over the control aspects of the program and began to work
with the PMO and the local welfare offices while K.E. turned his attention
to the guidelines and reporting requirements and to an HMO enabling bill
which was being developed for legislative action. The chairman of the
RSC had been working with an HSA lawyer and the proposer of the bill
(the Legislative Minority Leader) in trying to develop a bill acceptable
both to the Legislature and the administration. K.E. and Knight began
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to participate in these discussions held at the task force, but the
discussion process soon slowed down as the RSC chairman was not anxious
at that stage to involve too many others, including K.E. since he
felt that in order to get the bill through the Legislature that session,
political skills, not technical ones, were needed. He had had experience
dealing with the Legislative Minority Leader, and Knight and K.E. could
only have participated at the margin. They acceeded to his posture
since they were not "unhappy" with the bill as it was proposed.
The HSA undersecretary (L.N.) felt that the HMO-1 contract had
been rushed into. Upon further questioning he said that he felt only
that he had not been kept enough informed of Medicaid's actions.
Knight and K.E. did try, however, to keep him informed, particularly
since Knight did not want him to think the division was acting in a
"buccaneer" fashion. But L.N. had only a small staff and was extremely
busy, therefore could not keep totally abreast of the division's action.
L.N.'s assistant, who served as the link between him and K.E., asked
to be kept informed on the guideline development, negotiations with
HMO-3 and negotiations with a new HMD (-4) which had appeared on the
scene. K.E., while informing HSA, made a practice of doing so only for
major policy issues, since he felt that HSA moved slowly and was often
not completely knowledgeable on the issues.
HMO-3 activity had slowed down due to its own internal problems.
The several negotiating sessions and site visits K.E. had made were thus
"put on ice" after July, although he kept prodding them for progress reports.
HMO-4 went through a similar process and it became more clear that Medicaid's
purchasing power was not always as strong as it wished. In these latter
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two cases, federal grant money and Blue cross sponsorship were really the
key determinants of success. But some situations in which Medicaid could
test its perceived role as a strong purchaser or buyer did arise
nevertheless.
An out-of-state businessman appeared one day with a proposal to
link the city's neighborhood health centers into an HMO network with
his firm managing the whole situation. He sought the blessing of the
division via a signed contract which he would use to then "enlist" the NHC's
participation. Knight was very skeptical since he doubted the ability
of the group to inject good medical and financial management into the
NHC's. But K.E. suggested they first enlist the NHC's, then come to
talk to the division. His strategy was adopted. The profiteering HMO's
in California had scared everyone and caution, particularly with for-
profit HMO's, was uppermost in their minds.
Similarly, the NHC's themselves wanted to form a "network" HMO, but
Knight told K.E. not to spend much time with them since the payoff was
low -- i.e., the NHC's needed first of all to improve their own manage-
ment before they could run an HMO network. K.E. felt that the HMO device
might be used for just such a purposes, but Knight disagreed strongly
such that K.E. took his advice and did not actively pursue talks with the
centers.
Finally, a large in-city hospital had proposed am HMO (HMO-2). K.E.
had several negotiating sessions with the hospital but Knight finally
"axed" the proposal by suggesting that the hospital was very poorly run.
K.E. had also felt that concerted agreement among the hospital's admin-
istrators was needed to develop an HMO and this agreement did not exist.
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Although the proposal was eloquent on paper, neither Knight nor
L.N. at HSA felt upset at aborting an opportunity to develop such
an in-city HMO which would have at least 30-40% Medicaid enrollment.
By then Knight had begun to whittle down his own resistance to the
HMO principle by suggesting that what was really needed was a system
which would pay fee-for-service for ambulatory care (which was in-
expensive and which he wished to encourage) and capitation for
hospital care (expensive and often unnecessary). But no providers
seemed about to take this half-way approach, particularly since
the recently-passed federal act would not permit providers to receive
grant money under such an arrangement. K.E., for his part, felt
that since the prepaid concept was indeed that, a concept, one in-
volving limiting service to a single provider, preventative care,
the heavy use of paraprofessionals, etc., it was difficult for
middle-class clients to adjust to and even more so -- perhaps to the
point of inappropriateness -- for welfare clients. Thus both of
them believed themselves justified in adopting a cautious stance
towards any new HMO's although both agreed that the principles of
comprehensive care with stress on the ambulatory side were sound
principles to follow. They would however wait for the right situa-
tion before actively pursuing one and "do what was necessary" (Knight)
with those other HMO's who presented themselves.
Meanwhile the HMO-1 monitor who had been hired carried out some
of the administrative changes that Knight and K.E. thought were re-
quired. Where necessary, department policy was even bent to enable
the chaos uncovered to be dispensed with. For example, a bill
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over six months old was paid, contrary to DPW policy, since it
appeared the department had lost it. Also, for those persons who
had terminated welfare but who were still being billed for, the
division decided, after much examination to pay these old bills.
K.E. felt that the DPW had never developed a system of routinely
handling such terminations and it was thus its responsibility, not
the HMO's to absorb these bills. K.E. also experimented with turning
many of the disenrollment functions over to the local welfare offices,
but found to his amazement that the local offices could not be
relied upon. Knighc had long before realized this and upon his
urging, K.E. transferred them back to the Central Office (but to the
central computer, not to K.E. himself). He was able to get the
changes through the PMO through the tact and persistence of his assist-
ant and since he was a friend of the PMO staff.
Both K.E. and PMO sensed that perhaps excessive energy was being
devoted to such a small program, but Knight did not appear worried.
Other small programs also had large staff assignments whereas hospi-
tals, comprising 1/3 of the division's budget had only two staff
members. Knight seemed to feel that he had to "live with" the
HMO-1 contract and also show some performance for L.N. at the HSA -
that Medicaid was making a commitment to HMO's and was acting
responsibly. It was also clear to him that experimental or new
programs always required inordinate amounts of initial resources.
The HMO-1 monitor finally managed over the course of a year to
install some of the needed management controls so that by late
December the HMO-1 contract was "in good shape" (Knight). The
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experience gained in this endeavor would be useful if other HMO's
developed. But over the summer none had Instead, several groups
proposed HMO's and sought the new federal grant money for planning
activities. K.E. and others at the HSA sought access to the federal
proposal review process and thus opened up a channel of information
for them. These prospective HMO's at the time were not concerned
about the state role. But they knew that a state enabling act was
in process and they were curious about its development.
The HSA task force had evolved into a formal committee; its main
task during the summer and fall was to redraft the enabling bill
without the haste of the previous efforts. Knight encouraged K.E.'s
participation since he wished to protect the division's own interests
but also to ensure a healthy but cautious climate for HMO's. K.E.
actively helped in the drafting and other members of the task force
slowly became educated to the issues, many of which K.E. had exper-
ienced in managing the HMO-1 contract. At this point, K.E.'s
pre-eminent position began to slip away as his knowledge diffused
among the other state agencies who were gaining experience. Providers
still occasionally came to K.E. first because they had "heard he was
one of the most knowledgeable people in the state government on 11MO's."
K.E.'s last major step as the state's "HMO generator" was to convene
a meeting in September of all interested HMO groups (some 25) in the
state -- to explain Medicaid policy, its guidelines and reporting
requirements. Knight saw this as the final attempt the division
would make. They had a policy and a package of regulations. Now it
was up to providers to make overtures and initiate operations.
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K.E.'s activities thus slowed down somewhat, although HMO-4 took
several weeks of his time in just familiarizing them with Medicaid's
policy regulations. Most new HMO's were simply not aware of the
time required for development. HMO-4 also needed to await a signing
of a contract with Blue Cross before they could become operational.
So K.E. redirected his efforts to HMO-1. HMO-1 had a federal grant
which would study the very issues Knight had earlier concerned
himself with -- a comparison of fee-for-service sector utilization
and costs with HMO utilization and costs for both Medicaid and
middle class user, K.E. cooperated in the retrieval of data for
this study and also in a national HEW study designed to interview HMO
members concerning their satisfaction. Knight felt that these two
studies would finally answer the questions he was asking and so backed
them both. The latter study involved quite intense community re-
sistance to the interviewing program. Knight, normally quite attuned
to community responses, nonetheless backed K.E. in his explanations to
community groups of the need for the studies since both felt the
division was acting in the most responsible manner in promoting the
use of such evaluative data.
K.E. also renegotiated a second HMO-1 contract, this time with
considerable ease since the basic issues were well understood. He
even turned that contract into a "model contract" usable for other
situations. The second HMO-1 contract was the culmination of contract
negotiations with the four other proposed HMO's during which both
Knight and K.E. had groped their way to an understanding of what
they wanted. K.E. had also attended a national meeting of state
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agencies concerned with developing HMO-Medicaid contracts. He returned
with the conclusion that while his program was not perfect, it was
Jetter than most of the others. Indeed each seemed to have had
all the same problems.
Thus by this time K.E. felt he had the program in good enough
shape that he could move into additional non-IMO tasks. He requested
such tasks but Knight did not seem particularly anxious to have him
transfer his abilities or even add new roles. He was told that he
could "help X or Y in their work if you want", but without any real
emphasis. K.E. was to take a leave from the division for a few
months but this did not apparently affect Knight's decision. K.E.
had taken a problem off Knight's back and he apparently did not wish
to see it reappear. He "had invested a lot in K.E.". So K.E. continued
his work on the two evaluative studies, on the task force and in
trying to promote the HMO idea.
He had by this time begun to use a consultant for help in reviewing
proposals and developing further policies. Knight had suggested the
use of the consultant since that was one of the few items in his staff
budget he could manipulate freely. A very highly qualified person (a
professional friend of Knight's) became available. Knight had always
left K.E. alone since he had developed an appreciation for his
competence, but with the addition of the consultant he did so even
more. Their interaction now consisted chiefly of K.E. informing him
of his actions or of Knight sending K.E. cryptic notes when he discovered
reports in the press unfavorable to HMO's. K.E. did try to keep policy
issues open with Knight since he stated that he loved to talk things
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out and couldn't work in a vacuum. But Knight did not participate
seriously and even permitted K.E. to write memos to the Commissioner
(which was not unusual) but did not request to see advance drafts
(which was unusual).
Knight's schizophrenic approach to the HMO program was further
evidenced by a small study K.E. had conducted comparing the costs
of the fee-for-service sector in the area served by HMO-1 and HMO-1
costs (capitations). It showed the HMO to be some 15% less costly.
While it did not detail exactly what was being purchased for those
dollars, it appearea that the amount of services represented was
probably as great or greater in the HMO than in the fee-for-service
sector. Community groups, L.N., and the M40 had been clamoring for
such data for some time but Knight felt it would be misinterpreted and
advised K.E. not to release it. He did not, since, while he approved
of the concept of HMO's and felt this reflected favorably on them,
he knew that the division might be publicly forced into a posture
of developing a very large HO program when it felt the conditions
were not right. L.N. at HSA was informed of the results of the
study but did not propose this idea (which Knight might have feared)
since the reality was that still only one HMO existed in the state.
But a limited opportunity did arise. An aggressive ambulatory
group practice wanted to head off HMO competition in its market area.
They wished to avoid the federal bureaucracy and thus approached
the division first, seeking "sponsorship". Knight was delighted since
this was "exactly the type of provider we're looking for". Looking
for, in the sense that both he and K.E. had evolved the strategy that
they would seek: (1) an ambulatory based operation; (2) one that
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was well managed; (3) one that had a competent outreach component and
(4) one that had a large Medicaid population. This group satisfied
all four criteria. The practice was headed by a very aggressive
businessman-physician who had had extensive contact with the department
through his family planning clinic. He offered high quality care.
Upon hearing of the combination of these qualities, Knight urged
K.E. to enter into negotiations. K.E. confirmed the presence of
the four agreeable factors with the consultant's help and negotia-
tions began.
Knight met the proposer of this new 1M0 (HMO-5) on related business
and he confirmed his good impression. "If he can make big money doing
good medicine, then we should support him -- most of them have to do
it by delivering poor or average medicine" K.E. was "scared" of the
aggressivity of the provider but entered into discussions with relish
since it was a chance to actually do something after the several
aborted attempts elsewhere and after a year of "continually uncovering
problems with HMO-1." He had begun to feel the management of the
HMO-l contract was reaching diminishing returns especially since he
felt he could be useful in other tasks. But with this new oppor-
tunity he turned back to the HMO area with Knight's encouragement.
Viewing the success of the HMO program it is clear that while
the product of this activity was not as substantial as originally
hoped, much had been learned. The division. learned both through the
"cleaning up" of the HMO-1 contract and through the negotiations with
the proposed HMO's which would be helpful when those or other HMO's be-
came operational. It learned to determine what it wanted and eventually
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found it - the HMO-5 situation. It learned to specify its policy
and eventually applied it in several situations.
At a more general level, the bank of principles which the division
used was both drawn upon and new "deposits" made. Thus the principles of
not fostering incentives to undertreat, the stressing of comprehensive
care and the search for a well managed provider had all been asserted
earlier in the stream and reapplied here. Similarly, the importance
of holding providers to professed goals and of taking the lead from
other state agencies if a vacuum of authority had been created were
to be stressed in laLer new services cases.
The development of this set of principles which Knight and K.E.
shared was accomplished by Knight's openess and availability in dis-
cussing issues but also by his cautious development of policies
which he felt could pass L.N.'s scrutiny. Similarly K.E.'s initial
distress at being plunged into a new and complex area led him to seek
considerable outside advice and this, along with the testing ground
offered by the developing HMO, provided the division with a relatively
smooth yet productive opportunity to progressively use the principles
it had developed during the case. All these features were of course
part of what Knight referred to as his teaching style.
Diffusion of this learning to the rest of the division was uncertain --
the HMO program cut across all the other program areas and more learning
occurred in the reverse direction as K.E. used the resources of the
other program areas to build up its expertise. Direct transfer of
knowledge (not the principles) was only evidenced in a few situations -
in the use of restricted Medicaid cards (as in the HMO-1 contract) for
drug abusers, the use of the idea of capitation for a home care project
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by another program director or the use of HMOs' criteria for cutting
hospital usage as one of the bases for doing so in the division's
hospital program.
The repertoire of responses or strategies (the program for action)
the division used in developing the set of working principles was
similar to that shown in other cases. There was the initially strong
role assumption which later evolved into a less strident but
equally strongly felt responsibility, the clear assignment of staff
responsibilities, the slow initial investigation of the problem despite
the deadline hanging over it (which Knight simply ignored), and the
wide combing of the environment for information. We also saw Knight's
initial reliance on his past experience with NHC's as a touchstone
by which to judge HMOs and the wide use of contacts in the community
by both Knight and his staff for advice in the building of a program.
We did not see however the usual cursory examination of the new know-
ledge since Knight was being pushed by both those above and below
him to devote energy to the program's problems. Nor was the initial
advice of a few trusted friends so eagerly sought since the area was
so new. The division had to build up a group of friends. Nor did
we see the nagging ego problem since there was overall agreement that
the standards for evaluation of EMO's were relatively primitive but also
because the division's success could be measured conveniently -
number of contracts signed and persons enrolled.
Not only were principles developed using both the program for
action and Knight's teaching style, but a relatively strong management
approach to the problem was also introduced since both HMO staff had
management experience and perspectives. Both were concerned with
150-
making the division's goals understoodwith clarifying lines of re-
sponsibility, with clearing up the flow of paper and with establishing
a monitoring system which would report on utilization and cost effective-
ness. In turn this prompted HMO-1 to devote a probably disproportionate
amount of its time to the DPW contract.
This credibility in management that the division managed to
establish was primarily developed via the strong link between Knight
and K.E. Knight, as usual, had insisted on an early direct monitoring
of the program by himself, then a gradual delegation of responsibility
to K.E. With K.E. be stressed the importance of "integrity", the
accountability of the HMO, and later the strategy of experimenting with
well managed providers. K.E.'s resulting performance enabled the division
to prevent a credible face to the HMO community and to work towards
its goal of acting as a responsible buyer. The opportunity to work
toward such a paradigm resulted from a somewhat excessive assignment
of resources to the HMO concept since the division was being pressed
to do so by the cabinet office and since Knight assigned capable
staff to the area who had the time and energy to fully explore the
HMO idea.
What characterized this case most clearly was this strong but
wavering attempt to assert the division's purchasing power, not only
as a responsible and acceptable buyer but also as a lever to change
the overall medical system. This latter role, after much testing,
was discovered to be only applicable in certain instances, but the div-
ision did manage to exert some leverage by being of considerable
technical assistance to other offices in state government and to a
lesser degree in some of the new HMO's. In the meantime the division
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was able to determine the validity of the HMO idea through negotia-
ting with both existing and several proposed (and thus weaker) HMO's.
Both Knight and his staff developed and refined their ideas con-
siderably and made more precise what it was they wanted (or did not
want) in the HMO program and then moved on to other equally complex
new service areas.
5. Day Care for the Elderly
This case involves the development of a program for those elderly
persons on Medicaid who required some nursing attention during the day
time, but who had a non-institutional setting to return to at night.
The case is set in two larger contexts. One is the payment by
Medicaid, since 1968, of nursing home care. This move greatly stimu-
lated the growth of the private nursing home industry and permitted
many lower and indeed middle income families to "rid" themselves
of the financial obligations of caring for aged parents. By 1974
some 80% of the nursing home beds in the state were occupied by Medi-
caid patients, although many of these came from family environments
which were not considered "welfare homes". Concurrent with this
Medicaid expansion during the late 60's and early 70's was a realiza-
tion that institutions of all kinds had failed to fulfill their promise
of restoration into the commumity, or even provide a humane, but
terminal "way station". A resultant cry of "deinstitutionalizat ion"
was taken up by liberal professionals and by 1974, it was even con-
sidered a non-controversial political plant for many of the state's
politicians. Not coincidentally, deinstitutionalization was also seen
as financially appealing since it promised to lower costs in addition
to advancing social concerns.
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In 1973, federal guidelines for the possible provision of 50%
federal reimbursement (to the state) for experimental day care for
the elderly programs were issued in draft form. Apparently this was
in response to mild pressure from the Division of Long Term Care
within HEW who saw the idea as a possible alternative to institution-
alization and a way of containing the escalating costs of individualized
home health care. The guidelines were permissive, in that states were
not obligated to "pick up" this benefit. This was customary procedure
as the Medicaid programs in the various states varied widely depending
on which combination of these "optional" types of benefits were offered.
Final guidelines concerning the new program were not promolgated
until nearly a year later in June 1974.
This case is somewhat different from others in this stream in
that there appeared to be no strong input from the assistant commissioner.
This situation was not one in which the environmental forces confronting
the division were particularly strong nor was it an area about which
Knight felt strongly or had high priorities. Rather, it involved
mild exterior forces (permissive federal guidelines and provider inter-
est) set in the context of an idea in good currency -- that of de-
institutionalization. In the larger context, this new alternative
(day care) had been sought and proposed because of the failure and
mismanagement of the old "solutions".
The division nonetheless responded in the manner which it had begun
to develop over the preceeding year to handle new kinds of providers --
that of narrowing the grounds for involvement by writing a set of its
own informal guidelines. It added a further limitation upon the urging
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of an adjacent department -- that only a limited number of proposals
would be accepted under the conditions the division would develop.
Yet even before it began to develop these conditions it had rejected
overtures to begin work on the project, citing first the inability
of the division to receive federal reimbursement, then the unavail-
ability of both staff and a suitable "technology". Slowly, one
staff member became available, then the technology, then another staff
member, and finally the direction of federal initiatives became clearer.
Throughout this long "sorting out" period responsibility was diffused --
no one person was recly to grab hold of the project until the several
above forces had coalesced. While it is inviting to spotlight the
transfer of technology from an adjacent area -- home health care --
this was in reality only one of the many pieces of the puzzle which had
to fall into place before a division policy could be produced. During
this sorting out period, a more finely-tuned development of the output
was seen than had occurred in the other cases. There was greater
disagreement on the substance of the problem than was usual and a more
detailed examination of proposed federal regulations and provider proposals
than was usual.
This different process seemed to have evoked a more solid confi-
dence in the produce than was usual. In other cases in the new services
stream and in others not described here,the division's process was
normally more hurried and unfocused with a kind of bravado confidence
being placed in the process and in the moral rightness of the goal,
combined with a nagging ill-feeling that the product might or might
not have had any real effect on the system. A detailed look at this
process follows.
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The associate director for long term care in the division, Y.H.,
had had the idea for day care for the elderly in the back of his mind
for some time previous to the federal initiative, but had not acted
on the idea, having been preoccupied with many other priorities ("on
a scale of 10 to 1, it's 2 or 3"). During the fall of 1973 a private
nursing home approached the Department of Public Health (responsible
for licensing all nursing homes) with a proposal to offer day care
and inquired whether a new type of license would be required or
whether they could operate under their existing license since they
were simply "adding" a service. They had previously approached the
division's associate director for ambulatory care (R.K.) in October
but he, being new in the position, had no time to deal with their
proposal nor had he yet developed a long term plan for "home health
care", an adjacent area, and thus did not see how their proposal could
be considered by the division. In addition the federal guidelines were
not finalized at that time to even permit reimbursement for day care.
The private group retreated, not realizing what a large potential
market the Medicaid population (80% of the nursing home population)
might eventually form. Thus while the division was as generally respon-
sive to the idea of developing the service as in other cases, it
(both R.K. and Y.H.) made a rigid determination that they would not
assume that burden or role at the time. R.K., the most programatically
concerned, of the two, also linked it in his mind with a program, home
health care, with which he was familiar,
By January of 1974 the group had reapproached the Department of
Public Health on the licensing question. DPH's initial position had
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been that a new license would be required as it would have to regulate
a possible dilution of care in the adjacent residential unit operated
by the group. DPH and Medicaid had worked closely on other types
of programs, particularly those where the clientele of a facility
or class of facilities was largely Medicaid supported. In addition,
a contract had been signed by the two specifying the DPH would act as
quality inspectors for the Medicaid program for nursing homes and
that they would develop, with Medicaid's advice, "conditions of
participation", or standards for such homes. But it was not clear if
day care fell under this agreement nor did the two associate directors
in Medicaid think a separate license was required since the program
was clearly at an experimental stage and since it involved no capital
outlay of any kind, merely a change in service patterns. Medicaid
thus felt a state regulatory posture by DPH was not needed at that
time.
Y.H. decided to assert the division's perogatives and continued
to negotiate over "turf" with DPH while the actual program work on
the issue was slowly begun by one of his staff. Y.H., who had ini-
tially seized upon the issue himself, stated that he had received no
pressure from outside to work on the idea, only encouragement from the
HSA and a mild note from Knight saying that there had been interest
from the governor's office in the proposal by the private nursing home.
Indeed, Knight even thoughtthat R.K. (not Y.H.) had assigned the problem
to one of his staff. This without Knight's presence, no specific goal
was formulated, but the seemingly necessary slow incubation period did
begin. Responsibility for the project was still divided between R.K. and
Y.H., and now Y.H.'s staff member.
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Three other groups had also made proposals to the division by this
time but the initial one was seen as the most complete and competent.
Some of the other nursing homes had also indicated mild displeasure
with the idea since they feared it might cut away part of their "market".
Y.H., however, assessed these factors and concluded that since the
concept was clearly part of his long range plan and could be attacked
at "no perceived loss to himself", he would continue to back it.
He felt that R.K. was the only one who had the 'technical expertise
and so awaited his availability while permitting his staff to receive
and read proposals and to discuss them with DPH. This principle of
"going slow until you know what you're doing and then plunge ahead
forcefully" had been expressed by Knight in many other areas. It must
be assumed that its value had rubbed off on Y.H. and R.K. since both
acted quite independently of Knight - R.K.,because of an overall
shared philosophy and Y.H. because of his command of his program area
and his alliance with HSA.
However, both R.K. and Y.H. felt that "DPH didn't know what it was
doing" and that they should proceed on their own since "DPH spoke a
different language" and was overly concerned with procedure, i.e.,
setting up a task force to deal with the problem despite the fact that
they (DPH) said that they had no time to adequately deal with the
issue. They would try to assert their authority given the obvious (to
them) difficulties with DPH. Thus Y.H.'s staff continued to review
and compare proposals on a part-time basis,
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There appeared also to be considerable internal confusion within
DPH over questions as to whether DPH had the authority to license a new
category of service, whether the standards would need to be publicly
heard before adoption and who within DPH should have responsibility
for the project. These questions combined with the lack of a clear
priority for the project by the DPH commissioner led it to waste
considerable time on 'the form, not the content of the issue" (a DPH
staffer), while DPW moved ahead. The DPH staffer said that "hardly
anyone here realized that we should have an alive program - we're not
'bean counters' anymore". She saw DPW picking up authority not
only in day care but also in other areas since DPH had failed to take
the initiative.
Concurrently, R.K. had begun to "put together his home care package",
a series of programs in which VNA type nurses and other types of
professionals would care for Medicaid clients at home during the day
time. This had evolved into a fairly well elaborated program employing
a variety of professionals in a variety of situations. He had talked
with Knight at some length about the principles involved in home care
and they had visited a day care center for the non-elderly to check out
some of their perceptions. R.K. also felt that the experience he had
gained in his own development of the home health program was directly
transferrable; that is, in the day care situation, ambulatory, day-time
care would be offered but at a central facility, and not in the home where
many patients would need a high level of care not economically provided
on a one to one basis. They decided on two principles - that the program
should not develop into a "recreational" program (thus the reluctance
to look at proposals which were "drop in centers") and that the
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clientele must have the same needs as regular nursing home patients,
the only difference being that they had a place to go at night.
Several months then passed during which R.K. and-Y.H. concentrated
on other areas. Their involvement was centered around keeping in-
formed of the various proposals and attempting to settle the "turf"
battle with DPH. The appearance of final federal guidelines in June,
and the "tidying-up" of R.K.'s home-health program brought the issue
to the forefront again. Also, at that same time in June, a member
of the nursing home staff, A.M., became more fully available and Y.H.
felt he could assign her to his area. In fact she had become "avail-
able" much earlier but these other circumstances had prevented her
from devoting much time to the area.
In January, she had become irritated at carrying out a number of
minor tasks for Y.H. and went to him to ask for a clearer-cut assignment.
She was offered day care or another slightly more technical area in
the nursing home program. She chose the former and began to learn about
day care by reading the four proposals submitted by the different pro-
vider groups during a formal presentation. Her first reaction to the
proposals was one of "naivete", she "liked them all" but soon realized
after talking with R.K. that they "couldn't pay for 'drop in centers'"
which was how loosely structured some of the proposals were. Some were
from "real bad operators" and it soon became clear to her that one pro-
posal stood out since it was the most specific and indeed was opera-
tionally defined. She felt, however, that neither Y.H. nor Knight did
anything as a result of this presentation and this slightly discouraged
her.
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At this time DPH began to try to reassert their authority under the
DPW/DPH agreement. They were used to a fairly rigorous attending to
standards and a rigid protocol of inspection. This regulatory stance,
while useful for bringing the many poor nursing homes up to standard
was "1not suited to innovative areas" as Y.H. expressed it.
While this continued battle over turf simmered, A.M. began to
outline a set of guidelines for Medicaid participation, in addition
to developing a set of standards which DPH could use for licensure.
She stated that she "couldn't deal with the DPH people possibly because
of the agency's lack of commitment". Thus Y.H. encouraged her to
write the guidelines herself with the input of R.K. who was still not
yet really available to devote time to the program. She was given
no particular deadline, only told to "get something on paper" so it
could be reacted to. At first she wrote a mild form of conditions
of participation working under the assumption that the division should
have a general set of conditions which DPH could accept as reasonable.
One of the conditions was to be that the day care centers meet DPH standards
which she also began to draft. R.K. and Y.H. thought the guidelines should
be more specific as the division was a buyer of services and it should
be more aggressive, stating just what they wanted to purchase, i.e.,
that conditions should include detailed DPW not DPH standards. Knight
said that he had been aware of this battle over authority with DPH
but that he was not about to be bound by their joint agreement if DPH
was unwilling to cooperate in writing conditions of participation which
would assure the division's continued perogatives. A.M. said that
this was her first realization that "we could monitor the program since
the guidelines would be our's."
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R.K. and his consultant and Y.H. continued to work on the draft
conditions. The two argued occasionally over such items as whether a
full-time nurse should be present at the day care centers. A.M. began
to feel that she was really the only one who knew about the details
of the overall concept as R.K. and Y.H. were busy and did not always seem
responsive to her concerns. But she remained quiet for a while, using
Y.H. as a defense when confronted by R.K. whose sense of urgency and
whose style often annoyed her, and relied more on the consultant on
whom she could bounce off her ideas. R.K. prepared an all-but-final
version after visiting the one major proposed site on his vacation.
A.M. had prepared earlier drafts but R.K. thought these were too mechanical.
This earlier version had "concentrated too much on the federal regulations"
and talked too much about who should be responsible for care and now how
the care should be delivered. This was a continuing friction point
between her and R.K. although she later admitted she had concentrated
"too much on staffing" and that R.K.'s draft was an improvement
although she felt it could. be better still.
The division, through this struggle with DPH and the absence of
a strong hand from Knight, examined the problem in much more detail
than was usual, particularly in relying on the providers and not only on a
few "trusted" friends. But the consultant, a close friend of R.K.'s,
also played a key role. The slow iterative process eventually resulted
in a satisfactory version of the guidelines being submitted to DPH for
comment. DPH for its part remained angry about Medicaid's involvement
but Y.H. had agreed with them that the division would only get involved
in ten or twelve demonstration projects and that DPH could first comment
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on their evaluation as a quid pro quo for not insisting on heavy
initial DPH involvement (licensing, etc.). At that point, formal
license requirements could then be drawn up by DPH based on the exper-
ience of the negotiated contracts with Medicaid.
In the mid-fall the whole possibility of the program suddenly
appeared to be problematic as the federal government had, in an
information bulletin (not having the forcze of regulation), suggested
that day care could only be provided by hospital out-patient depart-
ments and from separate clinics. R.K. felt it to be dangerous to
encourage increasing control over the system by hospitals and so
continued to support the proposals by nursing homes. The regional
federal representatives felt at first the state program was thus not
possible. But Y.H. suggested that nothing stated that nursing homes
must give 24 hour care and they could just "fold it into" the nursing
home billing, i.e., the day care provider would be listed as a "nursing
home". This also avoided the s'eparate clinic "route" which they
feared since Washington was presumed to be trying to do away with the
whole day care for the elderly concept. The state's program could
be forever hidden in the nursing home program. R.K. was helped by
the fact that one of the officials from Washington was a personal
friend, although several other states had also been granted permission
to define the program in such a way to "protect" it from later cuts.
The situation then stood at the end of 1974 with some 13 proposals
having been reviewed by the division with 8 to 10 to be selected,
although Y.H. felt that "we'll select less if there aren't enough
good ones". A memo of understanding with DPH was agreed to in which
DPH would act as inspecting agents for the demonstration projects
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using the guidelines developed by DPW. A.M. had also negotiated
an appropriate rate through the Rate Setting Commission. The first
contracts with facilities were being signed and, according to A.M.,
the providers were in agreement with the guidelines and rates although
the ones who had the most interest and investment in it were disturbed
by the length of time the process had taken.
The story then is one which developed differently than the other
cases. Its slow coalescing of forces followed by a detailed, sometimes
conflicting development of a product in which greater confidence could
be placed (and a resultant absence of the "nagging ego" problem)
nonetheless led to questions in some of the participants' minds about
the actual process. The pattern of the division's responses nonetheless
illustrated that many of the features of this pattern had been learned
from earlier cases and could be executed without Knight. For example,
there was the attempt to link the program to an already existing one,
the strong assertion of the division's perogatives in competition with
DPH, the bending of the federal regulations to suit their purposes,
the reliance on consultants, and the slow experimental search for
a satisfactory solution.
A.M.'s learning during this case was significant. She felt that
this was the first major project she had worked on from its inception
and that she had gained considerable knowledge about day care. Her
management learning was of two kinds, one a negative one learned from
watching R.K. and which primarily dealt with how not to approach pro-
viders. R.K.'s style also was felt by DPH to offend providers but
Knight felt that R.K. had probably simply been forceful in stating what
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the division required. Her learning from Y.H. was more positive
(e.g. that authority could be seized from DPH or at another level)
or "how to put things on hold" but she felt that it was unlikely
its effects could be felt until she got out from under his wing and
moved to another job. She however, felt that a good set of guidelines
had been written and that they had responded well to the challenges,
although she felt she might have asked for more help. She regretted
that a lot of questions also "didn't get resolved in the division of
labor between the three Medicaid staff". Writing of "constant memos"
also worried her, yet she stated that "one must put things on paper"
to "cover oneself", to establish agreements to generate responses.
Her contact with Knight was minimal but she commented that his
teaching style was perhaps not always influential with all personality
types (including her own). It is possible that Knight realized' his
style was not effective with all the staff and thus delegated contact with
such persons to others although here A.M. logically reported to- Y.H.
Certainly his overall delegation to Y.H. in the whole nursing home area
would seem to indicate this since there were also others in. that part
of the staff (in addition to A.M.) with whom the teaching style was
not totally successful.
Y.H. felt that he had not accomplished much for the program, having
left the task to A.M. and the consultant. He felt that the questions
which had been involved were as much "professional" as managerial and,
since he was not "inspired" by the professional minutae of the issue
nor had the time to deal with them, he often "punted" the problem over
to others -- his staff, R.K. or DPH. He felt he could only advance
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things procedurally with DPH or in "cooling off" A.M. (since he
sided with R.K. on the substance of the guidelines; that is, he
also thought they should be quite detailed). He felt that such projects
should, in the future, be "project managed" since no one really cared
enough to push the idea through.
Yet the group working together not only managed to generate several
working principles (as described previously), they also, without
Knight's strong input, used many developed in other cases, for example,
the importance of talking to providers and understanding their problems,
but of nonetheless investing only in well-managed ones. While only
a very few of the teaching and management approaches favored by Knight
are evident here, the few that were utilized (such as the assumption
of authority, the use of experiments or the stress on goals) seemed
to indicate that staff members had absorbed these from Knight in
earlier cases and were now testing them on other cases. That this
process of testing was more confusing and lengthy does not however
negate the relative success of the project, whose goal was to establish
an (experimental) day care program.
Not only was the goal achieved but it was achieved in concert with
the division's mission - to act as a responsible buyer - and without
violating any of the body of principles which the division had begun to
build up. The fact that the explicit style of accomplishing this (i.e.
the teaching and management style of Knight) was not as closely adhered
to raises questions about the general utility of that style which will
be addressed in Chapter VI.
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6. Overview
Each of the cases described above can be tentatively described as
a success in that (1) a decision was made concerning the possible new
services, (2) policies for assuring the delivery of these services
were put into place and (3) the policies were then routinely followed
or further developed.
The EPSDT case evidencedin a situation of substantial environ-
mental pressure,a creative response which enabled the division to develop
the service in its own manner. Indications are, that while the basic
policy was in place, considerable attention would be directed to "proving"
its effectiveness. Since the very nature of this case was based on the
designation of the service as a "non-program", it is clear that it
had not been routinized in the normal sense. This, coupled with Knight's
absorption of the "non-program" into his personal arena, suggests that
the division's EPSDT concept might not likely outlast Knight's tenure-
unless, of course, he was able to turn around the direction of the
national program from his local base, a possibility which cannot be
assessed here.
The free-standing mental health clinic case demonstrated that the
divisinn was able to develop an approach to such clinics that it
believed viable and that was shared by the provider community. The
process of certification of the 50 clinics and the review of problem-
oriented records was carried out with continued energy while the
adjustment of the policies to assure better access to clients and a
still more responsive level of treatment got underway.
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The success of the 442 program issmore difficult to assess. A policy
was developed and placed in the agency's manual and a favorable payment
rate certified. Since the carrying out of the program was basically
in the hands of state and local education officials, the initially
chaotic situation being created by the implementation of the latter's
program made it impossible to determine how well or actively local
centers were carrying out the desired co-2 evaluations on Medicaid
children.
The evaluation of the HMO program is a mixed one. The division
managed to bring its existing HMO activity under control while the
mechanics for continued control were embedded in a formal contract and
a set of routine computer checks and evaluations. The division was
not instrumental in developing any new HMO's but a spin-off benefit,
that of the development of a HMO capacity within other state agencies
was achieved. It is unclear how this capacity would be utilized.
Finally, the day care for the elderly program can be viewed as a
success. A new idea was responded to, proposals were evaluated,
guidelines were developed and several demonstration contracts entered
into. By the nature of the case, its routinization was not required
nor can it be used as a criterion of success.
Each of the cases, while appearing to be somewhat disparate, were
directed at the fulfillment of a particular task or responsibility.
This task,as described on page 70, was to make new medical services
eligible for Medicaid reimbursement. While the state program was
one of the most comprehensive in the nation, both Knight and the
staff still saw the development of new services (or the major re-
structuring of old ones) as one of their tasks.
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Each time a potential new service was presented to the division,
a set of subtasks or "questions" were generated by Knight and his
staff, the resolution of which led to the development of a final
policy for the new service. Through an examination of the way in
which these subtasks were performed from case to case it is possible
to assess the amount of learning occurring within the stream of cases
and also to test whether that learning was utilized -in other new
service cases not described here or in other streams. The content of
that learning, i.e. principles of medical care delivery and of its
administration, will be shown in the response to these questions
while the key role of teaching and management in the development of these
principles will be described later in this chapter. Here I wish only
to demonstrate that, through the accomplishment of the subtasks, some
significant learning did take place, both within and across the streams.
The subtasks or questions generated in each case follow. A deter-
mination of the need for the service was made, a target population was
singled out and a mode of delivery and potential provider types suggested.
Then a reasonable cost for the service had to be determined and negotia-
tions with both providers and other government agencies entered into
to discuss not only the cost but also the validity of the first deter-
mination as to need, target population, etc. Finally an effort to
"propagate" the new services' availability, whether through local welfare
offices or directly through providers, was made.
The responses to the task of determining the need for a particular
service indicated that the division became increasingly conscious of
its role in developing new services. In the EPSDT and FSMHC cases,
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Knight's first response was to take on as little extra responsibility as
necessary but in the last three cases, the attitude and level of energy
towards new services changed significantly. General principles began
to be developed through the assessment of need. Thus the need for
comprehensive care was stressed first in the EPSDT case, slighted over
in the FSMHC case but then reasserted in the 442 and HMO cases.
Similarly, a principle of the need to avoid "maintenance" care was
developed in the FSMHC case and later reasserted in the Day Care program.
And the "need" to increase federal financial participation for the state
was first developed in both the FMSHC and 442 cases and later stressed
in other mental health areas and in the family planning program (not
described here).
The selection of a target population was based on the consistent
belief of Knight that programs for children were of the greatest prior-
ity (thus his personal interest in EPSDT and 442 and, to a lesser extent,
in HMO's) while other target populations were "selected" because of
the obvious human benefits involved, e.g. day care or family planning.
The division's willingness to respond to a wider variety of populations
was limited by the restricted nature of Medicaid clientele and the
already broad scope of benefits.
The tasks of determining how the service was to be provided and by
whom were closely related. The division responded to these tasks
by developing a set of principles which were used throughout the stream.
Thus an increasing stress was placed on well managed, high level, and
accountable providers although these criteria could be relaxed if a
particular provider was the only one available (see the mental health
clinics). Thus well managed providers were sought out in the later
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cases - 442, HMO and Day Care. High level (meaning physician)
providers were stressed so as to avoid discriminatory usage of nurses
or interns and residents in the FSMHC,442 and HMO cases. And where
this high level involvement was not possible, the principle of medical
accountability was stressed both in the FSMHC and 442 cases and later
in such areas as the regulation of nursing home pharmaceuticals (see
Chapter IV). Similarly the question raised in the HMO case as to the
advisability of gynecologists providing primary care was later used in
re-examining the whole family planning program.
The mode of delivery question asked by the division evolved from
Knight's insistence that a philosophy is of the first importance -
one must know what one wants to do. While the importance of a "philosophy"
was of course addressed in the questioning concerning the need for the
service, it became stressed more often in the decisions about who was
to be the provider and how the service should be delivered. The en-
vironment of the division demanded consistent policy thus placing the
focus of a clear approach in the response to these questions since it
was here that providers were most involved and concerned, i.e., would
they and their delivery mode be eligible for reimbursement?
One of the principles which was developed here was that programs
should be linked up with one another if possible or, at a minimum,
comparative "analogies" should be used. This was evident in all the
cases, for example, linking HMO's to neighborhood health centers or day
care to the home health technology. The desire not to provide incentives
to undertreat patients surfaced in the HMO case and was continually
discussed in setting rates for a wide variety of new services. The
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question of clients' privacy which arose in the 442 case when possible
clients needed to be identified also surfaced in the HMO case and
in the family planning program. Similarly the realization that loose,
decentralized provider organizations are difficult to police was simul-
taneously developed from a survey of the HMO literature and from the
hospital sanction case (see Chapter IV).
The question of what cost to allow ror each new service was one
which could technically not be answered by the division since that
power lay with the Rate Setting Commission (RSC). However the
division's recommendations to the RSC were generally adopted. From the
very beginning of the EPSDT case (the removal of restrictions on the
$15 fee), Knight pushed for fees which would permit the provider
to deliver an adequate service but not one which would make him turn
away Medicaid clients or give "shoddy" service.
The necessary negotiations with providers about rates, provider
types, client population and with other state or federal agencies about
hewing to the appropriate regulatory line developed several explicit
principles. First of all, Knight stressed, and his staff acknowledged,
that "providers should be listened to". A simple principle but one
which in previous administrations had been ignored because of lack
of either time or inclination. Thus in all the cases in this stream,
the provider groups' problems and needs were analyzed and incorporated
into a final policy. And usually, a more general policy was developed
with the division specifically initiating this type of dialogue.
When the situation which the division stepped into (or was pulled
into - the FSMHC and BMO cases) was discovered to be one of confused
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or absent authority; Knight stressed that the division should have no
fear of assuming that authority itself. The final two cases - HMO
and day care - showed that staff performing independently of Knight could
also exercise this authority. Knight also stressed that the federal
"partner", SRS, could be turned around if professional allies could
be developed - as in the EPSDT case, although no such similar situation
arose again. Finally, Knight's admonition that "if we're not sure
of the right things to do, go slowly but then, when you are, plunge
ahead" was followed in the 442 case and in the later working out of
the HMO and day care cases.
What is significant about the resolution of the basic question the
division asked each time a new service was developed is not so much
the nature of the principles described above but the fact that they were
developed and often carried from one case to another or from this
stream to another stream (see Chapters IV and V). This development and
ransfer of principles is a higher level of performance than simply
learning to produce a policy (to "succeed") in a task area and to
routinize that policy. Thus, while the achievement of the latter two
levels of performance are criteria by which the learning of the
division can be assessed (and in this stream, that assessment is a
favorable one), the development and transfer of principles appears to
be a third level of learning which the division reached and against
which its performance in other streams could also be assessed.
One of the fLunctions of this third level lies in its role in improving
performance at the 'first two levels. That is,one way of improving the
de.velopment and routinization of specific policy. is toliave a bank of-
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general principles which can be used not only for reasons of conceptual
"economy" but also for more positive or comparative learning purposes.
Despite the success of each of the individual cases and the
development of a set of principles which were sometimes utilized in
succeeding cases, an overall assessment as to the amount of learning
is difficult to make, even though all the principles described were
explicit ones, often stated in "maxim" form and usually observable
in the final written policy. The principles accumulated over time
in Knight's mind and were taught to staff members. But as each of the
cases described here was handled by different program directors, the
degree to which the principles were shared and then held by the
organization is questionable. They may well have been shared only by
Knight and individual staff on a one to one basis. This personal
learning, (see the case of the mental health director, L.A.) while
clearly necessary for any organizational learning, may not be sufficient.
Thus, while each of the principles was embedded in a formal policy or
program and continued to be used in other new service departments,
there is no assurance that the principles would outlive either Knight's
insistence on them or the staff's tenure in the agency. (See Chapter VII).
Nor is it clear whether the staff working without Knight would
actively develop new services. The organizational capacity described
here is one of dealing with a service area selected by Knight. A
weak leader or a shift in Knight's priorities to, say, sanctions or
monitoring would likely mean a lessened development of new services.
Thus the use of a test for learning such as an observable and increased
''momentum" (as in the sanction stream, Chapter IV) may not be applicable
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here. The momentum seen here, while clearly a part of the organization's
then-current "memory", may or may not outlive those members of the
organization.
The development and transfer of these principles (as well as
the division's success at the first two levels) may be viewed as the
content of learning. But the division not only learned this "content"
but also developed a pattern for developing these principles. This
is the "how" of the division's learning. In stark contrast to the
explicit principles, this pattern of development, which I have called
a "program for action", was almost entirely tacit. This program
consisted of modes of behavior quite similar to the "programs" later
observed in the sanction and internal administration streams (such as
ignoring or bending of regulations, or selectively trusting a few
close allies), which were never spoken of but which were part of a
relatively consistent and observable pattern of behavior-though the
pattern varied somewhat with the goals, personnel and environmental
inputs. Thus while all of the behaviors in the "program" could be
observed, they were rarely talked about by staff members and never
posited by Knight as principles. Indeed virtually all of the staff had
to ponder considerably over the nature of this "program" when asked
by the researcher. It is not completely clear why such a program was
not explicit but I believe that at least two factors lessened the
need for an explicit program of behavior. Firstly the fact that
such a concentration was placed on the content of the principles prob-
ably lessened the very possibility that the manner of their generation
would be explicitly focused on. Secondly, the strong early socializa-
tion of staff members likely lessened the need for an explicit program
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that is, it could be learned by watching and doing and did not need to
be explicitly advanced.
I would suggest that such a program of action helps to explain
the success of the division in each of the cases and, along with the
overall approach of the division (described in later pages), is a
necessary component of the type of learning shown by the division. Here
the "what" of the division's learning (tle principles) began to be
linked with the"how" of learning more fully explained by the division's
teaching and management approaches and its overall paradigm. That
is, the pattern of action about to be more fully described is both
the what and the how of learning. As the "what" of learning it
corresponds to a fourth level of learning. That is, the very
achievement or development of such a program constitutes a level of
learning more general than the development of principles since the program's
output was a set of principles which were then used to improve the
division's learning at the lower levels of policy development and rou-
tinization.
The "program's" features are first evident in the considerable
initial use of analogy (e.g. 442 is "pediatric care") or the attempt
to link one service to another (e.g. viewing HMO's as a variant of
neighborhood health centers). After this "analogf'"was made, we see
the strong assumption of the division's perogatives in each of the
cases, often with a strong "moral" posture outlining the division's
'right" to be involved in the area - see the assertion of "turf" in the
442 or FSMHC cases or the "moral" authority inherent in the EPSDT case.
Sometimes this assertion of authority was negative, i.e. "that is not
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our responsibility, so don't get involved for the moment." This
was evident in the first stages of EPSDT and 442 and in several
other cases not described here. In contrast to other streams however,
(e.g. the sanctions stream) the advancement of specific goals early
on in the case was not made, probably due to the relative inexperience
of the division with the medical aspects of the service. Generally
a well defined responsibility for the nei. service area was made, with
Knight either taking it upon himself (usually at the onset) or dele-
gating it to one and only one of his staff. This was further heightened
by Knight's admonition to staff that areas of potential new service should
be brought to his attention first of all and he would decide their priority.
This assumption and delegation of authority was one of only two components
of the "program" which were made explicit.
An incubation period where the division did relatively little after
its assumption (or rejection) of authority was observed in each of the
cases although this period was considerably longer in the 442 and Day
Care.areas since they were completely new services quite unconnected
with anything then being offered by the division. In addition these
services were not being strongly pressed upon it by members of the
division's environment such as providers or other state agencies. This
incubation period was usually followed by a light, once-over treatment
given to the details of the case. This was most evident in those areas
where Knight had either a well worked out philosophy (EPSDT) or where
he "knew" he could work out a strategy easily (442). Not only did each
new service first incubate and was then often glanced over lightly,
but any existing rules or regulations pertaining to were often ignored
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or "bent" in the division's favor. This was the situation in the
EPSDT, 442 and EMO cases.
Given this somewhat rarified approach, the need to somehow
"ground" the new service if such a once-over approach did not seem
practical led the staff (and usually Knight) to touch base with either
the provider group likely to be involved or a small group of select
and trusted friends. And in areas where no such friends existed
(HMO and Day Care), the staff involved developed on their own a group
of trusted allies. Not only did Knight and the staff increasingly
ground the policy development via this consultation, but the role of
experimentation also increased during the stream -- from no real
experimentation in the early stages of the EPSDT case to Day Care
where these services as a whole would not become a part of the divi-
sion's policy manual until the results of the 10 or 12 demonstration
projects were assessed. The intervening cases showed an increasing
willingness to experiment either with a group of trusted friends (442)
or with a well managed provider (FSMHC and HMO's).
- The activity surrounding each of the new service developments,
while often viewed initially as a "problem", was usually turned around
and viewed as an opportunity. This change of stance was also evident
in the sanction stream and is directly attributable to Knight's particular
attitude. For example, the EPSDT case led to the development of a
protocol which defined quality pediatric care and which could be used
throughout the division. A similar definition was made for mental
health and the initial problem of a chaoticly managed HMO program was
turned around to advance the division's credibility. Knight's attitude
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as expressed to the researcher was that, "I don't think in terms of
'being wrong', rather I think in terms of the direction we want
to go, and I don't worry about the mistakes we make along the way.
Thus the criteria of "success" of the case which were discussed earlier
did not specify that the new service be extensively developed, only
that a new policy towards that service be developed and implemented -
it could be a restrictive or cautious policy as in the HMO area.
In fact, each stage of activity in the cases was viewed by Knight
not only as an opportunity for him to teach himself and the staff
but also as an opportunity to bolster or "lever up" that activity
for other purposes. It was not clear whether this entrepreneurial,
opportunity-seeking stance had permeated the staff. As with the other
elements of the program for action, it too was tacit. Given that the
division was faced with a wide range of "problems" both new and old
to solve, it may be that one rule for selection of problems was that
those that could be "packaged" to help solve other problems were
unconsciously favored since they permitted the division to survive
a deluge of problems.
The final aspect of the program (more a consequence of the program
rather than a constituent element) is what I have labelled the "nagging
ego" problem - the staff questioning whether they had really accomplished
anything. It is apparent that this feeling was the strongest when
Knight was the most heavily involved, i.e. in the EPSDT and the 442
cases. In the FSMHC and HMO cases the staff had greater control over
the direction of the program and could take satisfaction from that, even
though hard "output" measures of success were difficult to come by.
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In the last case (Day Carewhich had lacked output measures) the staff
had almost complete control of the general direction setting and there
the nagging ego was not nearly as evident. Doubts raised by staff
over this lack of "essentiality" (as discussed by Argyris) concerned
the process, not the product. As Knight himself put it however "This
is a dilemma, what should I do, stop offering strong leadership?" It
was not in his nature. Thus one of the strengths of the division
(Knight's leadership) might also be seen as representing a problem
in that staff might only be able to tolerate both little involvement
in policy setting and lack of output measures for a very short period
of time before either some sort of internal pathology developed (e.g.
resistance to change) or they sought greener pastures, i.e. a more
fulfilling job where they could either see results or develop policy
themselves.
In later chapters I will discuss how this learned program of
behavior can be more fully understood as a program for dealing with
environmental uncertainty. That is, the program permitted the division
to select areas it wished to pay attention to (e.g. was it within
its legal or "moral" authority) and then provided it with a way of
progressively narrowing the uncertainty within that area (e.g.
using analogy or entrepreneurial "packaging"). Here, however, my
emphasis on the initial outlining of four levels of learning (includ-
ing the program for action) should be kept in mind by the reader since
they will be utilized in Chapters IV and V as criteria by which
the division's performance can be assessed. But other factors at a
higher level of generality also help to explain how the relative
success of the division was achieved and how some of the learning
described above was generated.
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These factors which, for lack of an immediately rich name, I will
label the overall approach of the division are three in number and
are, importantly, all factors which were accessible to and amenable
to conscious manipulation by the division. This approach was the
"glue" which held together the behaviors described above and which guided
not only this approach to new activities but also the division's
dealing with routine activities. The ap-roach consisted of the
teaching of general principles to a young, competent and inexperienced
staff, the enhancement of the organization's credibility through manage-
ment and the conscious development of an organizational paradigm - the
"responsible buyer".
The nature and content of the principles developed were discussed
earlier. The function of these principles was to aid in the translation
of the organization's paradigm into a more firm reality and to make it
possible for the division to bound sometimes seemingly complex or ex-
tensive problems. For example, "responsibility" was translated into
such principles as investing only in well managed providers (FSMHC, HMO,
Day Care), stepping in where a "responsibility vacuum" existed (FSMHC,
HMO) or stressing medical accountability (EPSDT, FSMHC, HMO). The
"buyer" function, although more evident in the sanction stream, was
translated into principles such as the use of the fee structure to
help achieve a "quality" product (all the cases), the "negative" princi-
ple that if lower quality services are the only ones available, the
very existence of the division's purchasing power could be used to
help change their service patterns (FSMHC) or that the services,
before being purchased, should be tested out, and once purchased, should
be regularly assessed for quality (442, FSMHC, HMO).
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The role of teaching in the development of principles in the
stream was clearly evident (see below) although the fact that each
of the staff members primarily involved in the five cases were ones
whom Knight trusted slightly more than most of the staff suggests that
he was aware that even his teaching needed fertile ground. As in the
other streams, each of the involved staff was young, energetic, com-
petent, relatively unskilled in health care delivery and viewed
themselves as generalists. They had each participated in the early
and strong socialization process during which the "informal matrix"
organization (Chapter II) was in effect and had sat through the
staff meetings in late 1973 when many of the general principles des-
cribed here were discussed for the first time.
But Knight's direct teaching style was also particularly evident in
this stream although not all of the elements of the style were utilized
here. Thus we see the manner in which he pulled people into a problem
area the moment he first heard about it (all the cases except 442),
the continual explanation of why decisions were made and the admission
that his mind could be (and was) changed (see his change of attitude
in the FSMHC and HMO cases). Similarly, his anticipation and appre-
ciation of the staff's styles led him to tolerate quite considerable
varieties within one area (e.g. FSMHC) or the working out of a
group style (Day Care) or the making of "mistakes" (HMO). I suspect
that this tolerance for diversity of style contributed greatly to the
ease of development of shared principles and the relative absence of
philosophical conflict. In many bureaucracies, the reverse is true.
Knight also evidenced a strong tolerance for, and encouragement of,
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experimentation in each of the five cases. Finally, his evocation of
his past experience was perceived by all the staff as being valuable
in their learning of many of the principles.
The second important element of the division's overall approach
was the use of "management", particularly in the development of
organizational credibility. The content of this management may
be similar or different from what is generally considered to be
"management" but I am not primarily concerned here with definitions
but rather with description of what actually occurred. Knight
called his process "management" and members of the division's environ-
ment outside the DPW called the product "good management" and I shall
thus continue to use this term.
The role of management in developing credibility was an iterative
one involving both a process of management and its product. Thus the
use of sound management techniques (process) in routine activity
led to a product which was perceived by the division's environment
as "credible". Knight commented on this product (credibility) by
stating that he saw it consisting of having a policy, making it available
and known, ensuring its consistency and coherence, and trying to live
up to it. This credibility then gave the division some "breathing"
room in which to develop and choose principles in areas of new
knowledge. And then, the manner in which these new principles were
.chosen, explained and made into routines using basically the same
management process further enhanced the division's credibility. Thus
the cycle could begin again.
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Knight's management of the new policy development process was
the same as his management of routine activity; that is, he showed
the use of the same techniques in both situations. Thus, while
competent internal management of routine activity was important,
here I shall consider only how this routine management fed the
"cycle" of new knowledge development. The division's routine activity
was not insignificant in all the new seivices cases however. For
example no progress could have been made on the HMO-1 contract until
the division arranged to pay its HMO bills more rapidly (similarly
with EPSDT).
While the fact that the division was doing something (anything)
in EPSDT and with FSMHC's gained it some credibility, in the 442, HMO and
Day Care cases the division's credibility had to be first earned in
the working out of the new cases since these providers were unacquainted
with Medicaid. Only then could it get what it wanted programatically.
Here Knight's litany of: having a policy for the new knowledge,
making it available, and ensuring its consistency and coherence
helped in assuring credibility. Thus much of the external credibility
of the division was based on the product of Knight's management
activity.
Providers interviewed placed great stress on this "product" not
to the exclusion of the content of policies (e.g. the mental health
clinics disagreed with some of the policies) or of the details of the
management process, but (I suggest), simply because it offered a
pragmatic means of relating to the division. In a turbulent medical
environment where there was often little agreement on principles and
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yet the actors were "forced" to work together, some basis for under-
standing had to be found. That basis was clear.. it was the credi-
bility as described by members of the division's environment.
"People now get back to you, they're responsive. You get an answer
and it's a clear one. Your policies aren't fixed, you'll change them
if you have to but you do listen to expert advice. There's a pride
of authorship in the division - you're fucusing on what the problems
are
The manner in which the product (credibility) was developed
internally was through Knight's management of new policy development.
Of first importance in this stream was his generally clear delegation
or assumption of authority evident in all but the Day Care case and
his avoidance of large or permanent committees or task forces. Secondly
we saw the open door policy for each of his staff and his general
accessibility to discuss principles with them (see all but the 442 case).
Thirdly, his reliance on "naive", non-professional staff to ask fresh
questions led each of the cases to be developed in a somewhat non-
traditional manner (all but EPSDT). Fourthly, his continual stress
on the "integrity" of the division (read my "credibility") to the
staff was a major component of his management style. Fifthly, there
was his willingness to experiment with new policies or reward providers
perceived as inventive entrepreneurs. And finally, the division's
cultivation of reliable consultants and advisors helped in the acquisi-
tion of credibility. The breathing space generated by this credibility
was then used to develop the needed principles which could be called
upon to formalize a policy.
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The importance of the conscious paradigm - a "responsible
buyer" - was clear throughout the five cases. It was most evident
in the day care and free standing clinic cases where the final "tune"
as to the providers' direction was called by the division and where
some in-roads into reshaping the overall system were made. Thus the
division saw itself as acting responsibly by moving into a needed
service, but doing so experimentally and with an eye to not permitting
an excessive rate. As a buyer, it could specify exactly what the
nature of the day care service would be through its contract guidelines.
Similarly with the mental health clinics - "responsibility" was cited
as one of the reasons for adopting the new service (thus increasing
federal dollars for the state); but this involvement also permitted
it to purchase only the quality service it sought. And the stress
on problem-oriented records began to touch off changes in the larger
mental health system. In the 442 case, considerably less success
as a responsible buyer was achieved although Knight certainly tried
to act out the role. He stated that he "had done all he could" -
he had responded to the demands placed upon him by other agencies and he
had developed a policy which would assure a relatively high-quality
product in a new field. In the HMO and EPSDT cases, the clear asser-
tion that the division would not be forced to (a) purchase ("buy")
under conditions unfavorable to it or (b) waste energy on a program it
deemed unworthy ("irresponsible") was evident. Here the division staff
and Knight utilized the paradigm in a somewhat defensive posture unlike
the day care and mental health areas but its role in guiding their
action was the same and their actions in beginning to live out the para-
digm were equally successful.
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Thus the approach of the division to its new knowledge consisted of
the teaching of principles, a management philosophy and techniques, and
the development and invocation of a conscious paradigm. At one level
these may be seen as the "how" of organizational learning - how the
division was able to deal with new knowledge and transfer some of
the principles to other situations. But if this approach is to be
described as a necessary (or at least accessible) lever for such first
order success, then the acquisition of this approach might also be
seen as learning. This new services stream indicated that some
progress has been made in routinizing this approach. Examination of the
other streams and a search for situations where the division's actors
acquired or utilized this approach independent of Knight must also be
made.
In the succeeding two chapters, the reader should keep this concept
in mind since it will become apparent that while the overall approach
was successfully developed and-applied in at least two other areas,
it continued to be strongly based in Don Knight, and, as I shall discuss
in Chapters VI and VII, was successful not only because of its inherent
power, but also because of a very favorable constellation of other
circumstances.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SANCTION STREAM
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1. Development of the Formal Sanction Power
The first case in this stream involves the development of a new
power by the division. The power to sanction providers had existed
since 1969 but had been haltingly and infrequently applied until 1973.
Then Knight took initiative and clarified this issue slowly but
consistently by working through the department's formal channels.
The power fitted into his overall philosophy and he then had only
to wait for an opportunity to utilize it.
Prior to November 1973, abuses of the medical assistance program
had been handled in an informal manner. Up until the takeover of the
program by the state (and the concurrent injection of federal money)
in 1967, the program had been managed by a small group of less than
ten central office staff. The prevailing attitude was (as expressed
by one of the long term staffers) that since the allowable fees were
low and there was difficulty in getting providers to agree to parti-
cipate in the program, the staff did not want to do anything drastic
to hinder client access to care. Sanctioning providers or even taking
a strong hand would have blocked such access by limiting the
number of participating physicians. At the time, this was probably
a correct assessment of the limited power of the division.
In 1967, when the Medicaid program began to take its present
shape, the same ten people continued to staff the division. Much of
the medical profession had resented the advent of Medicaid and Medicare
(although they later discovered these to be a vast, "willing" source
of funds), and the climate was still seen as not being appropriate
for any kind of sanction activity. For over a year, the program
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operated under the temporary authority of a governor's executive order.
It was not until early 1969 that enabling legislation was passed
formally setting up the division and authorizing it to receive
federal funds, to pay for certain services and to possess additional
powers. Among these powers was the power to establish administrative
sanctions (including suspensions for up to three years) against
providers for violation of the rules and regulations of the program.
These rules and regulations were not to include "medical criteria"
but elsewhere the act granted authority to establish rules for the
"efficient operation" of the program, to certify qualified providers,
and to develop programs of utilization review. That these latter three
powers could not be exercised without setting "medical criteria" or
that the line between them and medical criteria was fuzzy was ignored
in the compromise attempt to pass a bill which would assure that the
department would have the necessary powers to act efficiently and in
clients! interestsbut which would, in theory, avoid a clash with the
medical profession.
From that point in 1969, sanction activity took a particular form.
The small staff of the division would occacionally notice gross
elements of abuse and would call providers in to discuss a change in
practice. If the abuse was confirmed as a serious one or involved
financial "shenanigans", it was then nearly always turned over to the
finance director of the department. He was a strong willed, competent
and energetic veteran of the department who hated to see money paid
out which violated statutes or the department's regulations. For
example, if a provider was found to be billing for an ineligible service
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or utilizing services codes which maximized his revenue, he would be
called by the division or the finance director and told he would
have to make financial restitution for such billings. Such restitu-
tions were usually negotiated settlements with the finance director
being very proud of the fact that he "never lost a case", in court
or outside. Indeed his reputation was a strong tight-fisted controller
who nearly always did "win". More significantly here, however, is
that few problems were brought to the division's attention since the
means for detecting abuse were so weak and sporadically exercised
(see Chapter V). Those few cases that were brought to the division's
attention were seen as "financial" cases and were handled by the
financial chief, who sought only retribution and not suspension from
the program.
The legislature stepped into this void and created a Bureau of
Welfare Audits (BWA) whose responsibility it was to be the watch-dog
agency for the Medicaid program and to support the financial director.
Their activities however, stressed outright criminal activities such
as fraud (they became known as the "Fraud Squad") which they referred
to the Attorney General's office and the recovery of monies in the
vein carved out by the departmeat's finance director. But sanction
action exercised by the division alone or for poor programmatic per-
formance was still at a low ebb.
The assistant commissioner prior to Knight had seen that the
situation was not totally satisfactory, but gave its reform a low
priority. He appeared to be more interested in programmatic issues,
i.e., developing new services or assuring overall system effectiveness
-190-
through high payoff programs rather than in the level of medical
quality of providers.
In February of 1972, however, a turning point occurred as the
division made its first attempt at using the sanction power. Two
dentists were suspended by the division for violation of its rules.
In this case the violation was severe - billing for services not
rendered (which in a court would constitute fraud.) The case was also
being investigated by the BWA. The national legal climate at the
time however, had as a focus the protection of individual's rights
and thus the department's legal counsel determined that, while the
department had the authority to suspend providers, no adequate
administrative processes such as hearings, rules for examination of
evidence, or appeals, etc. had been established. The acting head of
the division (N.K.) declined to reinstate the dentists as he felt
the suspension was warranted and the legal division of the department.
was forced to send out the necessary reinstatement letter. N.K. felt
vindicated when the two dentists were later convicted in court on these
grounds by the Attorney General's office and lost their license to
practice. At the conclusion of these events, the commissioner assigned
the legal division the task of developing procedures such that the
department would not be denied such an opportunity again.
When Knight arrived nearly a year later in April of 1973, he was
briefed by N.K. on the total operation of the division during which
they discussed the case of the two dentists. Knight was disappointed
when he realized that the department lacked the power to suspend
providers. He stated then that his basic approach was to act as a
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buyer of services, i.e., the division purchased services for a defined
clientele and it must be free to not purchase from those it deemed
unqualified. In his previous role as a vice-president for purchasing
in private industry he had controlled many millions of dollars.
Similarly, in the development of his neighborhood health center,
he had hired or arranged for the services of providers who would
meet the needs of that community. He had not been forced to take all
comers. Thus his basic philosophy was foreign to the idea of having to
purchase from all providers who met only minimal, legal standards. Knight
thus requested the commissioner to speed up the legal division's actions
in developing the required administrative procedures as he knew he could
not exercise his philosophy without the necessary regulations in place.
There was no indication what had taken the legal division such time
to develop regulations although there was some confusion about whose
exact responsibility it was, t he legal division's or the department's
general counsel. In addition, it was, despite the commissioner's
assignment, simply not given a priority status by the legal staff.
As a staff member of the medical division remarked, "no one would have
pushed it but us." Nor was there any pressure from outside the DPW
to exercise the sanction power. But now the medical division had
taken a stand and work began to speed up on the development of pro-
cedures upon the commissioner's second request for action.
The department's lawyers then prepared draft regulations and con-
sulted with lawyers from the Department of Public Health and the
Human Services Agency. The DPH lawyers had felt that the whole area
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of sanctions was a regulatory one and therefore should have been
assigned to it while the DPW and its divisions concentrated on "program"
and financial concerns. The focus of discussion was not however that
that DPW did not have the authority (despite the "medical criteria"
clause of the enabling act -- which was not mentioned) but rather on the
fact that an amalgamation of the two agencies into a new "super
agency" was planned. DPH saw itself as the lead actor in the new
agency and did not wish to be bound by something drawn up in haste before
the amalgamation.
The HSA lawyer was generally supportive of the medical division's
overall direction but did not take a strong position in the discussions.
An additional lawyer from the Administration and Finance Department
(A&F) had formerly been with DPH and generally sided with the DPH
lawyer. These five lawyers from four different agencies slowly began
to work out an agreement as to what the regulations should contain.
Knight, who participated in the discussions, indicated that there
was really no substantial disagr.eement among the five although he
felt- that a committee of 5 bureaux was chaotic. In later cases, he
was not to let such important issues be settled by committees much
less one overburdened with outsiders. After the question of "turf"
was resolved in DPW.'s favor, the only change suggested by the
committee was that a fuller description than originally envisaged of
a charge of "violation of regulations" would have to be cited to the
provider about to be sanctioned. Similarly, several examples of
sanctionable acts were included in the proposed regulations. Knight
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also insisted that the regulations permit him to render an initial
decision after a first sanction hearing whereas the drafting lawyers
had previously suggested that a separate appeals officer be provided
for (as in cases involving recipient claims against department rulings.)
During this discussion period, a major nursing home containing
many Medicaid patients was inspected by DPH. Dispicable conditions
such that its continued DPH licensure was questionable were identified.
DPH and the division decided to act in concert on the case. All the
Medicaid patients were removed from the home in one day's "swoop" and
the home's license suspended. The case received significant publicity.
Knight felt buoyed by his action and by the publicity. It was not,
however, a direct application of the DPW sanction power since state
licensure had long been a condition of participation in the Medicaid
program.
Nonetheless, Knight took pride in publicizing the actions of the
division. He saw this, as a staffer related, as being part of his
image building process to show providers that "we weren't fooling
around." Knight began to push the legal task force to finish the
development of the sanction regulations. But he did not "go public"
with this activity. Instead, he kept the process relatively quiet.
He deliberately did not consult with providers and stated that he had
not investigated what other states were doing nor did he care. He
felt this was a purely administrative step being taken which he had
the right to take "alone" and that providers could later sue the
division if they felt the sanction regulations were inadequate. It
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was, he stated, a "calculated risk". Moreover the publicizing of
his actions could easily have been misconstrued by a paranoid medical
profession especially since the division had only begun to build up
credibility in such other areas as policy design, fee schedules and
payment of bills.
During this time the assistant director for vendor relations (R.T.)
had been assigned to liaison with the department's bill-processing center
to iron out billing problems raised by specific providers. These
generally involved late or incorrect payments. But in this delving
into the payment proccss he began to notice many irregularities in
the billing processes. In addition, now that the center had one specific
person in central office to relate to, they started to feed suspected
"problem" bills to him. R.T. began to keep a small file of these
providers but took no action. Knight saw this file as preparing the
ground for later implementation of the sanction procedures being
developed. His strategy would then be to "knock off" the obvious poor
and abusive providers in each program area and in each region ("like
the IRS" said Knight) and hope that the word would spread throughout
the provider community.
Finally, one day late in November, the proposed regulations were
published in the Saturday morning papers for comment. No significant
comments (and none from the major provider associations)were received.
The regulations became effective a few weeks later after insertion in the
agency policy manual. In early January, Knight sent a letter to the
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vice president of the medical society (with whom he had been on good
terms) summing up some of the progress being made in the division and
stating in a mild fashion that the division was now going to start
taking action against providers breaking regulations. No formal
response was received but the vice president continued to support Knight
in a general fashion. R.T. began to send out warning letters to pro-
viders. If the abuse was not corrected a stronger letter would be
sent along with a copy of the division's sanction regulations. This
activity was relatively low key however, and no significant steps
to sanction providers had been taken by late January.
At this point then a temporary lull set in. Knight began to further
develop his "purchase" philosophy in discussion with his staff and with
a young lawyer from the legal division assigned to work with the medi-
cal division. The lawyer felt that Medicaid's third party status was
not a pure "purchasing" situation and that the burden of proof was upon
the division to show that the provider had "erred", and that a "gross"
violation of the regulations must be shown. Knight felt differently --
that the burden of proof lay with the provider and that the degree
of sanction should fit the degree of violation - it need not be a
gross violation. Similarly the question of the "intent" of the provider
was to arise. But the working out of these and other principles had
to await a first sanctionable case. One developed almost immediately
in early February involving possible pharmaceutical abuse in nursing
homes -- a situation which was perceived by all as a chance to test
the new sanction procedures.
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This case can be summarized as follows: A division having little
formal power to sanction providers and, fearful of developing new
powers, let its responsibilities be exercised by adjacent bureaux
(the financial office, the Bureau of Welfare Audits, DPH, etc.). A
new head of the division arrived on the scene but is perceived to have
other priorities. The issue lags. A staff member nonetheless attempted
to suspend two providers but the order is reversed by the legal division.
This test case forced the division back to the drawing board to
develop and refine its sanction procedures. But the issue still languished
as the top position in the medical division lay vacant for 8 months and
the staff became increasingly pressured with other problems.
A second and more dynamic division head is appointed. He carried
a new philosophy from his previous experience and is appalled by what
the acting head tells him. He adopts a strong position that the
division must exercise its sanction "purchase" rights and pushes
for the immediate development of adequate regulations. He is buoyed
by publicity given to the closing of a poor provider by an adjacent
agency and further steps up the legal research until satisfactory pro-
cedures are developed although the division's legal ability to sanction
on pure quality of care grounds is overlooked in the push to get
something operational. Concurrent with this set of actions, he begins
to develop a principle or strategy (like the IRS) of setting an
example by knocking off the worst providers but keeps the strategy close
to the vest of the agency. Indeed most of the activity in the case
is conducted by Knight himself and neither his teaching nor his inter-
nal management styles are yet strongly in evidence other than his
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reluctance to use committees and his stress on the integrity of the
division.
A staff member assigned to iron out kinds in the payment process
begins to develop awareness of possible abuses and starts to keep a
"little list" of providers. When the sanction procedures formally
take effect, the division head notifies the provider associations in
a low key way and begins to send out "corrective" letters to minor
abusers. A short lull sets in and shortly thereafter a situation of
major abuse arises which is perceived as an opportunity to test the
new sanction procedures.
2. Pharmaceutical Abuse I
The case the division had been wat.ching for arrived in January. It
involved a large pharmacy whose business was composed principally of
Medicaid patients in nursing homes. The pharmacist's dispensing
patterns had been under observation for some years. The stimulus for
action in this instance had been a several year old complaint lodged
with the Bureau of Welfare Audits (BWA) by one of the department's
regional offices. The original complaint had not been investigated
and indeed even forgotten but the feeling remained within the divi-
sion that this provider had been guilty of "consistent over-charging"
and possibly other abuses. Finally in 1973 a complete audit of
several recent months of activity by the pharmacy was reordered by
BWA and in June, its current bills were retained by the division. Over
the summer these bills began to mount up unpaid in the office of the
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pharmacy director (I.N.). Finally in January, the BWA, while having
a pharmacist on its staff in addition to several accountants, approached
the Medical Division for assistance in interpretation of DPW's regu-
lations.
The pharmacist had been participating in he program for several
years, during which time the division had slowly begun to tighten its
regulations to prohibit or discourage such practices as prescrip-
tion splitting, over-pricing of drugs and other questionable practices.
According to I.N., this pharmacist had managed to stay just a jump
ahead of the increasingly tough regulations -- "as we became more
sophisticated, he became more sophisticated." By 1973, he had evolved
a large volume system in which prepackaged amounts of drugs were auto-
matically provided to nursing homes at regular intervals for patients'
use. This system was based on the fact that most nursing home patients
had a regular and continuing need for their drugs. The basic pres- -
cription system also differed somewhat from regular prescribing practice.
Each nursing home had a single order sheet on which all the patients'
physicians wrote their orders (prescriptions) after which the nursing
home used this form to order from a single pharmacy and, upon receipt
of the drugs, to administer them to the patients.
Initially the BWA had, using a strict and literal interpretation
of these regulations for nursing home pharmaceuticals, declared that
95% of the pharmacists' bills were invalid in some way. The basic
abuse uncovered by the audit was that the pharmacy extended the length
of the prescription written on the order sheet, or if no termination
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date was specified, continued to deliver the medication. Similarly, the
amount of medication delivered in any one prescription was often
different from that specified by the prescription, or if no amount
was specified,the pharmacist would assume an amount. For example, at
one extreme, a prescription might read simply "X units per day" and
the pharmacy would continue to deliver this medication indefinitely and
in batch sizes determined by its own staff. On this evidence the BWA
wished to take the pharmacy to court to recover as much of this
money as possible. The BWA's sole function was auditing and producing
evidence of abuse or fraud and it apparently needed this case as justifi-
cation of their role.
A meeting was called with I.N., R.D., the sanction director, the
department lawyer (D.L.), Knight, the department's finance chief (Y.E.)
and the BWA to determine how to respond to both these situations. At
this point it was not yet clear that this would be the first test
sanction case although a hasty sanction letter had been sent out by
R.D. suspending the pharmacy for 3 years, subject to a hearing with
the-Assistant Commissioner. Knight had apparently been very anxious to
test the new regulations and felt that the onus should be on the provider
to prove that the charge was inappropriate.
Upon being presented with the initial evidence of 95% of the bills
being invalid, each of the actors staked out his own area by determining
what he felt the issues to be. The BWA (and the Attorney General's
office) focused on whether a criminal charge should be laid or not; the
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finance chief focused on whether or not a civil case should be in-
stituted in order to assure the return of all monies due the Department,
the pharmacy director (and the finance chief somewhat) focused on
the question of whether the pharmacy should be suspended from the
program, while the assistant commissioner focused on the question of
whether (and what kind of) financial restitution should be made. As
each of the actors concentrated on specific views of what the charges
should be, it became clear that there was no "basic sense of who
should be running the process", (i.e. laying the charge). The fact
that the sanction process had been instigated did not make it clear that
the division was the prime actor although Knight began to assume a key
role.
All the participants further agreed quite early in the investigation
that no outright fraud was involved since the drugs had actually been
delivered and furthermore that the drugs were needed. - that is, in most
cases they were life maintaining drugs required on a long-term basis by
the patients. Thus the general focus changed from an initial one of
potential fraud to one of abuse, gross or minor and the issue then became
how to deal with this abuse.
As mentioned above each of the actors had a strong initial goal.
The pharmacy director wanted only to suspend the pharmacist for a
period of time in order to show other providers that the division's
sanction powers now were real. He had been angry over the "lack of
teeth" in the state program since previous cases of abuse or fraud had
been ignored or settled for small amounts by the BWA and the Attorney
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General's office. He did not realize until later that such a sanction
would likely put the pharmacy into bankruptcy. This complication
was based on the fact that the nursing homes depended on a steady
and regular supply from one provider. If the pharmacy was suspended,
for say, even as little as two months, it would have either had to
provide drugs at no cost to the nursing homes or terminate its rela-
tionship with the homes - who would, in the meantime, turn to
another supplier and not return to business with the pharmacist. Either
way, he would lose large amounts of money and be forced into bankruptcy,
although as I.N. mentioned, a businessman with his skills would likely
soon reappear in another guise.
The finance director's position was that all monies advanced not
in accordance with the division's policy manual should be reimbursed,
and that, if necessary, a civil court action should be instituted.
This was his primary concern, although he too felt a sanction (suspen-
sion) was necessary. Knight, with his business background, wanted
financial restitution but was also worried about (1) unduly putting
a man out of business through a large financial claim and (2) the
division's right to do that, even though "lesser" action, i.e. , a
sanction proceeding, would have the same effect. As mentioned earlier,
the BWA primarily wanted a "case", one which would involve the largest
amount of recovered money possible. The division's lawyer (D.L.), the
director of vendor relations (R.T.) and R.D. were more or less silent
observers in the process, taking no strong position of their own. R.D.
"tried to understand the process since I never really understood the
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details" while R.T. tried to understand the details, but took a quiet
position. Each of the three however, saw the issues converge to one of
how much to recover from the pharmacy but still allow .him to stay in
business.
Another "minor" issue was whether the regulations were indeed
implicit and available. The pharmacy said they were neither, while
I.N. maintained they had been made available 2 years previously and
had been verbally described by BWA agents in the pharmacy. Knight
maintained that he did not really care if the regulations were explicit
or not, since providing drugs without a clear physician "mandate" was
clearly a case of bad pharmaceutical ethics and "certainly against
the (overall) state licensing regulations." Thus, in addition to
the issue of whether any action would put the pharmacy out of business
or not, the issue of the pharmacy's intent arose; i.e., did he intend
to abuse the regulations and professional codes and did he have full
awareness of the implications of his actions. For Knight this issue
was key since he felt the severity of any action by the state should
be based on the intent of the provider.
While a formal procedure had been established for investigations
of possible sanction procedures, they were not strictly followed. The
pharmacist would often meet individually with each of the state
personnel involved. Communication was poor among these officials,
particularly to and from the attorney general's office. At one point
a "settlement" was reached between the attorney general's office and
the pharmacist but without the knowledge of the medical division.
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This typified the relations with the attorney general's office
and further weakened the desire of Knight and the finance chief to
engage in any court case (civil or criminal) since the state would
be represented by the attorney general's office - which they increasingly
viewed as ineffective. The A.G.'s office also felt the case was
"weak". The pharmacist also wanted to avoid a court case since it
would likely be lengthy and involve heavy expenses. He also appeared
to be somewhat scared of the finance director who claimed never to have
lost a case he brought to court.
Finally "everyone realized that the pharmacy's intent was not
criminal" although Knight felt it had been "bad pharmacy" and the
pharmacist had been "a fool" in disregarding administrative and pro-
fessional procedures. In the explanation of why he had carried out
the practices he had, the druggist eventually "hung himself" (I.N.).
That is, he eagerly and proudly explained his computerized system of
automatically dispensing medication in lots of various sizes -
which would maximize his revenue. After an explanation of his
procedure, it became clear to I.N. that dispensing patterns had been
based on adhering to a "system" rather than to the particular needs
of the patients or the possible danger of a specific drug. That is,
the pharmacy would dispense according to the following type of formula,
regardless of the above two considerations:
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1 pill per day -- in batches of 30 = 30 day supply
2 pills per day -- in batches of 30 = 15 day supply
4 pills per day -- in batches of 60 = 15 day supply
7 pills per day -- in batches of 90 = 13 day supply
The pharmacy had actually written down this procedure for the
nursing home managers to follow in their ordering. Upon its exposure
to the group in the medical division, I.N. "sat back and sighed", knowing
that a case had been made upon which restitution could be calculated. A
compromise was then worked out such that all bills would be allowed
for the cost of drugs provided, but only one dispensing fee per patient
per month (for each drug) would be allowed - not the often two or three
times per month "required" by the druggist's system. This amounted,
in a three month sample, to about 12% of all claims. This 12% figure
was then applied to all the past claims made (since 1967) and a total
amount of restitution calculated (in the hundreds of thousands of
dollars). The suspensinn was withdrawn since Knight felt it likely
that this would create a bankruptcy situation in which the division
stood to regain only very small amounts as only one "creditor" among many.
And the issue of a restitution based on whet had been a "standard practice"
not specifically disallowed by regulation was not raised again by any
of the parties.
Knight felt that it had been "a hell of a case to start off with"
(the new sanction procedures) but that it had "gone reasonably well".
News of the case went out rapidly to the pharmacist community but it
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was not evident what effect the actions had had and indeed it was only
after a second similar case that the division began to question the
effect on the provider community. Knight, however, felt that the
groundwork had been laid and directed R.D. to begin building up his
new program area. The concern of R.D. and the lawyer over the process
of sanctions was not to surface until much later in the year. The
rest of the division was kept appraised of the actions and Knight took
-pride in the sanction although the press and the medical community
was not formally notified.
During the next several months R.D. carried out over 20 sanction
cases plus equally large numbers of warnings to minor abusers. A lawyer
was hired to augment the sanction staff but he later left after being
found by Knight to be "too contentious" and "too used to loose situations"
(R.D.). R.D. developed his procedures and investigative methods slowly,
all the while "learning how to deal with providers, the media and
providers' lawyers." No major cases arose during these few months
although two suspensions directed by R.D. were appealed to the
commissioner over Knight's head and reversed by him. The commissioner
felt these two cases had been judicial matters not administrative,
although Knight felt "we have to be like the government with the Mafia -
get them on what we've got" even if it's minor or technical. Another
attempt to suspend a druggist (to make up for the first case - according
to the finance chief) was overthrown by a court.
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Knight was not entirely happy with the work of R.D. He felt R.D.
did not really sense what the substance of Knight's direction was and
more importantly did not come to him to discuss the bounds of their
"understanding". Thus Knight adopted a low profile and waited for
another "big" case which could be processed and used to spread the
word through the provider community. R.D. continued working on the
smaller abusers but without the total confidence of Knight. R.D.
said that he had learned from the case that if he had been a provider,
he'd stall as long as possible and get as many people involved as
possible since bureaucracies had a tendency not to record agreements-
reached or to simply forget them. It made him decide to be much more
systematized in his handling of future cases. He also felt a sanction
should have been imposed and continued this hard line throughout several
other cases in Knight's dismay since Knight felt that each case
should be considered on the basis of provider intent and "what do we
want to get out of it." The looseness of the process in the pharmacy
case led R.D. to concentrate on process in these succeeding cases
and eventually this process/goal dichotomy was to be one of the factors
leading to R.D.'s leaving the division
Several of the staff felt a bad precedent had been set in the case
but bowed to the wishes of the majority, principally the finance direc-
tor and Knight. I.N. still maintained that a sanction was necessary
and felt compelled to tell the pharmacy that he had been "overruled"
by the assistant commissioner. Nevertheless, he said that if he had
been, say, in the commissioner's position, and forced to choose between
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the views of his assistant commissioner and the pharmacy director
he might not have chosen a sanction. That is, he would do the "best thing
fnr the program" which could either be to set an example based on prin-
ciple or to recover hard dollars and impress the legislature who might
then support the Department on other issues.
Despite the uncertainty and groping nature of the process,
several key principles were developed here such as the emphasis on pro-
vider intent, the feeling that a provider should not be forced out of
business if no direct patient harm had been done, that providers' bills
should be held during a sanction process and that, by expelling a
provider, the division might lose possible leverage in forcing him
to reform. These principles were developed very much within the group
meetings and Knight's teaching style was not much in evidence. It was
clear that Knight himself was learning how to develop the sanction process
and he would have to wait until later cases to teach both I.N. and R.D.
Here he simply declared these principles as being generally applicable.
Only a few of the elements of the program for action which were
evident in the new services stream were evident here. There was no
initially strong assumption of the division's perogatives nor was
there a well defined goal. No attempt was made to evoke past exper-
iences or to involve either close professional friends or providers.
Nor was responsibility for the process assigned to any one specific
person.
We do see however the willingness to confront a problem so evi-
dent in the other cases and the guidance of a search for a solution
by what was thought to be right, even ignoring or bending the regula-
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tions (see page 205 and note that other possible culprits such as
the nurses or physicians were not charged). And despite this continual
belief in what was right, the solution generated through a long process
of internal negotiation was not held out as a "perfect" one, but a
"satisfactory" one.
Knight's overall goal of appearing to act as a responsible buyer
was achieved, that is, he had refused to purchase from a poor provider
and had acted responsibly both in dealing fairly with the provider and
in keeping him in the program so that he might be "reformed". The
case can be considered a limited success in that a situation was con-
fronted and action taken to the relative agreement of all parties.
This success and the evolving principles learned were not yet so strong
that Knight felt he could publicize the case widely. But within the
next few months a possibility to "go public" on a sanction case
squarely confronted the division.
3. Hospital Sanctions
In mid-May, a situation arose concerning a large propreitary hospi-
tal which was allegedly offering poor quality care. Up to then no
provider in the state had been sanctioned oiL grounds of low quality of
care and only once before in the country had a successful sanction
action been taken against a whole hospital.
A utilization review (U.R.) program had been recently installed
in all hospitals of the state by the division. It concerned itself
only with monitoring the patient lengths of stay in the hospital. For
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a specific diagnosis, a length of stay was assigned by a coordinator
and any stay over this had to be approved by a physician advisor assigned
to the hospital. This monitoring program was administered by an
adjunct of the state Medical Society (the Hospital Monitoring Agency or
HMA) under contract to the division. Performance of the program
coordinator in the hospital and the physician advisor were subject to
review by the division, however. The program had only recently been
developed, primarily at the instigation of the Human Services Agency
and while no evaluation had then been conducted it was expected to -
cut hospital-days by up to 10% solely by monitoring the length of
stay. It generally ignored other factors such as the necessity of
admission or the quality of care during that stay.
In January the program coordinator (a nurse) in a proprietary
hospital had begun to sense that the physician advisor was being some-
what liberal in the authorization of excess hospital days (over the
50th percentile or norm for that diagnosis) and that persons were being
admitted unnecessarily (although this latter area was not within her
job mandate). She felt that both these problems were complicated by
the fact that the hospital was owned by physicians and that the phy-
sician advisor was a member of the staff, although not an owner. She
requested that the program's central office conduct an audit.
In mid-February, such an on-site audit was conducted by the
central office of HMA. At the termination of the audit, an exit inter-
view was held (and taped). The HMA discovered excessive lengths of
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and unnecessary admissions. They informally warned the hospital that
these conditions should be corrected and recommended a change of
physician advisor. HMA stated that they would not make the warning a
formal one. The hospital was later to claim that because they had
not been formally warned and even because they did not receive a trans-
cript of the exit interview that the "problem" was not serious. The
HMA director could not understand this liberal interpretation, nor indeed
is it understandable from a reading of the transcript.
Nevertheless, during the next few months, two new physician advisors
were placed in the slot and both resigned rather quickly. Knight des-
cribed the reasons as "an obvious snake-pit in which no one wanted to get
involved." Apparently the conflict between the proprietary nature of
the hospital and the demands of the strict monitoring role were diffi-
cult for the physician advisor to resolve - that is, there was strong
pressure from his peers. At one point the hospital was without an
advisor for close to two months.
The division had received word of the informal audit from HMA, and
the confusion surrounding the volatility of the physician advisor
problem led Knight to conclude that all was not well at the hospital
and that its own audit should be conducted. As it was apparent that
the situation might involve more than the length of stay problems,
Knight felt strongly that he "wasn't about to let HMA take over the -
program (Medicaid)" and so requested in early May that the division's
medical director (N.B.) conduct an on-site audit in conjunction with
MHA. N.B. was accompanied by the vice-president of the medical society
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and the division's regional advisor. N.B. was a well respected acade-
mician and practicioner from the state capital while the regional
advisor was more representative of the practicing surgeons in the area
of the hospital. The medical society representative (acting here in
this joint audit as a representative of HMA) had developed a relation-
ship of respect and trust with Knight through previous encounters and
Knight felt he could rely on him to produce an independent judgement
of the situation.
The second audit team examined the records of 31 cases which
had been submitted by the HMA coordinator as possibly involving ex-
cessive lengths of stay or unnecessary admissions. It was not a
random audit, but did account for about 5-10% of all hospital admissions
and 25-30% of all Medicaid utilization for the preceding month. The
audit uncovered, according to the team, cases of unnecessary admissions,
inadequate records, poor work-ups prior to surgery, unnecessary treat-
ment, excessive lengths of stay and in one instance a situation verging
on malpractice. N.B. made verbal notes which were recorded and trans-
cribed. The hospital made little attempt to refute the charges at
that time. N.B. informed Knight that "here was a clear case of poor
treatment" and later admitted that he felt that perhaps some of the
information in the records had even been added "post-stay" as a justi-
fication for the treatment rendered.
N.B. was a man of forceful personality who was often given to
quick rapid judgments and who was used to being accepted at face value.
Knight explicitly trusted N.B.'s judgement but in addition made his own
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thorough examination of the audit transcript. He says that at this
point he became convinced that much more than excessive lengths of
stay were involved and that the case against the hospital for poor
treatment was "iron-clad." We begin to see some of the elements of
the division's "program for action" here. The division was willing
to accept information from wherever it could get it, it made a clear
assertion of its perogatives and decided fairly rapidly that it would
take action against the hospital.
- Most hospitals have their own utilization review (U.R.) committee
to monitor treatment in the hospital. These U.R. committees examine
admissions, necessity of treatment, length of stay and overall
quality of care. The intensity of these activities varies from
hospital to hospital but all accredited hospitals must have some semblance
of a U.R. committee. It was later to develop that the hospital, upon
the installation of the HMA length of stay monitoring, "dropped" its
other U.R. activities involving Medicaid patients, assuming that the
HMA program was also responsible for them. It is not clear whether
this was a misinterpretation of the program by the hospital or not.
Certainly the formal documents setting up the program could not have
created such an impression, but exchanges during the installation
of the program might have. Some other hospitals in the state were
also under that impression. But they, while assuming that HMA was con-
ducting a total U.R. activity, nonetheless continued their own U.R.
activities in addition to the HMA program.
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At this point, the HMA director and Knight's senior in Human
Services still felt the problem was a HMA affair and that it should
be handled (i.e. corrective action suggested) by HMA. Knight however,
was against the contracting out of responsibilities to others wherever
possible and was anxious to assert his firm belief that the division
was a purchaser of services and could therefore choose "not to
purchase" from obviously poor quality providers. He wanted to make
certain that in this situation it was the medical division and not
some other agency which assumed responsibility for the quality of
care and in this "obvious" case of poor care, his responsibility meant
exercising the division's suspension powers.
Knight then discussed with his assistant director for sanctions,
R.D. and the department's lawyer (D.L.) the advisability of a sanction.
Both these two stated that they accepted at face value the medical
director's assertion that this had been a case of poor treatment. They
thought however that the maximum three years suspension should be re-
served for more severe cases, and recommended a two year suspension
from the program. Knight then asked R.D. to send out a sanction letter
to this effect immediately. The latter scrambled to get together such
a letter with the "insufficient data" (R.D.) available. He felt he
had not had enough time to adequately prepare this formal and quasi-
legal document in concert with the complete team that had conducted
the audit. He could not understand Knight's haste, but Knight later
explained that "lives were at stake" here and that the informal HMA
warning some months previously had been ignored. Both these conditions
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probably account for the participants' immediate focus on the maximum
sanction rather than the further warnings. Thus, a hasty sanction
letter was prepared and sent out. Or so the sanction director thought.
Knight had run into the HMA director at lunch and had informed him
that he was sending out the sanction letter. The HMA director said
he was being too hasty and they should wait until the hospital had
a chance to formally reply to HMA against the charges made in the
joint Medicaid-HMA audit. Knight agreed and returned to the office
to inquire if the letter had gone out. He was assured it had but
no letter was ever received by the hospital and no copies of it could
be found. To this day it remains a mystery. Thus Knight's hasty action
was temporarily aborted.
The hospital, meanwhile, replied to the MHA state committee
formally admitting that, while some of the lengths of stay may have been
questionable, all admissions had been necessary and.denying all allega-
tions of poor care such as poor workups and inadequate records by
stressing that all the patients (save one) satisfactorily recovered.
At this point, the division then prepared its (second) sanction letter,
in a similarly rushed fashion. R.D. tried to draft a "strong" letter
but had difficulty getting the audit team and himself together for
such a drafting. A "weak and poorly prepared letter" (Knight) did
go out, calling for a two year suspension from the program and
citing excessive lengths of stay, poor quality care and violation of
state and federal regulations concerning record-keeping. D.L. had
become involved when asked by Knight to assure that the division was
moving in a procedurally correct manner in this "iron-clad" case
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and later dropped the record-keeping charge when he determined that no
such regulation actually existed.
At this point then, the first strong action had been taken. In
this turbulent climate, the division had chosen to be active. It
had detected a case of what it considered poor quality care and, more
importantly, had rapidly and irrevocably decided to formally move
against the provider. Knight had kept his commissioner informed at
key points as to what these actions were, i.e., that an audit was being
made and that a sanction was envisaged. While there was a need to
keep the commissioner somewhat free of the details of the new case
since he might later act as a judge in an appeal, the political rami-
fications of the case were strong and Knight felt he should be informed.
At this point, however, an event occurred which in hindsight was
fortunate for the division.
The sanction letter was mailed on a Wednesday and Knight called
a press conference for that Friday to announce the sanction. He
requested that R.D. notify the hospital by telephone to be sure they
knew what was happening before the conference (or in case they had
not received the letter). He assured Knight that he had done so.
On Friday Knight discussed his press presentation with the department's
lawyer who was shocked by this action of "going public" so early. He
requested that the commissioner be notified (he was out of town) and a
long distance call was made to him. The commissioner showed displeasure
at such publicity but as it was too late to stop it, an agreement was
made to discuss only the procedural aspects of the case with the
press, i.e., that a sanction was being declared, that the hospital
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could meet with the assistant commissioner to present evidence why
it should not be upheld, etc. Knight felt that he could no longer
contain the press since word of the audit had leaked out and this
might soon appear anyway in the papers. The hospital, however, apparently
had not received the sanction letter nor the telephone call and was
furious at being informed "via the press" and at having no chance
to prepare a rebuttal.
Knight admitted later that he had perhaps moved too rapidly with
the press. But the deed had been done and the occupancy of the hospital
dropped to 25% in the succeeding weeks as the effects of the publicity
were felt. The hospital immediately was caught in a cash flow problem
and called upon their lawyers to request a meeting with Knight as
soon as possible and in addition hired a medical consultant to prepare
a case by case rebuttal of the division's charges.
Shortly thereafter, a hearing was held at the division's offices.
The hospital was represented by their consultant and by a firm of
prestigious lawyers, in particular a young lawyer who quickly won the
respect of all the parties involved. The rebuttal presented by the
hospital was threefold: they had dropped their normal UR activities
(including review of the necessity for admission) for Medicaid patients
since they had assumed HMA was now carrying it out; HMA had never
informed them of the significant problems involved with the excessive
lengths of stay being granted by the physician advisor (who was approved
by HMA); and that quality of care was impossible to define except
by actual "outcomes" and all the patients had recovered. The physician
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consultant elaborated on this latter argument on a case by case basis
citing a variety of medical interpretations which would justify the
treatment rendered. He also advanced other arguments such as: the
patient was well known (thus obviating the need for complete records);
or "social complications" were involved (i.e., the life style of the
patient necessitated long lengths of stay). He also stated that the
hospital was indeed working on a program of developing standards other
than "outcomes" -- but that no one in the country had developed such
standards yet -- therefore they should not be singled out for such
failure.
During this initial hearing meeting and a subsequent one, these
intense medical arguments (and others) were advanced by the hospital
and rebutted by the division. Knight did not act passively as a
"hearings officer" as R.D. felt he should have, but rather engaged
the hospital lawyer and medical consultant in discussion. D.L. was
also relatively quiet during the proceedings. However a newcomer
to the discussion (E.K.), who had been involved in Knight's "fly-on-
the-wall" program (working out of a desk in Knight's office), actively
participated by sending notes to Knight and advising him on strategy -
which Knight felt to be helpful.
All this time the focus had been on the hospital's responsibilities
and actions and not on the individual physicians. The hospital made
a brief and early attempt to suggest that it was only a few specific
physicians who had been involved. Knight rejected this argument by
saying that a hospital is not simply "an office building renting space
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to all comers." More importantly however was the strategic element
here. Knight felt he could not take on both the hospital and physician
"lobbies" at one time and so concentrated on the weakest element, the
hospital. Later however the hospital was to again offer up three
doctors as a sacrificial lamb in order to reduce their sanction
somewhat.
The three major arguments ofthe hospital were slowly cut away
during these two sessions. If the hospital had dropped its normal UR
activities when the HMA program began then this meant either of two
things according to Knight: (1) the physicians lowered their standards
deliberately - which was an irresponsible professional action or (2)
they had never had more than the formality of a UR system before the
HMA program -- which would have also been contrary to generally accepted
standards. As for the excessive lengths of stay, the hospital did
admit them, but claimed the responsibility must be shared with the
HMA program.
Most interesting was the argument about "quality of care." The
hospital felt that since all the patients had recovered, and since
the only accepted standards at the time were outcomes, they should not
be sanctioned. Knight and the medical director began to search for a
"handle", some practical effect of the poor diagnoses, poor workupsi
and unnecessary treatment on which they could hang their argument.
During this first hearing and many intermediate strategy sessions, they
slowly evolved the concept of risk. That is, the very fact of submitting
a person to lab tests, x-rays and surgery was to put them at an unnecessary
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risk. Even presence in a hospital was a risk. Here Knight and his
team felt elated since they had managed to define, in a limited way,
what quality care meant; they had differentiated between poor treat-
ment, i.e., the technical side of performing isolated acts improperly,
and poor care, i.e., a poor choice of acts to perform. The hospital's
consultant managed to rebut each of the 31 cases but he was seen
by Knight and others as simply a screen thrown up by the hospital
to "cover" their poor pattern of care, despite the fact that he and
the hospital's lawyer were seen as competent and sophisticated men more
able than their clients.
At the conclusion of the second hearing, a standoff was reached.
The hospital had felt it had made its case well (although the consult-
ant later admitted in private that he felt the division's case was
also good). It had suggested that individual doctors were to blame
and that it would discipline them in order to escape a heavy sanction
action. But in no way did it feel it should receive a two year sanction
for the poor quality care. Their lawyer was willing to go to court
and felt he had a 60/40 chance of winning. The division's lawyer
estimated the odds at 50/50 and felt these were too poor to risk going
to court. Knight concurred with his lawyer primarily because the state
would be represented by the attorney general's office - in whom he
lacked confidence.
Knight told the hospital he would make a decision within ten days.
At this point two factors led the parties into a negotiating posture.
The hospital's occupancy (and reputation) was declining rapidly and
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the time and exposure in a court case would have been even more threaten-
ing. And Knight not only wanted to keep it out of court but also out
of the commissioner's hands -- the hospital's last administrative
remedy should they contest Knight's ruling. The commissioner (who
would judge the case) had reversed Knight's decision once previously
and diminished a second sanction. Knight thus began to negotiate
directly with the hospital's lawyer, even excluding the department's
lawyer, to the latter's anger at this break of legal "ethics" (i.e.,
lawyers should not talk to another's clients alone.) Knight however
was not one to follow protocol or bow rigidly to regulations or conven-
tional practice if he felt he was moving in the proper direction.
Knight had decided during the hearings that while the hospital was
at fault for not policing its physicians, its other activities as a
hospital were not to be faulted. He had visited the hospital and found
it to be clean, providing good nursing care, good food, etc. He thus
proposed the two year suspension be changed to six months suspension and
18 months probation with additional action to be taken against individual
physicians. This was to be the final sanction. During the negotiations
with their lawyer, it became clear that this would lead to a court
case or to an appeal to the commissioner. Knight thus offered the
hospital a choice to "plea-bargain."
They finally reached an agreement that the hospital would be
suspended for two retroactive months (representing some $40,000 in
return of billings), and be on probation for 22 months with their
activities overseen by a "Blue Ribbon Committee" which would assure
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that a complete UR system be set up for all patients. The hospital
was also to provide the department with the complete records of the
three physicians most involved so that they might be subject to
individual sanction if necessary. And finally, the settlement was
to include a signed public agreement to the above in which the hospital
would admit the charges of over utilization and low quality care. This
latter admission was very delicately worded such that it was not
completely evident that the hospital felt it had erred or was admitting
guilt. But the public effect was more important than the precise wording.
There was differing feeling in the division about Knight's actions.
The staff member responsible for the HMA liaison felt that a six month
sanction would probably have put the hospital out of business but
that since it was a hospital in an already adequately served area no
harm would come to the community or to the Medicaid clients and should
have been upheld. Knight said his "heart went cold" when the hospital
discussed the financial losses they might suffer from going of business.
D.L. felt that Knight had been out to "get the hospital". But Knight
said later that he had no particular image about proprietary hospitals;
they could be good or bad, he felt.
Externally, Knight's superiors had been notified of his actions at
key points but had told him to continue to chart his own road. The
secretary made an independent check on the proceedings and was generally
satisfied. The only real criticism the undersecretary of HSA and the
commissioner had to make was of the use of initial publicity and a
feeling that Knight had backed off somewhat too early on the hospital.
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In addition, two politicians from the hospital's area began to inquire
but Knight phoned them and suggested that before they get involved
they be sure to get the division's side of the story., This seemed to
lessen their interest in the case and overt political action did not
seem to have much effect on the case. There was very little feedback
from the medical community as a whole although the hospital community
was well aware of the action and applauded its direction. However
opinion was divided between those who felt the actions taken were
only a slap on the wrist and those who felt the division had stood up
admirably to the problem. In addition, the justification for the sanction
was bolstered by the hospital's own UR committee findings some months
later that over 40% of the appendectomies and hysterectomies performed
in the hospital had been unnecessary.
During this whole case, no one actually questioned the division's
legal authority to (a) sanction hospitals and (b) do so on quality
of care (as opposed to simply over-utilization) issues. There had
only been one precedent for the former and the latter was not really
clarified by the division until after the case was settled. Knight
had "sensed" these problems at the time of the case but felt that this
"was not a grey area" (concerning quality) and so decided to "take a
calculated risk". After the *case he immediately assigned E.K. (the newly
immersed staffer) to fully investigate this problem so as to be pre-
pared for a program of audits of individual physicians. Such a
program now seemed possible to Knight given a 'heightened public aware-
ness andan increased confidence on the part of the division. This
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case then shows a considerable growth, certainly a temporary peak,
in the division's actions. It had further developed a sense of how
to formally conduct sanction cases and it had done so in an increasingly
confident manner.
Not only was the case deemed a success, but a considerable spectrum
of learning occurred. The department's lawyer stated that he had
learned to not always take Knight or the medical director at face value
again. That is, he would try to be much more sure of both the content
of the case and the division's authority to act on it in future cases.
The sanction director said he learned a similar lesson and also that
"haste makes waste." Both these two staff members were close personal
friends and felt that the case had been somewhat mishandled by Knight.
Yet both were really saying only that these sanction cases should be
somewhat more formal and better prepared. Knight showed by his actions
that he certainly agreed with the latter position. As for the formality
of the proceedings, Knight tried to be fair, but it was his sense of
goals that carried him through and not any sense of legal formalism.
Nonetheless this need for preparedness can be seen as learning by the
two staffers and one that the new recruit who had aided Knight was also
to learn in later cases.
Knight on the other hand felt he had handled the case as well as
he could and that he would have had to go to the press eventually to
protect the public if the hearning had remained private or had reached
the commissioner's level and been upheld there. The effect on the hospi-
tal might have been the same, only negotiations would have been even
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closer to the threatened court action. More importantly Knight also
felt he had learned how to conduct sanctions (e.g., make the suspension
provisional until a private hearing); that regionalized policing by
the medical profession was suspect since the "buddy" system was so
strong (this was the major lesson learned according to the medical
director), that quality of care was different from good quality treatment,
and that the division now both needed to go ahead with on-site audits
of physicians' offices and had the technology to do so. D.L. and R.D.
also shared these perceptions although they remained worried about
the strength of evidence needed in any major sanction case.
That these principles learned by the staff and Knight were not
developed using Knight's usual teaching capacities can best be explained
by the newness and complexity of the case for Knight and his inability
at that time to have worked out what he called "philosophical under-
standings" with R.D. and D.L. R.D. was never to develop these under-
standings and D.L., while remaining quiet during most of the proceedings,
always presented an independent view due to his professional role and
the fact that he did not report to Knight. The new staff member (E.K.)
was, however, to learn considerably from this case as will be shown
in this chapter.
Many features of the division's usual "program" for bounding -a
case and for generating principles without Knight's teaching were
evident in the case. Clearly evident was the openness to information
coming from outside the division, the initial strong conception of the
division's perogatives and the development of immediate goals. There
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was however no incubation period for the case nor did Knight diffuse
the problem by working with trusted outsiders or even a large group
of staff as he typically did when developing new medical programs.
Knight and his medical director did continue to "bend" the existing
regulations to their advantage in an attempt to develop a new (to them)
technology - the definition of quality care. As was usual, an initial
problem had been transformed into an opportunity.
Knight did not have to rely in this case on any previous manage-
ment credibility the division had built up. Instead his actions stood
on their own - the very fact of taking action (and his dealings with
the press) had strengthened his stand. But internal competence useful
for future credibility was built up as the team struggled to develop
an acceptable definition of quality of care. This was self-education,
not the socratic teaching Knight often engaged in. It is even probable
that the two staff who felt so concerned about the formal aspects of
the case were pleased with the acquisition of this new, yet still
fragile, "technology."
Finally there seems no doubt that the division's role as an accountable
buyer was enhanced. The retroactive nature of the suspension somewhat
lessened the blow to the hospital but its effect could be judged by the
fact that it tried valiently over the next few months to wriggle out of
the agreement. But the overall effect on the provider community was
judged to be significant. And more importantly an internal momentum
had been developed which would last at least several months after which
the audaciousness of the division's sanction activity would demonstrate
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the need for more careful planning of the technological base, a
more thorough involvement of provider groups and a more carefully
elaborated "political" strategy.
But before this was to occur, the division became involved in
one further case where it had a chance to flex its muscles openly.
4. Pharmaceutical Abuse - Case II
The case involves the sanctioning of a large pharmacist who pro-
vided drugs to over twenty nursing homes in the state. The bulk of his
business (60%) was in supplying Medicaid patients and this portion
alone amounted to over $30,000 worth of billings per month. The phar-
macy was one of the two or three largest Medicaid providers and had
been easily identified as such by both the division's bill processing
system and by a newer computerized system (for pharmacies and dentists
only) under contract to a private firm.
The Bureau of Welfare Audits had been routinely auditing the
largest pharmacists over the past several months. In addition, they
were pleased at the success of the first pharmaceutical sanction case
which they had helped to develop. Thus this second largest pharmacy
was also subjected to an audit. The BWA, upon completing their audit,
forwarded information to the division which suggested that the pharmacist
had been violating several regulations of the division and such viola-
tions represented some $159,000 in billings over the past four and
one half years.
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The letter was received by the new director of vendor relations,
the bright young man (E.K.) buoyed by his just completed success in
sanctioning the proprietary hospital. He did not confer with the
new pharmacy director (who had recently replaced the former director
involved in the first pharmaceutical sanction case). E.K. said that he
accepted the "charges" as presented by the BWA. He did however, discuss
a draft of a letter to the provider with Knight. That letter, which
was routinely prepared and "routinely sent out", told the provider
that he might be in iolation of the division's regulations and
that he might be required to make restitution. The violations cited
were similar to the first pharmacy case--that the pharmacist had refilled
prescriptions more than five times and for a period greater than six
months and that he had delivered drugs in amounts of less than a
thirty day supply and done all the above in violation of the general
DPW and DPH regulations that all prescriptions must be authorized by
a physician in specific quantities.
Knight had realized during the hospital case that a period of in-
formal discussion should be held before the official sanction hearing.
Thus this letter was to request the provider to provide further informa-
tion on the charges which were sanctionable "on their face." It also
allowed, of course, for a process of negotiation and avoided the
division being caught by surprise by a new argument as had occurred
in the hospital case (i.e. the laying of blame on the HMA). The pro-
vider was thus notified to attend a meeting to discuss the proposed
sanction.
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Knight's only comment at the time was that it was indeed appro-
priate not to send a formal sanction letter. He felt that the previous
drug sanction case had indicated that since no criminal acts were
likely involved and patients were not harmed, the recovery of monies
was the most appropriate concern and this could probably best be
accomplished without a suspension from the program.- He thus permitted
the warning letter to go out although the whole case seemed to
involve little of his or the staff's energies at the time.
As the letter went out, the new pharmacy director (Y.E.) and the
department's lawyer (D.L.) were informed of the proposed meeting.
This was the first these two had heard of the proposed sanction and
their only inkling of the nature of the case came just before the
meeting when Knight mentioned to Y.E. that "we're going to either
sanction (suspend) him or get some money back." Knight seemed to feel
that after the first drug case, this one would be easy. They knew
what they wanted, had the authority and E.K. had swung into his new
role as the division's "policeman" with amazing ease and was acting
with considerable confidence.
At the meeting, the BWA presented its case to the provider,
stating that he owned $159,000. According to D.L. the BWA knew such
a figure would have difficulty being upheld in court but that it
could be used as an initial bargaining tool. D.L. was upset at this
strong, almost cavalier approach but said nothing. He also noted that
the majority of the charges involved "prescription splitting" - the
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dispensing of less than the standard practice amount of thirty days
supply although no batch amount had been specified. This worried
him since, of the four cited violations this was the only one not
discussed in the regulations. Thus what had been a minor issue
brushed aside in the first drug case, surfaced more prominantly here,
i.e. charges based not on detailed regulations, but only on viola-
tions of "standard practice."
Y.E., the new pharmacy director, listened to the pharmacist's
response and he too felt uneasy since no outright fraud was involved.
Although he knew "it was counter to the health needs of the patients",
he understood the reasons for such violations as he had been a prac-
ticing pharmacist for many years . Nursing home physicians rarely
visited patients to renew prescriptions, this task being left to the
nurse and the pharmacist to determine the duration and supplied amounts
of drugs. In Y.E.'s words, the pharmacy "interpreted the regulations
to suit his business needs." When in doubt (in nearly all the cases,
since no amount had been prescribed - only a notation such as "drug
x,y units per day"), he delivered small amounts each time, claiming
a $1.85 dispensing fee for each delivery. In effect this prescription
splitting was not "splitting" since the validity of the original pres-
cription was in doubt due to the incompleteness of the physician's
notations.
But the hestiations of Y.E. and D.L. were over-ridden by Knight
who pushed ahead on the initial charges as presented by E.K. and the
BWA. He stated that although this third charge was not in the regula-
tions (which worried Y.E. also), it was a clear example of not
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following good and acceptable practice and that he was willing to take
a calculated risk in this situation that they could "win" the
sanction case. As for Y.E.'s understanding of the reasons for the
pharmacist's actions, Knight had little sympathy. He felt the intent
was clear. In fact, this exchange highlighted one of Knight's beliefs
that non-professionals shouldhold management jobs in the division
since otherwise they might overly identify with their colleague pro-
fessionals. Y.E. was a pharmacist (and was new on the job) and had
not totally convinced Knight that he could work in the division's
interest.
The provider, for his part, was open and cooperative in the meeting.
He came unaccompanied by a lawyer (which was unusual) and had previously
cooperated with the BWA in opening all his records for inspection. He
apparently had much earlier retained the same lawyer who had repre-
sented the pharmacist in the first sanction case but had dismissed
him previously. This lack of representation was to puzzle the
division's members but they could not account for it. Nor could they
account for his compliant attitude. For example, after the provider
had presented his case, Knight indicated that an immediate stop-payment
on his current billings should be made. The pharmacist questioned this
in a mild fashion but only to suggest that it might do him out of busi-
ness if they were held up too long. He did not question the right of the
division to take this action.
Y.E. and the BWA did question this action to themselves but Knight
suggested that it was only "prudent" for the division to do so (i.e.
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"to hold onto what you have when you're trying to recover money") and
suggested providers might easily "run off to Rio or Bermuda" if
such action was not taken. Y.E. found this hard to believe, but said
nothing. The representative from the department's finance office
agreed to hold up current payments since his office and his strong
chief (see the initial development of the sanction powers) had always
done this as standard practice. E.K. and PL. wondered about the
legality of this action and the latter later explained that such
action might be reversed by a court injunction. But again they said
nothing. Knight later said that, being prudent, he must take such action
and that it was up to the provider to prove that the division did not
have that right. In the previous drug case, the pharmacist had tried
to get a court to restore his current billings but the request had
been rejected due to a-technicality in the filing of the request.
During the first meeting the initial $159,000 claim was negotiated-
downward. Firstly, the druggist had stopped the practices eight months
previously (in February 1974) and thus only a 45 month, not 53 month
period was involved. In addition the BWA had assumed that the percentage
of his total volume had been constant at 60% Medicaid over the whole
period. In fact, the pharmacy had started with no Medicaid business
so an average proportion of 30% was used. The combined effect of these
two was to reduce the amount claimed to about $69,000. Knight and the
others readily agreed to the changes. The pharmacist also claimed that
this represented all three violations and that, since the violations
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concerning the filling of prescriptions more than five times and for
greater than a six month period were really the fault of the nursing
homes and physicians, these two, which represented about 10% of the
total violations, should not be considered. Knight agreed to this
also and thus only the prescription "splitting" would be considered -
a total of about $59,000. This figure had been calculated by
disallowing all dispensing fees greater than one per month per drug
per patient but allowing the cost of the drugs delivered. Knight felt
they had got just what they wanted. They would recover money, they
had been fair in the process, and they would set an example for
other providers.
But the total sanction was to be based on an activity not specifi-
cally disallowed in the regulations - although the sanction powers did
permit sanctioning for "services not meeting professional standards."
As mentioned, this continued to worry Y.E. and D.L. since they felt
this was arbitrary and unfair, i.e., the rules of the game had not
been well laid out nor had the division or DPH regularly enforced
them. The sanction director, E.K., appeared to be somewhat upset but
only because he did not have very solid grounds for a "case" if challenged.
Knight on the other hand later expressed his attitude as being "we run
into this often and it is only by judicious use of, and taking advantage
of, the power that we do have that we're getting away with it. But
I'm pushing hard to get as much as possible of this sort of thing into
the regs." He also stated that he had an "easy conscience" about the
case but would have thought more carefully about it if criminal acts
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had been involved or if they had proposed suspending him from the
program or forcing him out of business. The pharmacist however,
as noted, challenged nothing during the first meeting and left saying
he would consider the possibilities of payment of the $59,000.
A second meeting was arranged shortly thereafter. The Medicaid
staff did not discuss the case amongst themselves but all knew the
focus of the next meeting would be on how the pharmacist would pay
back the money since he seemed to have accepted the inevitability of
payment. Indeed he had and the second meeting began with Knight and
E.K. telling him they expected the money to be repaid within the
fiscal year (i.e. over the next seven months). At this point, he
began to balk somewhat and it became clear that the nature of the re-
payment schedule was crucial to an acceptable settlement. Knight felt
that if he had too long a period to repay he would simply pay it out
of profits and that this was "no sanction at all." On the other hand
to make it too short might force him out of business which Knight did not
desire, nor did the pharmacy director, the BWA or the sanction director.
D.L. added that to "push him to the wall" would force him into court
where the whole sanction process might be questioned. Going to court
might also put him out of business. D.L. even admitted to the pharma-
cist that the $60,000 figure could likely not be justified in court
since it was based on a sample and not a complete accounting of all
violations.
Y.E. continued to feel somewhat uneasy about the whole process. He
had a feeling that he wanted "to upgrade the practice and morals of
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the profession" but he "was not sure this was the way to do it."
There was a danger "you would hit some of the good providers this way."
Knight had begun to work with Y.E. on other problems and was later to
say that he had had to lead Y.E. to "mistrust his instincts" during
the case, that is "Y.E. knew what was right intellectually, but had a
hard time accepting it emotionally."
Due to Y.E.'s and D.L.'s reticence to plunge fully into the case,
the negotiating was conducted mainly by Knight, E.K. and the Office of
Finance. The finance office representative said they might be able to
let the pharmacy repay in twelve months but that this was contrary to
policy. Knight was annoyed since he felt a negotiating position had been
given away, i.e., Knight might not mind ending up at twelve months but
did not want to start there. The pharmacist acted very compliant and
only mildly suggested that he could not pay within twelve months. If
he did he would have to close and then the DPW might get nothing,.
., At this point the BWA became slightly angry with the lackadaisical
attitude of the pharmacist and asked him why he had not brought up any
of the arguments he had previously made in private with the BWA. Similarly,
D.L. suggested that he should consult with his accountant and come back
with a proposed payment scheme. The speed with which he did initiate
the next set of discussions indicated that the hold up of his current
bills was probably hurting him considerably and that this tactic (along
with the use of the press as in the hospital case) helped the division
in the settlement process. He first came back with a proposed eighteen
month term and in later negotiations with Knight, D.L. and Y.E. agreed
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to a $50,000 lump sum payback (financed through loans).
Thus not only did the division achieve what it wanted but the
effect of the case on other activities was not insignificant. While
Knight had felt that the sanctioning of the nursing homes and physi-
cians involved was an issue separate from the pharmacy sanction, Y.E.,
with Knight's backing, moved rapidly to deal with these two groups of
providers. But they did not chose the sanction strategy. Knight
felt that to sanction all the physicians involved in these and other
homes would be too difficult at that time and it would not likely
change their practice in any case. They thus saw it as being too big
a bite to chew off at the time. But the problem could be approached
by another strategy - assigning responsibility to the "charge nurse"
in each home who would be responsible for getting the physicians
in at the correct intervals to make correct prescriptions. The division
then began an experiment with one of the local universities to assess
this strategy. Y.E. also began to examine a system used in other
stat.es in which an IBM card with three detachable copies is signed by
the physician with one copy kept by the pharmacist and one by the
patient, a system designed to reduce similar abuses. E.K. also backed
these and other approaches since he had begun to feel much more strongly
that it was the nursing homes and physicians who were to blame in such
situations.
The finance office and the BWA were also changed by the case. The
BWA began auditing some of the physicians involved to see if there was
any further legal ground for action and began to cooperate more closely
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with E.R. in the investigation of cases. The case also indicated that
initiative now lay with the medical division and not the finance
office as it had previously in other years before the development
of the sanction powers. Knight and E.K. were cheered by this new
power but were still wary since their strength might have been partially
due to the temporary absence of a strong finance director.
Of interest also is the feeling by the pharmacy director that
knocking off the big abusers was not the correct strategy. He felt
that much more abuse went on at a small scale among the middle and
small size providers who took a calculated risk that they would not be
audited. That is, they knew (or sensed) the division's strategy and
were unaffected by the sanctioning of the "biggies." He felt that most
of the pharmacy community ignored the first drug sanction case although
it was well publicized. His alternate strategy was to have random
audits of all the providers in combination with much more clearly defined
and strong regulations. But he did not mention this strategy to Knight
since he felt that although they had the same philosophies and goals,
they differed about implementation. He felt had to "live with" Knight
and so did not bring it up for some time. It should be added that he
was new on the job, although with twenty years experience, and was
undoubtedly still establishing the bounds of his "philosophical agreement"
with Knight - the agreement which we have seen consists of general
principles illustrated or worked out through specific problem cases
such as this sanction.
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Knight, when confronted with the researcher's version of Y.E.'s
proposed strategy said that "he could be right," but with limited
sanction resources, one had to go after the big ones, i.e., it cost
as much to recover $3,000 as $30,000 and if one can only handle
ten sanction cases per month then the big ones should be attacked.
While Knight also followed this strategy in all other provider areas,
there was some questioning of this by the medical director, N.B., in
the proposed on-site audits of physicians' offices (see the next case).
Here some evidence indicated practice rarely changed upon "setting
examples" -- it must be changed directly, i.e. by regulation or punish-
ment. Knight responded that this may be true but that each provider
area is different. Indeed the first pharmacy sanction may have had
an effect since the second pharmacist stopped his irregular practices
abruptly in February 1974 -- the same time as the hearings against the
first pharmacist began.
This case then is a story of how a situation arose which had been
handled once before by the division. Two of the actors, Knight and
the lawyer, D.L., were the same. They were confronted by a compliant
provider who did not challenge their right to take action even when that
right was questionable. The same situation had prevailed in the first
pharmacy case and neither D.L. or Knight were upset about the bounds of
their authority. After this second case, however, Knight appeared more
confident about the division's strategy while the lawyer became less so.
Two other actors new to the situation followed Knight's lead (one
rather forcefully and the other hesitanttly), in the use of the princi-
ples developed in prior cases. Thus the principles that intent should
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be considered, that the sanction should not be severe if no patient
harm occurred, that forcing a provider out might cause the division
to lose its leverage, and that, in an authority "vacuum", the
division should not fear to step in, were all envoked for the second
or third time. Indeed in the many lesser sanction cases during
the period they had also been utilized.
But after the conclusion of the case, Y.E.'s and E.K.'s positions
were reversed. That is, E.K. appeared to be somewhat more hesitant
after the case while Y.E. appeared less so as he resolved his mis-
givings about the division's "real" authority by plunging ahead to
rewrite regulations and develop means to deal with the physicians
and nursing homes involved. This stimulus to Y.E. was shared by E.K.
in practice however, as he continued to take aggressive stands and
to move against other classes of providers. But they had both began
to realize the need to establish much more clear criteria for
sanctions. The story then is one of a gaining of increased sophistica-
tion by all of the actors although it was a "fragile" sophistication.
This was followed by increased activity to both "correct" the gaps
in their strategies and to expand their range - to make real their
espoused theory and to test its utility.
This gaining of increased sophistication and clarity was achieved
through the pattern for learning seen previously. Knight first of
all linked the case to an earlier analagous situation, assumed a strong
role for the division and advanced an early,speciffc,working goal (a
sanction). The division continued to "bend" the formal regulations
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and to slowly and sequentially seek a satisfactory solution. The con-
sequence of this pattern, the nagging ego often seen in other cases was
here rapidly confronted as the various actors moved to relieve that un-
certainty.
Knight's teaching of both Y.E. and E.K. was also clearly evident
here. He had let E.K. watch him in action over the preceeding month
and had very carefully explained all his decisions, as indeed he did
with Y.E. in this case. He relied upon the past experience of the
division and cited it (i.e. the other sanction cases) yet let Y.E.
and E.K. come to their own conclusions about how the process could
be improved. And the teaching occured, as usual, in a specific context
(the case) in which a particular goal had been formulated.
Thus, the most interesting features of this case appear to be not
Knight's specific management style as seen in the new services stream
but rather his initial insistence on what was "right" and the existence
of a cadre of competent staff who, while sharing that goal of acting
as a responsible buyer, felt compelled to make it a more credible one
by putting teeth into the sanction process. Whether the staff agreed
or not on Knight's handling of the case (as opposed to the goal), each
moved quickly to relieve the uncertainty the situation had created.
Two of the three staff were to plunge rapidly into the next case where
the division's powers and their capacity to act as a responsible buyer
would be examined most thoroughly of all.
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5. On-Site Physician Audits
This case describes the development of a program of on-site audits
of individual physicians' (private practicioners) offices to determine
if quality care was being delivered to Medicaid clients. It involved
the initial genesis of the idea via a series of related monitoring
activities with other types of providers, the search for a legal (and
political) mandate for such a program, the development of a "technology"
for such activity, and finally its testing in a few quite specific areas.
It was the culminatica of a year's activity in the sanction area during
which the division's theory of itself was developed, was confronted by
some difficult realities, and was then made more real and operational
and, in the long run, more effective.
The case had its beginnings during the hospital sanction case although
Knight stated that he had long had (and indeed had) quality of care as
one of his primary goals along with financial and programmatic integrity
and the assurance of good value for the department's money. The issue
of quality care had arisen in the division before in several contexts.
The events outlined here are the meeting points of two thrusts of
activity. The first thrust involved taking some (any) type of monitoring
stance against each of the various provider categories. Thus hospitals
and nursing homes (over 70% of all care) were already "covered" (albeit
not to the satisfaction of the division) by monitoring programs such
as the contracts signed with DPH for nursing home inspection and the
HMA program in hospitals. Other areas, such as neighborhood health
centers, druggists and dentists were already covered by, respectively,
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strong, personal relationships with most of the individual centers,
a computerized payment system (see the two drug sanction cases)
and a system of prior approvals.
Thus after completing strong sanction actions against the hospital
and the second druggist, Knight felt that the only untouched area was
the private physicians.. While they constituted only 7% of all the
division's expenditures, their symbolic value was high as they repre-
sented one of the mainstays of the profession and one that had tradi-
tionally been sancrosanct, that is, removed from any real review by
peers, third party payors, or government. As the medical director
was later to remark, they also had a large potential for causing harm
since the 7% expenditures was composed of a large volume of (low-cost)
visits and since they were also the entry point into the system for
many clients and their neglect of Medicaid clients could be crucial.
The second thrust of activity in this case involved the content
of monitoring activity. The department had, of course, always tried
to monitor for outright fraud, i.e., non-delivery of services. In addi-
tion they had the authority to assure proper billing, i.e., to catch
"boosted" bills where providers claimed procedures were (slightly)
more complicated than actual fact, thus necessitating a higher fee.
It had also begun to question the necessity of services as in the
hospital program for review of length of stay and in the drug area (see
drug sanction cases). But the issue of the quality of care actually
delivered had only been attacked directly once before.
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There had been concurrent nationwide battles within the medical
community around such issues as what actually was quality care, how
could it be defined and who, if anyone, was to monitor it. The only
significant national efforts to attack the quality issue that had
shown any promise had been through continuing education, hospital
utilization review committees and, more recently, through federally-
sponsored peer review organizations (PSRO's). The PSRO's, the latest
effort, were, however, not to take effect for some three to four years
(if ever, some skeptics doubted). Within the division, "quality" control
had usually been disguised as something else or surfaced only in areas
where the division had the provider's complete cooperation or their
complete submission. The first real breakout into a previously untouched
area had been the hospital sanction case and Knight then began to feel
he could then legitimately focus on quality of care issues.
Thus these two thrusts, quality of care and private physicians,
converged in late summer of 1974. Yet it was not enough to have the
two thrusts converge - the development of a technology was an additional
step needed after the issues had focused. Knight and the medical
director began to explore this problem. TIe department of course re-
ceived bills from each private physician, but Knight felt that these
were inadequate raw material siace they usually only stated "office
visit" and the fee, although in cases involving complicated procedures
these would be identified by a procedure "code." No diagnosis, treatment
plans or results were submitted. Knight reluctantly concluded that the
paper bill alone was inadequate for determining what actually went on
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in the office -- did the person actually need treatment, did he
receive the correct treatment, was it well performed, was it adequately
recorded, what were the results, etc.? Thus some more direct means
of examining treatment needed to be found.
The obvious possibilities included actually watching the physician
practice, examining his office and/or records on-site, or requesting
submission of records and back up material for the bill. The first
possibility was tacitly dismissed by all since it would obviously
involve a major political leap, would likely be illegal and would
demand enormous amounts of time and money. The latter two possibilities
were the only real contenders. But what was envisaged was an audit
program, not a 100% monitoring; so that the option of having all bills
submitted with detailed records and back up material was not considered.
It seemed politically impossible (although it had been tried in a
limited way in some other states) and the division had no administrative
capacity to utilize such a deluge of material.
Rather an audit program of some randomly chosen providers and pro-
viders who had been singled out by field workers, the billing system or
other means would be mounted. Recall also that Knight's strategy was
to "knock off" the worst providers in each area so as to set an example -
a strategy chosen because of the limited resources of the department.
Thus the method he proposed for examination was on-site examination of
records and so, by early September, not only had the division assumed
a strong position on the need for some type of program in the area but
it (at least Knight) knew what the general shape of the program would be.
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After the initial flush of success from the hospital sanction case,
an important personnel change occurred. The sanction director, R.D.,
who had played an increasingly quiet role in that case and who had
never gained the full confidence of Knight, was about to return to
graduate school. E.K., who had aided Knight during the hospital sanction
case, had impressed Knight with his performance and so he assigned him
to the sanction area. His special mandate was to develop the program
of on-site review of private physicians -- including the necessary
legal backup since he wanted to be sure that the next sanction thrust
was based on more sound legal grounds. Knight had grudgingly admitted
that, while "not feeling uneasy" about the legality of the hospital
sanction, more work was needed. E.K. was also to research the action
other states had taken. Knight told him that private physicians were
"uncovered" and sancrosanct but that he had every confidence that the
new recruit could work something out and he was given a free hand
to develop the program.
At the same time as R.D. was leaving, another new recruit, a phar-
macist was hired to work in the sanction area. As was Knight's nature,
the exact division of tasks between these *wo newcomers was not made
precisely clear. There was ongoing sanction activity in all other provider
categories, plus billing irregularities and fraud in the private physician
area to handle. The two began to work on the complete sanction program
with E.K. concentrating on the on-site audit theme. The pharmacist,
however, after reading the file on the hospital sanction case and
observing the second drug sanction case decided that Knight was taking
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too bold, and perhaps unfair or even illegal, steps and so mentioned
his fears to Knight. Knight apparently began to feel that this
view was not really the kind that could be helpful in the sanction
area. In addition, the pharmacist had been brought on at a low salary
and it became clear that Knight would not be able to rapidly come through
with higher pay. He thus resigned after a few weeks and the whole
program area of sanctions fell to E.K. E.K. was young, ambitious,
intelligent and personable and, after the exposure to Knight in his
office and during the hospital case, much respected his style and
direction. He fell to the task with gusto and began to confer with
the department's lawyer, D.L.
D.L. researched the enabling legislation setting up the department
and came to the initial conclusion that the division lacked authority
to conduct such audits on quality of care grounds. The legislation
stated that standards should be set for the "proper and efficient" opera-
tion of the plan (Medicaid) but that the division should not set "medical
standards and criteria." These latter standards were apparently to
be established by DPH in its licensing capacity. But DPH had only
utilized these in a minimum way or, as in the case of nursing homes,
under a contract with the division in which they would act as inspecting
agents and enforcers of quality standards. Other state statutes had
also stated that standards for hospitals and nursing homes were to
be "formulated" by DPH.
E.K., discouraged by these findings and wondering whether federal
law gave any powers to the division began to research it, to look for
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a "general umbrella power" to set and enforce quality standards. D.L.
also searched the federal statutes, but here the search was also un-
fruitful. The legislation said that the "state health agency" (i.e.
DPH), should set standards and engage in quality of care areas (the
agency administering the Medicaid program was referred to as the "single
state agency" - although in some other states they were the same). They
did find a clause permitting standard setting by DPW for "review of
items of service" but this was not clear and apparently did not seem
to provide a necessary (both strong and clear) power for the department.
They concluded that DPH probably had the authority but "does
not want it or is unwilling to exercise it." They then conferred with
DPH's lawyer who seemed to indicate that he felt DPH did not even have
the authority to set, audit or enforce standards of quality for Medicaid.
The two DPW staffers interpreted this to mean that DPH was willing to
let DPW assume these responsibilities. An interesting shift of position
occurs here as usually DPH (see the day care for the elderly case)
was quite protective of its perogatives. The DPH lawyer was, however,
a strong civil rights lawyer who appeared to side with DPW. The two
staffers felt he represented the DPH position as a whole but Knight was
more cautious. He felt that others (higher up in DPH) would not be
so, amiable and was not so easily impressed with this casual abrogation
of power by DPH, although the medical director felt that "DPH had always
been understaffed and never very interested in innovative areas."
It is clear that the question of legality had not been clearly under-
stood (or admitted) in the hospital sanction case. D.L. had not
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questioned the division's authority to sanction on quality grounds
until it surfaced in the on-site audit case. He felt that if questioned
on the hospital case he might have been able to legally stretch the
utilization review powers granted to them for hospitals into quality
assessments (i.e., the poor records cited in that case). But he
realized the larger implications and thus cooperated in the search
for adequate authority. He did not speak to Knight about the
possible tenuous base for the hospital sanction case since he felt
that Knight did not want to hear from him unless they were in agree-
ment.
E.K. also agreed that the sanctioning of the hospital for "not
meeting professional standards" (as in the DPW regulations) may not have
been legal. He had sent Knight a memo to that effect stating that the
sanction program might otherwise become an impotent program of reviewing
bills in the central office. He was not sure that Knight understood the
linking of the authority question in the audit case to the hospital case.
But Knight, as described in that case, did grudgingly admit that the
claim to authority was murky at best. Indeed his action since that
time spoke louder than his words - as he had concentrated on the question
of authority to the early exclusion of political and technological
questions. There was no question here of much further "bending of the
rules" unless a very thorough examination of the problem was made.
At this time, however, a technological (how to do the audits) issue
arose -- that of the legality of an unannounced audit. The DPW lawyer
felt that advance notice must be given otherwise the division would get
sued the first time it happened and might well lose the case and have
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many physicians drop from the program. This ability to arrive unannounced
was felt to be important by E.K. since physicians could easily "doctor"
the records or prepare elaborate exculpatory explanations in advance
if they suspected poor care might be uncovered. The medical director
however felt this would not likely occur since it would involve tremen-
dous amounts of work on the physicians' part. Those who had something
to hide would either contest the division's right or simply drop out of
the program voluntarily. This aspect of the technology question was
dropped at the time since no ready solution was found. Similarly the
question of precisely what were the components of quality care was held
in abeyance while the search continued for the legal mandate.
At this point some of the uncertainty developing around the author-
ity issue began to be directed towards D.L. and his evolving position.
Knight felt that he was inexperienced and somewhat conservative. E.K.
also stated that he felt that to some degree but he nonetheless also
began to feel uneasy about going ahead without a sound legal base.
E.K. was thorough by nature and had indicated that he would probably like
to go to law school sometime. Thus some of D.L.'s attitudes had appar-
ently begun to rub off on him. He thought that Knight felt lawyers
are "magicians who can manipulate the law to get what they want."
And N.B., although not actively involved in the early stages, felt
that D.L. had not given him satisfactory responses to an earlier query
as to whether individual physicians acting for the department would be
held personally responsible in any suit based on a sanction case or
whether the department held liability insurance for them. D.L., for his
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part wanted to see a program of audits in place, but felt that the
authority was clearly lacking. Knight kept digging away with new
suggestions which he would systematically have to "shoot down."
He stated that he became discouraged after a while and began to feel
he wasn't being consulted as often as before since he always had to
respond negatively although E.K. continued to have goo d access. Here
Knight's teaching style was not as effective as D.L. was from outside
the division and had not been subjected to the selection or socializa-
tion process that the others had. But the discussions among these three
continued in good spirits and with no hostility or rancor. Only Knight
retained a high degree of optimism.
The trio continued to explore other avenues. D.L. suggested a joint
DPW/DPH audit but Knight apparently did not feel strongly about that
idea. E.K. (at Knight's suggestion) proposed fines as a possible
lever but D.L. replied that again the department had no authority;
they could only be levied by a court. About a month after he delivered
this opinion, Knight replied asking for a more definitive explanation of
why finin8 was -impossible. The Bureau of Welfare Audits also sugg-
ested the idea and when told it was not possible decided to develop a
bill on their own to submit to the legislature. Finally, a theory of
the "dropped ball" was proposed by E.K., i.e., that since DPH had
abrogated its responsibilities, DPW had "picked them up." D.L. felt
this was a "foolish and unsupportable argument" since it was specifi-
cally prohibited by statutes. But he began to respond to E.K. 's request
that he put the legal arguments in writing so that they could be
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submitted to DPH and a formal reply from them generated -- hopefully
one which would support the "dropped ball theory." This kind of
activity continued for over two months. Knight obviously had the
audits as a key concern but was letting his staff members develop
the rationale. He refused to take no for an answer and kept prodding
them to come up with new strategies.
Knight, however, kept an extremely low profile outside the division,
contrary to his usual posture of bouncing ideas off close and trusted
friends and informing his "constituencies" of their progress. But here
he did not wish to divulge his strategy too soon. In fact he specifi-
cally instructed all his staff not to mention the possibility of such
a program outside the department. He stated that he had not conferred
with his two superiors on the subject, saying that he felt he was
"within his perogatives to develop the program first."
Yet the commissioner of the department was aware of the activity,
but did not intervene or mention it to Knight. His superior in EOHS,
when informed of the program by the researcher, was ambivalent about it
but not surprised to learn of the program development activities.
He felt the responsibility might be a BWA or DPH one if it involved
fraud or non-delivery or over-utilization of services. He was generally
quite non-committal on the responsibility issue. But he was quite certain
about other aspects. First he "would want to know who was going to do
it and what the return would be." He was not convinced there would be
a large return and felt that such programs were best contracted out,
like the HMA and drug processing areas, i.e., to the professionals
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involved. Knight felt the opposite, of course - that the profession
would not police itself. But the undersecretary felt that the import-
ant thing was not who did it but that someone' did it, i.e. look over
the provider's shoulders, and that this demonstration effect brought
90% of the desired results. But they did not talk directly on the
subject; he only gave a warning to Knight not to be so aggressive
that "he might get into trouble."
The other obvious source for the division to touch base with was
the Medical Society. Knight did inform them that he felt such a
program of audits should be carried out but was deliberately vague
about who or how they should be done. The society also felt they
should be done but by some PSRO-like organization and not by "bureau-
crats". Knight felt that they were not aware of his desired goal of
sanctioning and suspending poor physicians and thus did not understand
his overall strategy. This strategy, as we shall see later, consisted
of testing the on-site audits in home health agencies and family
planning clinics (both with little "clout") or with a few group
practices who agreed to participate and later building up to "hit"
the solo physicians.
Another obvious outside base of support was the formal political
system. That is, if the legal powers are weak or unclear, the division
might propose new legislation to change the situation. D.L. had pro-
posed this as the only likely solution but Knight had rejected it. D.L.
suggested he would thus "expose himself to attack." As Knight himself
put it, "then you'd open a pandora's box and right now I'd rather wriggle
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and squirm within it." It is this "squirming" that has been described
above. And it continued with Knight convinced that while the enabling
legislation did give power to DPH it also reserved some power for DPW
such as the authority to do "random post treatment examinations of
recipients" in order to assure that services were "actually performed
as described" or that the providers must "provide evidence satisfactory
to the department of their qualifications to provide such services"
or the earlier mentioned "proper and efficient operation of the plan."
While the question of legal authority was the first to arise, these
political issues (backing within and outside the bureaucracy) soon
added themselves to the agenda.
Only later did the question of "technology" loom up. In the
process of defining what the auditors would look for, the need to
define what good care is and how it could be determined arose. Each
of the participants felt differently about the technology issue and
all but Knight were awed at the difficulty of actually developing
standards. As he said, "The technology is people; all we need is to
get good people to sit down and work them out."
N.B., the medical director, had been approached by Knight in the
early fall about the possibility of setting up the program. He said
that he had felt not too enthusiastic about the idea and had expressed
his reservations to Knight. Since that time he had participated passively
in the idea with most of the discussion centering on the other partici-
pants. His reservations about the idea centered mainly on the
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mechanics, or technology, of doing it although he also felt that it
would be difficult to get the necessary "political" backing in such a
sancrosanct area, and that they would have difficulty from the division's
own medical consultants who felt nervous about touching on such a
delicate area. He first of all felt the audits would be logistically
difficult since they would disrupt the doctors' working hours. Also
any standards they developed would be arbitrary since records in
private offices are so poorly kept (there not being the need as in
hospitals and clinic organizations for a document which can be read
by many different practicioners). He also felt that the "grossest"
abuses could be picked up in an audit of records mailed in to the DPW,
i.e., they did not need to be on-site since these gross abusers would
never make the effort to change all their records. He also felt a
personal distaste at having to act as a prosecutor for his fellow
physicians although if able consultants who would so act could be
found, he would go along with the idea.
Despite these hesitations, N.B. agreed in November that the
divison should try out the idea with the three individual physicians
identified by the hospital sanction case but only to the degree of
asking that they provide their complete medical records to the division.
This brief experiment also led to some discussion around the adequacy
of records themselves. E.K. felt that they were an inadequate base
to determine quality of care. The division might not even have the
legal authority to demand their production. Knight even backed down
somewhat and began to feel that inadequate as they were, the records
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could be focused on. That is, they had determined in the hospital
sanction case that poor record keeping in itself constituted poor
care and that they might have to "catch" the poor providers on the
grounds of poor records alone.
Knight thus admitted the difficulty of doing the on-site audits
so that the idea of focusing on a record review in DPW offices became
a short run possibility as did his earlier strategy of doing on-site
audits with other classes of providers. In the long run however Knight
felt that the standards can be developed. He cited as standards the
low quality of records, professional norms which could be "teased out"
of the physicians themselves, and the protocols of the American Academy
of Pediatrics.
The technology issue was further bounded by deciding to call
the whole area "program review" rather than "on-site audits." Here
Knight felt that if the random audits discovered good or excellent
care then that would be highlighted and perhaps even publicized. The
idea was to act in a "non-punative, educative" manner. But others within
the division saw it differently. D.L. called it a charade (perhaps
designed to get around the legal difficulties) and the medical director,
a disguise. The real intent was punative and to set an example. This
did appear to be the main thrut of the program but Knight when ques-
tioned said "no, wouldn't you be happy to find situations of good care?
If we do, I'd then work with him as an ally." Again Knight's ability
to turn problems into opportunities surfaces.
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The next action in the case was to begin to direct the concept
of on-site audits at either "weak" or cooperating providers --
home health agencies, family planning clinics, and a large group
practice clinic as a start. In the first two cases, the providers
had agreed to conditions of participation which stated that audits
and inspections might be carried out. D.L. warned that even here the
division might not have authority since two parties cannot, even by
agreement, exercise powers not legislatively granted to them. Knight
recognized this danger but moved ahead. As E.K. saw it -- "I agree
it's a bluff but here we have more credibility", i.e., it was a coopera-
tive situation and the two groups of providers were more dependent on the
Medicaid program than most private physicians. Thus the political and
legal streams merged and an acceptable short run strategy had been
formed.
Work also continued on the technology area. At a meeting with
one of the ex-directors of a prepaid group practice, Knight, N.B. and
E.K. explored the possibilities for monitoring quality care. They
concluded that the "hothouse" atmosphere of a teaching hospital or
a group practice was all-important, but agreed that in its absence,
it should be easy to establish "process standards of care" i.e., for
a tentative diagnosis of say, pneumonia, certain tests and work-ups
should be performed and recorded. While that discussion focused on
hospital admissions and the 10 or 15 most common diagnoses (which
constituted the bulk of admissions) they believed that the concept
would be transferrable to private practice and Knight continued to work
on his own to try to get agreements on some of these common diagnoses.
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The larger issue of whether the whole strategy of identifying and
removing a few "bad apples" was an effective one remained (see the de-
velopment of sanctions case). N.B. felt it was not, since some published
data had indicated that the "bad apples" continue to practice poorly
even after sanctions and educative efforts. But Knight felt that with
limited resources, the division had no choice.
The case now continued for nearly a month with action on all fronts,
political, technical and strategic (i.e. testing) proceeding along al-
though the uncertainty felt by all kept the process in a low profile
despite Knight's keen desire to see it take prominence. However in late
January of 1975 the initial testing of the quality concept ran into some
snags. One of the lawyers for the three physicians offered up in the
hospital case questioned the division's authority to sanction on
quality grounds. Knight was, of course, quite upset by this challenge
and his first reaction (to E.K.) was that, if necessary, he would take
it all the way to court and make the issue so public that while he
might lose the case, the physician's true quality would be revealed
by the publicizing of the details of the case.
This veiled threat was never delivered to the provider and the
next day E.K. prepared a lengthy summary of the division's position
citing all the provisions of the enabling act which appeared to give
the division some power. But he accompanied it with a separate memo
showing how the position could be rebutted by a skilled adversary. Knight
appeared despondent and suggested that they might have to let the three
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physicians go "free" in addition to "laying low" on the on-site audits.
E.K. had apprently clarified for Knight that the problem lay in two areas -
one, the authority to sanction on quality grounds and two, the existing
regulations which cited violation of professional standards as a
sanctionable offense. The first problem, they decided, would have to
be approached by pushing DPH to develop standards and also by seeking
to have the clause "except medical criteria" removed from the DPW
enabling legislation. As for the second problem, E.K. said that
the "sanction office is closed for repairs for six weeks" while he
combed the division's regulations and conditions of participation to
put as much as was possible into written form which would define"pro-
fessional standards." In the meantime the on-site audits with family
planning clinics and home health agencies would continue. Later, two
of the three doctors accepted a 2 month retroactive suspension and a
22 month probation while the third continued to fight his case. In
addition, the division's nursing home regulations had included refer-
ences to violations of DPH standards as sanctionable offenses and the
nursing home suspensions continued without this roadblock in their way.
The case is characterized first of all by the dogged determination
of Knight to do the "right thing" which in his mind was to act as an
active purchaser of quality services. His perceived role was given a
tremendous boost by the hospital sanction case and he quickly brought two
issues together -- a sancrosanct provider group and review for quality
assurance. In bringing the two together he utilized several of the
principles developed earlier in the hospital sanction case, for
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example that the medical profession will not police itself. But
he not only learned these lessons but also undoubtedly realized in
hindsight the audacity of this previous case for he not only instituted
some exhaustive searches for a remedy but kept the whole process quiet,
only selectively involving outsiders -- things he was not in the habit
of doing as we have seen in other cases. He also, at first, ignored
the advice of his medical director on the means of carrying out the
program and instead substituted his own personal experience. That is,
he knew that physicians did operate on the basis of tacitly agreed -
upon standards of practice and that the only task was to draw these
out and a technology would be available.
In the process Knight wore down his staff with a persistent
leadership not as evident in other cases -- but the persistance
paid off. A short run strategy was devised although it involved
retreating on political grounds (i.e. approach weak or cooperative
providers), on technological grounds (they could concentrate on the
quality of records) and on the focus of interest (solo physicians
would be approached later). Knight continued to seek out allies who
can help him develop the technology. He was of course still "bending
the legal rules" but realized that to break them on this issue might
cause the loss of the momentum the division had gained and that the
strength and the credibility he so much sought for the program must
be approached more directly.
The leadership shown was not the pure "teaching" style so evident
in other cases. Rather it was Knight acting on beliefs with which
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he felt secure; that a way could be found to conduct the audits. Here
he served mainly as a critic as the ideas his two competent staff
brought to him were discussed. Some of his teaching style's more
positive elements such as his ability to "read" correctly the style
of staff members seemed to be absent here, for example, in his inclina-
tion to not listen to the department's lawyer or the inability to admit
a "defeat", although with respect to the latter, the doggedness of
his direction undoubtedly helped produce a more reasoned stance.
But the delicate momentum which had been built up and Knight's
assurance of the correctness of this stance was finally challenged
(in a mild manner). This setback could not be evaluated but the
initial response of the division indicated that its long-run effect would
be beneificial. The speed with which Knight reacted indicated that
he felt the momentum gained could no longer be maintained by sheer
audacity or cooperation from a few providers; it must be made credible
by regulatory back-up, legislative action and inter-agency cooperation.
Whether the division could learn new strategies to carry out the latter
two tasks is an open question, but the evidence presented by the third
stream of cases (Chapter V) suggests that the strategies of legisla-
tive back-up and DPH cooperation would be difficult to implement.
6. Overview
This stream of cases (the sanction stream) began with the actual
development of the legal power of the division to sanction providers.
This initiative was taken by the division with virtually no mandate
or pressure from its environment and, after a year and a half, a series
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of major sanction cases had been conducted in which the limited goal
of suspending providers from the program and/or demanding substantial
financial retribution was accomplished. In addition, several nursing
homes were closed under threat of sanction activity. Evaluation
of the ultimate goal of improving the quality of providers throughout
the whole depth of the millions of services rendered each year to the
division's clients can not yet (if ever) be assessed. Yet the strategy
of setting an example by "knocking off" key abusers in each program
area in the belief that other providers would voluntarily bring services
up to standard can be tentatively characterized as being a success.
In addition to these major sanctions, several minor program abuses
were corrected under threat of sanction. The routinization of both
these major and minor thrusts is difficult to assess since their appli-
cation was a matter of policy on the part of Knight's administration
rather than a program consisting of a codified body of regulations
and a large staff with specifically assigned tasks. Yet the continued
emphasis of the sanction program over the course of a year and a half
(and its neglect by the previous administrations) indicates that the
policy was firmly held in the organization at that time.
Only one of the sanction cases (physician audits) was seen to be
a "failure" but even in that situation the lessons learned were imme-
diately applied to two other provider areas and also resulted in an
attempt to further codify the sanction power in regulations, in inter-
agency agreements and in legislation. This ability to transfer the
momentum acquired by the agency was noticeable as the division moved
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from pharmacies to hospitals, back to pharmacies and on again to private
physicians and clinics and a large nursing home owner, each time with
increasing confidence and a sense of credibility. Internally, Knight
and his staff reflected this increased confidence as they developed
procedures for handling the cases such as the use of provisional
sanctions or the involving of the press when required.
While the above momentum was clearly directed by Knight, parti-
cular staff members were instrumental in the carrying out of the
division's programs. Knight sought staff with a "prosecutorial" or
"policeman" bent who could actively pursue the sanction policy. The
first staffer chosen (R.D.) did not fit into the spirit of the momentum
being created as he did not seem to adapt to Knight's teaching style
and Knight's eventual response was to ease him (and another) out of
the division. The next sanction director appeared to have absorbed
both , the spirit and the know-how involved in the program. Others
such as the pharmacy director, the department's lawyer, and an adjacent
agency extended their horizons to further clarify sanctionable activi-
ties and to pursue offenders. The remaining staff did not actively
seek potential abusers but rather pursued those cases thrown up to
them by a wide variety of sources, The nursing home director, however,
using a system of DPW and DPH inspectors, continued to actively seek
potential abusers.
While the momentum developed by this core group of the division
was felt early on, their specific program for action was not so clearly
enunciated, nor was its development unvaried as the stream progressed
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and its demands changed. The division appeared to have learned that
not only is such a program a necessary component but also that it
must be adaptable to circumstances, Thus the initial cases showed a
consistent willingness to accept inputs from outside the division
(in the "tip-offs" for the case) and coupled this with a strong role
assumption that the actions being taken were justifiably within the
division's mandate even though that role was to be questioned later
in the stream. These cases were approached in a relatively "rational"
manner consisting of calculating the desired outputs from specific
goals, for example, "develop regulations which will permit the division
to suspend", or "Let's use the new regulations for this problem"
(drug abuse I). The initial cases were handled somewhat cautiously
and with a sense of uncertainty, as the division (a) relied on a large
group of persons in both cases and (b) put considerable effort into
examining the details of each-case.
Obvious not only in the initial cases but throughout the stream
was the haste and speed with which action was taken after the case first
came to the attention of Knight. This is in contrast to other areas
such as the development of new medical services where a considerable
incubation period occurred after the initial assumption of the division's
perogative. Similarly the early adoption of a specific goal for each
case was apparent throughout the stream (e.g. "we're either going to
suspend him or get more money back").
The initial uncertain strategy changed over the course of a year
as the division, and particularly Knight, became more aggressive,
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confident, and even audacious in their sanction activity. They much
less frequently relied on a large group process to reach decisions;
the regulations involved were interpreted more liberally; and the
actual details of the cases examined less thoroughly (unless confronted
strongly by outsiders). Despite this aggressive stance, multiple and
occasionally conflicting objectives came into play in the middle three
cases and the "rational" style of decision-making in the first and
second cases developed into one involving more judgemental or compromise
decisions as the division looked for "satisfactory" solutions. For
example, it was not clear what the effect of a sanction might be on a
provider in the drug cases, nor was it clear just how harsh the hospital
sanction could be without an appeal being generated to the courts or
the commissioner but a judgement had to be, and was made. This con-
trasted with the more "optimal" search patterns in the development
of new medical resources and the "inspirational" strategy in the last
sanction case which involved a great many variables about which the
division had little knowledge (recall also the "inspirational" approach
to the EPSDT case - one in which Knight was also very convinced of the
rightness of his approach).
Concurrent with the above was a progressively greater involvement
of the larger community through the press, the medical society and
others (universities, provider groups, etc). In the last three cases,
Knight also began to rely on his past experience or trusted friends
for technical knowledge although in terms of the managerial knowledge
necessary to carry out his strategy he remained confident of his own
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skills. It was only after the second drug case concluded that this
involvement of the division's environment was downplayed.
By then it was apparent that the elements the division had then
chosen to confront were the most complex of all. This increased
complexity had also been slightly apparent in the second drug case
(c.f. the hesitation of the pharmacy director and the lawyer). The
divison became less aggressive and confident and relied on Knight's
inspirational style of decision-making ("there's got to be a way").
Specific goals for the last case were not as clearly outlined but the
necessary internal homework was done with much greater thoroughness
as the larger environment was temporarily "frozen out" of the process.
Finally the division realized that while the various bases of its
action needed more development, it could nonetheless propose a compro-
mise short-run strategy to maintain momentum. Just as this occurred
they were "called" on their previous aggressivity and forced to retrench,
this time to prepare a long-run strategy to deal with each of the techno-
logical, legal and bureaucratic complexities.
While the nature of the program for action developed by the division
varied somewhat according to circumstances, its overall approach did not.
The division's approach was observed also in the new services stream
and will.be seen in the final stream (Chapter V). Recall that its main
components were three-fold - (1) the development of shared principles,
primarily through the teaching of young and inexperienced but competent
staff as each case developed, (2) the development of credibility
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and integrity through a management approach and (3) the conscious
development of the organizational paradigm - a "responsible buyer".
It is also clear that the development of shared principles was
aided by the division's program for action. That is, the division
learned not only how to accomplish specific sanction tasks through
the program but it also used the program for developing shared principles.
The program for action not only permitted success in the various tasks
but it also permitted the bounding of a very uncertain background in
which more specific pinciples could be developed (through teaching).
Thus, as in the new services stream, the learning of the program for
action is not only what the division learned, it also begins to
explain how it learned the principles. Knight's teaching style more
fully adds to an understanding of how the principles were developed.
The development of these shared principles between Knight and
his staff enabled the sanction stream to make rapid progress in the
last three cases. And conversely the difficulty Knight had in estab-
lishing an agreement on these principles in the first eight months with
his sanction director probably accounted for the initial slow progress.
This agreement was generated through Knight's teaching approach in which
general principles were developed during each case and then became part
of the organization's working memory on how to behave in succeeding
cases. The principles were, of course, all exercised in the service
of the agency's paradigm - the responsible buyer.
The content of these principles was outlined in the case descrip-
tions but will be highlighted here again. Firstly there was Knight's
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belief that the best way to show the community that it meant to exercise
(the negative side of) its buying power was to sanction one provider
in each program area. This was clearly evident as each of the major
cases was in a different area. As the stream ends, we see the
division moving on to actually suspend a multi-facility nursing home
operator, nor merely forcing a closing through threat of sanction.
Similarly the sanction director began to devote less energy to a
third pharmacy abuser charged with offenses exactly similar to the
first two. Once this principle had been established, a second
principle developed which stated that development of regulations and
the direction of the cases should not be done by a "committee". This
committee process in the first case so annoyed Knight that he stressed
that development of joint DPH/DPW standards for solo physicians should
involve as few people as possible.
The second case (pharmaceutical abuse I) generated several principles
which were also to be invoked in the hospital and second drug case.
These were: (1) that the provider's intent is a key feature in the
proceedings. Thus he should only be sanctioned if his intent was to
milk the program. The converse of this is that the charge could include
something not specifically mentioned in the regulations as long as it
was apparent that the provider was violating the spirit of the regula-
tions or going against professional ethics or "standard practice".
Another principle was that providers should not be forced out of business
unless clients had been exposed to direct harm. For example, the drug
cases did not indicate such harm but the hospital case did and Knight's
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"blood went cold" when the possibility of the hospital being forced
out of business was raised. The first drug case also generated the
understanding that the division would lose all leverage with the
provider if the sentence was so severe as to force him into bankruptcy.
Thus the division might not recover any money (1st drug case) or might
lose an opportunity to restructure the hospital's total utilization
review system (hospital case) for Medicaid as well as for non-Medicaid
patients.
The hospital case itself also saw the development of principles
which were utilized in succeeding cases. Firstly the realization
that quality care is different from quality treatment was developed
here and used in the physician's audit case. Secondly, Knight also
clearly tried to get across to his staff that often authority must be
seized if no one else is willing to exercise it - which he had to do
again in the second drug case and in the on-site audits case and indeed,
in many of the new services cases. The converse of this principle is
that professional organizations will not police themselves (the HMA
turned the hospital case over to DPW) such that Knight deliberately
tried to avoid an "HMA-like" organization for the on-site audits.
How were these principles generated and carried from one case to
the next? The clearest answer lies in Knight's teaching style. While
this style consisted of many elements, some six or seven are particularly
relevant in the sanction stream. Firstly Knight would often simply
declare a principle and hold it to be more or less self-evident, e.g.
that the degree of sanction should vary according to the intent of the
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provider. Secondly he would enter a case with quite specific goals
which might or might not change during the case but which provided
a direction for both he and the staff. (For example, the early feeling
in the second drug case that a sanction or suspension was inevitable).
Thirdly-, Knight often invoked his past experience in generating
a principle, e.g. that providers' current bills should be held pending
the case resolution seemed apparent to him from his business background.
FourthlyKnight very clearly explained his decisions to both staff
and providers. There may or may not have been agreement but the
reasons (and principles)behind decisions were open and available. All
the staff interviewed felt this to be significant. Fifth, Knight would
often openly admit his lack of knowledge about details of a provider
system and eagerly try to learn about, for example, how nursing home
prescriptions are filled and how one might define a bad nursing home.
After the on-site audit case, 'he asked his nursing home director to
"show me 3 good homes and 3 bad ones." Finally there was the use of
an explicit learning vocabulary. Knight would often ask in public,
"well, what did we learn from that?" or he would stress in staff meetings
how a case or a cumulation of cases had developed (at least for him) a
new principle - "we've learned that the medical profession won't police
itself very well and particularly not on a decentralized basis." This
learning vocabulary is so simple and obvious it may appear trivial
but its effect was, I believe, quite significant.
Thus it was through Knight's teaching that the organization's prin-
ciples developed and it was through these principles that the unrelenting
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and unchanging goals which formed the paradigm of the division were trans-
lated into reality. However the success of such a teaching style also
depended on the nature and quality of the "students". The overall
staff was primarily young, competent, anxious to seek out poor pro-
viders and relatively untrained in medical care or management - ideal
students for such a style. Yet it is still unclear whether Knight was
able to fully teach his staff the principles discussed earlier to the
extent that they would behave if acting independently of him. Certainly
each of the staff directly involved came out of the experience with a
different view than when they began. The two pharmacy directors
adopted a more clear and strong regulatory stance than might be expected
given that they were the only full-time members of the (professional)
medical community in the division. The initial sanction director
never developed shared principles with Knight but his insistence on
a more rigorous approach was one eventually adopted. The second
sanction director and the department's lawyer not only learned about
the conducting of the sanction process but so thoroughly checked out
the ramifications of many of the principles that Knight himself
eventually made a considerable shift in direction in order to better
achieve his aims in one of the particular areas. In the other areas
the team continued to develop cases using the body of principles developed
by Knight.
The second main component of Knight's approach which never varied
throughout the sanction stream was his management style. Recall that
the role of good management was two-fold. Firstly it enabled the
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division to develop credibility with the external environment. For
Knight this credibility was half of the paradigm of the "responsible
buyer". Responsible meant not only searching out cost effective
services and strategies but also acting responsibly and accountably
towards the division's environment. Good management of the division's
routine activity would give it the credibility it needed to move
forward into new or innovative areas such as the sanction activity.
Good management of routine activity meant to Knight, and eventually
to nearly all the staff, that the division should first of all have
policies for each of the areas it was involved in, that these policies
should be relatively consistent and coherent and that the division,
acting through its local and regional offices should actually act on
these policies (Knight - "by integrity I mean we should actually do
what we say we do.") And finally, the division should be held account-
able for all these activities. Simple concepts each of them, but
given the lack of management, or under-management prior to Knight,
their achievement (or lack of it - witness the continuing effort to
assure the local offices performed as well in each of the above areas
as the central office) is not a minor one. Thus, for example, it is
unlikely that the division would or could have moved against druggists
and hospitals without a sound fee schedule for both, adequate bill
payment processes (for pharmacies) and the monitoring program (for
hospitals) nor against nursing homes without the integrity shown (and
acknowledged by the providers) by the nursing home director.
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But of more interest from a learning point of view is how Knight
used good management as a tool not only for routine activity but also
to process new knowledge such as we are discussing here. The manage-
ment approach thus served the dual purpose of developing external
credibility which was then called upon to move into new areas where
the same internal management style could be used to direct the trans-
formation of new information into a learned response.
As with Knight's teaching style, not all of the management approach
is observable in the sanction stream, but several of its more important
elements are. Firstly, we see that Knight insisted on a "very careful
delegation of authority and responsibility" with as many as possible
of the key people reporting directly to him. He involved himself in
each major sanction case (including the development of the initial
regulations) and only gradually delegated authority - first in a circum-
scribed manner to the initial sanction director (who did not fully share
his principles or style) and finally to the second director in whom he
had.more confidence and trust. Secondly, he continually manifested his
abhorence of large working groups or committees (he attributed the
necessary retrenching in the on-site audit case to the committee's
output he had been saddled with in the development of the regulations)
and of separate. research, analysis and planning functions, i.e. plann-
inig and operations should be as close as possible. Thus each sanction
case was developed by a very close functioning of the program manager
and the sanction director and the charges grew out of operating
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violations and not abstract principles such as might be developed by
a separate research or prosecutorial unit (i.e. the MHA or even the
department's own legal department).
Thirdly he insisted on "getting good people" and on down playing
the emotional or political components of his staff's performance -
there was little classical "organizational development" activity and
surprisingly little internal political, power seeking activity. Thus
Knight eased out two sanction directors until he found the one he
wanted and only then delegated full authority to him and began to move
with full confidence. Fourthly, he continually stressed both the
general goals of the division, e.g. not to have to purchase from poor
providers and the refinement of specific goals laid out by him, e.g.
"1we're going to sanction this provider" or "we are going to make an
example out of this hospital." These specific goals were formulated
through Knight's teaching and his continuing ability to ask "what do
we want" or "this is what we want, isn't it?" or "what did we learn
from that" in open dialogue with his staff.
Fifthly, Knight stressed the need for staff to be open to and culti-
vate as many sources of information as they could. While this is not as
apparent in this stream as in the new resources stream, each of the
sanction cases was evidenced by a willingness to accept both data
and perceptions provided by the division's informants. Finally, Knight's
insistence on cost/effectiveness as a basic management tenet was evident
in the whole sanction strategy of selecting one big provider in each
provider area. As each provider area was first covered, he moved
-273-
rapidly to the next, not continuing to us.e scarce staff resources in
areas where, for the meantime, further payoff would be small.
Thus, not only were working principles developed through teaching
but they were to be exercised through management, a particular style
of management which the commissioner called unorthodox but which can
also be seen as remarkably simple, and in this case, relatively effec-
tive. And the principles were to be in service of a mission - a
paradigm to be made real and fulfilled. As with the development of
principles and the use of management, the role of the conscious
paradigm in directing the agency's program was consistent throughout
the sanction stream. The new paradigm Knight held out for the division
was unrelentingly evoked. The division was to be a responsible buyer
of services. Not only was it a buyer (and could thus choose not to buy)
but it was to do so in the service of a goal - efficient and quality
care - for which it would be held responsible. This was held out by
Knight both to the staff involved in sanctions and to the full staff,
although not all the latter concentrated on sanctions as the vehicle -
some, for example, stressed expanded primary care as their input to
the goal of quality.
The stress on the buying of quality care at cost-effective prices
was apparent in each of the cases as each one involved the recovery of
money in addition to the cited charge of violation of standards of
professional care. The other part of the paradigm, that the division
be "responsible" and acquire credibility, was not as clearly invoked as
it was in other more routine activities of the division. But in turning
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the sanction program into a routine, it did begin to add to its existing
credibility. It began to develop first general and then detailed
regulations for what was sanctionable activity (it had a policy);
it was more or less consistent and coherent although the need to
selectively apply it would no doubt be seen as inconsistency from
the provider's point of view; it did begin to act on its policy;
and it held itself fully responsible for its policy, as witness the
extended attempts to develop a legal, political and bureaucratic
mandate for this poiiy.
It is clear that Knight initially perceived that to make this
paradigm become alive and real, he must have the division act strongly,
quickly, and publicly in a wide variety of areas. During the course
of the year and a half he was to learn that such paradigms, while
providing a strong momentum, were also essentially fragile and could
easily be directed off course by a small force (i.e., the challenge
by the hospital physician's lawyer) and that their direction and
weight must be chosen carefully. Indeed, Knight was to learn that the
initial existential act of "establishing" the paradigm must eventually
acquire a base in the organization, in this case, in its staff (which
he did accomplish) but also in technical, administrative/legal, and
political areas (which he began).
To summarize then, the division learned how to accomplish specific
tasks, i.e., it "succeeded" in each of the cases it approached, and it
eventually managed to routinize this behavior as it began to develop
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regulations for sanctions and to handle several cases of a similar
nature to those described here. It also showed that it had developed
general principles for dealing with a variety of sanction cases.
And it did this first of all through a program for action which became
more fully understood and tested as the stream progressed, and
secondly, through Knight's teaching and management style. It is not
possible to assess whether those aspects of his style had been fully
learned by his staff. It is possible to assert however that a new
paradigm was learned by the division and made real and that the
learning of this paradigm was inseparable from- the content of the
lower level learning centered around task performance and the acquisi-
tion of general principles.
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CHAPTER V
THE INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION STREAM
-277-
INTRODUCTION
This stream of cases is quite different than the ten examined
in the new services and sanction streams. All cases were randomly
selected as examples of new situations the division confronted
and it was only after the whole fifteen cases were developed
that it became apparent that the other ten fit relatively well under
the rubric of either new services or sanction activities. These
cases appeared at first to be a residue since the division's true
main activities were in the other two,more policy-orientedstreams.
But it was soon evident that each of these cases dealt with
some aspect of the internal administration of the division - that is
how the division exercised a part of its monitoring power, how it
received policy input from consumers, how it dealt with claims
designs and how it dealt with its own and the department's field
staff.
The first case (loss of controls) deals with what was at first
viewed as a problem which was then redefined into a (potential) oppor-
tunity. The opportunity was not seized due to a clash of personal
and management styles and by the time it was seized, a considerable
cost in time and energy had accrued,
The second case (dental claims) involved the division being
taken by surprise on a decision which it perceived nonetheless as
at least a reasonable one. The division then simply sat back, washed
its hands of the decision and let it be implemented,
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The third case (consumer board) involved the rekindling of a long
standing interest by Knight when he realized that an early choice
of strategies had led the division to neglect a part of its environment.
The division pushed through the initial stages of the idea but then
eventually let it lag.
The fourth case (MA-7 form) involved the minor redesign of a
billing form which went amiss and the smooth recovery the division
made which enabled it to enhance its credibility.
The final case (field operations) was really the resolution of
two problems, one intractable and one which was created by Knight's
own management style. The intractable problem was, of course, not
solved while the other simmered for a year and finally exploded after
which a proposed adaptation was made.
Of the six cases (the last case is really two closely related
cases), three involved activities which the division perceived as
being beyond its control. One of these it simply downplayed for some
time at a moderate time and energy cost; in another it simply accepted
the uncontrollable nature of the activity and then ignored it; while
in the final case it made a conscious decision not even to devote
resources to the area.
Of the three. cases considered to involve "controllable" activity,
two were handled efficiently, one somewhat more so then the other
since it involved a potential loss of the division's credibility.
The third controllable activity was perceived as minor by the division
and so downplayed for some time until a minor explosion forced it to
reconsider and became more active in the area.
-279-
These cases, since they focus on issues of accountability and
control, are a more direct way of exploring how the division's
paradigm was translated into reality. They also suggest the outer
limits of Knight's otherwise effective teaching and management styles.
It is, however, not at all evident that there was any substantial cost
to the division once it became clear that some limits to its style had
been reached. Knight asserted that the cost was low, his staff felt
otherwise, while the researcher took an intermediate position as did
many members of the division's environment.
1. Loss of Controls
The Welfare Department consisted of several divisions, medical,
financial, cash payments, research, administration, social services,
etc. A network of 116 field offices provided both cash payments and
social services and reported through seven regional administrators
directly to the commissioner's office. (See figure 2 page 36). These
local offices administered both the cash payments program and the
medical program. The medical division set its own policy and wrote
it up for the policy manual after which it was distributed to local
offices by the administrative division.
The medical division's functions, recall were (a) to administer,
i.e. set policy and assure that bills were paid, (b) to monitor the
program for abuse, fraud or poor practice, (c) develop new medical
resources, and (d) handle exceptions, primarily generated through(b).
In fact most of its activity centered around (a) and (d). The local
welfare service office (LWo's) acting under the administrative control
of other divisions, did most of the actual monitoring up until 1973.
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The division's main operational contact with providers, then, was
through the local offices and any monitoring was provided by the LWO's.
This case involves an alleged awareness of the "loss of controls"
which would be forthcoming when medical providers would send their
bills directly to a central claims control office to be handled by
computer. Previously each local office had received provider's
bills, had noted any irregularities (often returning them to be corrected),
filled in missing information, determined the fee if a provider was
unaware of it, and had kept an eye open for provider abuse. Abuse
might include such things as excessive usage of the system or simply
poor medical practice, e.g., large numbers of dental x-rays within a
given period. Local clerks would often get to know the patterns
of the various doctors and their client's needs and could provide
useful information on "whether Doctor X ran a reputable practice."
Claims were then sent to the medical claims control center (MCCC) where
they were processed and further basic checks and edits made for such things
as eligibility of the provider, the recipient and the service.
However in 1973 a plan had been devised to bypass the local
offices completely by July 1974, after which all bills were to go
directly to the MCCC. The local offices only medical function would
be to explain policy to clients and providers. The medical division
would no longer be able to rely on these offices to monitor the program
and "kick up" exceptions or problems. This changeover was called Phase
II, Phase I being the centralization of the issuing of recipient and
medical vendors' checks.
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This case then, is the story of how the Medical Division dealt
with the knowledge and realization that the focus of its monitoring
activity would be changed. Externally, the structural separation
between the Project Management Office (PMO) designing the changeover
and the medical division lead to a highly charged debate between
them .over . the style of interaction and the type of resource
commitment necessary to deal with the changeover. Within the division,
a mismatch of persons between those with knowledge of the problem
and those with an understanding of possible solutions also existed.
Over a considerable amount of "wasted" time, these imbalances and mis-
matches were confronted and a resolution of the problem was agreed upon.
Time stands out sharply. Over six months passed between initial
awareness of the potential new problem by the medical division and
its eventual definition (with PMO) into a more bounded problem.
What occurred during that time and how the various actors processed
their awareness is the main focus of this story. The case thus des-
cribes how the division "sat" on the problem, either not fully realizing
the real nature of the event or awaiting a direction from its strong
leader (who also waited). Eventually the division reacted to the
possible loss of controls by taking the offensive, by fighting for
and trying to redefine a power relationship with PMO and also with
the local offices - this latter relationship having been somewhat
illusory all along. And finally, the division began to redefine the
event from one viewed as a "problem" to one of opportunity.
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Phase I had been the initial development of the MCCC. This
had been accomplished by a staff of consultants (PMO) on a long term
contract operating out of the commissioner's office. The PMO had
completed Phase I successfully, managing to cut the processing time
for bills from several months to between 30-45 days. This feat
had managed to considerably restore the confidence of the medical
providers and PMO, with the full backing of the commissioner, was in
the process of designing Phase II. The director of PMO was a highly
experienced computer consultant. He was rumored to be the highest
paid person in the rtate government and, this combined with what was
almost universally viewed as an arrogant style and a "large ego", led
to a somewhat abrasive relationship between him and others in the
Department. While some thought that the PMO (and MCCC) should have
operated under the control of the medical division, the initial
development of it was seen as requiring the backing of the commissioner
since it involved considerable cross division interchange around such
questions as client eligibility.
In October of 1973, a meeting had occurred between Knight, the
Department's finance director, and the head of PMO (N.E.) over the
speed with which bills were being paid. Knight suggested, with some
innocence, and a background of the cash flow problems of a businessman,
that speed was of the essence and that 70% of each claim be immediately
paid upon receipt and the remainder be paid after a more thorough
verification of each claim could be made. PMO was surprised at this
reversal of priority (i.e., speed over accuracy) and said it was im-
possible, although Knight had seen this system work in industry.
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The commissioner rejected the solution. Additional sub-currents
may have been present at that meeting, but one of the results was
that the PMO head felt annoyed with Knight and appeared to pay much
less attention in the future to the problems or needs of the division.
PMO had "virtually run Medicaid" said one staffer during the 8 months
prior to Knight's arrival and the new assertion of power by Knight
was only to be the first of their many zonfrontations over both style
and substance.
Another meeting was called in mid-November by Knight. He had
long been concerned with questions of centralization and decentraliza-
tion, having spent a major portion of his previous years in industry
involved with such issues. He thus knew of the PMO's plans to
completely centralize all bill-processing. A target date of July 1,
1974, had been finalized in September 1973. Previous contact with PMO
on other Medicaid projects had been somewhat unsatisfactory according
to Knight. He sensed that "something was wrong" on this issue and called
the meeting to determine how the division could relate to PMO during
Phase II. He said that he had no real conception of any specific problem,
only the feeling that there was going to be a change, that the division
had been ignored during previous changes and that his input was needed.
Others in the medical division had also known of PMO's work and
were aware of the target date. But, as one long-time staffer said,
"it was their target date, we were waiting for them to come to us."
She wanted to get into the fray but when she had tried, PMO had always
said, "that's not where we are right now." Rebutted by PMO and with no
backing from Knight up to this time, she and others waited.
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The discussion at the meeting was very general and everyone
sensed that it was a "groping session". According to the PMO staff
member, it was the first time many of the implications of Phase II had
been realized. Up until that time, PMO had concentrated on its ability
to build a complete file of medical vendors and recipients. Now
they would have to build a "history" of those files and,more
importantly, confront the issue of how to use that history - i.e.
for any incoming bill, the computer could check it against the history
of that recipient or vendor, but check it for what.
One of the few specific focuses at the meeting was the possible
loss of controls formerly exercised by the local offices. The PMO
staff recognized at the meeting that a loss would occur but the
head of the PMO unit, N.E., appeared preoccupied. His assistant
however, showed a willingness to cooperate with the division. At that
time Knight did not have a very good feel for what any new controls
might be. N.E. suggested that a staff person from PMO be assigned
to work full time on the changeover to Phase II although not specifi-
cally on the "loss" issue.
This PMO staffer, B.M., began to visit several field offices
and, after viewing the large backlog of bills, concluded that the
local offices had never had the time to assure adequate control in
any case. While this backlog had been somewhat rectified by Phase I,
he concluded that even in the short run, between Phases I and II, con-
trol was very poor. He cited examples of improperly submitted bills
and allowances of forbidden procedures which continued to be tolerated.
In fact, "control" had been exercised at the local level but it was
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unsystematic and on an individual case work basis. He had felt
that local workers could not possibly retain a full history of
individual clients or providers and that control was very uneven.
He had been "primed" by his colleagues in PMO to believe that local
control was chaotic and found this pre-conception confirmed. PMO's
assistant director, S.N., concurred in saying that while control used
to be "100%" for certain areas, "now, we'd make it less than 100% but
over all areas." Whether there would be any net gain to be achieved
by Phase II centralization was "impossible to say."
Knight and some of his senior staff agreed with the diagnosis but
did feel that over time, the net gain would be positive as "we'll
learn what to look for by looking at the good ones (providers)". He
did admit that an initial loss of control might occur but this did
not worry him. N.E. was even less worried since he said "we never even
knew whether there was any real control in the local offices."
The problem still remained unbounded however. B.M. had been
told to figure out what needed to be done and to do it. He tried
then to "flush out" the medical division's goals, but had difficulty.
The division often had no clear-cut goal- and his approach of trying
to elicit these by asking each of the division's staff individually
only created confusion. Many of these managers were not yet ready
to state what they thought the division's goals should be as they,
along with Knight, were busy learning their routine tasks. Others,
particularly the long-term staffers, were not geared to think in
terms of overall policy or goals - "we didn't know what he was talking
about nor did he make it clear what his needs were."
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B.M. admitted that he had problems also. He "didn't know medical
policy" or how responsibility was assigned within the division.
Knight had begun to assign specific responsibilities but the staff
was still developing shared principles as a group with much over-
lapping of technical capacities. It was an extremely fluid situa-
tion, one difficult for an outsider to understand. B.M. continued
to tell people the kind of material he would need and said he'd come
back to get it, expecting the division to "do its homework." Some
in the division, however, expected that he would return and, in oral
sessions, "hammer out the complete list of controls we needed."
Knight was not aware of the problem B.M. was having nor did B.M.
inform his supervisor, N.E. Knight thought "B.M. was getting what he
wanted," while N.E. said he had "a half dozen other problems equally
important." B.M. thus began to compile a set of desirable controls
based on the "wish-lists" of some of the more articulate members of
the division and on what he felt was responsible controls.
Since the PMO had an irrevocable commitment to the commissioner
and the legislature for a completion date on Phase II, PMO decided
to focus on "what had to be done in order to centralize." They would
only correct those things that had to be corrected. Some of the PMO
staff had not realized that sonie sacrifices would have to be made
and that the division's complete "laundry list" of controls could
not be utilized. B.M., however, did sense this and said "I began to
think in priority terms." First priority then, was to get a system
operating which would actually process the bills. This minimal strategy
was born out of B.M.'s frustration, time pressures, and the view shared
by N.E. and the commissioner who appeared to stress that first accuracy
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of bill payment and then generation of evaluative material was of
highest priority. They felt that speed of payment would automatically
follow if any accurate centralized system was developed. Thus B.M.
came to the medical division and began to talk about "accuracy",
stressing double billing as an abusive error, an error which the
division staff felt he chose since it was easily programmable. He
began to pay less attention to the more general evaluative materials
and controls (such as rejection of incompatible medical services)
which the division felt it needed.
This discussion around the nature of the "'problem" was accompanied
by one on the scope of the problem. At first the discussions
between PMO and the division centered around institutional providers such
as nursing homes and hospitals, as well as ambulatory care, such as
individual physicians, and clinics. B.M. included the institutional
care providers in the problem definition since they represented a large
dollar volume and because they had high public visibility. He felt that
the medical division felt these institutions were important but never
really checked this with Knight. The latter, B.M. admitted, appeared
not to sorry about what would happen when institutions (as contrasted
with individual providers) began to bill centrally. Later on, this was
to become a problem- boundary issue but at that time it remained un-
spoken. Knight apparently "did not worry" because institutions were
being adequately kept under surveillance under a variety of pre- and
post- service reviews and detailed reimbursement formulas already in
existence or underway. The billing system was only one point of
surveillance for institutions, but represented a major monitoring
point for individual providers.
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This first surfaced as an issue when a related problem was dis-
cussed. PMO had originally intended to phase in the centralization
by bringing onto the system one provider type at a time. B.M.
asked Knight what providers he wanted on-line first and Knight replied,
"You're giving me a carrot to wave (faster payment to providers) and
now the question is to whom do I wave it at first." He chose the
primary health care providers, i.e., individual practicioners and
neighborhood health care centers since they were the ones who had
the most direct impact on how care gets delivered to recipients.
According to Knight, improving relations with them would have the
greatest effect on the recipient whereas doing the same for say, hospitals,
might conceivably have no effect at all on the quality of care. The
proposal to phase in providers was later abandoned but it was
through this discussion that PMO learned of Knight's feeling that the
actual leverage with institutions was either non-existent or of a type
not exercised through the billing system. While this sub-event appears
as a somewhat tangential story, it provides an explanation for the
wavering attention of Knight to the problem. He appeared at times
not to view it as a problem of wide scope.
In addition the actual size of the problem-was unknown and, in
the absence of hard data, had seemed less important to others in the
division. At this point two staff members in the medical division became
more involved. K.E. had, out of difficulty in understanding the complex
system of prior and post service controls, developed a table showing
the full range of controls for all providers. In discussions with
other staff, he became aware of the forthcoming problem, particularly
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with respect to individual physicians and dentists. He, along
with a second staff member, tried to warn Knight of the problem
since it had been apparent that few on the staff recognized its
potential size. Knight, when approached by the two, suggested that
some figures be developed. K.E. and R.D. then worked with PMO and
the local offices to develop an estimate. Two weeks later they informed
him that the potential loss of money involved in switching to centralized
payment without a set of controls to replace those exercised by the
local offices was much less than anticipated but might reach as high
as $1,000,000 per year. Knight took no immediate action on the estimate.
At about this time, Knight sent a letter to the head of the
committee on tax-supported medicine of the Medical Society advising
him of the forthcoming Phase II and including a light but clear
warning that improper billing procedures would be caught and corrected,
by sanctioning if necessary. He had delayed this letter until then
since the department had had low credibility due to the slow payment
of bills. Phase I was now successful, provider checks were being
issued more rapidly and a public show of power was appropriate according
to Knight. Thus we see the use of a principle demonstrated in the new
services stream that one could not exercise the division's needed
powers until it had gained some credibility.
By early January an interim progress report had been prepared
by B.M. It had been intended for internal PMO circulation but the
PMO director, wanting a "rubber stamp of approval", called a meeting of
the six DPW assistant commissioners and circulated the report prior
to the meeting. At the meeting the principal PMO staff presented the
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initial report and asked for comments. Few were forthcoming
and it was agreed to meet again. The report was then circulated
within the Medical Division and comments written directly on the
report. Some staff were concerned with its "unreadibility" and
"process orientation." A month later, B.M. came back to Knight and
asked for the division's comments only to discover that the report had
been lost. Knight did not suggest a new copy be recirculated
and at this point B.M. said he "lost any motivation" he had had
for the project. He complained that Knight did not appear to give
any clear indication that the project was an important one.
At this point a whole backlog of resentment flared up in the
PMO staff. They had always viewed the Medical Division as unconcerned
with control issues and uninterested in working with PMO "unless
something went astray." The PMO director felt that the medical divi-
sion staff were nOt well trained and contributed to the problem.
Yet B.M. continued to meet with the division's staff on an individual
basis to sort out just what checks and controls were needed. Meetings
were frequent (as before) but with little, inadequate and confusing
medical input according to B.M. although a division member called
the meetings "a waste of time - no meeting of minds." Finally a
"beer and pizza" meeting was called in which PMO presented the type
of controls it was capable of generating.
It was attended by only half of the medical staff invited. Knight
was not present and PMO quickly focussed on "process" issues, i.e.
the relation between PMO and the division and the kinds of control
PMO was capable of developing. The medical staff who did attend
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stressed that the division would tell PMO what they wanted and PMO
should provide it by developing a "product" orientation. Thus the
earlier public, offensive strategy of contact with the Medical
Society was now being accompanied by this internal offensive maneuver
in which the division began to request a product from PMO, suggesting
that it had power and that it should make the requests of PMO rather
than vice versa. Here the staff seemed to have learned what Knight
had said to many of them before - that PMO should really be accountable
to the division - how could the division act responsibly when an area
of performance by which it was judged by providers was not accountable
to it.
PMO was stressing a process orientation and the fact that the
division needed to understand how "the car operates since you're going
to be driving it," whereas Knight (at earlier meetings) said "no,
we only need to know what kind of car we're buying." This was
said despite his usual insistence on developing a shared philosophy.
He simply thought that a philosophy had been developed and now it
was time to ask for a "product". In fact, however the meeting did end
up on a "process" basis, but with a defensive tone, e.g., what the
division could be "required" to do after Phase II -- such as storing
all the paper generated by MCCC on exceptions kicked out of the system.
But the question of what controls would be developed and how B.M. was
to improve the generation of thesewas not settled and a follow up
meeting was cancelled due to the confusion at the beer and pizza event.
Here the history of the division and its relation with PMO should
be explained. PMO's plans and timetable had been laid down 2 1/2
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years previously and agreed to by Knight's predecessor. Then Knight's
position was vacant for 8 months during which PMO effectively took
control of much of the division. As the commissioner said, it took
N.E. quite some time to realize that he now was dealing with a
competent and knowledgeable equal. But the commissioner did not
intervene in the battle as he felt it wouldn't do any good to "tell
people to cut it out" if "they both had different operating styles."
He was "inclined" he said, however to believe in Knight's stress that
PMO should be a "service bureau" providing a product to the medical
division, although he did not back up Knight in the fray between the
two.
During the time, PMO, while stressing a process orientation con-
tinued to express frustration at having no one specific person
assigned to "liaison" with it. Knight felt that liaison people were
inefficient and that B.M. should get his information directly from the
operating managers. B.M. continued his searching pattern, hoping
to find the one person who could give him the most thorough assistance.
At various times, Knight did assign staff to serve as a central
liaison person but they soon drifted on to other tasks. B.M. did not
talk with his boss N.E. about his problem and N.E. later expressed
the feeling that he should have asked his staff to tell their problems
sooner. But N.E. was an optimist and did not like to be told about
"problems", particularly those involving the medical division. The
structural separation of PMO and the division and their differing
views on liaison functions continued to plague the process.
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After the failure of the beer and pizza meeting, a staff member,
Y.H., with experience in medical control systems came on the scene.
He had previously (in October) written a memo to Knight suggesting
that one of the things that would be required in Phase II would be
the ability to select "profiles" of the activity of specified providers
or patients. This had been his only involvement up to that point. Yet
he had been aware of the difficulty in PMO's having to talk with
such a large number of the medical division's staff and wasting
considerable time hearing "anecdotal" evidence of abuse. He also
agreed with B.M. who felt that many of these same people with the
most knowledge (often anecdotal) appeared to be isolated from policy
making and were interested in a case work approach or a post payment,
physician-sponsored type of utilization review.
One new member of the staff advanced the explanation that these
long-term staffers had neither the motivation to act, nor the vehicle
(i.e., they did not understand the computer). Similarly it appears
that those with a policy orientation and an understanding of the
computer lacked a detailed knowledge of the potential types of abuse -
a knowledge which was best built up by experience. These conditions
were perceived by Y.H., but were not specifically discussed with
Knight. Knight, thile he appeared to be cognizant of the external
structural "imbalances", did not agree on the proposed solution
to the internal imbalances - a liaison person-nor did he feel he
could spare a staff member. Such a solution appeared obvious to PMO,
or as N.E. said, "Knight just doesn't seem to understand 'project
management'.
-294-
In the meantime, PMO waited. The beer and pizza meeting had
been led by the director of medical care, N.K., a long-term staff
member who had been "parallelized" and who now functioned as an
assistant director. But he had acted in Knight's name and B.M.did
not wish to "go around him" to Knight immediately. Y.H. was then
alerted by a staff member that PMO was "getting the short end of
things." She was a personal friend of B.M. and felt irritated
that he was not getting the "respect he deserved". She suggested
that Y.H. speak with K.E. and together they should present PMO's
case to Knight.
Knight had been, up to this time, trying to get PMO to commit the
resources necessary for the job. While he understood the anecdotal
nature of the input being received by PMO, he was counter to the
idea of any type of a "liaison person" in principle. He had developed
an aversion to liaison people and coordinators during his previous
experience. In addition, he continually questioned the role of con-
sultants such as the PMO staff. In this case, however, the need
for consultants was clear and accepted (externally) but their pro-
posed work methods were unacceptable ("process" and a "liaison"
person). A meeting was called of the PMO director and staff, Knight,
and some of his.staff to discuss the level of resources the division
could commit to working with PMO. Knight failed to attend and the
personal antagonism between him and PMO's head grew more intense.
N.E. had "been made to feel like lackey." No clear decisions were
made at the meeting but agreement was reached on the need for a new
classification of vendors, one of which any evaluative material would
have to be based. This sub-problem was fruitfully handled in separate
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succeeding meetings and seemed to take some of the edge off the hostility
and to provide a focus for renewed activity.
K.E. and Y.H., together with B.M., shortly therafter approached
Knight to alert him of the disintegrating nature of the process. Many
of the other staff also shared their view of the process, although did
not speak to Knight. Y.H. argued for a liaison person (a staff person
to Knight) as did PMO, while Knight calmly but firmly resisted. K.E.
proposed a compromise, one in which the Medical Division would meet
"with the right people, with the right time, and with a clear focus"
in order to provide PMO with what it needed. He proposed that key
program managers would meet every two or three weeks with a mandate
to come up with specific policy-related requests at the end of each
meeting for PMO to consider.
Two weeks later Knight called such a meeting and presented it with
a very strong piece of work which he had prepared himself "to start
the ball rolling." He said that it made sense to do this because
"the computer cuts across the whole system and now I'll have to
sit down with B.M. and see what's important to each of the staff."
Taking it into his own hands was a "logical" solution he said although
N.E. felt Knight was taking too much on himself. Knight viewed this
meeting as the necessary extent of his teaching - "I had reason to
expect that my people would now know the benefit restrictionsrequired".
He ran the meeting very firmly and a considerable amount of useful
output was generated. In effect, he became the central liaison person
B.M. had been seeking -- the "top man" he was so used to reporting to
in his previous consulting contracts.
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A second similar meeting was followed by circulation of the
assembled material for comment prior to transmittal to PMO.
PMO's assistant director felt the material was useful and, while
it could not all be accomplished, felt it provided a solid ground
for "negotiation." Knight did not continue to provide this sharp
focus himself however and PMO was worried that the initiative would
be diffused. Indeed the initiative was diffused. The deadline for
Phase II was pushed back 3 times (for other reasons) with a
final target date planned for February 1975. B.M.'s work was
delivered in June and the assistant director of PMO said it was
"anti-climatic." PMO had made assumptions about the probable input
of the division for Phase II and now found the work incapable of
being used although Knight felt that this was essentially PMO's failure-
i.e. the challenge was for PMO to program what the division had given
them. But PMO was running out of budgeted personnel time and could
not devote the needed time to redo the work. B.M.'s consulting contract
ran out and he left PMO.
No one from PMO or the commissioner's office pushed the issue
since PMO was short of staff and the commissioner apparently felt
more strongly about the "political" success of the centralization - i.e.
the bills were now being delivered directly to and paid by the central
computer although much of the editing and controls were still being
done by hand. But an important visible political effect - one which the
providers had been clamoring for - had been made.
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The whole issue, which was by then being referred to as the
design of "benefit restrictions" as opposed to loss of controls, lagged
as the division worked during the summer on many mechanical tasks
such as the identification of the procedure codes for the computer
and the design of forms. Knight did not pay much attention to the
issue, saying that he "felt that[Iihave no sense that the process
is going well but also no real sense that we'd get any better results
if we pushed any harder." Knight said he had been "burnt before" in
his dealings with N.E. and tended to avoid pushing him too much.
Finally, in early 1975, several staff from the division and from PMO
(which had by then acquired more personnel) began to revise the
benefit restrictions plan first devised by B.M. for computer accept-
ability, this time to the satisfaction of both PMO and the division.
Thus an acceptable product was generated but at a considerable expendi-
ture of energy and time although the new head of PMO, S.N., felt
it "probably couldn't have been done at any less cost." Knight later
felt vindicated in "having made an initial effort, and then backed
off" (at least personally) since the whole Phase II planning, which
included many aspects other than benefit restrictions, was aborted and
plans made by a new commissioner to turnover bill processing to a more
competent outside computer organization.
This case then is a story of how the Medical Division dealt with
the awareness that the immediate environment in which its monitoring
activity was conducted was changing, It is also the story of how the
members of that new task environment asserted themselves as the new
environment - confronting both pre-conceived management notions of
Knight and a set of interpersonal antagonisms. The cost of this change
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of environment and the conflict of managerial styles was measured
in time and energy devoted to seeking a solution to these problems.
An inordinate amount of time was required by the division to process
this new awareness and for PMO to realize that the division needed
that time.
Thus the learning evidenced in this case is not of a high order.
Some of the staff did eventually learn how to design benefit restric-
tions but in the end this narrowed down to program areas of only two
staffers. It is impossible to yet determine how, or if, this
personal learning could be transferred. At another level we see
very little evidence of general principles being developed (whether
through Knight's teaching or not). The only "principles" consciously
evoked were that staff bureaus like PMO should answer -toline bureaus
like the medical division, that liaison people are "ineffective" and
that ambulatory care is more worthy of a high priority in the designing
of benefit restrictions.
The division's usual program of action was not much in evidence
here, due probably to the early stages of the division's growth in
which the case occurred and Knight's unwillingness to involve himself
in the case. While the division was, as usual, very open to the
initial development of the issue, that is the perception that there
was something "new in the wind" and they must deal with it, no one
in the division made a strong assertion of the division's role.
That had to wait several months and even then Knight only evoked that
a few times externally (although he did stress with his staff that PMO
was or should be a service bureau). As usual the division did "sit"
on the issue for some time, trying to decide whether there really was
a problem and what its scope and size would be.
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Knight's usual pattern of direct delegation of authority and
avoidance of liaison staff led to an excessive cost in time and
energy and, even when Knight eventually (tacitly) realized this,
he did not devote much continued effort to its resolution. Similarly,
the failure of both Knight and N.E. to perceive the costs involved de-
spite the awareness of most members of their staff and their failure
to rely upon their considerable experience in dealing with similar
problems in prior high level jobs can only be attributed to the inter-
personal clash between them. Nonetheless the direct delegation of
authority, the inexperience of the staff and the resultant costs
did eliminate the nagging ego problem perceived in so many cases.
The product finally developed by the staff and PMO was one they both
felt confident with, after 15 months of effort.
Why this length of time and the concurrent energy costs? In
the other cases to date the division's success could usually be attri-
buted to the overall approach of Knight. Does the failure to utilize
this approach account for the pattern described here? Not entirely,
since several features outside Knight's usual approach also help to
explain the pattern here. Firstly the problem was not always seen as
something which required action - but rather was an opportunity, thus
permitting a somewhat slower response. Secondly, PMO felt no controls
were really being lost, and Knight felt the scope was narrow and limited
to solo physicians and dentists. Finally, the actual size of the "problem"
could not be calculated and when it was, appeared to be less significant
than first thought.
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Yet other features which help to explain the resultant costs
are attributable to Knight's style. And the costs were real,
especially since, as described above, the whole issue came to be
seen as one of narrow scope, probably of small size, and possibly
not even a "problem". Firstly, we saw that those who had knowledge
of local practices had either little policy (or policy change)
orientation or no understanding of the computer. Those who under-
stood policy or the computer had little knowledge of local practice.
But Knight had stressed that "individual managers are responsible"
for the generation of the necessary controls without realizing
that most of his managers were inexperienced in that they each
lacked at least one of the necessary inputs (knowledge of either policy,
local practice or the computer). Secondly, a proposed solution to
this reality, i.e. a liaison person, was seen as anathema to Knight's
principles of good management. Thirdly, Knight rarely offered his
inexperienced staff, through his usual teaching, much of the needed
guidance as to how to deal with the problems or what output was
desired.
This overall failure to keep his usual close check on the
division's activities (especially at that stage in late 1973) can
also be explained more directly by reference to the organization's
paradigm - the responsible buyer. Knight felt that PMO should have
been responsible (responsive) to the division but it was clearly not,e.g.
the clash with N.E. and the failure of the commissioner to support him,
(Knight - "reform must start from the top down"). Thus, since Knight
could not control it, he would simply not assign much of his personal
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energy to the area although the staff did consume valuable time
and energy. Equally important was the fact that this particular aspect
of the division's relationship with PMO likely did not affect either
the division's policy-making activities (with new services) or its
credibility with providers and thus any problem could be downplayed
since they did not seriously harm the pursuit of the division's
paradigm - that is Knight believed it would be foolish to devote his
own resources to a situation of low potential payoff.
2. Dental Claims Processing
This second case, on the surface, has many features which might
lead some to call it a non-event. However many of the actions taken
in the case subtly illustrate the manner in which the division responded
to what was universally viewed as a good idea -- although the idea was
one which the division had little role in developing.
The case involves the contracting out to a private consulting
firm for the processing of all dental claims submitted to the department.
Not only was the firm to simply process claims by conducting the
necessary eligibility and fee schedule checks, but it was also mandated
to develop a monitoring system which would also have the capability
to generate additional sophisticated management information. For
example, the system would prevent the billing of two incompatible
services considered to be "poor dentistry" and produce data such as
a listing of dentists in the 10th highest percentile of all billings.
In the summer of 1973, the central claims processing center of
the department (MCCC) had been experiencing difficulties in developing
the capacity to handle the increasing volume of medical claims of the
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division. One of the solutions had been to contract out the
processing of pharmacy bills. These represented a large proportion
of actual claims but a relatively small dollar volume. The claims
involved thousands of discrete items and was the type of service
lending itself easily to computerization. A private consulting firm
had already designed a "package" for general use in such situa-
tions and easily convinced the department to sign a contract for
pharmacy bill processing. Over two years this contract was executed
efficiently and to the satisfaction of the department and the providers.
However, this contracting out of services was not a completely
simple issue. The commissioner felt strongly against contracting
out, particularly when the department might not have the capacity to
monitor that contract. His boss in the Human Services agency agreed,
but realized the pressing need to take some of the pressure off the
new MCCC system while it was under development. And the head of the
Project Management Office (PMO) designing the new system felt even
stronger about letting his perogatives be taken over by outsiders.
But all agreed it was necessary as a short run measure and so agreed
to the contract. Knight had not been involved in these early
discussions since they had occurred prior to his arrival, but after
being briefed on the situation he recognized the problem and concurred
in its resolution.
The pharmacy contract ran well by all accounts and the pharmacists
were very pleased with the speed and accuracy of payment. The system
was publicized by the department bu-t received only minor attention
from other provider groups who occasionally made comments to department
personnel that it "would be nice if we could have such a system too."
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But these comments were low-key and unofficial; and no provider groups
(including the dental society) made official representations to the
department for such a move.
The state dental society had established a good working rela-
tionship with the previous assistant commissioner and expected to do
so with Knight. During the 8 months lapse between assistant commissioners,
the division continued to build on this relationship and developed a
strong staff of part-time dental consultants within the division.
This group had elaborated a relatively sophisticated system of
manual review of submitted claims and had also developed, and was
managing, a system of "prior approval" and "individual consideration"
claims -- claims which were deemed to be of borderline necessity
or claims where the service was so unique that no established fee had
been set. The dental program leant itself well to such a system
since diagnosis and treatment could be reviewed through x-rays mailed
in with claims. Also simplifying the management of this program was
the fact that dentistry involved a relatively small number of discrete
procedures as compared with the division's medical or surgical programs.
The consultants were well respected within the division and
were seen as "running the program", although operating under the
loose guidance of one staff member, R.Y. This situation seemed to
be accepted by Knight and others. Knight appeared to pay little
attention to the program since he felt it to be well managed. In
addition, it was not "his" program, that is, he had not participated
in its development. So he directed his energies elsewhere in the
division.
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The consultants, of course, "wore two hats." Most were concerned
members, and often officials, of the dental society. They had seen the
effects of the drug claims processing program and made occasional hints
that such an idea would be good for "their program" (as providers).
But they were somewhat ambivalent since, as regulators, they felt
that the division might lose some of the excellent system of manual
controls they had built up themselves. So they did not make strong
representations, although Knight "had a feeling" that they (the dental
society) had always wanted another third party (other than Medicaid)
to process their claims by computer.
It was not clear precisely why the dentists may have desired this.
There was no indicationthat dental payments were particularly slow --
certainly they were no slower than for other providers. Indeed the
assistant director responsible for dental care, R.Y., stated that
dentists were "notoriously bad counters" and thus.any late or partial
payments might have been as much due to their poor management as the
fault of the department's payment system.
The MCC was under additional heavy pressure in late winter of
'74. The flow of bills was much higher than expected and the PMO
had been seeking a way to ease this pressure. Concurrently, the
volume of claims -in the drug system being handled by the outside
contractor was less than expected. This contract had specified that
the firm handle up to a specified number of claims per month. Thus
there was slack in the system and the director of PMO made "a very
pragmatic and opportunistic decision," to contract out the dental
payments as these represented the next largest volume (after drugs)
of claims in the system.
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Thus the key actor in this case was not Knight or the dental
consultants or the dental society but rather the director of the
PMO, N.E., with whom Knight had clashed in the previous case. As
mentioned earlier, he and others in the commissioner's office had little
feel for the dentists' views on the question of claims processing.
He was, however, aware of the commissioner's general attitude towards
"contracting out" and he had checked with the assistant HSA secretaries
to see if the idea for contracting out the dental program was feasible.
He had also checked with the finance director of the department. In
fact, he had touched bases with everyone but the medical division,
although he was later to tell the commissioner that he had involved
Knight in "discussions" concerning the subject. His assistant had
also conferred with the commissioner on the subject, and the
commissioner said he "thought that N.E. had cleared it with Knight."
Why should the medical division have been involved at all?
Knight's position was that since it was "our bills" that were being
talked about and since he was generally held accountable by much
of the provider community, the division should be involved. If he
was to be a "responsible buyer", he must have some control over
those things he was being held accountable for. Additionally, a con-
tracting out would involve not only the processing of bills but also
the development of a monitoring capacity. While the programming for
this monitoring could be done by PMO or by a contractor, the input for
that system, i.e., what checks, edits, restrictions, etc. were needed,
would have to come from the program personnel (and consultants) in the
medical division.
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But N.E. had a long history of clashes with Knight (see Loss of
Controls Case). Both men were talented managers, both had large
egos and both were viewed as quite competitive -- although Knight
did not feel he was "competitive." N.E. felt he had been given
the responsibility to design a payment system -- by the commissioner.
This is certainly technically correct since he reported to the commissioner.
However, one of the main "users" of the system was the medical division
which would have to deal with the providers whose bills were being
processed and which would also have to design monitoring systems.
But N.E. just did not see it as "Medicaid's business." He felt he was
a somewhat better manager than Knight and, in a competitive outburst,
once stated that "this is gonna get him," although in a later interview
he said he thought it was a very "mechanical" decision he had made.
Once PMO had made the "pragmatic decision", the director of the
MCCC casually mentioned to R.Y. that the changeover (to the outside
contractors) would take place in two weeks. She was amazed, had heard
nothing about it, and quickly told Knight of the decision the next
morning and informed him of a meeting which had been called to discuss
the changeover. Knight was very chagrined and angry since the reasons
for the decisions had never been discussed with him nor had the reasons
for the haste. He felt that the decision was not necessarily a bad one
since he understood the reasoning and had viewed the drug contract with
some confidence. He did admit, however, that the dental program
"would not have been his next choice to be contracted out." He was
dismayed at the decision process however and sent R.Y. to attend the
meeting. Apparently he did not express his anger to anyone in PMO,
-307-
although he later said "he may have mentioned it ot the commissioner."
N.E. himself said that he never got any feedback from Knight on
the process.
Here we begin to see some similar patterns to those taken with
other cases of new knowledge. The initial energy invested in the
new knowledge had been generated by a "turf" battle. But Knight was
willing to accept the validity of that battle's resolution since
an analogous situation had worked out well. He did try to assert the
division's perogatives, but as we shall see, quickly acquiesed.
Knight did attend a second meeting to discuss the changeover but
by this time he considered it a "fait accompli" and washed his
hands of the decision process. The commissioner felt it was "only a
'fait accompli' depending on whose perspective you adopt" -- suggesting
that he might have earlier been open to discuss the content of the
decision if Knight had felt strongly about it. Knight then assigned
the responsibility to R.Y. and dealt little with it until several weeks
later when management reports began to be generated by the contractor.
He said he had not seen a version of the contract, (nor had R.Y.)
and "didn't know if there even was one." In fact the earlier drug
contract had been amended to avoid the time consuming process of
signing a new one and having it approved by budget officials and/or
the legislature. Thus, as usual, Knight delegated responsibility
rapidly when he felt an area was in "adequate hands." Only here he
did so even more rapidly since he had become so irritated by the
decision process.
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After the decision had been made and Knight's anger cooled down,
his staff began to design some of the restrictions which would have
to be part of the monitoring system. Other parts of the system were
similar to those in the drug contract -- for example, average costs
per type of claim and the identification of high volume billers.
The contractor was enthusiastic about the changeover since it was
relatively easy to program and thus meant a high profit for them.
They cooperated fully.
The question must now be askedwas the decision a success?
Knight felt that in the short run it was acceptable since "we had the
dollars available and it did make sense." His staff felt similarly,
stating that the division had gained some of the much sought after
credibility (although in this area they already had a considerable
amount). Bills were soon paid within 20 days and no complaints
were received from providers either on an individual or organized
basis. The fear that one staffer had that "the programming people
will make policy if we're not careful" did not come to pass here since
policy had been well established and was under control by the division.
The division's dental consultants had been worried about the possible
loss of controls since most of the bills would not now be processed
by hand, but this fear proved groundless. The PMO director had
never even worried about this aspect since he felt that one "must do
something, even if it is less than perfect." He felt that the develop-
ment of evaluative and monitoring capacities would evolve naturally
after an accurate and fast payment mechanisms was installed.
What were the long term effects of this action? Two reactions
had been anticipated -- that other providers would request similar
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treatment and that once such actions were taken it would be
politically hard to "retrieve" the dental processing into the department.
But to date there had been no pressure from the remaining providers --
nursing homes, hospitals and physicians - to farm out their processing
despite the fact that they made routine complaints about slow and
inaccurate payments. A new Governor, however, did begin to explore
this possibility but primarily at the insistence of other bill processors
who claimed that they could process bills even faster and more accurately
than the MCCC.
Knight had stated that he would like to regain control of the
dental processing (along with drugs) since he felt the department
could do it less expensively -- although the contractor's prices
were regarded as very reasonable -- and for reasons of "pride". This
latter reason must be viewed as a part of Knight's strong desire to
(a) build competence within the Department, and (b) to do so where
it can be held accountable -- two features he continually stressed.
However no plan to retrieve it was designed by him. N.E., however,
felt "it would be easy" to get back the dental processing at any time.
His assistant even stated they planned to retrieve it in October of
1974 but this did not occur due to the continued heavy stress on
PMO and the MCCC in implementing Phase II. N.E, did admit that retrieving
the drug processing would not be as easy, but also had not designed a
plan for doing so.
Some fears remained however. Later that year, PMO asked the
contractor to temporarily take over the processing of bills from
laboratories, medical suppliers and hearing aid dealers. Knight was
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consulted here and did agree to the changeover since it was in such
a minor area. The contractor, however, resisted but felt that
since they had done so well (and profited) with the drug and dental
side they must give the other a try. Later when PMO wished to
"retrieve" hearing aid processing, those providers began to put up
some resistance. However since they were a small group, their resist-
ance was overcome. Whether the resistance of the other providers
could be overcome in the future remains to be seen.
There the situation stood. A decision which normally should
have involved the medical division was made in haste and without its
concurrence. But because it was perceived as a sound decision, Knight
did not put up resistance. He had been "burnt" before by resisting
PMO's actions with the commissioner and simply washed his hands of
this decision after storing it away in his "mental" file and assigning
staff to work on it. The clash of strong personalities in the case
was somewhat muted after a year and a half of their frequent battles
but it is doubtful that any real learning occurred other than Knight's
negative learning of how to "deal with" PMO -- a long standing
problem - and R.Y.'s learning how to manage such an exterior contract.
Knight's early responses to the situation were no different than
his usual pattern of action (that is, linking the case to an analagous
situation, asserting the division's perogatives,and delegating authority).
Howeverhe had no opportunity to utilize some of the other features
of that pattern (e.g. consulting with trusted friends) since he had been
so taken by surprise. There was similarly little opportunity to
utilize his teaching skills, although his willingness to learn from the
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drug contract was apparent. The principles declared in the case
were not so much taught as observed. Thus Knight's feeling that the
division must be accountable, that if "burnt", he would "lay low",
and that excessive energy not be devoted to minor areas were all
evident but only observed in a muted fashion. His emphasis on good
management, here meaning cost-effectiveness and a willingness
to clearly delegate authority was evident however. It is tempting
to play up the clash of personalities as the focus of this case
but Knight would respond that that was peripheral and that there
really was no choice for him. He felt the decision was probably
a cost effective one and since it had been made and was also operating
well, he decided not to invest too much of his further energy in the
area.
Knight did mildly attempt to assert his role as a responsible
(i.e. accountable) buyer for the division but the washing of his
hands of the decision seemed to forbode that it would be some time
before an active effort would be made by Knight to reassert the
division's perogatives and retrieve the contracted-out service. The
departure of the PMO director in December of 1974 changed the situation.
Knight did make some effort with the new PMO director to correct
some of the faults uncovered in the contract but said that there was
"no need to push for changes" if it seemed likely that the dental
processing would be retrieved by the department. He seemed to feel
however that that decision would also be out of his hands - "some
decisions will be made no matter what I say."
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This case, then, can best be understood as a direct application
by Knight of the division's paradigm. Since he felt the division
had not been permitted to act responsibly, i.e. to be involved in
decisions affecting its performance, he invested as little energy
as possible in the consequences of that decision. And since the
decision had no demonstrable effect on either the division's
benefit package or its credibility, he undoubtedly felt justified in the
low investment of energy.
3. Consumer Advisory Board (CAB)
This case represents a minor attempt by the division to act more
directly on its view that the welfare recipients' interest should be
strongly represented. Although Knight had, during his first year
fresh from the neighborhood health center, continually stressed the
importance of thinking of "our clients", it became obvious to him
and most of the staff that the formal channel for such expression
by recipients - the local welfare offices (LWO's) - could not be
relied upon nor did the division have any corrective control over
the LWO's. Knight's next move then was to work directly with providers
(to whom he and the division did have diiect access) in attempting
to get across the clients' point of view - in addition, of course, to
his other concerns for quality, cost effectiveness, etc. While he
felt confident that his carefully nurtured staff shared his view of
acting in the client's interest, this work with providers alerted him
to the fact that it was possible and necessary for clients to have
some form of direct access to the division.
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Knight had come from a strong background of consumer involvement
in the direction of medical programs and he placed great trust in
a "well run board". He favored not just any type of consumer input
since he realized that such input could be unrepresentative or
irresponsible but did feel that a well-run board could be useful.
After some months in his Medicaid position he said he "realized that
all the other pressure groups (mainly providers) have direct access
to the division, why don't the clients have a crack too." His young
assistant, R.K., had also come from the neighborhood health center
movement and supported him in a proposal for some sort of consumer
Advisory board.
The division had had an advisory council for many years but, accord-
ing to most observers, it had been generally inactive and had never
provided much useful advice for the division. The council consisted
of both providers and concerned citizens appointed by the governor.
The DPW as a whole had also had such an advisory council which was
perceived as somewhat more effective but still without any real teeth.
In 1973 federal legislation was passed abolishing a national
Medicaid advisory council. The regulations accompanying the legislation
were unclear however and it was understood by the commissioner's
staff that the state councils were also being abolished. The state's
council thus continued in its dormant state and it was not until
early 1974 that the regulations were reviewed and clarified by one
of Knight's staff, R.K. He consulted with the federal agency and
determined that the old councils were not to be abolished.
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Knight and R.K. thus consulted with the department-wide council
and were told that the division could establish such a board or
council. They began to discuss among themselves how to constitute
a board. A technique Knight had used in his old grounds was
suggested - a "steering committee". They asked several people in
the capital city if they would sit on a steering committee to develop
a plan for consumer input. None of those asked were welfare clients
but all represented various community agencies and were all known
personally by the two. All of the group were seen by Knight and
R.K. as being "consumer-oriented" and the group, when convened, per-
ceived those two in that manner also.
The group met during the summer of 1974 and Knight explained
its purpose. Most of them felt that this approach, i.e. a "chosen"
steering committee was an appropriate way to handle the question.
Several in the group did feel that the process might have been
different if the DPW staff involved had not had local community
involvement or if they had been other than Knight and R.K. But
the two had earned the trust of the community agencies and groups
and they felt R.K. and Knight would "fight for consumers' rights".
They had a total of 3 meetings at which several issues were discussed
such as the role.of the proposed board and some of the problems of
the medical program. The only issue where any disagreement occurred
was on what types of persons should be on the board.
The steering committee felt that other DPW bureaucrats and pro-
viders should be included in addition to clients. They felt that
this was their only chance to get a "direct crack at the DPW hierarchy",
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over such issues as differing and inconsistent (and occasionally
discriminatory ) action by local welfare offices involved in the Medi-
caid program. Knight disagreed with this since he felt that clients
would be intimidated by their presence but when he saw the steering
committee felt it to be important he agreed although he suggested
that only clients should have a vote. This view that clients could
be easily intimidated was one of the few principles developed by
Knight and the group although they shared many others from their past
experiences such as the need to "get good people on the board."
The steering committee discussions were brought to the attention
of the state DPW council by the assistant to the commissioner.
Both the DPW board and the commissioner felt that the Medicaid board
should be constituted as a sub-committee of the larger council. This
would insure further links with the DPW hierarchy and the commissioner
even proposed that some members might also serve on both.
The steering committee then set out to select people who could
serve on the council. They asked the local health planning councils
and the local welfare offices to suggest nominees. In addition the
steering committee itself would suggest names of "providers" although
it appeared that these providers would be mainly community agencies and
not generally medical providers, i.e. hospitals, physicians, etc.
In other words, more of a "social work or social agency approach" as
one of the steering committee members put it. No one appeared to
think that this method of selection was inappropriate.
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Alternative means of selection such as "slotted" representatives
from specific interest groups or from the local office's advisory
boards were dismissed. The first was seen as being too difficult
to organize and the latter complicated by a lack of interest by the
local boards in medical problems. Similarly, a plan to have local
social workers select clients as representatives was rejected since
it would place inordinate control in the hands of these workers. It
was felt that no matter how representatives were selected, some
"professional consumers would inevitably get involved" but that that
was not bad as long as the proportion was not high and they were not
manipulated by the local office. Thus one of the principles that
was to come up again in other cases (see the field case in this
chapter) was made more clearly here - that local offices were not
really concerned with Medicaid problems and that the local social
workers could not be trusted .to be consistent and act in the client's
best interests.
Knight felt that the board could be used for two purposes - to
act as a sounding board for the division and secondly to "perhaps
shape public opinion about Medicaid," although he felt the latter
was less likely to occur. The steering committee expected that
some of the issues which would arise would likely center around means
of providing better information to clients about "just what the program
was." A publicity pamphlet already in preparation by one of Knight's
staff was tested with the steering committee but the committee
felt "more needed to be done." The group also felt that the appeals
process by which clients could appeal local decisions should be better
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developed and that local offices should be better informed on
clients' rights. Others felt the board would hopefully have a say if
any benefits were to be cut and that they might be able to show the
division how slow payments to providers by DPW affected the clients
directly (through lowered access to care). Some also felt that the
board might show how the "cheaters" - both providers and recipients
could be weeded out since the board members "knew" who they were.
On the whole, the idea of an advisory board was felt by the
steering committee to be a good one "since the system is so complex
you can't put a finger on who's responsible." But the process of
their getting action would not be so easy - "we may raise issues and
the consciousness of a few providers but I doubt if we'll have real
power - if we do we'll have to take it" (a member of the steering
committee).
Knight for his part was awaiting the choice of- clients- and could
not say how the board would function - he would only say "we can only
act honestly and see what happens." Later in the year clients were
chosen and several meetings held during which the main focus was an
exposition by staff of the complex policies of the division. Few
substantive policy issues were discussed in those early meetings. Thus,
while it could not be ascertained if the idea was a success, some of
the elements in its development are clear.
Knight took the initiative for the idea himself and had a strong
initial view of what the board should look like (no providers or bureau-
crats) based upon his past experience. He did not particularly worry at
that stage about any details of how the board would work. The idea did
take a long time to get off the ground; this however seemed not to be
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due to the division's usual stance of "staking out turf" and then
sitting on the idea, but rather it was due to the complexity of
convening so many people in the steering committee. Both Knight
and R.K. relied on old friends to start the process, but held
firm to their view that the client was important and should not
be swayed by providers or high (or low) level officials. But
they did acceed to the group's desires and would "play the issue
by ear" as they came up.
Knight in this case managed to combine all three of the elements
of what I have called his overall approach. Since it was an area in
which he felt that he (along with R.K.) was thoroughly competent,
the role of the teaching of principles was not so evident here. That
is, there was little teaching to be done since both had significant
experience. However the other side of the teaching coin, i.e.
learned or capable students, was clear. That is, if one did not
teach, then one made certain competent people were involved. Thus
Knight stressed the fact that both he and R.K. were knowledgeable
and experienced, that the steering committee was also, and that the
final board would only "work" if it had "good people" on it.
Similarly Knight did stress that the credibility of the division
would be at stake here; but while he could likely not prove this to
consumers by showing his usual management style, he could hope to do
so by exhibiting the personal credibility of he and his whole staff,
in whom he had confidence, And finally he was able to stress the
accountability of the division (as part of his wanting to be a "respon-
sible buyer") by providing a forum for the often bewildered consumer
to focus his grievances.
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Thus this case, along with the succeeding one (MA-7), illustrates
not only the direct application of a part of the division's paradigm -
the accountability theme inherent in responsibility - but also the
degree to which that paradigm could be lived out. Thus in the first
two cases, the accountability of PMO with respect to the division
was not clear, therefore, the division could not act as responsibly
as it wished and in fact forwent much action. In this case, acting
responsibility was not only desired but, in Knight's view, was
also possible; therefore energy could be invested in dealing with
the new knowledge - and the result was the initial functioning of a con-
sumer advisory board.
4. The MA-7 Case
This case could rather be called a vignette since it has not the
depth or indeed breadth of the other cases. But it is interesting in
that it outlines a problem involving both the internal and external
behavior of the division and also indicates some of the relationships
between managerial style and personality first discussed in the
loss of controls case. Equally important, it was suggested by Knight
as an example of something (i.e., some "new knowledge") which "we
didn't handle very well."
It is a story of how one division of the DPW forced a decision on
the medical division and how the latter readily accepted it. The
decision "backfired" when its effects were felt by the medical
providers and a short term adjustment had to be made. The adjustment
was made with surprisingly little strife on all sides and with a
mature, non-accusatory attitude shared by both divisions and the
providers.
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The "MA-7" form was one of three or four billing forms used
by physicians to bill the division. It had been in existence for
the preceeding few years and providers had grown accustomed to using
it. It was, in the words of the PMO director, "not perfect, but quite
adequate." Recall that the PMO, along with the Medical Claims
Control Center, were the designers and operators of the computerized
billing and payment process and reported directly to the commissioner
and not to the medical division. PMO had designed many of the forms
in use by providers, although not all - some having been carried over
from before PMO's establishment. One of PMO's tasks was to bring
some rationality to the bewildering variety of forms used by providers.
Its policy had been to redesign each of the dozen or so forms as the
current supply exhausted itself.
Thus in July of 1974, the forms expert for the PMO approached
the division's director for provider relations, R..T., to discuss
the new form he had designed for the MA-7 bill. Discussed is not
really the proper word since previous forms had been designed by
PMO and rapidly approved by R.T. with few or minor changes. In
approving these previous forms, R.T. had primarily considered what
the department needed in the way of information. The point of view
of the provider did not take any precedence, but nonetheless the
results had proven satisfactory to providers, That is, any complaints
the division received came from either very small provider groups or
from unorganized groups unable to exert much pressure. Similarly
the PMO considered primarily the department's perspective and felt
that the major changes proposed in the new MA-7 were those which
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would facilitate the key-punching operations at MCCC. However,
they did feel that the form would not present too much difficulty
to a physician or his billing clerk -- as the assistant director
of PMO said, "we knew it wasn't perfect, but we can't do everything."
There were additional circumstances surrounding the design of
the MA-7. The supply of old forms was to run out within a very
short time. PMO was under heavy time and budgetary constraints
and had noticed the depleting supply rather late. Thus, there was an
immediate need for action. Indeed when the director of PMO, N.E.,
was informed of the low supply he said to go ahead without even
having Medicaid "sign off." But his assistant thought better
of the matter and requested his forms designer to check with the
division. The PMO stressed the urgency to R.T. and asked if he could
sign off on the form within the next few days.
The PMO had also arranged a whole series of meetings with physicians
across the state for August in which the complete range of billing
forms (some new, some old) would be explained to them. While the
idea for such meetings has come from N.E. with whom Knight had had
a generally abrasive relationship, Knight readily approved of the
idea. He was concerned that one of the few faces the division presented
to providers was through the billing forms (and their processing)
and he had not direct control over either the forms or their processing.
Thus he made certain that R.T. would work closely with PMO on the
meetings to smooth the introduction of the new forms and to present a
credible public face. The schedule for these meetings produced an
additional time demand. Thus when PMO came to consult the division the
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pressure was strong. PMO had in fact already ordered the new forms
while at the same time consulting the division, obviously hoping
for a perfunctory approval.
R.T. stated that he had felt these pressures and should have
taken more time to examine the form. He did not ask what the
consequences of delaying or changing the form would be, although
he had asked that question for the design of previous forms where,
however, the consequences of a poor design were smaller. Nor did
he examine the form from the point of view of the provider. He
simply said "it looked OK" and approved it. In retrospect he said
that he should have "said whoa" but was confronted by the assistant
director of PMO telling him that they would redesign the form more
thoroughly the next time around when they hoped to have more time
and resources. The PMO assistant director did admit to "putting
some pressure" on the division.
So R.T. signed off on the new form. As he realized this form
would be used by many providers, he prepared a letter for Knight's
signature explaining the new form to them. He had never done this
before but thought it necessary now. Knight, for his part, having
felt no bad consequences from earlier form redesigns, signed the
letter after a casual examination of it. He knew that PMO had con-
ceived the form and that they were not particularly provider-oriented
but he trusted R.T., normally an extraordinarily thorough and inquisi-
tive person. So some one and a half million of the forms were thus
printed and distributed in time to coincide with the series of prov-
ider meetings.
-323-
At these sessions it became clear that "some serious mistakes had
been made." (R.T.) There were not enough spaces for certain pieces
of required information, the headings on the new forms were difficult
to understand and, most importantly, the form did not permit a
physician to bill for seeing a patient several consecutive days in
the hospital. It is interesting that this latter area previously had
been handled by permitting the physician to enter both the first
and last dates of his hospital visits in one cell under "date of
service." But PMO had said that this would not be permitted on the
new form and the physicians would have to write out the complete
set of patient information for each consecutive visit, thus unnecessarily
repeating a tremendous amount of data. Thus it seemed that by saying
that these new (and implicitly better) forms would be used, and
by openly explaining their use by holding the meetings, PMO and the
division in fact "generated provider criticism." If they had
simply used the old forms, no one would have complained.
Yet providers did complain. They complained at the meetings
and they complained directly to Knight on the telephone. He
had not attended the meetings, but his name was on the covering
letter. He immediately asked to see the form and went over it in
detail. While R.T. felt it was a good form for what it did (i.e.,
permitted billing for many patients and few services) it did not
permit billing for few patients and many services such as repeated,
consecutive hospital visits. Knight felt that in addition, the
layout was "unclear", some areas did not provide enough spaces for
response, and no provision had been made for the retrieval of diag-
nostic information. The "space" questioned seemed to be clearly a
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mistake, whereas the layout issue was "a matter of philosophy"
according to the PMO staff. That is, one could sacrifice instruc-
tion space for information content on a form or vice versa, but
one always traded off one for the other, Indeed the public meetings
were a tacit recognition of this -- one could never make the
forms "self-explanatory," additional material was needed, whether
communicated via a covering sheet or via face-to-face meetings such
as had been called. Thus the final focus of the discussion was on
how to solve the multiple hospital visit problem.
Knight told PMO to change the forms. They replied that they
had over a million of them already printed and that it would be
impossible. He replied that PMO should then change or adapt the
usage of the form. At one point, although this change was being
smoothly negotiated by the assistant director of PMO, Knight stated
that "if it comes down to me and N.E. (the PMO director) -- it'll
come down to me and N.E." He seemed ready to draw swords over
the "blatently" poor form, but the adaptation was successfully nego-
tiated by the PMO assistant director.
This adaptation consisted of permitting the space on the form
listed for the date of service to be used for the beginning and
ending dates of a series of consecutive hospital visits. It was not
designed this way but could be so adapted. PMO said that when the
current supply ran out in some six months it could be physically re-
designed. The PMO did indicate some hesitation about the need to do this
as the adaptation seemed to be working adequatl'y after a letter had
been sent to all physicians notifying them of modification. Little
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more was heard from the providers. Indeed a second new MA-7 form
was redesigned and put into use several months later with better
spacing and more clear headings and the continued use of an "adapted"
space to indicate multiple hospital visits. Knight was still not
pleased with this adaptation (since it involved more complex, rather
than simpler instructions) although the providers were and he continued
to discuss another version (the third) with the Medical Society.
When the inadequacy of the form first became known, Knight, as
noted, was furious. But he refused to "point the finger" at R.T.
R.T. appeared to feel guilty at his "mistake" and wanted to assume
all of the blame. But Knight refused to let him, saying that he
had signed off and therefore he must bear the ultimate public respon-
sibility. He similarly refused to "point the finger" at PMO in
public dealings with the physicians since he saw that, from PMO's
point of view, two Medicaid officials had signed off on the new form.
But he did bring up the whole incident in a general staff meeting as
an example of "thinking of the provider" and of always being prudent
when dealing with PMO. In private he also supported R.T. but said
not to let it happen again.
R.T. characterized the case of a "series of indecisions." Yet it
is more than that. Many of the patterns of action observed in other
cases are also apparent here. Firstly, there was the generation of a
problem because of the structural imbalance between PMO and the divi-
sion and the greater degree of PMO's sophistication in form design --
PMO simply dumped a completed piece of work in R.T.'s lap saying that
it was really too late to change it. There was the early, casual examina-
tion of the problem by both Knight and R.T. - by the latter because
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things had always worked well (but also because of the pressure)
and by Knight because of his style of investing full responsibility
in his staff and then trusting them when they brought something for
him to sign.
More importantly, there was the involvement of the division's
provider environment, this deliberate exposure to physicians resulting
in further dialogues about the new form and two additional versions.
The division's usual method of first testing such a new idea with
a few trusted friends was not tried here although Knight began to do
so with the third version of the MA-7. Again, there was the strong
role assumption that when changes have to be made, it was the division
and not PMO who would dictate these changes.
Finally,there was the reliance on past experience - Knight placed
himself in the provider's position in responding to their criticism.
His staff did too,but it seems clear that the trauma engendered by the
events would assure that such a situation would not reoccur. His
staff similarly learned to be more formal and prudent when dealing
with PMO. At the level of concrete results, the event "succeeded" --
a successful adaptation was made and it appeared that the third
redesign of the form would incorporate the complete changes desired
by both Knight, the providers, and PMO.
Thus the behavior shown by the division began to use a more full
range of the tacit program for action which it had available and had
exhibited in the sanction and new services stream where it had more
control over the new knowledge. It had also begun to productively
use some of the elements of this program in the consumer board case
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where it was more responsive to its environment, yet strongly
asserted its perogatives and then slowly and sequentially began
to experiment with solutions with those affected. Here it did the
same, only stumbling a few times on the way. This stumbling by
R.T. may have been necessary to resolve the nagging ego problem
which was similarly resolved in the day care case. R.T. felt confi-
dent that the final product would be a good one and that he had
learned "the hard way" (by himself) how to go about the forms
production process.
At the higher level of the division's more conscious approach
to new knowledge, Knight's teaching style began to be more evident
here than in the preceeding cases in this stream. While he was not
involved early in the case, his handling of its later elements
enabled the division to turn the problem into a qualified success.
Thus he made himself readily available to both providers and to R.T.
once the problem had been identified, he admitted the division's mis-
take and was non-critical and supportive of his staff. We used his
experience as a provider to get across the nature of the "mistake"
to R.T. and PMO and he stressed with his total staff what had
been learned from the event. What had been learned - the principles
as I have been calling them in earlier cases, was relatively simple -
that the providers' point of view should be seriously considered and
that staff should be more formal and prudent in dealing with PMO.
While he had stressed the former in staff meetings, this was the first
time the latter was stressed even after the experiences of being "burnt"
twice before by PMO.
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The management elements of Knight's style were, however, not much
in evidence here. Indeed, his clear delegation of authority and use
of inexperienced staff may have helped to generate the problem. But
once it surfaced, he did become very concerned with enhancing the
external credibility of the division by a rapid, open, and reasoned
response to provider criticism. Behind this was the feeling that
the division could not act as a responsible buyer unless this cre-
dibility was assured.
Knight also stressed the role of accountability in acting out
the responsible buyer paradigm. Thus "responsible" seemed to mean
being held accountable and purchasing services at cost effective
prices while "buyer" signified, as we have seen, searching for
a quality product and refusing to buy from poor quality providers.
Here he stressed accountability by assuming the blame for the
department externally, and internally refusing to "point the
finger" at R.T. or even PMO since he had signed off on the MA-7
version.
- This case then, while small in scope, taken with the CAB case and
the eventual responses to the loss of controls issue and the dental
claims processing, indicated some small progress in dealing with
internal administrative issues over which the division had little
control. The division was still not actively seeking out such issues
but when confronted by them, began to develop a more consistent and
reasoned response.
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5. Field Operations
The field operations of the DPW and its medical division have
a long and complex history. Prior to 1967, welfare payments were
made and administered by each town and municipality according to
their own standards and policies. In that year, the state took
over the administration of the program. In practice, this meant
using the same local staff while adding a centralized layer of
administration. During the next seven years the department struggled
to propagate a uniform policy throughout the state and assure that
it was followed. It also centralized the payment of all bills,
both cash assistance and medical, first in the regions and by 1972
in one central location. The problems of this changeover were immense.
Policy had varied considerably from office to office and the local
staff had often been reluctant in taking orders from a new, centralized
administration. Moreover, the local offices were often extremely con-
servative in their interpretation of policy which went against the
expansionist and client-oriented directions being pushed by many
liberal forces in the late 60's and early 70's.
At the same time, in 1967, the Medicaid program began. Local workers
then had not only to cope with the changeover to a state administered
system but had also to learn the equally complex and evolving policies
of a new medical program. Their tasks were not only to determine
eligibility for cash grants and provide social services but also to
process medical bills (see Loss of Controls case), counsel clients
on the right to medical care and aid them in acquiring it. By all
accounts the local welfare offices (LWO's) did this poorly, not
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seeing Medicaid as being that important and being pre-occupied
with the other changes then underway. The central and regional offices
of the department, while naturally having more of an overview, were
equally preoccupied. They, too, along with local staffs had been
trained in the welfare, not medical fields, and never fully addressed
themselves to the importance of Medicaid, although by 1974 it had
climbed to over 40% of the department's budget.
The Medical Divison, headed by an assistant commissioner,
could exercise little authority within the department. The local
and regional offices reported up the chain of command to assistant
commissioners responsible for cash grants and social services.
(See figure 1, page 36. Thus any policies of the medical division
had to first move "laterally" in the central office, then down to the
local offices. The division had a staff of less than 15 in 1973
compared to over 100-0 in the rest of the Department. The fifteen
did include, after 1969, a medical assistance program advisor (mapa)
in each regional office (7 in total) who reported to the assistant
commissioner for medical assistance. Their role was originally
designed to be the division's voice in the field - where they would
help local offices interpret policy, process complicated or "exceptional"
medical cases and- alert the central office to problems of policy imple-
mentation. The mapa's rapidly became jack-of-all-trades having to be
familiar with the total medical program. But their influence
within the department was still limited due to their being outside
its chain of command and their small numbers,
Some other states had handled the Medicaid program differently,
placing it within their public health agency and relying on the welfare
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department only for the determination of client eligibility. This
of course created inter-departmental liaison problems, but at least
the Medicaid Agency had control of its own field staff. But in
this state, the "eligibility" link had been seen as crucial and
so the Medicaid program was tacked onto the welfare bureaucracy.
Previous welfare commissioners and the current administration up
to 1974 had come from the welfare field and were said to be
"only too happy" to get rid of Medicaid. But they were "stuck with
the program" so continued to give it only minimal support in terms
of personnel, facilities and interest.
The division's small staff thus carried on trying to formulate
medical policy as best it could and trying to assure that policy
was at least written down so that local Offices could have something
available. Much policy remained verbal however and the central
office found itself continually responding to questions from the
local welfare offices and "fighting fires." The mapa's and the central
office staff were generally medical social workers by training and
by experience. Most of the mapa's had been with the division several
years and the relationship with the central office was harmonious as
the two groups worked closely together in building up a "seige" ment-
ality against the flow of client and provider problems.
By mid-1973, however, the situation was still far from ideal.
The medical division had been without a leader for eight months
and the LWO's were faced with increasing caseloads and overworked staff.
Little attention was paid to Medicaid by the LWO's. The only Medi-
caid function that had to be carried out was the processing of
medical bills before they were sent to regional (and later) central
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finance units for payment, Interpretation of medical policy was still
varied, adequate counselling was rare, and much policy was still un-
written. The mapa's had hardly begun to make a dent in educating
the LWG's and were themselves swamped with administering the system
of prior approvals (PA's)and individual consideration (IC's) items.
These were two categories of medical bills which required additional
processing by the mapa's, usually with a review by one of their
regional medical consultants.
There was no assurance that local clients knew what services
were available or that they were being delivered in an appropriate
manner. One of the central office staff felt, however, that most
clients knew about the basic hospital, physician and drug programs but
were not aware of the broad scope of the Medicaid program. He had
tried to produce a booklet for recipients, a simplified version of the
30O page policy manual, but said he had been "stalled by the department
bureaucracy." The mapa's also tried to work with the LWO's but
could never mount a systematic attack on the problem.
Knight's appointment in mid-1973 as assistant commissioner did
little to change the situation at first. He early on attended a
statewide meeting of local and regional administrators and said he
"saw that the reason for violent disagreements between the LWO's and
central office was poor transmittal of policy by the regional offices."
Knight felt that "all the action is in the LWO's" and that the regional
offices were only "distorting things." His Tevious experience (and
success) in industry had led him to believe that regional field offices
only hindered the flow of information and the implementation of policy.
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He believed in a highly centralized policy making function with
direct communication to the field - "sales" in his earlier experience
and the LWO's in this case. Thus his initial view of the mapa's
position was set. Not only should they not set policy but in this
case they would have difficulty helping to execute it since they
had to deal with regional (and local) offices of the department
over whom they had no direct control.
Many of the mapa's were older, long-term employees of the
division and Knight did not relate easily with them, particularly since
they were rarely in the central office and he favored a very personal
style of management. But their role was never clearly defined by
Knight nor for that matter ever redefined by him. He did say that
he hoped that the mapa's would become more involved in "promoting
the program" as much of their paperwork (PA's and IC's) was due to be
shifted to MCCC over the next two years and that they might become
client advocates. But in general he adopted a policy of benign neglect
towards the mapa's and placed his emphasis on reorganizing the central
.office, designing and redesigning the benefit the benefit package, and
sanctioning. He felt so strongly about his view of the ineffectual
role of regionalized administration that he even said at one point
he would resign if some of the ideas being quietly advanced by the
HSA secretary at that time for greater regionalization were to come
to pass. But the mapa's role never became an issue nor even a problem
at that time.
Knight's views towards the local offices were different however.
While he realized (and was told) that interpretation of policy was
poor and uneven and that clients were rarely receiving any counseling
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about the use of the medical system, he knew it would be difficult
to effect any change. Not only did he not have direct control over
the implementation of medical policy, but the two other divisions
(cash grants and social services)"didn't control the LWO's either."
It was a classic case of "the vicious circle of bureaucracy" with
the excess of central DPW policy gradually giving birth to consider-
able discretion by the local social workers. LWO morale was also
low due to understaffing, and excessive concentration on "paper work."
Half the LWO staff were long timers steeped in the culture of the
department and viewed as unchangeable while the other half evidenced
a rapid turnover and considerable difficulty in mastering the huge
DPW policy manual - much less any Medicaid policy. Thus Knight
said "I had to decide early on where I could get a reasonable
return for a reasonable effort - and the LWO's didn't look like that
place."
Knight also felt, although he never expressed it strongly, that
accessibility of clients to care was not a severe problem since the
state had a surplus of physicians. Thus one of the roles which
might be expected of LWO's finding providers for patients - was
not a priority function. Any effort to train the LWO's in better re-
view of bills would not significantly affect the flow of dollars
since the bill paying functions were soon to be centralized. The
changing of the patterns of delivery of the medical system was viewed
as important, however, but Knight thought that effort could best
be conducted by central office working in concert with the providers.
Similarly the idea of each the mapa's or the central staff taking a
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direct (i.e. one-to-one) client advocate role was of course impossible
with such limited number of personnel.
In addition, one of the strong forces usually motivating the
division, the federal SRS agency, did not take a strong position on the
role of either the mapa's or the LWO's. Only in the EPSDT and family plann-
ing cases had it concerned itself with the importance of the LWO. As we
.have seen, Knight ignored this for sometime in the EPSDT case. He did,
however, assign one central staff member to the task of assuring that adequate
outreach was being conducted for family planning although even then consider-
able emphasis was placed on the family planning clinics themselves providing the
outreach in concert with the LWO's. Thus the division, acting under Knight's
leadership and his firm beliefs, ignored the local offices and the mapa's
and turned its attention to reorganizing central policy and developing new
services in conjunction with the medical community.
The mapa's were, of course, not "ignored" on a practical basis since
they each had daily contact (at least by telephone) with the central
office. They were initially pleased with the influx of Knight and several
new staff into the central office. It meant that some of the long-neglected
policy areas could be redesigned, that much of the policy which had previously
been verbal could now be formalized and that somehow they might get out from
under the deluge of "paperwork" either through added clerical help or the
redesign of the PA and IC system to coincide with the centralization of
bills payment at the MCCC. However, two of the seven mapa's were newly
hired and had to spend their first several months just learning their
day-to-day work and the existing policy of the division. They had
no time to think about changing their roles as did the others.
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But the change was not to come about, The new and expanded
staff in central office began work on design and redesign of policy.
(Knight - "policy first, then implementation"). The two principle
staff directors whom Knight relied upon were new to the division.
They thus had no real concept of the role of the mapa's and
followed Knight's lead in categorizing the mapa's. Both these two,
the other new staff members, and the six or seven young staff who were
being reassigned by Knight had participated in the early indoctrination
period from April 1973 to beyond Christmas while the mapa's only
came to central office once a month. The central office staff met
at least once a week during this time and socialized considerably.
Knight only occasionally stated his view that the regional staff need
not be involved in policy design but his feeling was obviously trans-
mitted' to his central office staff thr6ugh his actions.
A very few of the staff did however "bounce off" proposed policies
with the mapa's (e.g. in transportation and in mental health). One
central office staff member, O.E., said he felt that perhaps some
of the younger members were more prone to discuss policy with the
mapa's. This might be explained by the fact that the long-time
staffers were initially very concerned with "proving themselves"
to their new boss. While their jobs were not at stake, their respon-
sibilities were as they saw new tasks being assigned to the younger
members and it is possible that they simply concentrated on central
office development during this stage. However the difference was
not great. Even the young staff were perceived by the mapa's as
being "wrapped up in their own policies", "fencing themselves in on
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new policy." There was "no sharing of any kind". One of the
mapa's even perceived a "sense of competition among them" (the
younger staff) "which Knight seemed to push", Examples cited were
the preparation of a new fee schedule for physicians and the
new MA-7 billing form in neither of which the field felt they had
been adequately consulted.
In many cases when central office staff thought about "the field",
they lumped together both the LWO's and the mapa's. For example,
information on a combined Medicare/Medicaid bill payment system was
not sent to either the LWO's or mapa's since the responsible program
director said he felt the volume of bills would likely be small
in each LWO and he had no assurance that social workers would
ever receive or even read the policy. Thus he sent the billing
information only to providers and much later, to the mapa's. This
theme was often repeated with the mapa's claiming they had to
respond to questions of clarification of policy mailed to providers
when they themselves had not seen or received the policy. The mapa's
began to view the central office as diletentes - lacking in medical
experience or even management capacity ("no one ever sat down and told
the LWO's how to file their bills.")
Their view of Knight was less charitable. They viewed Knight as
feeling that policy design was more important than implementation.
Knight's response, of course, was that the policy making function
was legitimately one for central office and that policy had to be
first designed before it could be implemented. While his response here
was clearly stated, the mapa's feeling that he viewed implementation
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as not important would be questioned by Knight. On the one hand
we saw how he felt that action with the LWO's was not likely to
have results whereas working directly with providers would have
some effect in insuring that clients had access to services which
were of a high quality. Testing of this strategy would come
about through the management reports produced by MCCC (total dollars
spent by category, etc.) the monitoring about to be phased in
by MCCC and through the day-to-day contact with providers around the
issues of fees, conditions of participation, etc. Thus the mapa's
were to be used only for interpreting policy, administering the
PA and IC system and "tipping off" central office to problems.
But the litany offered to the mapa's by Knight was somewhat
different even though he realized the source of their discontent "at
the very first meeting". While Knight verbally downplayed the
above view of the mapa's role in their presence, he upgraded the "new
role" they were to begin to assume. They were to become intelligence
agents, spotting gaps in the delivery system and helping to create
new resources. For example, if a need for a new transportation service
in one of the regions was apparent, they would identify the need and
work with possible providers to develop the service. In practice,
however, Knight saw the central office staff as having the technical
capacity to handle this type of activity and, as seen in the new
services stream, the mapa's were little involved. Knight's public
exortation motivated the mapals for only a short time however. While
they were told they could and should fulfill this new role, the behavior
and attitude of both Knight and the central staff led them to conclude
that it was simply not meant. Their complete reaction later on in
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the year will be discussed below; here I only wish to describe
the anticipations and initial reactions of the mapa's.
Some responded to the new role held out for them....."Some are
aggressive while others are scared" said R.K. of the central staff.
Knight felt that "the role will change for those willing to change"
and that perhaps "three of the seven had begun to respond" to this new
role. But even among those who did respond aggressively, the attitude
was not harmonious since some felt slighted when realizing they had
not been promoted despite Knight's success at enlarging the central
office staff. One of the mapa's was promoted, however, and this only
underscored the gap between the mapa's and the central office
since she was a "new" mapa and fitted in well with the style of
the central office. In fact she had drawn attention to herself by
her actions in the map4 position. Thus, rather than leave a competent
person in that position, Knight pulled her into central office, al-
though he did find a competent replacement. Several of the other
mapa positions showed a rapid turnover of staff - one of the remaining
mapa's attributed it to the "demeaning attitude" of central office
and that "Don simply doesn't realize the pressure on us." Others
said that they thought he considered the mapa "expendable". It was
"not a creative job...it's just PR..We're a jack-of-all-trades...
all we do is react."
And it was clear that by the first of 1974 Knight did consider
them expendable. He proposed that the mapa's be "pulled into central
office". He felt they could better be used on program development
and could handle the "prior approval" and "individual consideration"
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(PA's and IC's) functions centrally partly because the latter were
due to decrease with the advent of Phase II. When he proposed this
scheme to the commissioner and the other assistant commissioners,
the reaction was strong - the regional administrators did not want
this to happen. They knew they would still be stuck with the
hundreds of provider inquiries the mapa's were then dealing with.
While they had little concern for the program ("they were all 'mustangs',
brought up through the system because they were hard-nosed administra-
tors, oriented towards personnel and staff"), at least the mapa' s
acted as a buffer for them.
The commissioner then told them that "if they didn't want the
mapa's removed they had better come up with some positions for central
office medical" (Knight). Thus, Knight backed down upon the promise.
of an enlarged central staff but the eventual transfer was only of a
few clerical and one professional position - not nearly what Knight
had anticipated. By then, the mapa's were confused and demoralized.
They did not doubt Knight's sincerity or principles ("he often takes
our advice if a medical problem comes up") but did feel upset at the
effect of his belief in the unimportance of the role of the mapa's.
"I think he honestly believes that he knows how to administer the
mapa's and that this is the best way to do it." They viewed him as
unchangeable on this position.
The mapa's had no choice then but to settle back into their
routine of coping with the onslaught of provider and LWO questions.
They were to work with O.E., one of the long-time staffers whom Knight
had previously appointed to be the "field coordinator". He was to
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coordinate the work of the mapa's, act as their liaison in central
office, and "trouble-shoot" any particular problems that came up in
the field. Although it was not stressed, the fact that he had
been in the system over 30 years and knew most of the local office
personnel would perhaps aid in dealing with the latter. While Knight
was also beginning to delegate authority in many other areas, this
appointment was viewed as one of "getting the field problem off his
back." In addition, Knight appeared to have difficulty relating
to 0.E. who knew the details of the DPW and medical system thoroughly
but who was not perceived as having much "policy sense".
0.E. had been one of the 4 or 5 "old guard" who had previously
run the whole program by themselves and he felt he had the capacity
to contribute to policy. Knight felt otherwise and his relegation
of 0.E. to the role of only one of the 9 or 10 assistant directors
"sharply affected 0.E.'s ability to work and cut deeply into his
imaginative capacity" (one of the central office staff). The
selection of 0.E. further complicated matters for the mapa's since
his selection indicated a "low priority" for the field system.
0.E. began to work with the mapa's in establishing better relations
with the LWO's and in boosting up their support (space, clerical help)
in the regional offices. But he was seen by the mapa's as ineffective
amd confusing. He failed to gain their respect and in an attempt to
"prove" himself to Knight began to cut off communication between the
field and Knight. The mapa's had been annoyed by the "lack of clear
lines of authority and responsibility in central office" and now that
they had it at least partially, it was ineffectively utilized.
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So the mapa's carried on with their workload, "reacting and
coping" as one of them put it, As it had in the past, their work
consisted of responding to providers about unpaid or late bills,
explaining billing policies to providers, administering the flow
of prior approval and individual consideration items. They also
took over some of the social service functions from the LWO's by
default, for example, trying to obtain nursing home placements or
calming worried relatives who feared for a patient's entrapment in
the frightful world of hospitals and bureaucrats. The new mapa's,
of whom there were four for two positions in the course of 2 years,
had to learn the ropes from the beginning and were thus even more
overloaded. As one of them put it, "I had to learn how to get things
out of central office. You people let a lot of things sit or bounce
around between each other." But they too "learned to cope".
All of them tried to train what little clerical help they had
(usually one or two persons) to deal with the more routine problems
but this still could not stem the flow of work. In fact, the more com-
petent a mapa was the more likely she was to become a magnet for
provider and client questions. They began to rely on and to push
their medical consultants harder, Each region, like the central
officehad a staff of consultants it called upon for reviewing the
PA and IC items, and many of these apparently noticed the changed
atmosphere in a central office and begun to act as client advicates,
taking the side of the patient more frequently. The mapa's continued
to decry the lack of interest of Knight in the field, often at their
monthly meetings, but Knight would gently brush off their pleas and
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assure them that things were going to change. He did request several
additional regional positions for the next budget but these were dis-
approved as were most of his other personnel requests. The mapa's
did not see any change in things and continued to grumble. Knight
even felt one of them was probably "bad-mouthing the program" in
public.
The central office generally continued to ignore the mapa's
although some of them felt they had made "some attempt" to involve
the mapa's. In general though, central staff only dealt with them
when a problem came up or when they wanted specific information about
providers in the area. The mapa's complained that when central staff
were coming out to the region to discuss a new service with providers,
or even to do a field audit, they were rarely notified and they were
upset that Knight himself never came out to visit them in the regions -
"he should sit behind my desk for a day to see what it feels like."
But most of the mapa's were energetic women, full of pride and did
not, despite the low salary, consciously let their growing resentment
affect their work output.
The division's relations with the local welfare offices did not
improve over this period either. The sporadic attempts O.E. and the
mapa's made to improve the LWO's knowledge and handling of the
Medicaid program were overwhelmed by a series of other factors -
not the least of which was Knight's continuing feeling that the
division could do very little to improve the LWO's quality. The
quality and size of each of the 116 LWO's varied enormously and
this was perhaps the first factor in working with them - the division
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could simply not count on any task given to the LWO's to be carried
out with any reliability. Secondly, in June of 1974, the processing
of all medical bills had been centralized in the head office thus
taking the responsibility from the LWO's. While local social
workers were still, of course, theoretically to continue to have
knowledge of the program and advise clients and providers on policy,
this major relief from the paper overload contributed to a feeling
that Medicaid was now even less their responsibility. In addition,
their familiarity with the program gained through bill processing
was being eroded. And for the elderly clientele of the program,
their cash grants had, since January, been flowing through a federal
office (although still with state financial participation) and the
elderly no longer had an "assigned" DPW social worker. They would
only be provided a worker should they request one for a specific
purpose.
In September of 1974, the department LWO's were also undergoing
a court-ordered administrative change called "separation" in which
certain workers would be designated to handle only cash grants
and certain others only social services. The confusion and in
many cases rancor, that this caused made it even more difficult
for the division.to rely on the LWO's to carry out their proper
roles of advising and aiding clients in obtaining medical care.
The cash payment workers had been designated as those who would
counsel clients on the medical programs since each client had a
cash grant worker but not each one had a social service worker. The
cash grants worker would clearly be the only possible resource in
such situations but likely knew the medical program, or even cared
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for it, less than the social service worker.. Thus several fac-tors
contributed to the LWO's increasing lack of involvement with the
medical program. One result of this which illustrates the combined
effect of these factors was that nursing home placements for the
elderly were poorly made, often with significant delays.
While the LWO's no longer were involved with any formal screening
of medical bills, the program for such screening had not yet begun
at the central computer (Phase II). The slowdown of Phase II affected
the mapa's since they had expected that their volume of P.A.'s and
I.C.'s would be lessened and they could begin to take on their new
role. But they not only still had to deal with the P.A.'s and I.C.'s,
but they also had to handle an increasing number of calls, many of
which would have gone to the LWO but for the latter's decreasing
knowledge of, and concern for the medical program.
While the mapa's were "coping" under the situation, their frustra-
tions were being aired more among themselves. One of them said that
"Don's litany of how our role will change doesn't help us any - he
doesn't even know what we do." And as a member of the central
office staff remarked. "You can't move the paper out of the regional
office (to the central computer) until you understand what that
paper is all about." Knight's continued discussion at the monthly
meetings of the good things the division was doing was perceived
differently by the mapa's and irritated them. While Knight obviously
intended it as a morale booster and, if possible, (as observed in
other cases) as a teaching experience, one of the mapa's responded by
saying, "why does he always tell us about the good things central office
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is doing, why don't we hear about the failures or mistakes; we don't
need to hear how good central office is." One even felt that the
division lacked professionalism - "no one reads any-professional
journals and we don't know what other states are doing." But
their feelings of frustration were denied a real focus. One was
to be provided soon however.
R.K., the director for ambulatory care had, earlier in the
fall, thought that an attempt should be made to more formally involve
the LWO's in a training program designed to improve their knowledge
of Medicaid. He approached the social service division at central
office and some of the regional administrators and tried to advance the
idea. But he was brushed off by their remarks that they didn't yet have
the time and besides, shouldn't they wait for the printing of a client
handbook about Medicaid then being designed (see Consumer Board case).
Knight encouraged R.K. in his endeavor, but never very actively, since
he felt it would be difficult to "pull off".
Later in the fall, one of the mapa's had been asked to talk to some
local workers about the medical program. That one event had workEd
out well and R.K. proposed that it be extended to other regions. He
worked out a plan for such a training program with one of the mapa's
and other staffer from central office and circulated it to all the
mapa's. In this case he was going ahead without the concurrence of the
central social services staff but assumed he would acquire that shortly..
He also proposed that the mapa's become "advocacy centers", working
directly with local agencies (other than DPW) and community groups
to make known the Medicaid program and to become the voice of
Medicaid in the regions.
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The mapa's soon met with R.K. to discuss his proposal during their
monthly day in central office. While he had sent out a second memo
downplaying the "advocacy role", the mapa's nonetheless used
this occasion to burst the bubble on their expanding, year-long resent-
ment. They accused R.K. of not understanding what they were doing,
of being arrogant, even lazy, and of not realizing they had no time
to do any of the things he was proposing no matter how much they
would have liked to. They surfaced all their concerns about lack
of involvement with the central office and their neglect.
The meeting was an extraordinarily heated and antagonistic one
which drew the attention of everyone in the office. R.K. backed down
on the proposed advocacy role, but continued to hope that the LWO
training could be carried out at least through the special child
guidance unit with whom they had experimented so well. The training
of the complete range of LWO workers (especially at their intake or
entry into the DPW) was held in limbo as it still required the acquies-
cense of the other divisions and the DPW regional administrators.
Then while these two attempts to beef up the calibre of the
LWO's had reached a temporary impasse, Knight had had another idea
brewing. The commissioner and he had earlier had the idea that
people from the WIN program (work incentives) for welfare mothers be
employed in local offices and trained as Medicaid representatives.
These would be welfare mothers hired outside of civil service regula-
tions and reporting more directly to Knight. However this plan took
several months before a decision could be made and in the meantime the
federal CETA program (Comprehensive Employment Training Act) came
into being. This was an emergency temporary program for unemployed
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persons. Several dozen jobs were allocated to the department and
the division received 14 of them. Knight eagerly seized on this
area and said he would be "very involved in their training."
They spent 3 weeks at central office absorbing the program,
then Knight assigned 8 of them to the various regional offices and
in a few cases to large LWO's. In some cases they would aid the
mapa and in other cases deal directly with central office on specific
problems such as nursing home placements. The problem of assuring
adequate performance from the range of LWO's still remained but the
regional staff had been boosted up. The mapa's had received a dual-
edged sword, however. That is, on the one hand the CETA people would
aid them in their work but they also appeared to owe their loyalty
to the central office and Knight. Knight appeared to feel pleased
with the CETA people in the regions since he knew precisely what
they were doing and he had had the opportunity to help train them.
But the mapa's felt they didn't know what the CETA people were
supposed to do - their resentment remained and would have to be
handled by other means.
Knight had, of course, heard about the "blow-up" of the mapa's
with R.K. and said that he would have to do something "even though
R.K. was just trying to get them to do what they're supposed to do."
He called such a meeting, the results of which were a memo to all
staff saying that the mapa's should be involved in policy making
where possible (all draft formal policy was now being circulated to
them by then anyway) and that several of the mapa's specific
problems with paperwork would be corrected. Knight also chose to
assign the resolution of many of the mapa's problems to O.E., in whom
they had little confidence.
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The central office staff did seem to feel that they would
"involve" the mapa's more. Knight however, while viewing the problem
as solved did not appear to have changed his basic view of the
importance of the mapas' role. An upgrading of the mapa's salary
level was requested in the next budget and he requested they keep
a log of their activities so he could more fully understand their
jobs, but it unclear whether this interest would change their perform-
ance or their view that Knight is just one of a long line of assistant
commissioners - "we'll be here long after he's gone." The effects
of this shared neglect on the regional front were perceived as "gripes,
not grievances" by Knight. The mapa's continued to do their assigned
job competently and also pushed for more responsibility and resources.
There was moreover, no indication from providers that the mapa's were
anything less than competent.
And, of course, the intractable problem of the LWO's remained
unsolved. This case of benign, even deliberate neglect, can be seen
as how two potential "problems", i.e. how to deal with the local
and regional offices, were so defined that in the one case its solution
was a deliberate neglect based on the stress of environmental
constraints and in the other case a solution of benign neglect built
on Knight's principles and the inappropriateness of his style for
solving that problem.
For the two situations Knight made an initially quick decision on
the problem as he so often did. That decision was that the LWO's were
relatively unmanageable by he or indeed others in the division. Since
many functions were to be centralized and since clients had good access
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to care, he would concentrate on working directly with providers.
With the mapa's, he made an equally rapid decision backed by his
industry experience and his general philosophy that regional
staff involvement in policy making should be held to a minimum.
He delegated responsibility for the mapa's and then shielded himself
off from much further discussion involving either their roles or
their problems. Each of these actions was consistent with the way
other new situation- had been handled. Usually, in such cases,
however a strong sense of positive principles was taught to the staff.
The principles which were developed or carried over from other
cases or past experiences were in this case essentially "negative" ones.
They were that local offices are uncontrollable, therefore the divi-
sion should work with providers; that a careful nurturing of the latter
would have a significant effect on care delivered, and that regional
offices could and would not be much help in developing policy and
only a minor aid in establishing provider credibility.
But here, not only were the principles evoked more negative in
nature but Knight's teaching style was inappropriate for the mapa's
since it was based on close daily contact and on a young, non-pro-
fessional staff - conditions which did not apply with the mapa's.
Indeed his "learning" vacabulary used at staff meetings backfired,
since the mapa's perceived this as "boasting". However the central
office staff acquired Knight's negative principles through observing
him, through his appointment of O.E. and through his general stated
reluctance to involve the mapa's or to make any systematic effort to
control the LWO's. Thus the staff's close identification with Knight
and his strong teaching style (at central office) led to a shared
neglect by staff of both the LWO's and the mapa's.
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His open management style so evident in other cases was clearly
not called into play so effectively here. The mapa staff could not
all report to him, as was his usual style, while his delegation
of responsibility which worked well in other cases backfired here
(with O.E.). He failed to keep a close check on the mapa's work,
and the use of young non-professionals, while successful in the
other two streams, created resentment among the mapa's. While he
did let the mapa's "find their own slot" and he did stress the
direction and integrity of the division, these positive management
steps either could not overcome the other problems or were construed
differently by the mapa's. Mapa reaction to this year long situation
was to build up a mounting pressure which finally exploded.
On the LWO front, the LWO's of course did not see their neglect
as a "problem." While community groups and providers did begin
to comment on the low effectiveness of the LWO's, these reactions only
reached any significant level by late 1974. As for the rest of the
department, Knight had little internal credibility with the regional
and local staff and besides, the LWO's "were uncontrollable anyway."
Knight often said - "I'll listen to anyone's ideas if they come up with
a better solution." No one could in this case - the problem was
systemic - based on the history and culture of the DPW and its relations
with its newly acquired, minor brother, Medicaid,
But the nagging ego feeling so often felt by Knight's staff
in other cases led them to try a solution, one which would involve
new roles for both LWO's and the mapa's. That proposed solution resulted
in a partial resolution of at least the mapa problem as Knight began
finally to listen to them and then to acquire new resources for them.
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The LWO "problem" remained unsolved although many of the mapa's did
indicate they would continue to try to improve the LWO's now that they
seemed to have some central office backing.
Thus the problem of learning how to deal with the division's
field operations can be evaluated in different ways. The LWO problem
can be considered an unsolvable one in the short term in which case
the division's strategy of working directly with providers must be seen
as a reasonable adaptation to a situation in which Knight had no
direct access to the LWO's (to use his teaching style) nor direct control
over them (to use his management style). This strategy at least did
not diminish the division's credibility. It also helped it to act
in a limited way as a responsible buyer although it is not clear how
the ultimate benefactors - the recipients-viewed this "responsible
buyer." Here Knight's view of acting responsibly was to not waste
energies in areas where he felt that neither he (or anyone) could
likely have much effect.
The mapa problem also may be seen as an allocation of resources
problem. In this situation the problem was not insolvable, however.
Indeed it is not clear that it was ever a "problem" since the mapa's
did perform as desired. Nonetheless, they forced a problem "definition"
on to Knight and his staff despite Knight's preconceptions about the
situation and the inappropriateness of his teaching style. What the
division (particularly the staff) did seem to eventually learn
from this problem forced on them is that, with a small change in atti-
tude and a small shift of resources, the mapa's might be utilized
even more effectively, thus bringing greater credibility to the
division - which would ultimately help it to live up to its professed
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paradigm. Knight however did not agree with this conclusion feeling
that the potential payoff was still low and that he had been justified
in conserving at least his own personal energies for other new areas..
6. Overview
In the assessment of the other two streams, criteria for organiza-
tional learning such as-was the new knowledge processed successfully
once, was it routinized, were the principles developed in one case
used in others in the stream (by Knight or his staff) or were these
principles utilized in other streas - were applied. Similarly we
looked at the evolution of the division's tacit "program for
action" in dealing with new knowledge. Finally we examined the
evolution of a discernible style, one based on teaching, the development
of credibility through management and the evocation of a conscious
paradigm.
After a first assessment of this stream, this framework appears
to be somewhat less immediately useful in describing and explaining
the agency's activities. The division appeared to be fumbling
considerably, ignoring whole areas of responsibility and certainly not-
acting with the confidence and active stance that it did in so many
other cases. Yet after a second assessment it is clear that there
was a considerable amount of learning going on, but it was not
evident in the lower level criteria of "success", tacit programs
for learning or development of management capacity. Rather such
learning was observable in and derived directly from the organiza-
tion'sparadigm - the responsible buyer. Responsible meant the search
for cost effective services and acting "accountable" in their purchase.
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It is the accountability element which links these cases together
and around which some learning appears to have taken place.
It will be necessary to "muddle through" an evaluation of
learning using the lower level criteria before we can properly under-
stand the accountability theme in this stream of cases. Asking the
question was the case a "success" in the view of those associated
with it permits us to see no discernible pattern. The loss of controls
case did succeed in producing an output but at considerable cost;
the dental claims processing case was seen as a good decision, while
the consumer advisory board development was also perceived as having
set out on the correct path although the time it took to do so was
probably excessively lengthy. The MA-7 design failed in its first
version but was resurrected later. The decision as to how to deal
with division's field operation was, on the one hand (the LWO's),
probably inevitable, and on the other hand, (the mapa's) certainly not
a success comparable to other cases. Thus there does not appear to be
any obvious progress in the division's handling of these cases. Some
succeeded, some did not, and the only variable which helps to explain
these is the degree to which the division perceived the case as a
controllable area or not (see page- 2 7 9 ) - thus defining
its interest and -the energy to be invested in the case.
Using the criterion of "was the success (or lack of it) evidenced
in the case routinized in any way" presents us with no significantly
more interesting conclusion. The experience in the loss of controls
case probably had an effect on each of the division's staff in that
that was the first time they had had to deal with the PMO in any way.
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Over the next year, they each had to interact with PMO on a variety
of other issues. While there was not an overall concensus among
the staff, there did appear to be a feeling that relations with
PMO were better. Thus the six-month jousting with PMO may have been
necessary (given Knight's avoidance of the PMO director and unwilling-
ness to lay down any mutual ground rules) for the staff to establish
a routine manner in dealing with the PMO.
The dental claims processing case appeared to be well handled
after the initial decision was made. Similarly, a later contracting
out of laboratory bill processing was made without the abruptness of
this case. The effort to involve clients directly in the consumer
advisory board was a one-shot affair and any criterion of routinization
is irrelevant. The MA-7 design did indicate. that successive redesign
of the form could be made equally rapidly with the concurrence of
all the parties involved. Finally the field operations case certainly
indicated the division's capacity to hold itself to or routinize a
decision (in this case to ignore) involving the local and regional
offices.
The other criteria, those of a transfer of principles from one case
to another and/or the use of principles by other staff members were also
utilized in the other streams. The nature of the "principles" in; the othsr
streams were of the order of "avoid the use of interms where possible"
or "do not sanction if it will do the provider out of business and
if he has caused no direct patient harm." These had to do with health
care delivery aspects of the case being examined. Occasionally they
had to do with how to develop these delivery policies, i.e. "providers
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should be listened to". But in this stream, what few principles that
were developed had to do with much broader "postures" to be adopted by
the division. These higher level principles or positions were much more
directly related to the division's paradigm and were more conveniently
applied than in the other streams. Knight believed that a variety of
detailed responses to the question of how his staff dealt with internal
problems was possible. What was important was the initial posture
of the division in establishing a policy direction. And that posture
was in each case set by him. It was these postures which he consistently
held from case to case in this stream and which the staff partially acquired.
Those postures were basically quite simple. Firstly there was the
view that the division must be held accountable for its performance and,
in areas where its performance was affected by other bodies, then those
bodies should be accountable to the division. This accounted for
Knight's insistence that PMO was a "service bureau" which should provide
a "product" for the division. It explains Knight's upset at the
decision-making process for the dental claims processing and for the
initial MA-7 designs. It also explains his ignoring of the LWO's since
their accountability could not be assured and his view that regional
offices are minor subsidiaries and executors of policy from the central
office.
The second major posture was that since LWO's were unaccountable to
anyone (and the mapa's unreliable), the central office of the division
must deal directly with the providers and try to assure its credibility -
which could be acquired by listening to providers and explaining the
division's positions carefully. This second posture thus explains
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both Knight's eventual ignoring of the loss of controls issue since
it involved only a small set of providers and did not affect the
division's credibility and his equally strong hand in the MA-7
case. It also explains his dealing directly with consumers
(since the LWO's were of such low quality) and ignoring both LWO's
and the mapa's in dealing directly with providers since he felt that
neither had the capacity to perform that function. Thus the postures
or very broad principles which were adopted or developed here were
not a direct, evolved product of the working out of the cases as was
evident in the other streams. They did not seem to flow from the
success of any particular case or even from the usual tacit program
of action of the division.
However, some of the features of this tacit program were visible
here although they are not as significant. Indeed action itself,
which was the common feature of the "program" in other cases, is not
significant. Rather it is the lack of action, the reasons for this
lack, and the responses to it which are the most relevant. Nonethe-
less the cases do show, for example, a progressively stronger assumption
by the division of its "perogatives". In the loss of controls case it
seemed to be caught off guard by what was happening to it, but finally
Knight realized that his delegation and his failure to appoint'a liaison
person had not been effective. He then took some positive actions.
Similarly, in the dental case, the division's perogatives, while abused
by PMO, were reasserted to the commissioner by Knight. In the third
and fourth cases, the division also asserted its "right" to be in-
volved in those areas. In the field case, a possible assertion of
authority with respect to the local offices was ignored not because
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the division felt the LWO's were not controllable by the division
but because they were uncontrollable by anyone.
Knight's technique of not breaking down a problem and "factoring"
it among several persons,but rather assigning it to one responsible
person was utilized as usual in most of the stream's cases. In
the middle three cases either he or one of his staff handled the
problem - with a relative degree of success. However, he did not use
this tactic in the first case and the costs were significant. These
costs were further complicated by the fact that the quality of
the staff (with respect to this particular problem) was not equal to the
task. Similarly, in the field case Knight clearly delegated respon-
sibility - but to a person who did not appear to be up to the task,
although Knight would explain this by his view that the field area
was not a high priority one. The lesson which, of course, could be
learned from thisis that a non-factoring of problems is acceptable
if staff competence is high, whereas conscious or unconscious
factoring of a problem among several individuals can be harmful if
individual competence is low.
Knight's habit of utilizing his past experience as a guide
was as clearly evident here as in the other streams. In fact,
in all but the dental claims processing it seemed to be one of the
main determinants of his action. For example, that liaison people
should be avoided, that consultants should function as a service
bureau, that consumer input is valuable, that providers need clear
and simple billing forms and that regional offices are of minor
importance - were all relics of his past two jobs. This strong
belief in the value of his own experience also led Knight to
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neglect one other feature of his usual program of action - "touching
base" with the relevant environment (in this case PMO and the mapa's).
This inability to come to some sort of philosophical understanding
with both PMO and the mapa's was probably due to the lack of any
real attempt rather than any failure in such an attempt.
The final relevant feature of the program which was evident
here was the relative lack of any of the nagging ego problems seen
in other cases. Thus, despite the fact that Knight ignored many
,of the areas, the staff still had to contend with the problems of
dealing with PMO, the field and the providers and they were thus
able to work out a relationship by themselves in which they had some
confidence. Recall that without any real test for their personal
competence, the surrogate used by many of the staff was early partici-
pation in the setting of the division's directions. When Knight
usurped this function, staff would continually worry about "have we
really accomplished anything." Here that feeling was much less prevelant.
As suggested then, the usual tacit program was not as clearly
in view here. One or two elements of it appeared to show some
development over the stream, while others were simply employed across
all five cases. Certainly there is not the widespread progress shown
in the other two streams. We must then look to the division's
overall approach to see if any progressive adaptation or learning occurred.
First of all, consider the element of teaching which elsewhere was
heavily used to develop and elicit principles which accumulated in the
division's individual or collective memory. The only case in which
Knight explicitly used his teaching style here was in the MA-7 case
where he was available for consultation, admitted his "mistakes",
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carefully explained decisions, was non-critical of staff and used
a learning vocabulary to some degree of success. Only with the
mapa's was any further explicit "teaching" used and there it backfired
since the ground on which it fell was so infertile, even hostile.
In all the other cases the teaching was tacit and conveyed
through staff watching Knight act or listening to his pronouncements
about administration. These pronouncements (or principles as we
have been calling them) were not about medical care or how to go about
getting it but rather about management, and more particularly, the
importance of accountability in living up to the division's paradigm.
Thus, as described on page 357, these principles had to do with the
division being accountable to the public and PMO being accountable
to the division. They were also concerned with the lack of account-
ability in the LWO's and the minor role of the mapa's both of which
subsequently necessitated a greater involvement with providers. Credi-
bility could then be established with the latter through a careful
"listening" posture and a clear explanation of the division's eventual
policies.
The importance of a complex set of management techniques used
both internally and externally which was so evident in other streams
was not as clear here since p-oblems were generally ignored or given
low priority by Knight - thus the use of his management style could
not be called into play. That style involved Knight's interacting
with his staff. Here there was usually no direct interaction and
we see that either no action was taken (Field, Dental), action was
taken unilaterally by Kiight(CAB) or action was generated by and
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often concluded by the staff acting relatively independently. (Loss
of Controls, MA-7, Field). Only Knight's view that good management
meant cost effective use of staff resources helps to explain his own
lack of action.
Similarly, the use of competent management to produce external
credibility was not as significant here. Indeed the opposite was
true; for example, Knight would often bear the brunt of complaints
about PMO's operations from providers, but only in 1975 did he begin to
point .out to them that he had not as much control over PMO as he
desired or was necessary. External credibility here would be attained
not primarily through competent performance of the division's tasks
but rather through listening to and talking with providers and through
serving providers as an intermediary to PMO and the LWO's.
Thus this stream of cases distills itself down to a story about
the direct learning of accountability - a major element of the paradigm.
The other streams dealt with living out the paradigm at the lower and
more indirect levels of principles for service delivery or sanctioning,
tacit action programs or techniques, while a gradual even hierarchial
progress was made towards a cumulative set of actions which could be
said to represent the paradigm. Here attention was directed directly at
the paradigm itself with, as can be seen, a resultant "cost" at the
other levels - although that cost was not directly observable to
providers nor was it observable in any change of service policy. Indeed,
this direct attack may have been accounted for by Knight's insistence
on the importance of provider acceptance and a high quality service
package - rather than on the manner in which these were internally
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developed. That is, where such internal administration affected
strongly the division's credibility, or the quality of its package
of benefits, he was very concerned with the internal generation of
credibility or benefit policy. When not, he simply ignored the
relevant internal administrative problems (new knowledge) which
were being thrust at him.
It is impossible to assess the correctness of this approach or
even its real cost, if any. What can be said however, is that given
the organization being constructed and the nature of its early dependence
on Knight, the staff certainly learned that part of the division's
approach- having to do with the accountability and responsibility
portions of the paradigm. They also learned how to pick up the fallout
from such an approach and in a manner which may ultimately have
been more personally satisfactory to the staff members since they
could directly "test" the paradigm which Knight was espousing.
In one sense then, this stream illustrates the outer limits
of the division's approach. That is, given areas deemed to be uncontroll-
able, the division ignored them rather completely. Deemed is the key word
here since Knight would wade into battles with agencies over whom he had
no control (e.g. the federal agencies in battles over EPSDT and later
PSRO development) if he felt there was a high payoff to be acquired by
a not excessive use of the division's resources, On the other
hand, the staff still had to deal with many of the problems caused by
these :uncontrollable areas and their ability to do so gives some
slight indication that, in Knight's absence, similar problems would
be handled with a greater level of comprehension - not withstanding the
fact that similar decisions:m night well be made in these cases.
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CHAPTER VI
The Division's Learning
-364-
Several cases of new knowledge management have been presented and
partially explained. That is, a framework for describing these situations
has been developed and assessments made as to how those situations evolved.
But those framworks and evaluative methods were developed gradually during
the course of examining each of the three streams of activity. Now the
complete framework must be laid out and the fifteen cases tested within
that framework. This chapter thus attempts to answer the question, "did
the organization learn and if so, how?" The additional question of what
the organization learned is inseparable from the question of did it learn,
since the definition of learning which I have evolved here (and which was
first introduced on pg. 174) consists of the achievement of successive
levels of behavior, with the achievement or reaching of each level being
defined primarily in terms of the ability to process, generalize from, or
evolve from, the level below it. For example, learning at the second level
consisted of the routinization of behavior at the first level.
These levels consist of: a policy or action response to individual
situations of new knowledge, the routinization of that policy or perform-
ance, the generation of general principles from each case which could be
utilized in other service or problem areas, and the development of a pro-
gram for approaching each of the first three levels. Each of these four
levels of learning will now be described and an assessment made as to the
degree the medical division attained those levels.
1. Developing and Routinizing New Policies
When confronted with situations which the division had not faced
before, it was called upon to develop a stance or attitude toward that
situation. The situations were not all simply "problems" being forced
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upon the division by outsiders or by the natural flow of events within
the division. Somewere situations in which an event, or an awareness
of the division's members, led the situation to be defined as an oppor-
tunity. The one common feature of all the situations is that either
Knight or the division's staff felt it necessary to respond in some way,
usually to develop a policy. The degree to which and the manner in which
it responded are more fully explained by the program for action. (See
previous chapters and Section 3 of this chapter.)
Thus the first criterion for learning at this level is, did the
division respond - did it develop an attitude or policy towards the new
knowledge. Secondly, was the policy considered a "success". The "success
of the newly developed policy or stance is a difficult one to utilize since
so little is known about the ultimate effect of medical care policy. Thus
the test of "success" which I have used here is an acceptance by the pro-
vider or administrative area to which the policy was directed. Thus, for
example, was the division able to act cooperatively with providers and
other agencies, did such groups actively try to block development and im-
plementation of the policy, did the status of the policy enhance or limit
the division's general image (which could be used to extract other conces-
sions)?
One might invoke a third criterion here, that the policy, after being
developed and accepted (and routinized), be tested or evaluated in some
manner. Here, the researcher was generally prevented from observing the
organization during a long enough time period during which one might rea-
sonably expect the division to begin to evaluate its policies. Equally
important, the methodology was not, certainly in the short run, available
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to the division for so doing and much evaluation either was simply ignored
or the lower surrogates of development and acceptance of the policy util-
ized. In a division which had no coherent policies in its primary areas,
this in itself was a considerable achievement. Nonetheless, one of the
consequences of this confluence of factors was, of course, the nagging
ego problem. This problem, which was not immediately observable until
after the initial learning levels had been achieved, suggests that the
division may have "sensed" that it had often omitted this criterion, a more
rigid evaluation, at the initial levels. However, this was not always the
situation and this third criterion will be utilized where possible with
the limited data available.
These three criteria are necessarily general and process-oriented;
that is, I am not concerned with whether a better day care policy could
have been developed nor with the actual "objective" result of the imple-
mentation of the policy but primarily with, was a day care policy pro-
duced, implemented and accepted both by the division and its immediate
environment of providers and other government agencies, and further tested
if possible. In this sense then ultimate failure of the policy to better
the condition of potential day care patients would not negate the process
of development and routinization of a policy which I have indicated are
two initial levels of learning. However, an attempt was made to respond
to the question of how the actual quality of those policies might be eval-
uated and is presented in Appendix A.
The use of change over time as a third criterion here indicates that
such a criterion could well be used for the other levels of learning.
That is, one could ask, was the program for action developed and changed
over time, did the management style or even the paradigm change over time.
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However, that criterion was not utilized elsewhere due to the necessity
of limiting the scope of the research and basic methodological prob-
lems in reconstructing with precise enough fashion, when events occurred.
Rather, I concentrate on whether and how the various levels were reached
and not whether they changed over the relatively short (1 1/2 years)
span of the research.
In the new services stream, we said that in each of the cases, a
policy was developed for the new service. In each case, that involved
developing a response to the question of was there a need for the ser-
vice, what was the target population, what should be the mode of delivery,
who should provide it and at what rate, and making efforts at negotiating
the acceptance of these policies with provider groups and other state
and federal agencies. These questions were answered and policies deve-
loped for each of the service areas. In addition the second criteria
for this level was met through the efforts made to gain acceptance of
the policy from providers and other governmental agencies. In each of
the cases, these members of the division's environment did concur with,
and in all cases actively participated in the development of the policies.
Two of the cases in this stream do stand out, since the degree to
which this environmental concurrence was achieved varied from that of
the others. By the end of the EPSDT case, some outsiders were calling
that policy a failure in that the division had failed to demonstrate to
a component of its environment that its alternate philosophy had improved
the delivery of care to children. In the HMO case, preliminary evalua-
tion indicated that the original grandiose goals for the program had
proven to be unrealistic and that the division needed to revise its goals.
In both these cases, however, the failure was not a failure of learning;
-368-
'rather, in one case, a failure to adequately demonstrate the success
of a new policy and in the other case, a realization by the division and
the HSA agency that the policy had been unrealistic. In both cases,
moreover, the division did act on that evaluation - in one case it worked
harder and in the other it retreated. The only reason we are able to
even discuss possible "failures" here is that the pelicy was able to be
tested fairly soon after its development. In all the other cases such
testing was not possible except over a term extending well beyond the
study period. These two cases, however, do indicate that when possible,
the division could act on an evaluation and thus the third criterion
for this level can be said to have been partially met.
In each case, the policy was also routinized to some degree. In
general, this routinization meant considerable effort to propagate the
policies to the rest of the welfare department, to providers and to
clientele. It usually involved insertion of the policy into the agency's
policy manual (EPSDT, FSMHC and 442) or the development of an experi-
mental policy (HMO's and Day Care). It always involved the assignment of
a specific staff member to the area, usually to certify new providers
and to monitor the implementation of the policy.
In the sanction stream, the legal power of the division to sanction
providers was developed with virtually no mandate or pressure from the
division's environment. After a year and a half, a series of major
sanction cases in which either substantial financial retribution was
achieved or the rovider suspended from the program had been routinely
conducted. In addition several major providers (nursing homes) were
dropped from the program and several dozen minor program abuses also
corrected under threat of sanction activity. A strategy of "knocking
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off" key abusers in each program area was accomplished and both this major
thrust and the minor thrust just mentioned were accepted as policy by
members of the division's inner environment of responsible government
agencies. The policy was ndt codified in a body of regulations nor in
a large staff with specific, routine assignments, but its continued
emphasis over a year and a half indicated that the policy was firmly
held by the division. While the first case failed to adequately define
the powers of the division with respect to "quality of care" sactions -
resulting in a last minute retrenching in the final case (physicians'
audits) - that retrenching did lead to a more thorough examination and
evaluation of the sanction process which ensured that future cases
could be prosecuted with more vigor. Here, as in the first stream, the
failure was not a failure of learning, but rather of the substantive
policy and indeed the change of policy indicated a positive learning
and further indicated that the third criterion, a change of policy,
could be met.
In the internal administration stream, only three of the cases could
be considered to have adequately satisfied the criterion for first and
second level learning since the delineation and routinization of a policy
was achieved at some cost; it is here that we begin to get some hint of
the limits, whether imposed or chosen, of the division's learning model.
The initial resolution of three of the situations, their acceptance by
the division's environment and their development into a routine was,
however, accomplished in the MA-7 Form, Consumer Advisory Board and
Dental Claims cases. The MA-7 case even indicates that the third cri-
terion - that of a testing and change of the policy - could take place
as revised versions of the MA-7 form were sequentially proposed.
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The loss of controls case was resolved but only at a considerable
cost in time and energy while the mapa situation probably could have
been resolved differently with only an incremental amount of effort
or change of approach. Both these cases were characterized by the
unwillingness of the division (primarily Knight) to take a positive
decision on the problem (rather a policy of taking minimal action was
gradually evolved), although that unwillingness did not result in harm
to the division's ability to purchase services or to its credibility.
In that sense then, these two cases cannot be said to have forced the
division to deviate from the pursuit of its paradigm, the responsible
buyer, and thus at least did not inhibit learning at the first level.
Rather it occuredbut either was costly or more could have been achieved
with little incremental cost.
In summary then, the division did succeed in developing policies in
each of the areas of new knowledge, and in developing a routine for
acting on those policies which permitted it to move on to tackle addi-
tional new knowledge. In nearly all the cases that development was a
conscious one in that the policy was rarely a "policy of default",
the development was achieved at a low perceived cost to the division,
and the policies were ones which had the support of the division's
immediate environment of providers and government agencies. In addi-
tion, there were some indications that the division could even within
the short period of the study, evaluate those policies and act on
that evaluation. Thus the division can be said to have learned con-
siderably in that it achieved or attained the first two levels of learn-
ing which I have suggested are appropriate bases for such judgments.
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2. Development of General Principles
The third level in the learning framework which I have developed
is that of the development of general principles which could be, and were,
utilized in other dissimilar situations. Here I use dissimilar to des-
cribe cases which involved different sectors of medical services or
different actors in the decision process. While all the cases examined
did have similarities by which they could be grouped into "streams"
(i.e., in that each stream approached a similar set of problems), they
were sufficiently different from each other in the services they dealt
with or in the actors involved to warrant any transfer of principles
from one case to any other to be described as third level learning.
For those cases which were essentially alike, we used the criteria
of routinization in Section 1 to determine if learning occurred during
those cases.
In each of the cases described here a search was made for prin-
ciples which were indeed actually used in two or more cases. That is,
the principles could not simply be stated but had to be actually used
in two or more cases. This use could and did occur in two distinct
fashions however. First, the principle could be stated and used in
one case (e.g., "use sweetened fees to encourage particular providers"),
and then evoked by Knight or staff in a second case and used to develop
a policy for that case. A second, less obvious transfer of principles
occurred in situations where a principle was used in one case, but never
clearly stated as such, then "discovered" during a second case when
staff would remember that tacit principle and determine it to be useful
for the second case. During the second case, it would be explicitly
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stated as a principle. Thus in the transfer of principles which I dis-
cuss here and in each of the overviews to Chapters III, IV and V, the
transfer is an explicit one, in that not only were the principles used
in two (or more) cases in the stream but that transfer was a conscious
one.
Nonetheless, in each case, some principles were posited by the
division members or behaved, but no evidence was found of their transfer
to other of the fifteen cases I examined. These principles were, however,
used in two other different manners. First, the principles would be
stated or recognized and simply held in the division's memory. Thus
a principle would be recognized in a gven case and be declared as a
learned principle even though it was not immediately used in routine
activity or other new areas.(For example, that maintenance care, as
opposed to therapeutic care, be avoided - as in the day care case -
was informally discussed after the day care case, but not specifically
utilized again within the time period I was observing the agency.)
Secondly, the principle could be developed in a case and used either in
routine activity or in the other new areas not discussed here. Used
here means the same as outlined earlier, i.e., it was used to develop
policy in two cases and explicitly stated in at least one of those two
situations, usually during its first use, but often not until it was
used again. These "non-transferred" principles were described in each
of the particular case developments and are not stressed here. Within
the fifteen cases, however, most of the principles developed were indeed
explicitly transferred to other cases in the stream.
The evidence for the use and transfer of such principles was the
same as that for all other material collected in the study. Either
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staff members told the researcher that the principle was used, e.g., "we
thought that, since comprehensive care is a valid idea, we should avoid
the mass screening that SRS seemed to want"; or the developed policy
clearly reflected the principle, e.g., the reorienting of the DMH clinics'
policies reflected the division's principle of stepping into a vacuum
of authority; or members of the division's environment confirmed that
such principles had been discussed in the development of policy, e.g.,
that small provider groups should approach the division first and not
vice-versa.
In each situation where I have referred to the generation and use
of a principle, at least one of the above criteria was met. However,
any one alone is, I believe, an adequate basis upon which to assert
that a principle had been used. Thus, in two of the above criteria,
it was not necessary that the final policy reflect the principle, only
that the principle informed and advanced the decision process for new
policies. The principles were thus a pool of available principles, and
since they were not totally consistent, some were necessarily rejected
in favor of others. Thus the simple suggestion of a principle as a
possibility for policy development, and not necessarily its later adop-
tion, could be considered valid evidence of use.
While these explicit principles were only sometimes referred to as
"principles" by Knight and his staff (the categorization is the author's)
each of the division's members involved recognized (either at the time
or later) that some "generalization" was being made, applied or trans-
ferred, and was thus being "learned". Most of the staff, however, con-
sidered that learning to be a natural or inevitable product of their
situation (i.e., young, competent, but inexperienced) and instead placed
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more stress, when interviewed by the author, on management learning.
(See pg.4 20.)
The new services stream showed the clearest development of prin-
ciples, probably because the area of health delivery was relatively new
to all the staff involved and was thus the area with the greatest poten-
tial for the shared development of principles. I will not repeat the
complete set of principles here; the reader is referred to Chapter III,
principally the overview. The nature of those principles is not what is
the most significant here; rather the fact that they were developed and
were utilized in other cases in the stream is important. Recall only
that they dealt with the kind of medical care which should be delivered
and how it could be attained; for example, the principle of medical
accountability was developed as was the idea of using "sweetened" fee
structures to encourage providers to follow the division's policies.
Within the five cases sampled here, at least eight major principles
were developed and used again in two other cases in the stream while
several others were used in one other case.
Similar development occurred in the other two streams and was des-
cribed in the conclusions to Chapters IV and V. The range of principles
in the sanction stream was not as great since the cases were more similar
in nature. But this similarity permitted the division to develop a
considerable momentum and self-confidence as it learned principles which
would help answer the questions that had to be asked in each case, such
as: how much authority does the division have (if a vacuum of authority,
step into it), on what should the charge be based (the provider's intent
is key), how severe should the punishment be (base it on the degree of
direct patient harm). In the internal administration stream, principles
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were developed not out of the detailed working through of specific situ-
ations as in the other two streams, but rather by a direct invoking of
the division's paradigm - that it must act responsibly and thus be
accountable and avoid situations where it could not hold others account-
able. Thus action was initiated or foregone based on this higher level
touchstone rather than delayed for the case to generate and demonstrate
the significance of some principle.
Thus in the fifteen cases sampled, some 39 discernible principles
were developed and utilized some 118 times, mostly within that stream
of cases I was observing,but also in other cases of new knowledge not
described hereor in routine activity. (See Figure 3 for a summary
table of principles.) Both these latter situations will be discussed
later in this section. What is equally interesting is examining whether
there was a utilization of principles not only from one case to another
case in that stream, but also from one stream to another. One would
expect any such principles to be of a high level of generality and few
in number, since the streams were quite different in content. Upon
examining the cases, those expectations were confirmed, but there were
at least ten easily identifiable principles used in such a manner. Not
surprisingly these principles, because of their level of generality,
are more closely related to the division's paradigm where acting res-
ponsibly, accountably, and in a cost effective manner (both with the
division's time and with the purchase budget) were stressed. They
are paraphrased below with identifications of 1 (New Services),2 (Sanctions),
3 (Internal Administration), to indicate in which streams they were utilized.
a. "Listen carefully to providers' points of view and
explain our policies carefully." (1,2)
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Figure 3 - Use of Principles
4j~
CO 0
(inparaphrased format) 0 P a)
PRINCIPLE >" I U2a
1. Use good fees to
encourage providers X X X X
2. Comprehensive care is
.t.o -be encouraged x X X
3. Washington's mind
can be changed if pro-
fessional allies x
developed 11.1
4. We must have a phil-
osophy behind each X X x x x x
case
5. Staff must be inter-
ested in health x x
care-
6. Child care is a high
priority x X, X
7. Clients should not
receive discrimina- X X X X X
tory care
8. Invest only in well-
managed providers Ixf X - - --- _
9. Increase federal
dollars - X
10. If a vacuum of auth-
ority exists, step X X X X x x
in.
11. Stress medical accoun-
tability X X x
12. If possible, try to
link new knowledge x X
to an existing
_program
13. If provider group
is small, wait for X X X
them to come to us
1 1 for change
14. Stay away from the
school health x
systems-
15, Clients have a right
to privacy x x
16. Don't give incen-
tives to over or X x x
under treat
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Figure 3 (cont'd.)
CASE 0 M o
Q),~f1 f54. C a
W~ r- -4 U P. ~-
e0-- C 4-W U W 4-4 0 i-PRINCIPLE 4 41 0 -.o
(in paraphrased format) - 0 . M -W M o
P4 ~ 4i 0 r r. 0 W 0
17. If high goals professed, x x
hold providers to
them -
18. You can't rely on local x x x x
offices
19. We must respond to x x
community groups.
20. Be cautious with elaborate x X
data systems.
If we don't know how, go x x x
slow at first.
22. Avoid encouraging hospi- x xx x x
tal care - - - - -
23. Avoid encouraging mainten-
ance (social) care
24. Hit one big abuser in x x
each area - - -
25.. Avoid committees, task x x x x
force liaison persons
26. A provider's intent is x x x X x
key
27. Don't sanction heavily xX x
if no direct patient harm. - -
28. We lose leverage if a x x x
provider is forced out
29. Hold providers' bills if x x x
necessary - - - ---
30. Good care not the same x x
as good treatment
31. The professions will not x x
police themselves - --
32. PMO must answer to us - -
33, Exercise of power depends x x x x x
on provider credibility -
'34. We must be accountable I - - --
35. If burnt, lay -.ow -
36. Don t worry about minor x
problems -----
37. Consumers can be over- X
whelmed I- I_ - - - -
38.. Think about provider' scon- x x xx
cerns and explain our
policies to them_
39. Regional offices should not x
develop policy
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b. "If there is vacuum of authority, do not hesitate
to step into it." (1,2)
c. "There is a need to evidence credibility before
our policies can be exercised." (1,2,3)
d. "Ignore small provider groups unless they affect
our credibility." (1,2)
e. "Do not rely on standing committees, task forces
or liaison staff to help us develop policy." (1,2,3)
f. "When evaluating providers, consider carefully their
intentions and motives but also try to work with
well-managed ones." (1,2)
g. "Ambulatory care should be emphasized rather than
hospital care." (1,3)
h. "Local welfare offices are unreliable." (1,3)
i. "There should be a readily identifiable locus of medical
accountability for each encounter between client and
provider." (1,2)
j. "Clients should not receive discriminatory treatment -
either medical or administrative." (1,3)
k. "We must have a philosophy behind each case." (1,2)
This extensive development in the cases of principles relating
to the division's tasks and their transfer to other cases, indicates
that the third level of the learning framework was achieved. But the
description of the attainment of this level of generality in the division's
systemic approach to new knowledge must be accompanied by an examination
of the nature of the principles and their function in relation to other
elements of that system.
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The principles were not a philosophy in themselves although they
represented a philosophy. Knight often said that he tried to reach
"philosophical agreements" with his staff and then permit them to
deal with situations on their own "as long as they don't go beyond the
bounds of that understanding." But upon questioning the staff, I found
that no one could recall sitting down with Knight and discussing any
agreement, nor when asked what that agreement consisted of, could they
easily reply. Knight's use of the term "philosophy" is at fault here.
The understanding which was reached was one based on principles such as
I have been describing. Taken in toto they may constitute a philosophy,
but the staff perceived them at the level of working principles and,
moreover, ones which were generated by the activity of specific cases.
More important, the principles were used as guides to the development
of policy and are thus different from the elements of the program for
action. That program's function was one of providing rules for behavior
by which the division could narrow the possible universe of actions and
place itself in situations in which the principles could be developed.
The principles, on the other hand, were specific "maxims" which were
imbedded directly in a policy of the division. For example, "touching
base" with providers (a part of the program) did not necessarily mean
that all their interests would be catered to. Rather, a principle that
came out of "touching base" with both hospital and ambulatory providers
was that ambulatory care represents a higher pay-off than hospital care.
Similarly, assuming a clear role for the division (a part of the program
nearly always observed) could result in the use of either of two prin-
ciples: "step into an authority vacuum", but "avoid entangling the
division with poorly managed providers or agencies."
-380-
In a few instances, an element of the program was so important to
Knight that he would verbalize it (e.g., in his attempts to clearly
designate responsibility and avoid the use of committees, liaison staff,
etc.) in the form of a principle. Thus an element of the program could
occasionally be used as a principle, depending on the context and the
importance of the "rule" or principle. But, in general, the two levels,
program and principle, are distinct and identifiable as different levels
of generality. A thorough examination of particular overlaps between
the two levels would not be useful here. The more important observation
is that there were two distinct levels of learning and that they both
served distinct functions.
The first function of the principles was to aid in the translation
of the paradigm of the responsible buyer. While Knight and some others
could specify that paradigm relatively clearly - i.e., it meant stressing
the role of acting accountably and buying at cost effective prices - those
directions still did not take concrete shape. They only did so in the
specific cases by the translating of that paradigm into the principles.
The paradigm, while clear and obvious, could be translated in many and
even seemingly divergent ways. For example, the buyer function could
be translated into holding providers' bills (if the "buyer" thought he
were being "cheated") or conversely, helping to speed up payment to a
favored provider if he were large and delivering good care but caught
in an emergency cash flow problem.
But exactly how were the principles linked to the paradigm, since
they were at such different levels of generality? An examination
of Figure 3 will indicate that not all of the principles themselves
appear to be at the same level of generality. For example, the principle
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of not sanctioning too harshly if no direct patient harm were involved
is clearly more specific than the principle which held that the exer-
cise of power depended on provider credibility. Those ten principles
which were identified on page 379are clearly at a high level of generality
and more directly, indicate how the division's paradigm was translated
into reality. Many of the "lesser" principles can also be shown to relate
to these more general principles and to the paradigm, but first let us examine
some of these ten.
Listening carefully to providers' points of view and explaining
policies carefully can be seen as a manifestation of the responsibility
aspect of the paradigm. Thus responsibility meant both understanding
the division's environment (i.e., the "servant" part of the civil servant)
and when policy had been set, making certain it was understood by those
affected. Responsibility was a two way concept involving an agreed
upon ("legitimate") course of action and an understanding between two
groups.
Letting small provider groups take the initiative unless a possible poor
relationship would harm its credibility can be seen as acting as a buyer,
i.e., with scarce resources, one must concentrate one's efforts but must
also maintain the confidence of the public-a facet of being responsible.
The principle of avoidance of task forces,committees and liaison per-
sonnel is also seen as a partial definition of acting responsibly since
such groups were perceived as not having the power to make decisions or
not capable of being held accountable, two of the main functions of
organizations.
Ambulatory care was to be stressed over hospital care since it
represented a far bigger payoff (i.e., a better product for the buyer)
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because it dealt primarily with mothers and children (the future generation)
and since in some sense was defined as inherently more appropriate, humane
and socially valid. Responsibility entered into this principle since
the hospital arena was heavily controlled by other agencies and the
division had little expertise; thus it seemed more responsible not to
divert scarce resources to an area in which any payoff would, in the short
run, be low.
A final example of the link between these general principles and
the paradigm would concern the principle of having a readily identi-
fiable locus of accountability for each medical encounter. If the
division were to buy a product,it should know to whom it should turn
to discuss the "product" (as should the patient). Similarly, if the
division were to be held responsible for care delivered, it should
others responsible and know just who those others were (not simply a
signature on a bill).
Other examples could be cited but the prime function of the prin-
ciples now becomes more clear - to translate the paradigm into a reality.
The other principles of lesser generality can also be seen as part of
a system of principles which constituted a working theory of how the
division should act. One might describe the shape of that system as
being one of a hierarchy of principles, but the evidence that a con-
sistent hierarchy existed was unavailable. Rather I shall only suggest
that some of the remaining principles can be seen as a subset of the
major principles just described. For example, using "sweetened" fees
was a way of encouraging ambulatory care,while stressing that clients
have a right to privacy was a natural outcrop of their receiving
discriminatory treatment. Similarly,sanctioning one big abuser in each
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area was a way of establishing across-the-board credibility in the sanction
area while avoiding school health systems stemmed directly from the prin-
ciple of avoiding poorly managed providers.
Nonetheless, some of the lesser principles found their origins in
a direct link with the paradigm. For example, encouraging comprehensive
providers of care was perceived as acting responsibly since it was a basic
and strongly held tenet of the health field. Similarly, "if we're not
sure, go slow at first" was directly related to acting as a responsible,
in this case, "prudent" buyer. Similarly good care not being the same
as good treatment would be a natural principle for a buyer who would not
simply examine elements of his product but its whole configuration.
While this link between principles and paradigm is a simple concept
to understand, the role of principles is nonetheless often acted out
differently in large bureaucracies where principles about task perform-
ance are often tacit and/or often in conflict with the espoused para-
digm or mission of the organization. That is, principles may remain
tacit and thus unavailable for conscious or directed learning. While
the role of tacit learning cannot be disregarded (Polanyi), there is
a compelling appeal to conscious and directed learning, particularly
since it is so rarely observed in government bureaus and glossed over
by students of "social development", cultural learning, and socialization.
Similarly, there is frequently a lack of concordance between working
principles and the organization's paradigm. The effect of such a lack
of concordance between an organization's espoused theory and its theory
in use has been shown to be inefficient for learning (Argyris and Schon)
and is the major reason for highlighting this aspect of the division's
model here and in Chapter VII.
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Equally important here, however, is the principles' obvious function
in advancing the division's learning. That is, they permitted the trans-
fer of knowledge from one case to another and from one stream to another
by highlighting what were the key points Knight (or staff members) felt
was important in one case. Not only did they permit a transfer of
knowledge but they did so in an economical fashion. Since the general
schema for learning we have been using assumes that learning can be
partially considered as the acquiring of patterns of behavior or thought
and their economical recall or reuse, then the division's ability to
so "learn" from one case of new knowledge to another was clearly faci-
litated by the use of the principles. For example, what was conceived
of as important in the EPSDT case was that in a vacuum, the division
could step in to fill it. That operative principle could then be
tested (and was) in the other new service cases (except 442). Similarly,
that the degree of sanctions should be related to actual patient harm
first developed in the first pharmacy case , permitted the division to
adequately determine the severity (much more severe) in the hospital
case. The "economy" functions of the principles also need to be
highlighted. Thus, the simple fact of having a body of working prin-
ciples available meant that time and energy could often be saved in
policy development. Thus in the cases mentioned above, not only did
the principles tell the actors what to do, but it permitted them to
use their resources more efficiently; for example, investing energy
with poorly managed providers (as in the HMO case) could be avoided
by simply invoking a principle.
While we have seen that the principles served an important role
in the division's model, one might inquire into the manner in which
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they were transmitted and the degree to which they were shared by all
the staff. I shall consider the latter point first since the evidence
is more clear on that point. Here the fact that the staff consciously
"performed" them, that is used (according to my earlier definition of
"use") the principles from one case to another, indicates they had been
learned. In addition, few significant disagreements with the principles
were ever voiced. Indeed, as Y.H. said, "there's not a lot of soul
searching in this organization." Of course, the division's style
facilitated this general agreement with the principles. The principles
were reasonable, Knight was involved in each cdse of new knolwedge
(a point to be discussed in Chapter VII), each unit reported directly
to him such that he could resolve any conflict of principles and the
division's open ended budgets prevented staff from feeling "their"
principles were being displaced at the expense of other program's prin-
ciples. Thus the principles were generally shared by staff members,
not only by Knight and those involved in a particular case, and this
hharing was facilitated by the division's style.
While this simple sharing by staff members does not, of course,
indicate absolute concordance with the principles-since there is little
data on the staff acting independently which would provide evidence of
the degree to which the principles were internalized. - the reverse side
of thes coin, that is the manner by which they principles gained promi-
nence, may provide some clues. It cannot be denied that the
principles represented aspects of Knight's philosphy. The principles
served to extend Knight's control over the division's activities in that
he participated in the generation of nearly all the principles and in the
resolution of any situations in which principles appeared in conflict.
-386-
The latter situation was not observed frequently as most of the principles
were consistent or at clearly-recognized different levels of significance
(e.g., "avoid the use of school physicians", but "stress comprehensive
care"). In those situations where a potential conflict of principles
was apparent, Knight would take his "calculated risk", judge one to be
more significant than the other, and proceed (e.g., "avoid poorly managed
providers" but "step into a situation of an authority vacuum" in the
FSHMC case). While the psychology of Knight and the manner in which he
calculated risks and judged significances is an interesting avenue of
exploration, it is more properly the subject of a complete and separate
study. The important feature to note here is that fact that Knight had
so structured the division that conflict rarely occurred, and when it did,
he acted as the final arbiter.
But a more probable factor in answering the degree to which the
principles were held is Knight's role as a teacher in eliciting principles.
While the teaching (see Section 5) involved many levels of content (i.e.,
policies, principles and management approach were being taught), that
style was an open and low-pressured enough one that it is difficult to
conceive of its outcome as being one in which the staff did not concur.
This is particularly so since while teaching, Knight commonly solicited
advice from the staff ("what do we want here?"). And there was
little evidence of conscious rejection by staff of any of the principles.
Thus there is considerable, although not extensive evidence, that the
principles were well imbedded in the organization. Additional speculation
on the tenacity of the principles will be presented in Chapter VII.
The use and role of the principles developed was of course not
limited to the cases described here. They also served as guides to policy
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development in other situations of new knowledge and in routine activity.
For example, in the development of a family planning program, the prin-
ciples of stressing comprehensive care, of carefully working with providers
and of using a "sweetened" fee were all invoked. In the development of
a furlough policy to permit nursing home patients to leave the home for
up to ten days and still have their bed reserved, the principles of
stepping into an authority vacuum and of changing the federal agency's
position if suitable local alliances could be formed were utilized. In
a job switch between two staff members, Knight placed one staffer in a
position where he need not have as great an interest in health care, and
one in which his need to use consultative task forces and committee meet-
ings would be lessened.
Similarly in routine areas, many of the principles proved useful.
For example, in the nursing home area, Knight and his director stressed
the principles of being open and honest with the home owners, of assuring
that clients were not discriminated against and of moving with caution on
"fancy" computerized information systems (in this case one to store infor-
mation about the availability of beds in each area). In the hospital area,
the stressing of ambulatory care led Knight to downplay the division's hos-
pital involvement as did the fact that the division had little credibility
at that time with most of the hospitals. Similarly, most were viewed as
poorly managed and Knight had often stressed the view that those situations
should be avoided unless there was an authority vacuum. In the drug
area, Knight stressed the accountability principle in requiring the
division's pharmacy manager to send out warning letters to providers -
not the advisory review committee which suggested the warning. He also
hired a professional as the second pharmacy director, thus stressing
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the importance of being able to talk to providers even though it went
against his feeling that the staff should be non-professionals.
Thus we have seen that general principles capable of utilization
in a variety of new policy situations were generated and used and also
employed in routine activity and that their use was imbedded in the
shared memory of Knight and his staff. We have also seen that the prin-
ciples served the functions of helping to translate the division's para-
digm into reality, providing an economical pool of knowledge for policy
development, and of permitting the transfer of knowledge between cases.
The use of these principles thus constituted a third level of learning,
one whose function in organizational learning is more clearly evident
than the previous level's function.
3. The Program for Action
The program for action which has been described in the cases is
similar to a computer program in that it is best understood as a set
of "rules" for behavior, in this case how to approach a wide variety of
situations of new knowledge. "Approach" means not only what initial
stance to take toward the new knowledge but also what actions to take
in order to develop a policy and to utilize principles developed elsewhere.
The acquisition of such a program by the division would indicate that it
had met the criterion of learning at the fourth level. From the earlier
definition of those levels, it would also be a program for learning the
first three levels.
It is clear from the case material that a recognizable pattern or
program for action was developed by the division. Not only was it
developed but it seemed to be developed very early in the division's
new life and applied consistently throughout, although that program was
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"fine-tuned" somewhat during the sanction stream. The function of
the program for action was to provide rules for behavior by which the division
could narrow the possible universe of actions and place itself in situa-
tions where principles could be logically evoked or generated. This
role as a preliminary to principle development was clearly an important
part of the division's approach to dealing with new situations.
Let us then summarize the nature of the program and examine its
effects. First of all we saw that the division was open to many sources
of new information and was always willing to have at least one meeting
with those concerned about how to approach the situation (e.g., the
mental health clinics). For example, Knight permitted staff to schedule
meetings on his calendar without his specific authorization and thus a
new issue always got at least one hearing. Even when it was felt that
no action could be taken, initial discussions were held and those involved
told clearly why their particular concern could not be addressed, usually
because of a lack of resources (staff time) - for example, in the day care
case or even the loss of controls case. This general openness served to
establish some minimum credibility with providers, client groups or other
state agencies.
Secondly, the division usually tried to first deal with a new
situation by making an analogy to some previous situation or by trying to
'squeeze" the new theme into an existing set of activities within the
division; for example, EPSDT was seen as being only regular comprehensive
pediatric care, as was the 442 service at first. The Consumer Board was
seen as analogous to a neighborhood health center board and day care for
the elderly was basically similar to home health care. Many researchers
have stated that the use of analogy is so pervasive that it is one of the
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prime features of (low level) learning and we should not be surprised to
set it at work here. Its main purpose in the division was, of course,
to conserve staff time and energy. If some new input was similar to
something already in existence, it became very easy to deal with (at
least conceptually) and energy could be devoted to routine tasks or
other new situations.
Thirdly, the division would always strongly stake out its respon-
sibility in a new area. It assumed that it had a "right" to be involved
in the area and it assumed that right with some degree of "moral author-
ity". In all the sanction cases and in most of the new service cases,
Knight clearly stated what he felt the division's role should be; for
example, in the HMO program he felt no compulsion to continue a con-
tract which had not been proven viable to him nor did he want the HSA
agency "committing" Medicaid dollars for the 442 program without his
authority. This staking out of turf was not done in an initially detailed
way - more often the staff would later have to "run back and forth over
the turf to be sure it was not being trespassed upon" (R.T.). This whole
strategy could, of course, have unforeseen consequences, particularly
when the decision was made not to take action, as in the EPSDT or field
case.
The next step in the program was usually to advance a fairly specific
goal for the new area. The goal might well change over time and often
did, but it gave some direction to the actors involved and insured some
initial action. A complete "solution" did not have to be worked out
right away. This gave staff something to focus on and an avenue by which
they could learn by doing; for example, the decision to experiment with
two centers in the mental health clinic program, to clean up some of the
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monitoring problems in the HMO program or even to decide that "we're
either going to sanction this guy or suspend him" (second drug case).
After setting an initial goal, Knight then clearly assigned res-
ponsibility for the new knoinledge, usually to one staff member or
occasionally taking it upon himself: "I very carefully delegate
authority and responsibility" (Knight). He rarely assigned responsi-
bility to a group or committee. This had the effect of insuring that
outsiders knew who to come to for information and that they were not
bounced around as is typical in many bureaucracies. This strategy,
of course, was particularly useful with the young staff since they all
felt a need to prove themselves and to deal "responsibly" with the
new task. With an older staff, that strategy might not have been as
effective since, when vested with full responsibility over a program,
more entrenched staffers could always find reasons for not acting.
Nonetheless the strategy worked well here and only backfired twice
(the loss of controls and the field cases where the delegated staff
did not have the required competence) and only created additional costs
in one area (day care for the elderly) where the three staff members
spent considerable time "muddling through" a problem which was none-
theless successfully resolved.
Knight next of all managed to impart to his staff that rules and
regulations of either the federal or state bureaucracies were but fragile
boundaries. They were seen as "bendable" or at least open to the inter-
pretation of the division. The background of Knight and his staff did
not prepare them for the usual heavy reliance by long-term bureaucrats
on the "regs". He saw regulations as only one hurdle that had to be
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confronted in a path of action, the prime step in that path being "know-
ing what to do". This bending and liberal interpretation of regulations
was apparent in all the sanction streams, in the EPSDT and 442 cases
and in most of Knight's act:kity in acquiring personnel.
The next step in the program for action was usually to rely upon
some close trusted professional friends or on Knight's own past exper-
ience in deciding what the "right policy" should be. This was clearly
evident in the selection of the division's consultants for all the new
services cases and in his reliance on his neighborhood health center
experience in the 442, HMO and FSMHC cases, and in his reliance on past
business experience in the sanction and internal administration stream.
This led some staff to feel that the agency was developing "tunnel vision"
("Don is always careful to get consultants he agrees with") but there was
no indication that this strategy adversely affected the division's per-
formance. Rather, in a turbulent environment, it enabled it to deal
with the uncertainties of new knowledge in a cost/effective way particu-
larly since the relevance of that past experience and the personal credi-
bility of the consultants was accepted by the providers and agencies the
division dealt with.
It was only after first consulting this rather close knit circle
in order to establish a position that the division began to involve the
whole range of provider groups. This was done very consciously as Knight
often told staff members to "be sure to touch base" with the dentists,
clinics, hospitals, etc. This touching base involved explaining the
division's evolving position and asking for additional input. The credi-
bility the division so carefully built up through good management of its
routine activity was thus embellished by their actions with new areas
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involving providers. There was clearly a lesser felt need to do this
when Knight "knew" he was acting correctly, as in the sanction stream
(although he did involve the Medical Society on two occasions there)
or in the internal administration stream.
Another feature of the program was the division's increasing willing-
ness to experiment. In all the new services cases we saw that rather than
implement a policy across the board the division would test a policy out
with a few providers in order to see if it worked. In Knight's mind
these were more "demonstration projects" than experiment , but the willing-
ness to approach them that way meant the staff could learn from such experi-
ments, before having deal with a full-blown program. This experimantal
posture was also evident in some of the sanction cases (e.g., physician
audits) and to some extent in the internal administration stream with the
consumer board and the mapas (after a year of neglect).
Coupled with this experimental attitude was the division's ability
to turn problems into opportunities. That is, when forced to do something
(EPSDT) or when cleaning up an administrative nightmare (HMO's and Loss of
Controls) it used that problem situation to develop new policies in the
area (i.e., pediatric standards, defining a good HMO and eventually pro-
gramming incompatible medical procedures). Knight was an entrepreneur
by training and in spirit and he saw each situation as, in addition to
being a problem, an opportunity to learn. Thus in many of the cases,
the original "definition" of the situation was considerably enlarged by
himself and eventually by the new staff who had not experienced the "seige"
mentality of the long-term staff.
An important consequence of the program was the existence of the
"nagging ego" syndrome which I have outlined in each of the cases. This
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was particularly strong when Knight usurped policy initiative or when
the ability of the division to obtain direct feedback from the environ-
ment was constrained. It was nonetheless real, however, as most of the
staff often admitted to the researcher that, despite what appeared to
be an "efficient" program for learning and shared confidence in the
rightness of the principles developed, "we don't really know if we're
having any real effect". That is, were services actually being delivered
to clients in the way their evolving policies specified? The nagging
ego syndrome was behavior which was directly associated with each case
and its resolution through the program. That is, the syndrome could be
as easily observed (through dialogue and interviews) as the elements of
the program. The syndrome will be considered again however, in dealing
with the limits and possible future of the division's model; here I
only wish to indicate its relation to the program for action.
I have suggested that this program for action was really a program
for learning, that is, it provided rules for action in order to develop
new policies or to utilize polciess developed elsewhere. But why-should
such a program of tacit rules be needed and how do they differ from the
principles generated at the previous level. The response is that the
program seemed to provide a way of initially dealing with the uncertainty
inherent in new knowledge. Thus we can look at the dozen or so features
of the program as a "program" for first deciding whether and how much
effort to put into a new situation. Once a decision had been made to
invest energy then, and only then, could a principle be developed, since
the division was not given to "abstract" development of principles.
Secondly, the program helped to remove uncertainty by placing it in
situations in which it could eliminate the bulk of a much greater set
-395-
of possible, or inferred, principles, although these "particular"
situations also generated additional principles.
The above observations come first of all from examining the degree
to which the division was open to new inputs and the degree to which
it assumed its "rightful" perogatives (the first and third features of
the program). Thus both being open to all new inputs and then, at a
first rough level, "selecting" those in which the division had a right-
ful perogative were ways of deciding whether to invest energy. Recall
that while in most of the cases described those two features were present,
but their degree varied. For example, the division was less open in the
field case than in the FSMHC case and less strongly asserted its authority
in the day care case as compared to the EPSDT case. The factors which
best seem to explain this variance are the degree to which Knight "wanted"
something (that is, the priority he placed on the area), the degree to
which he thought it could be attained, and the degree to which it could
be controlled if obtained. Thus he moved more strongly in the sanction
cases than in the HMO case since he clearly wanted a sanction program,
he avoided the 442 program at first since he was not certain he could be
effective due to the program being run by another agency, and he moved
more strongly in the HMO area than with the local welfare offices since
one was clearly more manageable (controllable) than the other. These
"rules" for assignment of energy seem simplistic of course, but many
authors (e.g., Rogers, J.D. Thompson and even Stafford Beers) have
suggested the importance of such simple rules in dealing with new situations.
Once a decision had been made to invest energy, a second decision
had to be made; that is, how to develop a bounded response to the complexity
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of factors in the situation. By "bounding the complexity", I refer
here to the manner in which the division defined for itself those
political, technical and administrative factors which it considered
relevant. "Bounding" does not necessarily indicate a narrowing of
alternatives, since some steps in that program were designed to generate
alternatives. Other steps served to eliminate possible policies. One
might construct a decision tree or "action tree" outlining how the
division bounded the new knowledge. But analysis here cannot be that
precise; the program for learning gives us only some indication of the
branches of that "action tree", not the precise order in which they fit.
The first way of bounding a new situation was to directly compare it
to another situation where possible, i.e., the use of analogy. Then,
if it was not obviously similar to a current activity, the division
could first of all "bend" the regulations since Knight often knew what
he wanted and did not feel overly constrained by them. If, however,
the knowledge of "right policy' was not immediately *available, he would
rely on a few close professional friends to further bound the problem.
Still further work might be needed to convince doubters of the policy
decision so an experiment could be made but one whose basic purpose was
to demonstrate the viability of the chosen direction. Knight believed
there were no right or wrong answers therefore one must make a "best
judgment" and act. His "knowing" or appearing to know thus seemed to
be partially responsible for the creation of the nagging ego problem
among the staff. (See Chapter VII, page 4 5 0 for further discussion.)
Finally, if all the above had failed to produce a satisfactorily bounded
response, then Knight would touch base with a larger circle of rele-
vant members of his environment if he thought it useful or if it fit
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his style. By that point a "solution" usually had been generated.
While the responses to the problem of how to bound the new know-
ledge are somewhat more complex than the factors which determined
how much energy should be directed to it, they are still easily compre-
hendible in that they are all rooted in action, not analysis. Con-
siderable analysis might take place (e.g., with trusted friends) but
the end result was to be a workable policy, not a "correct solution".
Thus these two qualities of Knight, i.e., dealing with the possible
and concentrating on producing a workable solution differ somewhat from
the attitudes often underlying the crisis or guerilla models of change,
a part also to be further discussed in Chapter VII. The program for
learning then, despite its weaknesses, did present a set of actions
which would ration scarce energy resources, bound the inherent uncer-
tainty of a new knowledge situation and result in new policies and
principles.
A notable aspect of this whole program for learning is that it
was a generally tacit program. That is, no one stated clearly (as
they did with the principles discussed earlier or the paradigm) that,
for example, "we should try to squeeze this new service into an
existing one" or that "we should ignore the regulations", or that "we
should experiment". They simply did those things and were "observed"
by the researcher through his reconstruction of the events which con-
stituted the case. Only the delegation of responsibility and the
touching base with providers were explicitly stated.
Recall that the principles developed were done so very explicitly.
The distinction between the two levels (principles and program) is not
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however based on one being tacit and one explicit, and thus we cannot
say that such a distinction is necessary for learning to occur at the
third and fourth levels. Yet the obvious difference in explicitness
between the two levels in this particular organization does raise
interesting questions. It is unclear why such differences occurred.
On the one hand there seemed to be a choice by Knight to explicitly
concentrate on principle development, the paradigm and management.
Thus one would certainly expect certain features of a system of learn-
ing to be implicit or tacit and since these features in the division's
system were so explicit it comes as no surprise here that others were
tacit. Polanyi has suggested there is very likely a maximum amount
of explicit learning which can take place, but unfortunately this
theme and its relation to the division's learning cannot be explored
with justice here. However, the significance and function of the
tacitness of the program for action will be more fully considered in
Chapter VII.
Because of this generally tacit nature, it is difficult to assess
the degree to which the program for action was imbedded in the division's
behavior since it was not codified in official policy or available in
records or documents. The continual presence of Knight as the main
actor in all the cases also skewed a possible assessment of the degree
to which the program was held independently of Knight. In a sense the
program was his program, although staff members willingly shared that
program and acted it out under Knight's guidance.
A search for situations in which new knowledge was processed
without a considerable involvement by Knight was made and proved to
be generally unfruitful. What appeared to be the most common pattern
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was for staff to engage in some sort of "holding pattern" in which,
if Knight's attention could not be directed to a new area or if he
told staff in less than clear terms to ignore the area, they simply
did a minimum amount of work on it. That is, they would monitor the
situation to make sure it did not "explode" in the division's face
and generally do as little as possible. "We just try to keep on top
of it...and be ready to go to Don if necessary." (L.A.) There was no
significant concern on staff members' parts about the need for these
holding patterns since it was clear there were usually other tasks
at least equally valuable on which to work and staff knew they could
always reapproach Knight if "trouble was brewing".
There did appear to be one exception to this general observa-
tion and that is the case of Y.H., the nursing home director. He
had previously worked at the Human Services Agency and had designed
several new programs there which he then implemented fairly indepen-
dently when he was "parachuted" into the medical division. On some
other issues he continued to rely on the HSA secretary and undersecretary
as his mentors. Knight said that this situation was a "bone in my
throat which I've had to contend with" but since he felt confidence
in Y.H.'s competence, he had no choice but to tolerate the situation
and simply kept himself informed about Y.H.'s action so that he would
be assured "that I was acting responsibly" (Y.H.).
This continual presence of Knight thus prohibits making a strong
assertion that the program was fully held by the division members
although the HMO, Day Care and Loss of Controls cases indicate that
staff members could evolve such a program on their own although it
would take more time and energy. Here, in the absence of either
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explicitly stated behavior or recorded documents as evidence of the
program's degree of imbeddedness, we must consider the division as a
system of relationships between individuals, ideas and structures.
Rather than assert that Knight, or any individual or group did or did
not learn the program, it's thus possible to suggest that a system
of relationships was built up in which the division's actors, together,
evolved a consistent pattern of action in which various concepts and
structures were manipulated by them to produce policies and routine
performances. Since the pattern of relationships is the organization,
then it can be said that the division did have imbedded in it a program
for learning. That that program may have been primarily due to any
one particular feature (i.e., Knight's presence) and the effects of
the absence of that element will be answered in Chapter VII.
The division then, can be said to have met the criteria established
earlier for fourth level learning; it had developed and performed a
pattern of behavior which generated additional behaviors and concepts
at lower levels through its confrontation with situations of new knowledge.
The program for action then constitutes learning at the fourth level
I have defined. Up to this point it has been possible to describe what
the division learned; that is, the content of the four levels I have
described were seen as successive levels of learning and the very
achievement of each of the levels or plateaus indicated that learning
had occurred. These levels, which were first described in Chapter III
are roughly hierarchical in that the achievement of each level helped
to improve learning at the lower levels. Thus:
Level I - producing a policy or attitude towards the
situation of new knowledge, one which is
shared by the division's environment
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Level 2 - routinizing or implementing that policy
Level 3 - generating principles for the design of
those policies or for their transfer to
other cases
Level 4 - learning a "program" for learning levels 1,2 and 3
Each of the first four levels thus constituted not only "what" the
division learned, but the "what" was also the "how" of the next lower
level. But the program for action however is the last level of learning
for which this can be said unequivocably. That is, beyond the fourth
level we cannot be certain that the manner or approach by which the
division learned at these lower levels was also learned.
Thus other features of the division also contributed to the learning
at these lower levels but were not so obviously learned by all the
division. These other factors, moreover, were not fully specified in
advance of the research; rather they were induced from the fifteen case
situations. This limited data base indicates that they cannot yet be
legitimately proposed as further levels (criteria) of learning despite
the intuitive appeal of some of them, e.g., the teaching style and their
obvious use by Knight as a method of inducing learning. Their utility
then lies in showing how this particular organization evolved the not
inconsiderable learning at the first four levels. Whether these features
would have utility in other situations and whether they might be seriously
advanced as "necessary" criteria in defining a learning organization will
be discussed in Chapter VII.
These other factors, which are three in number, constitute what I
shall label as the overall approach of the division. That approach
was composed of an obvious teaching style and the recruitment of competent
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"learners", a unique management approach which won organizational credi-
bility and permitted learning to evolve and a conscious organizational
paradigm, all of which were acted out at roughly increasing levels of
both generality and explicitness. That approach, as I shall describe
it, was initially Knight's approach. Although it may be seen as his own
program for learning in that it was his approach to developing learning
at the lower levels, in some cases we shall see that that approach was
shared, while in other cases it was impossible to assess the degree to
which it had been internalized by all the staff.
4. Teaching Style
Knight's teaching style was, I have asserted, one of the primary
factors not only in the development of specific new principles in the
cases described but also in the division's success in managing routine
activities, since that style was applied to the latter area where the
content of what was taught was the management style and strategies which
are described in Section 5. Conversely, Knight viewed his management
approach as including the teaching style. The staff perceived them
as overlapping somewhat but the two are distinguishable for several reasons.
First, the teaching style better and more fully explains the development
of new principles than the manement approach, and I have thus separated
it out for analysis here. Also the teaching style was primarily limited
to Knight whereas the management style was transferred and acted out by
staff members.
The teaching style contained many elements which could be considered
more unconventional than those of the management style and is thus worthy
of separate analysis. Finally, the degree of explicitness of elements
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of the teaching style was less than that of the management approach
although the teaching style was clearly more explicit than the pro-
gram for learning. I shall later describe even greater degrees of
explicitness as the management approach and the use of the paradigm
are discussed. Here, by "explicit" I mean that both Knight and the
staff were much more aware of the techniques being used than with the
program for learning and were aware that the process constituted a
"teaching" style. The style was not only relatively explicit but was
consistent throughout; that is, Knight did not appear to develop any
new elements of his style over time.
As was described in earlier chapters, we saw that the greatest
use of teaching occurred in the new services stream. Here not only
did the staff "need" to learn since the material being dealt with
was new, but since much of that material was new to Knight, he, too,
had to learn. Thus some of the teaching was clearly a self-education
process for Knight. In the sanction stream, we saw less teaching
since the content and the actors of that stream were more restricted in
scope, since one of the students (R.D.) was not amenable to Knight's
teaching style, and because Knight already "knew" many of the principles
to be developed since they had less pure medical content. In the final
stream, even less teaching was evident, primarily because, either
consciously or unconsciously, little energy was devoted to much of the
new knowledge or because teaching was not needed since Knight felt the
staff was already competent (Lack of Controls, Consumer Advisory Board)
or inaccessible to his style (Field).
The content of what was "taught" in each of the cases may be
observed at three levels. Most obviously, Knight would, through the
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use of that style, act in concert with the staff to generate the
principles described in Section 4. Occasionally a policy might be
directly involved by the teaching style (e.g., "let's use teams of
evaluators from the neighborhood health centers for 442") but more
frequently the general principles would be the observed outcome of
the teaching style. The second common use of the style was to transmit
the management outlook of Knight. This was more usually observed
in the routine areas where, for example, Knight would often call on
his past experience to deliver concise lectures, e.g., be sure
to record all decisions made either by letter to the affected party
or in a memo for the record. As I have suggested, it was then the
division's adequate performance in routine areas which permitted it
to engage in new areas. Finally, the teaching style must also account
for much of the transmittal of the program for learning described
earlier. This is difficult to prove, of course, because of the tacit
nature of that program, but I would suggest that the teaching style,
(primarily the element of permitting staff to "watch" the decision
process) was the manner by which that program became imbedded in the
division's repertoire of actions. It was initially Knight's program
but the staff eventually came to perform it in concert with him.
Let us now consider the various elements of the teaching style.
The style consisted of many elements, some of which might not commonly
be considered to be attributes of teaching, for example "declaring" a
principle to be self-evident. I suspect, however, that that element
is more common in conventional teaching approaches than realized. But
more important than debate over any particular element is the cumulative
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nature of the elements; together they constituted a clearly recognizable
style - which I have labelled "teaching".
We first saw how Knight used the informal matrix in late 1973 as
a device to spread around whatever knowledge did exist in the division
to all its members. This helped not only to educate the new staff
but also permitted Knight to observe the relations between the new and
old staff and redirect any irrelevant teaching by the latter if neces-
sary. I will not dwell on this first element of the teaching style
since it has been discussed at length in Chapter II.
The second element was Knight's general availability to staff.
Rarely did he "turn off" a staff member and then he usually did so
by saying, "well, what do you think is the answer to that problem".
For example, in the HMO case, he was very available to N.E. for at
least the first several months. Thus few of the staff felt he was
unapproachable when a new situation arose and there was clearly an
open background in which learning could occur.
A third element was Knight's habit of letting people watch his
decision-making. This was most obvious in the use of his "fly on the
wall" technique. Irregardless of the rightness or wrongness of those
decisions, it is clear that this technique helped staff to understand
and more importantly identify with the decisions and the style in
which they were made. As one scaffer put it: "The person then has
to act like you or he's not accepted." Also important was his willing-
ness to let virtually anyone from the staff, particularly in the early
days, drop in on meetings in his office and just observe the decision
process, often while waiting for a chance to talk to Knight on some
other issue. These techniques could be analyzed in depth as socialization
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of the most subtle and powerful order but their effectiveness in trans-
mitting a style, a sense of priorities and specific principles, is
highlighted here.
The next element of Knight's teaching approach was one of anti-
cipating an individual's personal style so that they might learn by
themselves. Thus, for example, with Y.H. and R.K. he permitted their
recognizable brashness to flourish although it was not at all his
style. This enabled staff to make mistakes as well as positive contri-
butions, secure in the knowledge that Knight could reverse or adjudicate
their mistakes if he had to. This is not simply the old and recognizable
tactic of letting staff take a hard line on an issue and when the dis-
satisfied opponent seeks a higher level of decision, he finds the agency
head to be more flexible on the issue. It was that, but it was also
a way of letting staff make their own mistakes, but under supervision.
The difficulty of permitting this freedom of style was that if a particular
style was unsuitable for the agency (e.g., R.D. or some of the long-term
staff), Knight had no readily available tool to change that style other
than to ease them out of the agency or away from major responsibilities.
A fifth feature was Knight's continually asking, "what do we want
here?" This was clearly evident in, for example, the 442, day care for
the elderly, and sanction cases. This ability to start from scratch
and to isolate the ker elements of a situation was recognized by most
of the staff and was appreciated. Moreover, while he might often have
formed his own idea (e.g., in the FSMHC case), he generally used that
style of questioning in a non-rhetorical and sincere manner with the
staff. ("Don sees things in a logical way. He's able to isolate the
bottlenecks and power plays and makes it seem more simple.")
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Knight also explained decisions carefully. It was rare that a
decision was not concluded by a "because". For example, in the FSHMC
and second drug cases, the reasons for the downplaying of the indepen-
dent role of social workers or for permitting a restitution of money
and not a suspension were carefully explained and, in fact, became
principles used in later cases. While Knight was only human, of course,
and no doubt occasionally made decisions on obscure or personal grounds,
a justification - if not a reason - was usally given. Coupled with this
was Knight's habit of presenting principles within a specific context.
That is, principles were developed first of all in specific cases, and
their invoking at a later time was usually done in a related context.
They were not seen as abstract principles to be learned, but rather were
working principles. Even when the more general principles such as a
belief in the effectiveness of ambulatory care were advanced, they were
not done with any sense of messianic dogma, but rather the principles
were clearly seen as relating to some goal and not important in themselves.
Knight would, however, on occasion simply declare a principle to be
self-evident, such as holding a provider's current bills while under
sanction investigation. This was not done often but the clarity, and
to Knight, logic of such ideas seemed to be easily accepted by the staff
(Knight: "my view is a logical process").
Another feature of the teaching style was Knight's non-critical
attitude. That is, he considered mistakes to be inevitable and part
of the learning process ("so what if you make ten mistakes a year -
I'm not a guilty person and I don't think in terms of right or wrong").
The sharpest example in the cases described was in the MA-7 case with
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R.T.'s admitted "mistakes" - that is, his mind could be changed on an
issue although he rarely publicly admitted "a mistake". Rather, like
many strong leaders, he simply changed his behavior. A clear example
here would be the use of the press in the hospital sanction case.
He did not like to feel he had been "wrong" but clearly tuned down
such prior contact with the press in future sanction cases.
Knight would often invoke his past experience as a very relevant
criterion saying, "I learned in the sporting goods business that..."
or "we learned at the XYZ health center that you can use nurse prac-
titioners but they have to be under the strong supervision of a phy-
sician". Similarly, when a set of "past experiences" had occurred
within the division he would often invoke these as a form of evolved
precedents. That is, a cluster of principles which they had evolved
would become apparent (as in the mental health field) and he would
summarize them, usually at monthly staff meetings or to relevant
outsiders, such as the federal agency (SRS) or the press, in the presence
of staff.
The use of experimentation as a learning style has been discussed
elsewhere so it will only be highlighted here as another element in
the teaching style. While Knight often saw experimentation as a
device for demonstration, it is clear that the staff learned from this
(e.g., in the FSHMC and 442 cases) even if he felt his own personal
learning to be less significant. Indeed, the increasing use of experi-
mentation in the new services stream would seem to indicate that what-
ever its precise rationale, it was perceived as effective.
Finally, the vocabulary of teaching was important. Knight con-
tinuously used the word "learned" in his speech. He would ask "what
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have we learned" or he would state it: "We've learned.. .". This
observation is impossible to "prove" of course, but after noticing
it for the first time, the researcher was struck by the continued
frequency with which the word was used. Certainly the use of the
word and concept is so intuitively appropriate for a teaching/learning
situation that its importance was probably underestimated by the divi-
sion. Indeed Knight was not even aware of his frequent use of a
"learning vocabularly".
These elements then, constituted the teaching style of the
assistant commissioner and were, I believe, a major factor in the
achievement of the four levels of learning described in Sections 1
and 2. Most obviously the teaching style was used in the generation
and use of principles (third level) but the style was also used directly
in policy development for new or routine areas (first level) where
Knight's prior health and industry experience were transmitted to
the staff via his teaching style and in the build up of the shared
program for learning (level four).
But this teaching could not have had its effect without the
existence of a competent group of "students". The general charac-
teristics of the staff have been extensively described in Chapter II
and the case development, but it bears repeating that a cadre of young,
well-education and inexperienced staff was indispensible for the success
of this style. Most of the long-term staff also reacted moderately
well to this style although their actual behavior showed less change.
Each expressed to the researcher some variant of "Don's experience in
the sporting goods business has been really useful" or "Don is really
a good teacher". I suspect the long term staff reacted this way not
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only because of the inherent utility and appeal of the teaching style
but also because they sensed the situation could have been worse, i.e.,
other new political appointees in the state had been known to sweep
out the old-timers or totally relegate them to obscure responsibilities.
While I have not suggested that the teaching style is a necessary
component of a learning organization and thus subject to some of the
same criteria used to evaluate the earlier levels of learning, one
might apply one of those criterion, namely to what degree the teaching
style was imbedded in the organization apart from Knight. From one
perspective, the style was clearly a part of the division's routine
set of relationships since the young staff willingly participated in
that style and indeed were a necessary component of it. A more rigorous
test might be to examine whether the teaching style itself was being
acquired by staff members. Since so few members of the division had
staff of their own (the larger span of control) this was impossible to
assess. In the few cases (R.K. and Y.H.) where members did have staff,
data which might confirm the depth of acquisition of the style was
impossible to collect. Thus we can only state with surety that the
teaching style was an important component of this learning organization.
The teaching style was, however, only one of the three components
of Knight's approach which contributed to the division's success at
developing new policies, learning new principles, and developing a
program for learning. His management approach was another.
5. The Management Approach
The overall management style of Knight, discussed in the case
material, bears some similarity to his teaching approach but I analyze
it separately here primarily since the latter appeared to be relatively
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unique and also since it contributed more directly to the way in which
principles were developed in each of the new knowledge situations. The
management style, however, was more explicit and was transmitted to the
staff somewhat more thoroughly. It was also more conventional, and was
used more directly in routine activity.
Let us first consider the conventionality of the management style.
It was referred to by the Commissioner as "Don's unorthodox management
style". Yet it was not all that unorthodox nor indeed was it difficult
to understand although it was a style composed of many elements. Each
element in itself has been used by successful managers since time began
and each one "made sense" given the context and personal qualities of
both Knight and the staff. What seemed to be the basis of the Commissioner's
observation was that the elements, when combined, formed a naturally
more individual style; but more importantly, their combination with the
teaching approach did constitute a unique and effective approach.
The management style was also more explicit than the teaching style
or the program for learning. Both Knight and the staff could describe
most of its elements and irdeed some of them were taught as principles
both for new situations or for the management of routine activity. The
management style was also more fully absorbed by staff than was the
teaching style which we have just indicated was limited primarily to
Knight.
The management style also had greater effect on the division's
routine activity than the teaching style. Here competent management
of the division's routine processes produced a "product" - organizational
credibility. That product - which Knight defined as "having integrity"
meant that the division should have policies, that they should be
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available to providers and clients, that they be relatively coherent
and consistent and that the division attempt to live up to them. That
credibility then gave the division "breathing room" in which to explore
and deal with areas of new knowledge without facing excessive external
pressures or constraints.
In the new services stream, the importance of the management style
in establishing credibility in routine areas was clearly significant
since most of the new services were at the "edges" of some existing
service (e.g., mental health clinics or HMO's) in which there was
considerable contact with providers on a routine basis. In the sanction
stream, the role of prior credibility was less direct since sanctions
were a totally new effort, but the personal integrity and credibility
of the staff during the sanction stream contributed much here to the
success of that stream in the providers' and the public's eyes. In
the internal administration stream, the management style was less in
evidence since it required interaction between Knight and his staff,
and, as we have seen, much of that stream involved little action at all.
For the new situations we have described, the management style
was also useful. Since the new areas were more visible to providers,
the way in which they were dealt with becomes important and here the
division's environment saw the use of Knight's same managment style
in dealing with these new areas as also being inherently credible.
Equally important, the use of that style provided a fertile background
of certainty and confidence in which teaching could take place and in
which the division's program for action could transform complex new
knowledge into workable policy responses.
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The style consisted of many elements, all of which have been par-
tially described in earlier chapters. Here I will briefly summarize
each, but principally attempt to show how they helped in the building
up of the division's credibility. First, Knight used a wide span of
control - over ten people reported directly to him. What this primarily
meant, of course, was that it gave him direct access to all the staff
so that his teaching style could take hold. It thus meant that he
could control the development of new principles and, also, since his
personal credibility was ugh, the organization could directly share
his personal credibility.
A second feature was his "open door policy". This assured, along
with the wide span of control, that he could keep tabs on all routine
activity, and serve as the integrator or resolver of problems. It
of course also meant that staff would bring all new situations to his
attention and is the main reason we found so few situations involving
new knowledge where Knight was not involved.
But the credibility did not flow only one way. Knight's use of
very competent staff gained credibility with the environment and even
reflected back on him ("Don personifies the achievements of his office").
More importantly, however, was his techniqu2 of "letting people find
their own slots" and the use of staff new to the medical field. These
unconventional (for an understaffed agency) techniques insured both
that people would "get their own egos involved" and thus become committed
to an area and that, as newcomers, they would ask "naive questions" about
established beliefs, e.g., why should physicians not be more responsive
to clients and to those who pay the bills.
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Another feature of his style was the creation of a climate of
certainty in late 1973 by the use of the "informal matrix" which was
discussed in Chapter II. Recall that this was a certainty about "how
to go about our job" and not about the effects of that performance
and thus does not respond to the "nagging ego problem" discussed
earlier. The climate of certainty, while a part of the management
process which generated divisional credibility, was also more directly
related to that credibility, not only in that the confidence permitted
the rest of the management process to be credibly carried out but also
since confidence in itself may be seen as an element of credibility.
Thus the environment would ascribe more credibility to the agency if
it believed it to be acting with confidence. Here confidence is seen
as an inherently positive feature, especially in a situation where the
division had so long felt overwhelmed by its tasks.
This early structural setup then evolved in 1974 into a situation
in which very clear delegation of authority to specific managers was
made and in which the use of committees, task forces or liaison staff
was minimized since those bodies avoided making decisions and could not
be held accountable. This evolved structure also helped considerably in
gaining external credibility since providers and other agencies knew
precisely where to go for answers. It did, of course, begin to present
some problems as the scope of a'tivities of the division got larger and
the staff maintained less contact with each other. For example, the
sanctioning of a family planning clinic was carried out by the sanction
director without routinely verifying with the planning director whether
that action might cut off access to care in a particular geographic area.
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Concurrent with this was a cluster of management outlooks which
began with the avoidance of "non-line" units such as research, planning,
or budgeting. On the one hand the small personnel complement hardly
permitted such luxuries, but Knight firmly believed that "managing
should be done by managers" and that overall long-term policy in an
area was best set by those who understood it through operational
experience. He thus tried to push information downward in the organiza-
tion so that "things don't pile up on my desk" and saying, "you've got
the necessary information to make those decisions". Since committees
could not be relied upon and since staff units were a luxury, he encour-
aged staff to cultivate many sources of information outside the bureau-
cracy in order to acquire relevant "intelligence" often denied to a
central office division.
Knight also kept a very close check on staff performances, parti-
cularly when he was assigning new responsibilities. He would utilize
reports from providers who had dealt with the staff and he would often
ask for generalized reviews by each staff member as to how he were pro-
gressing. He nonetheless thought "work should be fun" and permitted a
very open, casual style of interaction in the office - as long as the
job got done. He did worry about such transgressions as excessive coffee
breaks but only because other DPW staff would see that as poorly affecting
the division's credibility. There was, however, a significant absence
of "human relations" type activities, i.e., inquiring of staff how their
personalities and problems interacted with their jobs and how staff re-
lated to each other. On the one hand, such organizational development
activities were clearly less needed since staff interacted mainly with
Knight and not with each other and also since they were generally pleased
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that they had been permitted to "find their own slots". On the other
hand, Knight was perceived as a somewhat shy individual and appeared
to feel uncomfortable with such personal problems. The result was that
any personal problems were discussed by the staff among themselves. Such
discussions usually centered on what it was like to be in their first
responsible job or the intriguing character and style of Knight.
Before considering the final three elements of Knight's style,
ones which were more directly related to the establishment of credi-
bility, it is worth mentioning a "tactic" which was of considerable
internal utility in maintaining a sense of what the division was doing.
Here Knight continually stressed "putting things in writing". The
potential for "slippage" in bureaucracies is so great that he stressed
that requests and commitments made should be recorded in writing so
that there would be less possibility to misunderstand these situations
when they later came up for discussion. The use of "memos for the
record" was also stressed. It is clear that these tactics helped the
credibility of the division - particularly with providers - while within
the bureaucracy it may not have won many friends but it did help to
bring order to a complex set of tasks.
The first of these final three elements is, as we have seen, Knight's
continual stress on the direction the division should be going ("manage-
ment is knowing where you want to go"). The prior lack of leadership
in the division had, along with other features such as late payment of
bills, damaged its external credibility considerably. In a world where
the choices were many, some kind of definite direction was perceived by
providers as better than none at all. That sense of direction, evident
in all the cases described earlier (save the loss of controls and field
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cases) clearly also helped the staff in developing their own sense of
direction. As most had had little experience, this feature was absolutely
necessary, but it also had benefits for external credibility. Within
that sense of direction, however, Knight permitted an experimental style
(already discussed in Section 4) and advocated an "entrepreneurial"
approach, one which was opportunistic (e.g., the joining of two streams
of activity in the physicians' audits cases) but one which willingly
tolerated "mistakes".
Knight also stressed that the division should act in "cost/effec-
tive" ways. Whether this meant stressing ambulatory care which in the
long run would be cost effective, or simply meant not assigning resources
to areas where it appeared the payoff was low (i.e., the local welfare
offices) it made sense to providers. It also meant that the division could
avoid doing a bad job in certain areas, thus further damaging its repu-
tation. But more importantly, it simply made inherent sense to providers
and other bureaucrats and thus helped to win their respect.
The final element of the managerial style was a direct approach
to the importance of credibility or integrity. Knight simply stressed
continuously that "we must act with integrity". He emphasized all
the elements of that integrity, being sure that there were policies for
each of the service areas, that they were written down in the policy
manual and that they were coherent and consistent. This was a repeated
theme and one whose blockage by, say, the departmental office in charge
of distributing policy to the field irritated him considerably. This
direct approach to the importance of integrity ("we are responsible for
what we do") is perhaps the most indicative of Knight's overall concep-
tion of the division's role, at least half of it - the other half being
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the achievement of goals. In fact, the two were inseparable since
Knight was convinced that in the situation he found himself, purposes
could only be achieved by demonstrating integrity.
But how widespread was this management style? Was it only Knight's
way, in combination with his teaching style, of inducing learning at
the first four levels or did staff members acquire that style also?
It is difficult to assess this properly since I have not examined in
detail the routine activities of the division where staff acted more
independently, and since they usually acted in conjunction with Knight
in new areas. Several ways of assessing the effect of Knight's manage-
ment style can be utilized however. One would be to describe Knight's
use of his management style in routine activity while a second would be
to directly ask the staff involved about that style. A third possibility
would be to explore that theme with informed outsiders from the division's
environment. Finally one could explore situations where the division's
"good management" failed it and then explore the consequences for the
division's credibility. This combination of approaches is not an ideal
one (e.g., the second approach focuses on the staff's "espoused" behavior
but it is the best available one given the researcher's constraints).
These four approaches, when combined, should permit us to make a reason-
able assessment of the degree to which the staff had learned the style
without examining the routine behavior of the staff directly. Thus
we will examine the inputs to that process, the opinions of the actors,
the product (credibility as seen by the environment) and search for
a "negative" case.
Knight's use of his management style for both routine and new
activity has just been extensively described and thus we can focus on
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the responses of the staff directly. The division's staff responded
to the operation of what they felt they had learned in many ways.
Few responded initially with examples of "substantive" learning
around issues like "how to deliver care". Most eventually did respond
in this vein, e.g., that hospitals have complex accounting procedures
and can thus manipulate costs easily or that nurse practitioners are
best used if well supervised; but they clearly constituted this type
of "technical" learning, not their most significant. Instead, and
it is not surprising given their short job experience but obvious
technical capacity, what they stressed were aspects of an overall approach.
Thus some spoke of learning how to relate to the environment and to
physicians, others of the importance of simply doing something, while
others stressed more personal learning, e.g., acquiring a sense of con-
fidence. But all stressed how they had learned pieces of Knight's
management style.
Thus several stated that they learned"how to ask what we want"
(L.A.) while even more said that they had learned "how to set priorities"
(R.Y.). An equal number indicated they had learned to "look for results",
"to follow up" and to "try to monitor" or to "get into situations where
we can have some effect." Many also felt they had learned how to "cover
themselves" although R.T. stressed that this was best seen as "backing
yourself", i.e., being well prepared and getting things in writing. Several
staff also felt they had acquired the entrepreneurial spirit, "I've learned
there are no real answers.. .but taking risks and doing something is better
than doing nothing." The degree to which this learning of Knight's style
was effective in establishing credibility will be considered next.
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The role of organizational credibility as perceived by members
of the division's environment was discussed earlier in many of the
case histories, indeed all of them save the loss of controls case,
and it was clear from these assessments that the manner in which
the division handled new situations was accepted as being credible
by those agencies and providers involved. But most of these same
groups also had to deal frequently with the division on routine matters
and so over a dozen respondents who had contributed to the several case
studies also volunteered assessments of Knight's management style and
the role of credibility in routine areas. These assessments confirmed
the climate of credibility which they had encountered in the new knowl-
edge cases.
In order to confirm more conclusively the credibility described,
additional members of the division's environment who had not specifi-
cally participated in any of the cases were also sought out in order
to elicit their views on the organization's credibility. Such a
group of "informed outsiders" was difficult to find; many observers
of the national Medicaid scene had no knowledge of the local situation,
most providers were only familiar with their own area of service,
and the legislature was generally ignorant of the program save its
cost; indeed the program was a true "sleeping giant". But at least
seven informants ouside the state bureaucracy were finally uncovered
and interviewed. They included the director of a welfare "watchdog"
agency, the capital city's health commissioner, the ffnancial director
at a large hospital, an academic studying Medicaid, a legislative staff
member, the president of the Medical Society and a staff member of the
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federal agency overseeing the Medicaid program. Each of this latter
group also eventually responded to general questions about the new
programs the division was instituting, its monitoring and sanction
activities, its fee schedules or bill payments and the future of the
Medicaid division. But each of these eventual responses had to be
"dredged" out of the interviewee or was affirmed only after he had
offered his first impressions in response to the very general question
of "how would you evaluate the Medical Division?"
The informed outsiders all willingly volunteered evaluations based
primarily on the increased credibility the division had acquired.
Credibility meant that the division had first of all gained the respect
of its environment - "people dealing with a program have standards of
efficiency and when they're not met, then the program loses its credi-
bility; people know when they're beating the system..but the division
is focusing on what the real problems are and getting some control
systems working." It also meant that the division be responsive and
not avoid issues - "People now get back to you and they have answers. -
You can see the action generated." It also meant a personal credibility
developed by the staff - "people are competent and stick to it...they
get it done." Building up a base with providers was also seen as
important - "We couldn't believe it, no one had ever listened to us
for years. - Knight is having tj pay the price of 25 years of neglect
of the profession." Finally, it meant a clarity of response - "Knight
is highly esteemed - he's a straight-shooter because he untangles what
can be done from what can't be done. He's never kidded us around."
Clearly, then, the members of the division's environment saw Knight's
management style as being effective in producing a credibility which was,
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if not sufficient, at least a necessary condition of support in their
minds.
Even in those situations where the division's handling of some
routine activity was less than ideal, the resulting product gave no
indication that provider credibility had been adversely affected.
For example, the mapa's often received policy material after providers
did and were unable to respond to questions, but the mapa's were
generally well viewed by providers. Similarly Knight's use of the
press in the hospital sanction case was thought by some to be a
prejudicial administrative action but the medical community as a whole
did not appear upset at this tactic. Also, a series of long negotiations
with various home health agencies broke down after, as described by R.T.,
it became clear that "we weren't speaking the same language although we
were using the same words." However, this did not affect the division's
ability to work with them on other issues. Nor did a stormy exit from
a meeting of ambulance providers by a staff member (after she refused
to discuss an item not on the agenda) affect her later ability to work
with that group. It thus appears that these few instances, simply
because they were few, did little to harm the division's overall
credibility.
We may then take the results of these four tests (pg.419 ) as
reasonable, though not ideal, e-:idence that the management style of
Knight was indeed significantly absorbed by his staff and lived out
by them in a progressively more competent manner.
To summarize this section on management style then, we have seen
that, first, many conventional elements of management were combined
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into a unique style by Knight. That style, also partially acquired
by his staff, enabled the division to perform its routine activities
such that it increased its credibility with its immediate environment.
This credibility gave the division breathing room to tackle new areas
to which they applied the same management style and to combine it with
a teaching approach to develop and learn general principles of health
care delivery.
6. The Organization's Paradigm
But teaching and management were not enough to ensure the success
of the individual cases of new knowledge nor the generation of prin-
ciples. Success with respect to what goal? Principles to what end?
To the end of being a "responsible buyer" Knight would reply. I have
described in the cases how the continuous and clear focus on this
paradigm was, along with Knight's style, the element of unity which
held the division together and permitted a coherent and economical
development of a set of working principles which could be applied in
new situations.
This paradigm did not spring from out of a void in 1973. While
the public climate for health system reform in 1973 was just warming
up, some of the more perceptive bureaucrats in Washington had seen the
need for change and there were a few forces at the state level pushing
for reform. (See Chapter II, section 6.) Thus the secretary of the
state's Human Services Agency said that, "first we wanted to get some
management control of DPW and Medicaid... then we wanted to make it
into a good health program." The undersecretary said, "the second
goal was to build a sophisticated program to get at the quality and
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cost of health care and in doing that we could begin to get some
innovation and change in the overall health system." Knight's direc-
tions thus fitted in with these goals. He wanted to act responsibly
which meant being held (and holding others) accountable for the
delivery of cost effective services. And he wanted to act as a buyer,
which meant assuring quality services but not being forced to purchase
from all comers. They all hoped to influence the larger system but
knew that that could not be accomplished immediately. Knight then had
made his own formulation of these goals: he would act as a responsible
buyer.
We have seen in the cases of new knowledge described that that
formulation or paradigm was indeed lived out. In the new services
stream, the emphasis was continually placed on the purchase of
only quality services and only on those wituations or clients for
which there was a need (e.g., did the division really "need"
HMO's, or did welfare children really require mass screening programs?).
In the sanction stream, the whole emphasis was on not having to buy from
poor quality providers. In the internal administration stream, the
stress was generally on acting responsibly, i.e., in two cases (MA-7
and CAB) responding to provider or client inputs, and in the other
three cases, not taking on responsibilities which could not be exer-
cised properly. We have seen that in one of the cases (Loss of Controls),
there were differing definitions among the staff about whether Knight
had properly assessed that situation, but Knight himself felt that he was
acting responsibly. In each of the cases in the three streams, the
staff also accepted the use of that paradigm and tried to live it out
via their use of a new management style and the principles.
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Indeed, the living out of that paradigm became more bold during
the progress of each of the streams as both staff and Knight elaborated
a large set of principles which defined what being a responsible buyer
meant. At the beginning of the stream, however, it appeared that the
staff did not really know if the division could be a responsible buyer -
it knew it should, but could it live up to it? The use of the phrase
"responsible buyer" was very common in late 1973, almost as if the
staff was convincing itself that it was a respondible buyer. (Kuhn
has suggested that such a paradigm may well be a prerequisite to per-
ception - that is, in order to perceive what you are, you must state
what you are, or think you are, or think you might become). Next
the division began to "perceive" or develop an awareness (through the
principles) that it could be a responsible buyer. The use of that
term inside the division dropped off over several months but its use
by Knight and the staff appeared to increase externally as if now the
task was to convince others that it could live up to the paradigm. The
effect of this paradigm is perhaps best illustrated by a comment from
the commissioner - "Don's greatest contribution has been in his purchase
of service definition. It's helped people to understand the role of
DPW and its powers."
The paradigm's strength thus lay first of all in its very obvious-
ness. The strength of all such "good ideas" probably lies first of all
in their intuitive sense of "correctness" and appeal to a wide body
of people. Who could argue with being a responsible buyer? It clearly
served as a public or political rallying point either to gain resources
or credibility or simply cooperation. The paradigm, as any paradigm does,
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ignored some directions the division might have taken. It might have
thrown up its hands completely and simply followed a minimum set of
federal regulations; it might have set up its own delivery system.
But the utility of the paradigm lay not in setting any "right" direc-
tions but rather that it provided a framework through which the organiza-
tion can be evaluated by its environment.
The paradigm also has utility in that it provides a framework
within which learning may (or may not) take place. Since learning
is usually seen as "progress" from one state to another state, those
states (in this case "what we are" or "what we can become") must first
be defined. After developing this definition, then the relevance of
vague or complex new inputs to the agency can be more easily assessed.
Without it, all inputs to the division would become equally relevant,
e.g., the "irrelevance" of the federal style EPSDT program would pro-
bably not have been perceived without the existence of the paradigm.
As Kuhn has suggested, a fact is mt a fact until there is a theory
to explain it. But the paradigm not only helped to set an initial
stance (as with EPSDT) but it also permitted the testing of the prin-
ciples developed in moving toward that stance, and thus served as a
litmus paper, a testing ground for the development of principles.
For example, why should para-professionals in the mental health area
necessarily be used with cautioa? - because there was no proof of their
competence or quality as a class of providers (buying only quality ser-
vices). But they existed; how should they be dealt with? By requiring
that a psychiatrist supervise and be responsible for them and that the
psychiatrist be responsible to the division through a series of regular
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reports or problem-oriented records (acting responsibly).
The paradigm, then, while not a unique one in itself (others had
suggested similar roles for government) served both external purposes
in gaining and maintaining public acceptance and internal functions in
fostering the growth of a set of principles which we have defined as
a main element of learning.
* * * * * *
We attempt in this chapter to examine whether the medical division
had met certain criteria of a learning organization (as defined in the
levels of learning) and how it might have achieved that. We have seen
that the division did generally meet those criteria. It developed
policy responses to situations triggered by new knowledge, and it
routinized those responses. It also developed and used a set of general
principles which served as an economy device for learning and also for
translating the division's paradigm. It also developed a pattern of
action for developing those principles and policy responses. The degree
to which those levels of learning were fully imbedded in the division's
system of relationships was also assessed although here the evidence
was not particularly strong.
The manner by which the division achieved these levels of learning
was also explored, first by concluding that each level of learning was
indeed operative in advancing tie level preceding it, but primarily by
examining the division's overall approach. That approach consisted of
three identifiable components: a teaching style, a management approach
and the use of a strong paradigm. The development of this overall
approach could be said to constitute the achievement of additional levels
of learning (see my definition of levels 6 and 7 on page1 7 ), but the
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question of whether that approach constituted additional levels of
learning or more simply a means by which the particular organization
studied achieved the lower levels of learning, was not examined in
this chapter. Nonetheless the approach's function in the learning of
the initial four levels was clear. It provided, through the paradigm,
a background by which an initial direction could be set and later
learning tested. It provided, through the teaching style, a method
of developing the levels of learning. And it provided, through the
management style, a means by which external and internal confidence
in the division's learning processes could be developed.
The demonstrated success of the medical division in achieving
these significant levels of learning and developing an approach to
that learning, must now be assessed in terms of its relationship to
existing models of change and its durability and possible transfer
to other situations.
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Chapter VII
The Division in Perspective and Some Possible Lessons
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We have seen that the Medical Division developed, according to
some general criteria I elaborated, what I have called a learning
organization. But how is this descriptive model of the division
different from the conventional models discussed in Chapter I (the
crisis and guerilla models) which are most generally used to describe,
analyze and account for actual organizational change? To what might
those differences be attributed, and what can be learned from them?
And did the division's model really represent a "complete" learning
organization such that it might stand the test of more stringent
criteria such as long-term durability, applicability to other organiza-
tions or ability to "self-transform" that model. These questions will
constitute the major themes of this chapter.
1. The Division's Model of Change and Conventional Models
The crisis model serves to explain organizational change by
asserting that organizations build up institutionalized sources of
resistance to change to which they become wedded and which require
a crisis state and a massive infusion of resources to effect substantial
change. Such conditions are seen as necessary not only for major para-
digm shifts but are also necessary for mid-level changes in activities
since the organization has rarely built up imbedded "programs" for
dealing with such changes (e.g., the addition of new tasks or technologies).
Some examples from recent years will help to illustrate how major
organizational changes (or attempted changes) often follow the crisis
model. For example, the Law EnforcementAssistance Admin. tried to "solve"
the problem of crime in the streets and an archaic justice system by a
massive infusion of funds into local criminal justice systems. Yet here
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indications are that these funds are being diverted by, or absorbed
into the traditional systems with little real impact. The welfare
system in California was subjected to a similar turmoil by former
Governor Reagan. There, the infusion of funds was minimal, but the
injection of administrators with extremely conservative policies in
order to"solve"the welfare problem, has apparently done little, as
both costs and caseloads continue to rise. A third illustration of
the model is the American automakers' responses to a clearly growing
threat by smaller and cheaper imports,which were basically ignored
until the energy crisis forced Detroit to grudgingly make major shifts
in its paradigm such that they could declare that the age of the big
car was over and that major retooling would take place once every
three to five years instead of annually. Finally, New York City's
possible default on its municipal bonds due to its archaic tax structure
and accounting methods has long been anticipated, yet it will apparently
take a crisis on the order of default to force the necessary changes
in methods and personnel. Observers of these and other similar examples
can compellingly describe these and other situations and yet can only
despair that such a short-sighted and disruptive model for change must
be employed so recurrently.
But the model of organizational change developed by the division
was clearly different from that crisis model. While the division in
late 1973 enjoyed some general support from other state agencies and
from some provider areas due to Knight's prior reputation, it was in
disfavor with the legislature and seen as a troublesome "pest" by
much of the provider element. The public, the press and the governor
ignored the program. Thus the environment of the division was neither
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excessively hostile nor excessively benign nor was the division's
situation seen as a crisis requiring inmediate solutions. Even those
who did see the situation to be a crisis state (mainly the division staff
itself and the HSA agency) were unable to secure any massive input of
resources and/or public backing for an immediate renewal. What we
saw instead was a very gradual build up of organizational competence
and of a specific learning style. While it is true the staff comple-
ment nearly doubled over two years, this was in response to a series
of many individual requests which Knight made and to his skillful
manipulating of the resources he was granted. Thus the development of
the division's model could not reasonably be attributed to institution-
alized sources of resistance at either the paradigm or lower levels nor
to an environmentally defined crisis or even a public mandate to
"clean up" Medicaid. The crisis model then does not help to explain
the division's success in developing an approach to organizational
change.
Nor does the guerilla model help to explain the division's approach
to change. That model describes how activists with strong goals try to
"subvert" the system either acting from within the agency or, if the
"guerilla" happens to be the agency head, within the larger system.
They build up antagonism to change within the organization by their
style and usually leave after short periods, with their reforms decaying
rapidly.
Recent examples of that model in action are not hard to find.
They would include, for example, the New York City infusion of several
dozen young "whiz kids" operating out of the Budget Bureau, the Mayor's
office or a RAND project grant during Mayor Lindsay's tenure. Their
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attempts at institutional change produced little more than technical
reorganization (e.g., deployment of firefighting equipment) and the
climate for future change was hindered by their style. Even totali-
tarian governments have seen fit to use such methods; witness the
recent"cleansing" activities attempted by young Red Army cadres in
the cultural revolution of the late '60's and early '70's. Evidence
indicates that slippage has occurred even there as, for example,
children of peasants are being squeezed out of elite schools. Another
example would be the movement within Boston to bypass the regular
municipal bureaucracy through the establishment of several "little
city halls"--seen as the only way to effect major change- and yet
those institutionalized guerillas have degenerated into a petty political
role (Nordlinger).A fourth illustration of such institutionalized guer-
illa activity is described by Nelkin in her analysis of the federal
agency organized on the agricultural extension agent model to effect
changes in the technology of home building. Individual guerillas as
agency heads is best exemplified by Jerome Miller's acting in the Youth
Services Department of Massachusetts and Illinois in which (at least in
the former state) he could only change the old system of institutionalizing
youth by outrageous political movements, administrative fiats, lies and
even midnight placement of youthful offenders in community based homes.
A final example from the management literature (Burns and Stalker) des-
cribes how organizational change (in this case, firms in the radio indus-
try in Britain)were basically changed by a new group of company scientists
who had to fight strongly from within to get their own directors to adapt
to a turbulent environment.
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But the Medical Division bears little resemblance to the examples.
Here Knight might be seen as a "guerilla", but in fact he took parti-
cular pains to assure that he had as wide a base of external support
as possible. His manner outside the division was firm but not aggres-
sive nor even abrasive like so many "committed" or "reform" leaders.
Indeed, he even saw his style and methods as being very orthodox and
seemed at a loss to understand how others could see him as unique.
Nor was guerilla action by the staff members tolerated. Knight was
very concerned that staff not appear like "bucanneers or vigilantes"
and stressed that they should maintain the same mixture of openness,
decorum and firmness when dealing with members of the division's
environment that he displayed. And internally, guerilla action was
clearly not tolerated. Knight could not bear the thought of "indepen-
dent action" - which is why the reaching of a philosophical agreement
became so important to him. Thus neither Knight or his staff felt
themselves to be at odds with the system - they were trying to change
it, but did not think in terms of "enemies". Some enemies were created,
of course, but the division's stress on credibility and integrity muted
the vast majority of other potential rifts.
Thus the division's model of change was somehow different from
the conventional crisis or guerilla models of change. Not only was
the method of change different but the consequences were different.
That is, there was no signficant disruption of the division's routine
activity. Such disruption appears to be a common feature of both the
crisis and guerilla models and its effects, in terms of wasted resources,
account for much of the search for alternative models of change. I do
not suggest that such disruption is a priori dysfunctional; in some cases
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it may even be necessary, but only that here, a model has been developed
which produced a type of significant change (which I call learning)
and yet the organization continued to be focused, to produce an output.
It did not have to drop all its routine activities in order to learn;
indeed it even managed to add to and improve those activities. As I
have suggested, this competent management of routine activities even
permitted and enhanced the division's learning.
This delicate, but deliberately created balance between competent
routine performance and learning seemed to be one of the factors account-
ing for the lack of disruption of routine activities commonly found.
That is, not only was a style created which placed equal emphasis on,
and rewarded equally both routine performance and learning, but the
execution of this style meant that when new knowledge confronted the
division, it had a learned pattern or approach to deal with it. There
was no need to drop routine activities, whether in the face of an
external pressure, internal advocacy or more simply in the face of
a "good idea". Other factors which also contributed to the division's
avoidance of disruption included the extreme pragmatism of Knight
and his staff and the climate of certainty built up by Knight, both
of which are discussed in Section 2.
The division's model also differs from some of the other candidates
which have been advanced as suitable alternatives to the crisis and
guerilla models. The management science approach to change (Churchman,
Beers, etc.) proposes that organizational functioning (change is implied
or assumed to be inherent in that model) be grounded in the inherently
logical appeal of new knowledge or technology. The new knowledge will
be rationally integrated with the organization through intelligent men
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working together. It considers the generation of organizational goals
and managerial methods as secondary to the content of new knowledge.
Its greatest applicability would seem to be in situations where the
number of variables the organization chooses to deal with is few and
much is known about them. It is a narrow view of management and yet
one which has some credibility with today's public. Whatever its
potential for success, the division's achievements cannot be explained
by such a model. While Knight and his staff were convinced of their
own competence and even acted with moral righteousness at times, this
was not the source of their success. The content of their learning
was not only subject to considerable stumbling and eventual change
as it developed, but it also was subject to considerable influence
from the division's environment. The management science model would
posit a less hesitant and more comprehensive approach to learning
and less routine acceptance of direction from the environment.
Neither does the organizational development model (Argyris, Bemis,
Likert) account for all the division's success. While it does speak
to a shared understanding between manager and staff, explicitness of
purpose and method, and decentralized control, it does not address
nor condone features of the division's model such as the usurption of
goal setting by the agency head, the "moral" sense of rightness of
both Knight and staff, the bend4ing of rules, the considerable initial
reliance only on close friends nor the existence of learning in the
relative absence of good feedback.
The division's model does share some features of the contingency
and neo-structuralist models (Lawrence, Thompson, Galbraith, etc.) in
that its mode of operation and strategies are based on a carefully
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worked out fit with the environment. Yet its formal structure is
clearly not the source of the division's strength nor are the formal
integrating devices suggested by the neostructuralists much in evidence.
Rather the integration was achieved through formal devices (the
informal matrix), personality features (the sheer force of the teaching
style) and some similar personal qualities of staff members.
The division's development, then, can be described as an example
of an alternative model of organizational change, a model which I have
called organizational learning, and yet which differs from current
descriptive models used to account for change and from some of the
alternatives proposed to those models. There are no doubt other
examples of organizational learning to be discovered and modeled but
the rich example here should provide us with adequate insights upon
which to understand how effective alternatives to the crisis and guerilla
models can be developed in practice.
2. Sources of the Division's Effectiveness
The crisis and gierilla models are most commonly used to account
for the process of change (if any) in government bureaucracies. The
patterns of behavior existing in such bureaucracies prior to the
activation of those models are what I shall call conventional patterns
of behavior. I cannot assert that these conventional bureaucratic
patterns alone contribute to the rigidity of bureaucracy and an attendant
reliance on the more disruptive crisis and guerilla models of change.
But the absence of these patterns in the medical division and its sub-
sequent freedom from reliance on such conventional models suggests that
it is these distinct features of the division that contributed to its
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development of an alternative model of change. The division's new
patterns are not complex in concept but the intensity of their
application did seem to account for much of the development of the
division's model and its effectiveness in achieving the levels of
learning described in Chapter VII. Thus the manager wishing to avoid
the conventional models might seek to understand not only the elements
of the division's model as described in previous chapters, but also
how they differed from the common practice~found at work in his own
organization and the lessons that could be learned from those differences.
These unconventional elements of the division's model are not without
their limitations, however, and these are also discussed in this section.
The reader might thus view these limitations as costs associated with
the adoption of any of the elements, a view which might preclude a
wholesale, or unthinking adoption of them.
a. The division first of all avoided reliance on the crisis
and guerilla models by a conscious rejection of the importance of
those models as a basis for change. That rejection was based on a
particular brand of pragmatism that differed considerably from the
crisis or guerilla models of change in which, while change takes place,
it either dies away or creates intolerable antagonisms. The 'crisis"
model, particularly in America, appears oriented towards a possible
demand for "immediate" solutions to longstanding, deep-rooted, and
vastly complex problems such as "poverty", the "environment", "race",
or "education". It seems inevitable that massive and sudden inputs
into organizations involved in such complex areas can only create
frustration and later abandonment of the mission, particularly when
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aided by the short attention span of the public, the media and elected
officials. Yet the division chose to develop policies in areas which
could be "solved" and in which real advancement could be shown. In
addition, the division's pragmatism permitted it to avoid being caught
up in the heady sway of a crisis atmosphere during which routine activity
comes to a standstill and the agency becomes disorganized. That is,
Knight simply did not believe most problems could be solved by crisis-
like activity and took pain either to shield staff from such activity
(e.g., budget reduction proposals in early 1975) or to simply explain
to those around hin urging immediate redeployment of staff resources,
that problems were not solved by such short-term strategies (e.g.,
improvement of the local offices).
Similarly, the guerilla model, while often also directing its
attempts at systemic problems, has as its most prominent feature,
domination by passionate advocates , zealots or even dogmatists, who
believe that they are "right'' They often create such antagonisms
that resistance to much needed change is often generated by their very
presence. Here again the division's style in which it believed there
"are no right answers" permitted it to achieve considerable environmental
backing at a very low cost. Knight's distaste for overly zealous or
dogmatic staff or for any guerilla-like, vigilante activity assured that
no patterns would develop which would disrupt the routine work of the
division. Again, a simple and obvious alternative to existing models
of change but one which needs highlighting.
This pragmatic attempt to deal with the possible and with high
pay-off situations did however lead Knight to avoid situations he
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felt he could not control. Avoid is an excessively harsh word since
by no means was contact broken off with the parties or agencies involved
in such situations. Rather, as was shown in the internal administration
stream, Knight simply had a tendency to avoid becoming too entangled
with groups that he felt were poorly managed or that he could not hold
accountable - "I try to hold people accountable in such a way that it
doesn't mitigate my own accountability." For example, in response to
questions regarding a possible greater level of energy devoted to
improving relations with DPH, DMH and HSA, he replied "To what end
would all this 'fine tuning' be? Should I run around to all these
meetings and never be available for important things?" What this
meant in the opinion of many staff is that while relations with the
rest of DPW and, for example, DPH or the HSA, were not poor, they
could be "fine-tuned" to a considerably greater degree. But "Don's
need to have control" seemed to prevent such fine-tuning. And the
method which might be used for such fine-tuning, for example, inter-
organizational committees or task forces, he felt to be inefficient
(and given his view of accountability, they were) or inappropriate
(i.e., his teaching style could not be extended so far as to include
those with whom he was not in regular personal contact).
b. A second reversal of conventional practice is also apparent
in the division's model. While other organizations have met or matched
the learning criteria that I have applied to the division, they have
often done so at a price, not simply one of not performing their routine
activity, but more importantly of losing their sense of responsibility.
For example, witness those professional schools who develop too far
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in front of the profession they are at least partially designed to
serve; or social service agencies headed by zealots who, in their
drive to change a system, either concentrate only on the most visible
clients or so disrupt the agency that its clients suffer in the
short run. Yet the medical division's model has shown that it is
possible to both learn and act responsibly despite the fact that any
learning model appears to have some inherent conflict with the need
for public accountability (as pointed out by Schon when he alludes
to the conflict between legislation and "public learning" as a basis
for policy).
The method does not seem complex; it simply seems to be that
learning and responsibility were held to be equally important by both
Knight and his staff. Thus Knight saw himself as being accountable
to the welfare clients, to the legislature, to providers and to himself
(i.e. being of integrity) and he saw his staff as being accountable
to him and to themselves. Indeed this stress on accountability and
one of its associated products, credibility, fostered the (necessary)
condition in which such organizational learning could prosper. Thus
the division's emphasis not only on both teaching and management but
on their inter-relationship should be viewed with appreciation by managers.
c. In many bureaucracies there is a considerable effort made to
develop and enforce organizational behavior patterns or rules. Most
commonly these are referred to as "the procedures" of the organization.
In such bureaucracies, behavior at that level is often rigidly pres-
cribed by manuals or manager's instructions or enforced through employee
codes. The level of behavior I am referring to here is primarily the
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same as the "program for learning" of the medical division described in
earlier chapters. Usually considerable attention and energy is directed at that
level of behavior at the expense, I believe, of the output of those
behaviors or the goals to which they should, from a manager's perspective,
be directed.
Recall that the elements at this level of behavior in the division's
model were nearly entirely tacit. They uere performed but no particular
formal or verbal stress was placed on them. In the division's case,
the output of those behaviors was the principles and the goal toward which
they were directed was the paradigm. Both the principles and the paradigm
were very consciously developed and considerable energy devoted to their
propagation. I believe that both the division's reversal of priorities
(principles and paradigm versus behavior codes) and the reversal of
the status of the principles and paradigm from their usual tacit status
to one of strong explicitness accounted for much of the division's
success and is a lesson many organizations might stand to relearn -
that it is indeed the ends for which the organization is created which
are of prime importance, not the means.
Yet the emphasis on the propagation of a strong paradigm does appear
to have some potential costs. The very fact of choosing that paradigm
and of asserting it with a moral fervor as Knight did has as much poten-
tial as the guerilla model for leading the organization into serious
conflict with actors within its environment and consequent loss of
acceptance. In addition, since Knight's appointment was a political one,
the potential for such battles seemed to be built in to the process.
However, while these two factors would likely lead to considerable
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conflict for other organizations trying to adapt this style, Knight
generally managed to avoid such battles by choosing a fairly universal
paradigm against which few could argue and by building up personal and
organizational credibility. The lesson here is obvious: while a strong
paradigm has many advantages, it must be accompanied by other features
if unnecessary conflict is to be avoided.
d. The importance of the explicit nature of both the paradigm
and the principle is a difficult one to assess. However, I would
speculate that here again an important lesson can be learned. When
an organization's paradigm is explicit and its working principles
only implicit, it would seem that not only would a manager's assessment
of learning be difficult but the organization's members themselves would
find it difficult to assess their learning of either a simple development
of principles or of a change of principles, since it is by these working
principles that a paradigm is operationalized. Similarly when a para-
digm is tacit and principles explicit, learning may take place; yet its
actual contribution to a goal (the paradigm) may remain unclear since
the paradigm is tacit. Thus, if we can assert that organizational learn-
ing must consist of some goal or direction (however vague) and a level
at which that goal is grounded, then the connection between the two would
seem to be more easily made if both are explicit. In the end this line
of argument might be seen to distill itself to one of either valuing
explicitness for its own sake or a tautological one of defining organiza-
tional learning as being explicit change. Both of these possibilities
are ones that I cannot discuss here, but rather I shall only suggest that
the division's explicit principles and paradigm clearly differentiated it
from most conventional bureaucracies and thus may offer a promising line
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of both inquiry and action for others to explore.
e. A fifth reversal of conventional bureaucratic practice by
the division was Knight's considerable tolerance of a diversity of
personal styles as long as their bearers followed the principles and
worked toward the organization's goals. Again, in many organizations
(certainly not all) there is considerable effort to develop a "company
style". In the division, staff were free to manage in accordance with
their own styles as long as they did it responsibly and were willing
to submit to the teaching process through which principles and goals
were developed. This tolerance helped create a relaxed climate where
staff were clearly more receptive to learning; it eliminated wasted
effort trying to assert a "division style" and it permitted the division
to focus itself on the important tasks. Again a simple lesson, but
one which is not always appreciated.
While there was a general tolerance for a variety of styles,
Knight could not tolerate members of the division acting in either
ill-defined "co-ordinative" roles or with no direct management res-
ponsibilities. This avoidance of "staff" (as assured to line) functions
might be seen as a limit of the division's model. Clearly the division
saw these roles as unnecessary, whether for relating to other agencies,
for internally proposing innovative ideas or for coordinating internal
tasks. But the agmcy could probably only grow but slightly before the
need for such staff would become apparent. For example, deteriorating
relations with PMO, the computer center, and the dental claims processor
eventually led Knight to assign two people to oversee those functions.
Similarly, the budget function in 1975 became more than the routine it
had been in the past and only the loan of a person from another agency
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and the creation of a small working group of Knight and his staff pre-
vented a budget submittal lacking the necessary analytical backup and
detail. In the future it seems that that function would be assigned
to at least a part-time budget specialist. Similarly, the need to
have a field coordinator with both competence and credibility and a
"systems" coordinator was apparent even in late 1974 and Knight did
acknowledge this. Here I am suggesting that this avoidance of "staff"
functions harmed the division greatly, only that there was a need and
that over time that need could not be ignored without greater costs as
the division increased in size.
More importantly, however, this tolerance of a diversity of styles
had associated with it an absence of any real conflict over both goals
and principles. The absence of conflict within the division (which was
described earlier) is a two edged sword. While it clearly permitted
the division to focus on its task, the possibility remains that other
possible goals or major directions were suppressed, not so much delib-
erately, as Knight was always willing to listen, but as a consequence
of his style and choice of staff - "There's not a lot of soul searching
around here", said one of the staff although Knight would respond that
"you can't have real conflict unless you have people of equal knowledge"
thus indicating his view of his role in the division as being much more
of a generator of knowledge than a mediator. He thus begged the issue
of cliflict, although he felt that with at least one of his staff, R.K.,
he often let him go ahead on certain issues even though they disagreed.
But we have also seen in at least three cases where there appeared to
be a conflict over program content (i.e. with I.N., the first pharmacy
director and with two assistants in the sanction unit), those persons
left the division.
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While I do not wish to delve deeply into the function of conflict
in learning and innovation, one spectrum of theories ranging from the
psychological to the political, believes it to be a signficant and
necessary component. Wilson has found, however, that while decentral-
ization (and potential conflict) of an organization leads to a greater
number of innovations being proposed, proportionately fewer are adopted,
thus suggesting that a successful learning organization must find a
balance between the heady conflict involved in the generation and advocacy
of ideas and the concensus needed for their later adoption and execu-
tion. Knight would claim that adoption and execution were his prime
focus and thus the assessment of where he chose to set on the spectrum
between the generation of innovative ideas and responsive action is
one which cannot be made easily. I only wish to point out here that
the potential cost of a strategy skewed to one side of that spectrum
(in this case, towards an absence of conflict).
The absence of conflict has implications for the durability of
the division's success in that less rapid concordance with the goals
and principles might assure that these elements would not only be
successfully taught but that they would be held with greater convention
such that they could endure Knight's departure from the division. (This
will be discussed further in section g.)
Thus Knight's tolerance of a variety of personal and management
styles did create an air of openness and freedom not often found in
more rigid bureaucracies but the concomitant need for much greater
adherence to organizational goals, principles, and occasionally
cultural mechanisms may have denied the division some of the benefits
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of more internal advocacy of dissenting positions.
f. Theorists and thinking managers have stressed that organizations
must develop staff who can "tolerate ambiguity" but they rarely describe
how this is to be done. The division's approach, however, did permit
it to deal adequately with the considerable amount of uncertainty and
ambiguity inherent in a turbulent environment. The division handled
this by creating a very secure sense of certainty about its approach,
that is, its goals and its management style, and to some degree its
principles also, since the principles were strongly held but nonetheless
seen as flexible. It was this certainty of approach which both Knight
and his staff held which permitted them to tolerate the inherent ambi-
guity in a large set of principles and their difficult application to
real situations. The staff clearly felt proud of this new style they
had learned (see Chapter VI, Section 5) and this permitted them (and
Knight) to remain relatively open to innovative areas and to not feel
the need to close or terminate discussions on proposed approaches to
new situations too rapidly.
g. The guerilla model of change is explicitly based on the central
role of a key (or of a few key) persons and the crisis model is implicitly
based on a strong leader executing a public mandate arising out of a
crisis. The centrality of Knight within the division's model must thus be
assessed since all of the sources of effectiveness discussed in this
section, while shared by Knight and his staff within a set of
relationships, had their origins in that one central person. Some
would claim that Knight was the key to the effectiveness of the whole
model and that, without him, it could not function efficiently. To
what degree, then, does the model's success depend upon the central role
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of a person with somewhat unique and very personal leadership qualities?
This issue is examined from one perspective in the succeeding sec-
tion on the durability and transferability of the division's model
since each of the situations discussed there are ones in which either
Knight would have less centrality in the organization or would confront
situations over which he would, almost by definition, have less influence.
But the issue may also be addressed here directly, first by considering
the issue of Knight's personal qualities, secondly by examining the
problems created by Knight's key role in policy decisions and then by
speculating on the effect of Knight's inevitable departure from the
medical division.
Three rather personal features of Knight might be seen as key
to the successful operation of the model. First of all his clear
need for philosophical agreement among staff. But this was really
a desire to have shared and explicit working principles, a desire which
led to considerable learning as we have seen. Nor is it different from
the desire of any manager to have a body of working principles which
can be related to an overall goal. In this sense Knight's personal
style was neither idiosyncratic nor harmful. Secondly, his need to
avoid conflict. While it is likely that conflict would harm the par-
ticular balance the division had built up, it is not clear that an
increased level of conflict would be harmful to another organization
or manager attempting to use that same model. What would occur in
the latter situation, I suspect, would be an only somewhat greater
amount of policy conflict; but if all the other features of the division
model were maintained, the absence of conflict fostered by Knight would
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not be central to the model's success. Finally, the nagging ego
syndrome. While it is clear that the partial usurption by Knight
of the program for action and principle development could be said to
have prevented adequate and valid testing by staff of that pattern
and principles, it did lead to early success in learning. But that
success could not be attributable to Knight's personal usurption alone,
since many other "strong leader" managers have adopted such a style.
To this degree, then, other managers couId equally well adopt these
portions of the division's model.
Thus the most personal qualities of Knight's style, while clearly
affecting the division, do not appear to be prohibitive to the adoption
of the overall model by another organization. Other positive features
of his style (e.g., the teaching style) are not unique to Knight. They
do existed (however muted) in other managers as do the personal qualities
of staff members which I have described. Thus while Knight himself does
not appear completely central to the model's success, a person with similar
qualities does appear to be a key to its success. Thus it is probable
that another group of staff and another manager could apply the model
provided that the favorable conditions to be discussed in Section 3,
could be maintained.
Yet Knight's centrality and his usurption of policy control did
contribute to a problem - the nagging ego syndrome. Both the division's
role as a central office policy maker and the uncertainty of medical
technology also probably significantly contributed to this syndrome but
here we are assuming also the effect of Knight's particular style in
the creation of that syndrome and the costs associated with it.
That problem was the feeling by staff members that they were not
really certain if their activity, particularly the newer activities,
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were having any effect. Even when no action was taken, as in the loss
of controls and field cases, staff worried that that lack of action
was creating further problems. I have already discussed some of the
surrogates used for evaluation in Chapter VI and in Appendix A, but
the effects of these must be examined more fully, if only because some
members of the human relations school would assert that the staff had
been "bought off" by the alluring prospect of a responsible job, a
wide scope of problems, and a personable boss, but that firm control
still obviously rested in Knight's hands and that the staff were not
living up to their full human potential.
I am less concerned here with "true potential" than I am with the
probable organizational effect of that nagging ego syndrome. Recall
that I suggested that with few sensitive output criteria for evaluation,
staff would turn to "process" for a sense of fulfillment and that one
of the major ways in which staff could satisfy their egos would then
be through involvement in new areas. We then saw that most of the
areas of new knowledge were strongly influenced by Knight while those
(also those routine activities) which were not, appeared to be ones
in which the staff had more confidence (e.g. the day care case). I then
suggested that this likely meant that, given the competent nature of the
staff, the result of this situation would likely be that either they
would eventually leave the division (being unable to tolerate the situation),
or would develop some sort of pathology within the division and become
much less effective in their performance.
Knight's response to this potential problem was interesting. He
said that "there's no right answer to any question, only whatever the
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person in charge wants. All that (the day care case) means is that it
was a better product for the person involved." Thus he clearly did not
see the syndrome to be a real problem. I believe that his assessment
of it not being a problem may be correct but I believe so not on any
moral grounds of who should make decisions but only because, in effect,
the nagging ego problem was more of what Knight would call a "gripe,
not a grievance" - that is, it did not appear to affect staff performance.
The reason for this is relatively straightforward. Knight gave
staff considerably more freedom in routine areas and since these consti-
tuted by far the larger part of the division's action, staff could
involve their egos in competent performance there. In addition, they
not only had the opportunity to learn a management style (as discussed
in Chapter VI, Section 5) but also stressed that they had learned
about the specifics of health care delivery (e.g., how nurses and
phsycians work together), how to relate to the environment of physicians
and other providers ("you must give technical assistance if you expect
providers to change") and much about themselves ("I learned not to be
overwhelmed by things"). Thus there is some indication as long as
this learning could go on and there were routine tasks to be mastered,
the nagging ego problem was not a severe one.
Knight's centrality to the model's success may also be examined
from the perspective of what might occur should he leave the division
after having "installed" a learning system so effectively. His
departure is almost inevitable - the political nature of his appointment
and the importance of the program in the state budget almost preclude
any other possibility. Knight himself recognized the problem this pre-
sented when he mused about the durability of his creation, saying that
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"much would depend on who replaced me" and "I can't train my replace-
ment". He did believe that it is possible to train people to be res-
ponsive and that he had done that. But notwithstanding that possibility,
it would be unlikely that any new assistant commissioner would be similar
to him; indeed each of the previous occupants of the position had had
considerably different styles. The departure of Knight would also touch
off subsequent departures among some of the staff, particularly those
who felt personally loyal to him. Balancing this would be a few who
indicated they would deliberately remain in order to prove that they
could manage and learn without Knight. It is in the former situation,
however, that one might begin to see the real effects of Knight's
teaching (according to Knight himself), that is, when his students would
fly on their own, away from the wings of the master.
It does seem possible that the current remaining staff could continue
to live out the management style and the paradigm initiated by Knight,
but whether they could impart that style to others would be problematic
although I suggest in section 3 that some other style for learning
might be developed. One certainty is that without Knight, the process
of learning would likely be much more consuming of time and energy
(see the day care and loss of controls cases). The principles already
developed would, of course, remain but the division's ability to generate
new ones would be lessened.
Both Knight's usurption of policy decisions, his avoidance of
conflict and the nagging ego syndrome might well be suggested as
reasons for declaring that even those existing principles were not
well imbedded in the staff's minds since they had little chance to
develop them on their own and they were thus not held with the
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conviction necessary for continued application should Knight depart.
The evidence suggests otherwise however. Knight was willing to accept
policy initiatives from staff even though final decisions were usually
made by him. Nor was he unwilling to accept advocacy of independent
positions; he simply stressed that once a decision had been made,
divergent opinions and actions should cease and staff work to imple-
ment that decision. And, as I have suggested, the nagging ego syndrome
was as much due to the division's distance from the field and the nature
of medical technology as to Knight's policy control and would thus
remain to some degree even after his departure. Additional direct
evidence presented in earlier chapters also suggests the principles
were held with conviction by staff; thus what the departure of Knight
would mean would be that there would be no one to assess the relevance
of each principle and to choose the "appropriate" one in situations
of conflict. Thus, as I suggested earlier, the division's learning
process and its application of existing principles would be more
consuming of time and energy as the staff sought out a perhaps different
learning style.
The issue of Knight's centrality then is one hich cannot be
completely assessed by examining this one slice of organizational space
and time. I have suggested that others could operate the division's
model, and even that it might endure and evolve without a strong leader.
Possible problems arising out of his centrality were also assessed
(e.g. the nagging ego problem and the "tenacity" of the principles).
That centrality, however, is clearly of a different nature from that
evident in the more conventional models since it did contribute to the
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development of an effective system of learning.
h. The observations made in this section 2 are not intended to
present a "rosy" picture of the medical division nor to suggest that
its model differs entirely from conventional managerial models (e.g.,
the emphasis on a strong leader and a clear system of accountability
is even suggested by the scientific school of administration of the
'20's). They are only intended to serve two purposes. First, to
suggest how the division's model differs from conventional "change"
models (in its explicitness, its stress on accountability and its
pragmatism) and yet avoids some of the stresses and disruptions of
these models. And secondly, to suggest how other organizations
implicitly desiring change, but legitimately viewing the crisis or
guerilla models as inappropriate in their situations, can break out
of the conventional bureaucratic model through a re-emphasis on a
paradigm and associated principles and the creation of a climate of
tolerance for style and for ambiguity in initial policy development.
The costs associated with the division's model could be assessed
much more critically but it must be borne in mind that the division
did fulfill two very important roles - it carried out its routine
tasks competently under severe constraints and it did learn new tasks
which were then routinized. Rather than assess in greater detail the
"current" strengths and weaknesses of the division's model, a more
fruitful area of inquiry would be the application of somewhat more
stringent learning criteria to that model.
3. Extension of the Division's Model
I have suggested that the division's success in creating a learning
organization cannot be adequately explained by traditional models.
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I have also highlighted some of the sources of effectiveness of the
division's model of learning and their associated costs. However,
a reasonable rejoinder to that analysis might be that the organization
would not endure under the stress of time or the absence of several
conditions favorable to the installation of the division's model.
Such a query is indeed a reasonable one and I shall attempt to address
it in the section dealing with the durability and the transferability
of the division's model, that is, its extension in time and space.
a. Durability
As mentioned in Chapter I, many authors have noted that while
"learning organizations" have been created in the past and may even
have done so without disrupting their routine activity, their dura-
bility is short-lived since their capacity to learn dies when the
environment around them changes or when key staff leave. It was not
feasible to observe the medical division for an extended period of
time in order to test the durability of its learning model. However,
speculation on that theme is possible and can be carried out by des-
cribing what the division might look like under three inevitable situations
which will occur in the future.
1) The first is most simply the passage of time. Over time
one might expect the distribution of resources in the division to be
differentially made. In the early stages of the division we saw that
there was a considerable feeling of equality since no staff had
control over any particularly large set of disposable resources,
many were able to work on pet projects, and all had equal access to
Knight. But over time, these conditions will likely change. First,
some staff will begin to (and already had begun to) acquire staff
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members of their own. As Knight began to set priorities or as they
were forced on him, this inevitably occurred. Thus the ambulatory
care and nursing home units grew. Even the small HMO program had
two people in it. While Knight was not one to play favorites, it
seems inevitable that certain staff would acquire more status and be
permitted more freedom to work on what they deemed important or on
the more "interesting" projects. Similarly as Knight gained an under-
standing of the various programs and his staff and began to decide
what he felt was important, access to him (another scarce resource)
would begin to be differentially distributed.
What this differential distribution of resources might lead to
is more internal "political activity". By political, I refer to
those actions where people become protective of both their programs
and their status - what are called their vested interests. As has
been adequately documented (Downs, Tullock, etc.) internal action
based on vested interests can be disruptive of any attempts at change,
be they learning or otherwise. It is much easier, however, to assert
that over time vested interests will develop than to assess the
probability that resultant political activity (primarily manifested
in resistance to change) will occur. Nonetheless, the possibility
is there and it must be faced. Knight's only indication of the strategy
he would adopt in such situations was that he would simply "try and be
aware that such behavior exists and try to stop any distorted information
that resulted from it." His demonstrated ability to cut out conflict
would no doubt be helpful here and routine tasks would most likely still
continue to be performed well; but the continued learning climate would
probably lose some of its vitality.
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2) A second inevitable condition is an increase in size of
the agency. As we have seen, a considerable portion of the success
of the division's learning centered on Knight himself. He was
involved in all the new knowledge activities and the program for learn-
ing was a program that he and the staff acted out. The development of
principles for use in those situations was also achieved primarily
through Knight's teaching style. As the division grows in size (at
this writing a size of anywhere between 100 to 250 persons was being
considered by a new governor), access to Knight will inevitably decrease,
the strength of that program for learning and the teaching style will
be diluted while the philosophical agreement Knight sought so much will
be harder to maintain. This is not to suggest that the division's routine
activities will suffer, only that its ability to manage new tasks using
the approach it had developed will, since inevitably most of those new
tasks would be assumed by the new increment of staff, be ones who would
be distant from Knight. Not even the utility of the informal matrix
for socialization purposes (which was used in late 1973) will be repeat-
able, as size alone will prohibit that. Knight believed, however,
that his"hiring powers were great" and that a sensitive use of these
would enable him to carry on the mold of astute personnel selection and
development. But a main component of that mold involved an access to
him which could not possibly be maintained with increased size.
Increased size will also likely mean the addition of "staff"
(as opposed to line) positions since it seems inconceivable that
the legislature or the new governor (who had a strong research-planning-
budgeting orientation) would vote new positions without adding several
of-these "staff" positions. Knight would undoubtedly seek competent
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people for these positions but it seems likely that competent people
in "staff" positions would develop crticial and independent positions.
Knight's ability to handle this internal independence would be strongly
tested.
The division did, however, have some qualities which would enable
it to cope with an increase in size. The sense of unity of the
members was high and the easy-going nature of most of them indicated
that new members could well "absorb" that spirit fairly easily. In
addition, if Knight were to permit new staff to "float", to watch
others and "find their own slots" as he did with his initial cadre,
this would bode well for a promise of continuity in style. It is
also possible that given the overall competency of the staff, their
actions without Knight might avoid that part of the nagging ego prob-
lems attributable to the strong role Knight played in policy develop-
ment. Also important is the fact that many of the current staff have
indeed learned many of the aspects of Knight's management style. As we
saw that it was this style, applied to routine activity, which produced
credibility and breathing room, there is no reason to suppose that an
enlarged staff might not use this breathing room to create their own
style of learning, perhaps one based on teaching, but perhaps not.
3) A third inevitability over time would be the departure of
Knight himself from the organization. The probable effects of this have,
however, been already discussed in section 2.g. and will not be repeated
here. The conclusion remains the same though, that parts of the division's
model (the principles and management approach) would likely be utilized
less efficiently while the division sought a new learning style, one not
inevitably based on teaching.
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I have suggested that the durability of the medical division's
approach to learning as it was constituted in early 1975 is problematic.
I shall discuss in section 4 whether indeed that criterion is a too
stringent one but before that, I will address the question of whether
the division's model is applicable in other organizational settings.
b. Transferability
I have already alluded to the possibility of individual staff
members transferring the learning model to other situations, but since
the model essentially describes a whole system, it is more appropriate
to consider the transfer of that whole system to other settings. A
final consideration, one based on the criterion of the capacity of
the division's model to transform itself (e.g., learn a different
program for learning, or a different paradigm) will be addressed in
section 4. What I am examining here is the possible applicability
of the division's model, including a person like Knight, but not
necessarily he, to other agencies such as, say, the DPW as a whole,
or a non-human services agency (e.g., a department of transportation),
or a purely regulatory agency (e.g., the FCC or FAA). My speculation
will conclude that the model, as described here, would be considerably
difficult to utilize in other situations. This is not to suggest that
Knight or individual staff might not be successful in such situations,
but only that the model's use in such situations should be understood
with caution.
Consider the general situation the division found itself in -
general environmental support, small but expanding size, a professional
staff, a simple and non-revolutionary technology, no institutionalized
independent power bases within the organization, and a mission to develop
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policy rather than to deliver services. Let us examine each of these
conditions and speculate on how the division's model might function if
each of them were relaxed.
1) First of all, consider the general environmental support.
While this support was not munificent, neither was it hostile. Much of
the division's strength was based on the "integrity" of the program and
its managers. If, however, the environment of the agency simply did
not support the program or did not believe it to be worthwhile, then
no amount of personal integrity would be sufficient to gain support.
In such a case, it is likely that many staff, particularly those with
the greatest integrity who would face the greatest frustration in such
a situation would leave, not being willing to face provider or public
abuse for too long a period. Nor would the style of a person like
Knight be much help in an extrmely hostile political environment;
first of all because that style basically avoided political "lobbying"
or obvious "public relations" and secondly, since his principle style
(teaching) is clearly not appropriate in such situations where hard-
nosed confrontation is the norm.
Knight responded that this development of his former health center
had been conducted in a hostile environment and that he could be
hard-nosed, as his sanction activity had shown. Both his responses
seemed to be true; however, his first success was in an environment
which, while partly hostile, also desperately needed the services he
was developing, while the sanction activity was not the bulk of the
division's work. Had the sole function of the division been one
of punishment and not one oriented toward policy development,
I believe that the style of a person like Knight would not be effective.
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2) Consider also the small but expanding size of the division
and imagine how the division's model could be applied in a large and/or
contracting agency. The relevance of a small sized organization has
been discussed earlier in this section; we need only consider the fact
of an expansion of activities here. Consider an agency being forced to
cut programs and staff complement. The luxury of letting people
"find their own slots" as Knight did, would likely not be available
in such a situation and inevitably some staff would be squeezed into
situations they did not prefer. Their openness to learning would be
correspondingly diminished and possible conflictual situations would
develop, situations which neither Knight nor his staff desired or
handled well. Indeed one might even question the need to have a
learning organization in such a sutuation. The most relevant factor
in determining the model's applicability in such a situation would likely
be whether task responsibilities were being diminished. With fewer
people, a steady or non-diminished task level could maintain the
learning style; with diminshed tasks, however, it is unlikely that
either Knight or his kind of staff would react well to the potential
of such "negative" learning, e.g., how to diminish their responsibilities.
Knight's response here was that he had stood up to a governor and
HSA secretary when cuts in the division's benefit package were proposed
and that should he be charged with diminishing the responsibilities of
a particular agency, he could well go "the other way". Again there
appears to be no doubt to this part of his response. However, I would
doubt his ability to attract or maintain a competent staff of integrity
in such a "cutting" operation. Since much of Knight's style was
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ultimately translated through his staff, his ability (or indeed
anyone's with a similar teaching style) to gain credibility in
depth within such a diminished organization would be lessened.
3) The personnel the division utilized were all college
educated, many with advanced degrees. Most were generalists and
found pleasure in dealing with areas they were unfamiliar with.
Indeed for many it was their first position of any responsibility.
This combination of circumstances, in some cases deliberately created
by Knight, produced an ideal situation not only for commitment to routine
tasks, but also for receptiveness to new situations and to Knight's
teaching style. Suppose, however, that an organization contained per-
sonnel, a majority of whom had been on the job a long time, who were
not as well educated or who had specialized in their careers.
Such a typical organization might be the welfare department
as a whole or perhaps any number of municipal bureaucracies. Knight's
style would likely find much more difficulty in such situations, although
if he could "buffer" himself from such a personnel system with staff
that approximated those of the division, this would likely prove to be
a way of at least assuring that there was one "layer" of learning some-
where in the organization. Knight responded here that "you've posed a
situation that no one has yet learned how to deal with." In a sense
this is true. The crisis and guerilla models have been the only "effec-
tive" models seriously shown to have any impact in such situations.
Again it can only be stated that the division's model is thus no panacea
and might reach its natural limits in such a situation.
4) The technology of the division (health care delivery) was
relatively simple to master - witness Knight's success in teaching it
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to his staff and the cynical comments of the one staffer with a
Masters in Public Health degree that his formal education had not been
of great utility. Similarly, that technology was not totally new nor
was the technology, as a whole, threatening to the environment.
Consider a situation where the technology of an agency was very complex
(such as the regulation of nuclear power) or involved the injection
of a brand new and threatening technology (such as air pollution control)
into the environment. The former situation would require the greater
use of specialists and professionals, much more likely to take positions
independent from Knight and much more likely to seek support for their
positions both inside and outside the agency. The second situation
would likely produce a much greater level of political conflict between
the agency and those with vested interests in the old technology.
But these situations (internal independence and external political
conflict) are ones for which the division's model does not take
adequate account. That is, the strength of the division's style -
an extraordinarily sensitive and personal teaching style - may also
be seen as a weakness in situations of such sharp conflict.
5) Another situation in whicb such sharp conflict might arise
would be if there were organizational units under a teacher like Knight,
which whether through tradition or law, were able to maintain indepdn-
dent power bases. For example, if there were other appointed civil service
levels below Knight or if resources for specific programs (i.e. staff,
funding, etc.) were either strongly controlled by the legislature or
a federal agency or simply seen as the "property" or an outside constituency.
Examples might be the Rate Setting Commission where many of the civil
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service staff were seen as being "owned" by the nursing home industry
or by Blue Cross, an educational institution with a legitimate and
decentralized decision-making system, or a branch of a state highway
agency whose strength lay in its ability to bring federal dollars
into the state irregardless of what an appointed commissioner might
desire. All these situations would produce conditions in which such
units would be unreceptive to Knight's teaching style and which he
would avoid, given his wariness of areas he could not hold accountable.
Thus the effectiveness of the model would be lessened although in
Knight's personal case he would likely not even create such a problematic
situation by accepting a long term appointment to a position with too
many independent power bases within the organization.
6) A final condition which might be relaxed in testing the
transferrability of the division's model would be the emphasis on policy
making as opposed to production of goods or delivery of services.
Suppose the organization in question was one which required that the
top executive concentrate mainly on the production of routine, detailed
goods or services, say a manufacturing plant, or funds collection for
a charitable organization. Knight himself did not appear to be terribly
interested in the day-to-day details of such operation; he preferred
to be building an organization. While this is a personal quality of
Knight, it is probably necessary that a model like the division's be
directed by a "builder" and not a "detail man". Thus there is some
doubt as to whether that model could be useful in such a production
situation. Much would depend on Knight's ability to maintain linkages
with, and retain people, who were proficient in this detailed style of
work. In one sense the division's model would find easier application
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in such a situation since philosophical agreement could be as easily
achieved while the possibilities of both conflict and the nagging ego
problem would likely be diminished. In some situations, however,
this concern with production organizations might be a "straw man"
in that such organizations may not even need to be learning organiza-
tions - but this will be discussed in the next section.
Thus it seems likely that, given a wide variety of other organiza-
tional situations different than those found in the medical division,
the applicability of its model to these situations would be problematic.
This conclusion that the success of the model in other situations is
not assured is, of course, speculative and I do not wish to cloud the
obvious strength of the division's approach, only to alert those who
might attempt its wide scale transfer to the problems they might face
in such a transfer.
We have now asked whether the division's learning model could
maintain itself over time and whether it could be transferred to
other settings. A concluding question centers around whether the
division's model allows for its self-transformation.
4. Conclusion
I suggested (in Chapters III through V) that criteria for a
learning organization included the development of new policies, their
routinization, the development of general principles and then the
development of a program for action, a program for learning. I then
showed (in Chapter VI) that the medical division had met those criteria
and that it had done so using a particular approach.
Might we then not suggest that that approach, since it was clearly
successful in creating a learning organization at levels up to my
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fourth level (the program for action), be advanced as a criteria for
a successful learning organization. The case study method used here
probably prohibits against such an assertion. All that can be said
is that the model developed is one effective way of creating a
learning organization. There are some elements of that style which
appear to be very powerful - particularly its teaching element and the
use of the paradigm - but here we are a prisoner of the methodology.
If we believe (and the methodology does not disprove it) that
there are possibly other methods of creating learning organizations,
then we might well ask the question, could the division's model
transform itself into one of those other models, i.e., could the
division change what I have called its overall approach consisting of the
teaching and management styles and the use of a paradigm. One might
first suggest that ability to transform that style would be a criterion
of a successful learning organization, particularly since at this stage,
knowledge of what constitutes a "good" learning organization is very
unclear and an approach successful in one situation may not be in
another, as I have suggested in the previous section. Thus, one
could evaluate the division's learning using his criterion. Could
it, for example, shift from a teaching style to one based on a techno-
cratic, comprehensive/rational model as suggested by, say, Beers or
Churchman? Could it change its style to one involving an "organiza-
tional development"mode, or could it become much more political?
Or could it transform its style into something as yet not well des-
cribed, some newer model still to be invented?
One way to explore the utility of this criterion for the division
would be to examine the behavior of the division's staff members in
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situations not involving Knight. However, we saw that there were
very few of those situations in the period we examined and we could
not, for practical reasons, follow the careers of staff members as
they moved through other organizations. One could also imagine other
methods for exploring whether the criterion of self-transformation of
style is a useful and generalizable one (such as an examination of the
organization that had changed its style with the same personnel)
but neither of the above methods could be applied here. Thus for
the purposes of this study, such an exploration must remain unfulfilled.
But a more interesting criterion would involve asking whether
the division could change its own paradigm or mission. On the one
hand this seems to be a more complex and demanding criterion than that
of simply changing the division's approach to learning as discussed
above. For example, could the Corps of Engineers add an ecological
perspective to its primary, existing entrepreneurial/exploitative
paradigm? Could the Department of Transportation adjust its pre-
vailing highway mentality? Yet in the division's case, that question
is actually less demanding than the one based on its changing its style.
That is, I suggest that both the very learning capacity built
into the division and itb explicitness would permit it to change or
adjust its paradigm if necessary. Thus the paradigm, while strongly
held by the division, had strong roots in a learning system of which
it was only a part. While a paradigm was necessary for that system
to succeed, the exact nature of it was not. In organizations which
neither have an explicit paradigm nor a method for living out the
paradigm and for integrating new knowledge inputs with that method,
then the difficulty of changing that paradigm is considerable since
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the paradigm may be the only feature shared by the organization and
a feature to which it clings tenaciously. What I am suggesting is
that the very depth of the division's learning system permits it to
change a paradigm since it is not wedded to that particular paradigm.
The value of the explicitness of parts of that learning system
and of the paradigm (and the conjuncture of the two) may also be seen
here. In organizations where either (or both) the system and the
paradigm are tacit and/or in conflict with each other, it would appear
that energy which might otherwise be devoted to a necessary paradigm
change would be devoted to either identifying itds current "learning"
style and paradigm or reconciling differences between the two. It
seems, then, that the division's model is one which might well be
able to "self-transform", that is, change its very paradigm should
that be necessary.
But I believe that that criterion, along with the earlier criterion
of transformation of the division's learning approach are much too
stringent ones. While I would not wish to preclude others from
applying such criteria, it is the reason I have done so only summarily
here. If we refer back to sections 2 and (primarily) 3 where we dis-
cussed some of the limits of the division's model, it is clear that
most of those limits were not limits in the situations in which the
division found itself, but rather reflected some presumed inability
of the model to deal with all organizational situations. From
this observation I suggest that the application of such a stringent
criterion as ability to self-transform (change its style or paradigm)
in order to confront all possible situations is likely to produce
findings that very few organizations can meet such a test.
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The call for a universal learning model which I referred to in
Chapter I can now be seen as containing three perspectives - the first
of which we have just discussed - namely, that an organization learn
not just at one level (e.g., developing new tasks) but that it learn
at many levels, including changing its very approach or paradigm.
Its two other perspectives are 1) that all organizations be learning
organizations, and 2) that they be so at all times. This calls for
such a universal model for organizations is not surprising. The
meager history of organizational theory has shown that such unreal-
istic solutions are not uncommon (e.g., the "scientific" administra-
tion of Taylor, the hunan relations school). However, later work
in the "contingency" school has suggested that differing organiza-
tional models are appropriate in differing situations. The two most
clear formulations of this approach are by Burns and Stalker and
Lawrence and Lorsch.
Burns and Stalker's distinction between mechanical and organic
organizations is a powerful one but needs to be extended to include
a wider (non-binary) variety of situations. Lawrence and Lorsch
tacitly recognized this when they suggested that the structure and
performance of an organization is related to the degree of uncertainty
in the environment. Even the literature describing the crisis and
guerilla theories of change seem to recognize the need for a spectrum
of organizational models since, for example, neither of those two
theories corresponds to a pure mechanical model, nor to a pure
organic one but rather to a third type, one grounded in a turbulent
environment. Other appropriate prototypes for turbulent environmental
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situations have been described as organizations headed by a charis-
matic leader with highly centralized authority but using few formal
rules and a flat hierarchy - in effect a mixture of the mechanical and
organic organizations (the former utilizing centralized authority,
many rules, and a steep hierarchy with the latter using decentralized
authority, few rules and a flat hierarchy).
What I am suggesting here is not that any one of these models
is "the" appropriate model for organizational change but that a wide
variety of models seems appropriate and that that variety is one
which should be based on a match or "fit" of organizational models
with environmental conditions. Thus the degree to which all organiza-
tions should be "learning organizations" would be seen to be dependent
on the organization's environment. From this assertion, an admittedly
less idealistic and universal search for learning organizations would
be that search for situations in which particular change or learning
styles are evaluated as being well suited (or not) to particular
environmental situations.
Earlier I suggested that the criterion of self-transformation
might be too stringent - is not performance of the organization's
routine tasks and learning at the first four levels I have described
enough. The reason I suggest that that criterion may be too stringent
lies in an examination of the latter two perspectives (pg470 ) of the
call for a universal learning model. That is, our society (the
environment) does not "require" all organizations to change their
tasks, much less to change their approach or paradigm. Even when both
society and the organization agree on the need to change and learn,
their joint need and ability to cope with such learning follows cyclical
patterns over time.
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Firstof all, take those organizations which need not become
learning organizations. Since organizations are mechanisms designed
by men to achieve certain ends, some of those ends must inevitably
be routine, non-changing over a long period(,of time. Many production
organizations such as factories or even some white collar organizations
such as insurance companies perform such tasks. While one might
occasionally here cries questioning the "ultimate" purposes or
consequences of large factories or insurance companies, once the
purpose of that organization is accepted, then the need for it to
carry out those functions efficiently and to do no more than that
seems to be recognized. Society does not ask that insurance companies
become learning organizations. Indeed, to attempt to force a learning
style on such an organization may well be as disruptive of the
organization's routine activities as those situations where change is
required and it is effected only through the crisis or guerilla models.
Secondly, there seems to be an organizational parallel to human
learning, that is, that organizations need periods of reflection
where they absorb the learning they have just completed and come to
internalize it. Since organizations are composed of individuals (who
also appear to need such periods), this is not surprising. In
addition, there may be more systemic reasons for the cyclical ability
of organizations to absorb and manage new knowledge. As Schon has
described, ideas and thus a mandate to use them, come into good currency
in some sort of cyclical fashion. Ideas about any one organization's
task area may only fit into this cycle, i.e., hold society's attention,
once every 5, 10 or 20 years. The public's ability to focus is not
unlimited and given this, it is not surprising that environmental demands
for change come infrequently to a particular organization.
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In addition there is the increasing problem of public accountability.
This is a significant problem since many of the proposed and existing
methods for creating learning organizations rely on being somewhat
shielded from the public view e.g., the guerilla model or even the
more mainstream model in which (as described by Wilson, Rhenman, etc.)
the rate of innovation is controlled by elite or centralized authorities.
Since traditional bureaucracies are conceived as uncontrollable (Downs,
Tulloch, V. Thompson, Nelkins, etc.) and thus unaccountable, graft-
ing on of a somewhat inherently "subversive" learning paradigm
without an attendant accountability paradigm may be viewed as
socially irresponsible.
Even if an organization attempted to force its own ideas of
what was an"idea in good currency"on the public, the ability of the
public, in the form of legislators, the press, academics, etc. to
evaluate and monitor that learning is limited. Not only do these public
bodies have limits of scope, but much of the product of such learning
activities requires considerable periods of time for such outside
bodies to become familiar with and to fully evaluate. Recall that
this was one of the stronger points of the medical division's
model - its balance between accountability and change held by both
Knight and staff. If, in an age of increasing complexity, we believe
in public accountability, then not only the extent, but also the
pace of learning may have to be somewhat less rapid than that called
for by some idealists.
Thus we have seen that it is possible to create a "learning
organization", one which can develop an approach to learning, succeed
in the application of that approach and yet avoid many of the disruptive
effects commonly found in other methods of change, methods which we
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would hesitate to call learning. Thus, the model developed here is an
example of the learning organization sought by those who either wish
to avoid the weaknesses of the crisis or guerilla models or who do
not possess the types of resources that the normative.alternative
models require.
Nonetheless, the division's model does have some inherent costs
or limits, which I have discussed. The significance of its success
was also assessed by examining the possible range of circumstances
in time and place to which it may be applied. We saw that that range
is a restrained one even though the possibilities of its eventual self
transformation appears to be bright. But I have suggested that an
application of excessively stringent criteria (such as ability to
self transform) in assessing what constitutes a true learning organiza-
tion may be both unproductive and unnecessary. From this same perspective,
even the criteria I examined in section 3 (universality in time and place)
may be too stringent. Thus the obvious success of the organization com-
bined with its (speculated) difficulty in meeting such stringent cri-
teria for learning suggest that completely "self-renewing" organizations
are extraordinarily difficult to create and that the search for such
pure and universal models is a vain search since the environment does
not require that all organizations in all circumstances be perpetual
learning organizations.
If the viewpoint that organizations are not simply rudderless units
shaped by their internal social structures or whose behaviors are
fully explained by molecular analogies (such as systems theory) is
accepted, then one need not return to the mechanical views of Taylor
or the organic but paternal views of Barnard to assert that organiza-
tions are at least partly goal-directed bodies. Thus they may more
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profitably be seen as tools in the service of these goals - whether
generated by the environment, by organization members or more fre-
quently by a combination of the two (Perrow). This implies that
they are not always like individuals, who may seek such learning
for its own sake. Thus the normative search for models of organiza-
tional change might more profitably be directed away from its implied
analogy with the "ideal" world of the highly educated individual,
always craving new knowledge, to a more subdued search which would not
yet seek those organizations which might self-transform, i.e., change
their very methods of learning. Rather it would stress how any such
models developed dealt with the organization's "fit" with environmental
conditions. Such organizations would accomplish their routine tasks
and learn only when required to by specific environments and public.
Such a search would, first of all, recognize that an exploration
of how such "requirements", i.e., organizational goals, are formulated
and transmitted need be a necessary area of that search. That explora-
tion has regretfully been minimized in this study. However, such a
study conducted by others might be more politically oriented and would
examine how organizational goals are generated and diseminated by
usually small clusters of individuals inside the organization or from
a specific,limited section of its environment.
Such a search would then be directed towards mid-level, case study
explorations of organizations (such as this study) which examine actual
learning alternatives to the "crisis" or "guerilla" models, but still
alternatives within a goal achievement framework.
The language developed in this study to describe several levels
of.learning might then be applied to assess whether those putative
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learning organizations met those restrained criteria. The levels of
learning described in this text may well be found to have a more general
applicability as criteria for learning since they are intuitively
appealing, are logically consistent and have been useful in describing
an actual learning system. The manner by which the medical division
met those criteria might also serve as useful sources of inquiry or
experimentation by both researchers and practicing managers.
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APPENDIX A
The Ultimate Purpose of the Division's Learning
I have described an organization which learned to successfully
develop new policies and tasks, to routinize them, to develop more
general principles of health care delivery and a program for learning
these principles. It did so with a relatively unique style consisting
of teaching, en emphasis on management ard a strong organizational
paradigm. But the analysis here gave little consideration to the
ultimate effect of all this activity - did clients receive better
health care through the methods developed by the division in its.
response to situations of new knowledge. The underlined phrase is
significant since I have made no attempt to assess the Medicaid program
in general, only to discuss how it managed new knowledge. Nonetheless,
the ultimate effect of those new policies on providers and clients
outside the division should and can be explored. I do not intend to
make a comprehensive assessment of the division's effect on the health
care system and on the health of its clients. That would necessarily
be the subject of another complete and lengthy report. Thus, while
such an exploration is not a major thrust of this work, the researcher
feels a responsibility to respond to the reader who legitimately asks
to what end was all this learning devoted.
Some of that exploration did already take place. The evaluation
of the division's own members as to its ultimate effect has been dis-
cussed in several places, including the references to the nagging ego
problem. In addition, in each of the individual cases I have described
how particular providers, agencies or clients dealt with the division
and their general attitude of cooperation or acquiescence in the situation.
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Those descriptions alone indicated that those most specifically involved
viewed the division's actions as making adequate progress toward the
goal of improved health care. A third evaluative source might be
more generalized members of the division's environment, ones who might
be expected to make a more dispassionate and macro-level assessments
of its performance.
As indicated in Chapter VI, section 5, it was difficult to find
well informed members of the health or welfare communities. Those that
were identified did not place particular stress on the specifics of
each of the cases of new knowledge described. Indeed, most of them
were not even aware of what had transpired. Instead they offered
evaluations of the division's general processes or spoke to the perfor-
mance of the division in its routine activity. None were concerned
with "learning" by the division. They first of all placed stress on
the increased credibility the division had acquired. This has been
described in Chapter VI and its role in giving breathing space
suggested. However, they were concerned in general terms with some
new services, with monitoring activities of the division and with
some aspects of the division's internal administration, all areas which
I have described in the specific cases.
First, the new services. The outside observers, if they had any
comment on new services development, dealt with issues such as - is
the state out of compliance with federal regulations, or will the new
service bring more federal dollars into the state. These issues par-
ticularly concerned the legislature. Few were concerned about the
ultimate effect of the new services on clients' health or indeed even
knew about the services. Even the citizen's advocacy group in the EPSDT
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case seemed to base its criticisms more on the fact that the state
was not following federal guidelines, despite the fact that some ten
or so of the other richer industrialized states were also involved
in battles over the appropriateness of the guidelines.
The division's monitoring activity, or "gaining control of the
program" (of which sanctions was one method)was a highly political
arena. As suggested in Chapter II, most providers simply wished
the division would not interfere with its work. Federal officials
felt that "he has achieved, to a degree, a better climate of control
over the general administration of the program." Others felt that
credibility was the key - "people won't play ball with you unless
you monitor well...There's some indication he's doing that well...
with the drug and dental contracts..and with sanctions; although the
hospital sanction case was a proprietary hospital so everyone could
say 'we're not like that."' These vague and general comments indicated
that any real and precise effects of the division's monitoring could
not be felt until phase II of the computer control system (see loss of
controls case) came into operation and more sanction activity could
be undertaken. Only then would the political impact be felt as pro-
viders began to question the right of the division to muddle in its
affairs.
The internal administration of the division concerned the providers
only as they saw its product, that is, a check in the mail. Their
actual fees were seen as being adequate;therefore they cared primarily
about how their claims were processed, that is, the amount of paperwork
they had to do and when or whether they got paid. The president of
the medical society said that "bills are now paid promptly if they're
filled out properly. There has been great progress in this area."
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The problem of possibly not getting paid at the aid of each fiscal
year came around was a real one for providers, but as one hospital
official said, "most of the sophisticated providers know this is the
legislature's fault and not Medicaid's" (i.e., for not voting enough
funds). But "unsophisticated" providers remained vocal and Knight
never "went public" on this problem - that is, he never developed
a public strategy of wiping that potential blemish from his credibility.
He did, however, respond eagerly to individual inquiries from providers
and, with a new commissioner, began to become more involved with estab-
lishing relationships with the legislature. But much still remained
contingent on the results of phase II since accurate budget requests
were difficult to develop unless a sophisticated information system
was in operation.
Thus, other administrators and providers in the division's environ-
ment either 1) were not aware of what the division was doing in
the realm of new activity or 2) focused in on very specific aspects
of that activity that concerned them, or 3) evaluated the division
on very global grounds, such as increased credibility.
Nor was the client segment a much better place from which to judge
the effect of the division's learning. The technology for evaluating
whether, say, EPSDT was having a real effect on child health was a
primative one, much disputed, and Knight distrusted the academicians
and analysts ("Public Health types") who might conduct such evaluations.
But he had no money to do so himself and there remained the larger
question of whether any financing mechanism could effect the quality
of care or the way it was delivered to welfare clients. In other
states this would be easier to evalute since, for example, a raising
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of fees might be followed by increased utilization or an addition
to the benefit package could almost a priori be considered favorable
for clients. But the program in this state had operated for several
years in a favorable environment of a large number of providers, ade-
quate fees and a comprehensive benefit package. Thus it is difficult
to assess Knight's particular contribution to the situation other than
on process grounds such as credibility, monitoring, etc.
But the clients themselves, might not they feel the effects of
removing shoddy doctors or paying for 442 evaluations for their retarded
children? How would they evaluate the division's progress towards
the four goals of quality services at cost effective prices in an
equal and accessible manner? Many studies have indicated that patients
have considerable difficulty in judging whether they are receiving
quality care. The welfare recipient is, in addition, usually at
a cultural and educational disadvantage. Rather than make this kind
of evaluation directly, Knight.chose to approach it by developing
credibility such that providers would offer at least as good care as
they did to anyone else, primarily middle class citizens. Once having
achieved that credibility he could then begin to impose conditions
(i.e., division regulations) and monitor their implementation. The
question of access to care is also difficult to evaluate. The clients'
prime source of information on the program was the local welfare offices
and these were perceived as being generally unreliable by both the
division and clients. Thus the division's alternative was again to
deal with providers to assure that they would be receptive to seeing
Medicaid clients - since most of these clients knew, at a minimum, that
they were eligible for some type of medical care.
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The criterion of cost was, of course, irrelevant to the client
since he paid no fees at all. Cost was only relevant to the bureau-
cracy and here evaluative material was lacking. The state had, until
1973, not produced the kind of data which could be adequately compared
with other states. When such material was finally produced, it was
barely comparable since the benefit packages and client mix varied
widely from state to state. Even Knight's general strategy of stressing
ambulatory care to reduce institutional costs would take several years
before effects could be seen. As one observer said, "that's not
something you do in one or two years, much less overnight."
All this lack of immediate output criteria for evaluating the
program nonetheless worried the division. As Knight said, "that means
if we could fake the integrity or credibility, we could get away with
a lot - that's really scary, isn't it?" The staff worried too as I
have described in the earlier discussion of the nagging ego problem.
Knight's personal response was.to continually stress the paradigm since
he knew it to be right and to feel confident that, since he had been
a provider, he could place himself in the providers' shoes and evaluate
his own performance from that role. The staff also lowered their level
of uncertainty by believing in the paradigm and by seeking involvement
in policy development, irregardless of the quality of evaluative
material which could be gathered from the vague and/or unconcerned
members of the division's larger environment of clients and the general
public.
The the ultimate effect of the division's actions remain unclear
since any rigorous assessment was either impossible to make or was
simply not conducted by the division or by its environment. What I
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have tried to indicate is that when the medical, welfare or political
environment of the division even bothered to evaluate the ultimate
effects of the "black box" which was the division, it did so using
process, not output, criteria and even then did not apply these
criteria to the learning going on within that black box, but rather
to the division's routine activity. While the lack of output criteria
may be unavoidable in situations like this (Rien and Weiss), the
general, even inappropriate,process criteria applied to the division
are light years away from a more rational evaluation of policy
development such as suggested by say, Dror.
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